

*Afghanistan Index*  
*Tracking Variables of*  
*Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan*

<http://www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex>

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
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**NOTE ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE AFGHANISTAN INDEX:**

Although the footnotes to the Afghanistan Index document our sources in detail, it is worth noting here a few broad points. The majority of our information comes from the U.S. Government, though we must often analyze it and process it further to show trends over the full period since 2001. Some information comes from foreign journalists on the ground and from nongovernmental organizations; a very modest amount to date comes from Afghan sources. Most tables and charts are straightforward representations of data as we obtain it from the above primary sources, with only modest further analysis and processing required. However, a few graphics, such as those on crime and unemployment rates, require more methodological work (and more assumptions) on our part—and are as a result also perhaps somewhat less precise than most of the tables and charts.

**1. SECURITY INDICATORS**

**(FIGURE 1.1) ESTIMATED NUMBER OF AFGHAN CIVILIAN FATALITIES AS A DIRECT RESULT OF FIGHTING BETWEEN PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT ENTITIES (AGE), 2006-2008<sup>1</sup>**




**FIGURES IN DETAIL**

	2006	2007	2008*
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>929</b>	<b>1,633</b>	<b>1,445</b>
<b>Attributed to:</b>			
<b>Pro-Government Forces</b>	<b>230 (25%)</b>	<b>434 (27%)</b>	<b>577 (40%)</b>
<b>AGE</b>	<b>699 (75%)</b>	<b>950 (58%)</b>	<b>800 (55%)</b>
<b>Could not be attributed</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>249 (15%)</b>	<b>68 (5%)</b>

**\*Through August 2008**

**NOTE:** Pro-Government Forces include Afghan Government and all international forces. Figures from 2006 and 2007 are from Human Rights Watch. 2008 figures provided by UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan. UNAMA estimate for 2007 was 1,500 total such civilian fatalities. According to UNAMA, the total of 1,445 civilian fatalities through August 2008 compares with 1,040 through the same period in 2007 (representing an increase of 43%).

**(FIGURE 1.2) U.S. TROOP FATALITIES SINCE OCTOBER 7, 2001<sup>2</sup>**



**Total from October 7, 2001 through January 20, 2009:**

Fatalities (all kinds): **635**

Fatalities in hostile incidents: **417**

Fatalities in non-hostile incidents: **218**

\* The actual figure for non-hostile fatalities is shown only for months in which there were more than 2 such incidents.

Indicates the start of a new calendar year

**(FIGURE 1.3) CAUSE OF DEATH FOR US TROOPS, BY YEAR<sup>3</sup>**

Year	Improvised Explosive Device	Suicide Bombs	Mortars/RPG's/Rockets	Landmine	Helicopter Losses*	Aircraft Losses*	Other Hostile Fire	Non-Hostile Causes*	Total
2001	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (16.7%)	0 (0%)	4 (33.3%)	6 (50.0%)	12
2002	5 (10.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (2.0%)	1 (2.0%)	4 (8.2%)	18 (36.7%)	12 (24.5%)	8 (16.3%)	49
2003	1 (2.1%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	19 (39.6%)	0 (0%)	12 (25.0%)	16 (33.3%)	48
2004	12 (23.1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.9%)	1 (1.9%)	2 (3.8%)	3 (5.8%)	10 (19.2%)	23 (44.2%)	52
2005	18 (18.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (2.0%)	5 (5.1%)	36 (36.4%)	1 (1.0%)	20 (20.2%)	17 (17.2%)	99
2006	27 (27.6%)	3 (3.1%)	1 (1.0%)	1 (1.0%)	21 (21.4%)	0 (0%)	33 (33.7%)	12 (12.2%)	98
2007	33 (28.2%)	1 (0.9%)	9 (7.7%)	1 (0.9%)	13 (11.1%)	0 (0%)	35 (29.9%)	25 (21.4%)	117
2008	84 (54.2%)	4 (2.6%)	7 (4.5%)	2 (1.3%)	2 (1.3%)	0 (0%)	36 (23.2%)	20 (13.3%)	155
2009	5 (45.5%)	1 (9.1%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (9.1%)	0 (0%)	2 (18.2%)	2 (18.2%)	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>185 (28.9%)</b>	<b>9 (1.4%)</b>	<b>21 (3.3%)</b>	<b>11 (1.7%)</b>	<b>100 (15.6%)</b>	<b>22 (3.4%)</b>	<b>164 (25.6%)</b>	<b>129 (20.1%)</b>	<b>641</b>


Through January 20, 2009

\*Helicopter and aircraft losses include deaths caused by both non-hostile accidents and those downed by hostile fire. The "Non-Hostile Causes" data then does not include non-hostile helicopter or aircraft losses.

**(FIGURE 1.4) AMERICAN MILITARY FATALITIES BY CATEGORY OCTOBER 7, 2001 –JANUARY 3, 2009<sup>4</sup>**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Total fatalities as of January 3, 2009: 626</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Male: 612</b> <b>Female: 14</b>
<b>Age</b>	<b>Younger than 22: 120</b> <b>22-24: 119</b> <b>25-30: 171</b> <b>31-35: 93</b> <b>Older than 35: 123</b>
<b>Component</b>	<b>Active: 506</b> <b>Reserve: 31</b> <b>National Guard: 89</b>
<b>Military service</b>	<b>Army: 484</b> <b>Marines: 67</b> <b>Navy: 43</b> <b>Air Force: 32</b>
<b>Officers/Enlisted</b>	<b>Officer: 99</b> <b>E5-E9: 272</b> <b>E1-E4: 255</b>
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>	<b>American Indian or Alaska Native: 9</b> <b>Asian: 8</b> <b>Black or African American: 50</b> <b>Hispanic or Latino: 52</b> <b>Multiple races, pending or unknown: 5</b> <b>Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander: 9</b> <b>White: 493</b>


**(FIGURE 1.5) U.S. TROOPS WOUNDED IN ACTION SINCE OCTOBER 7, 2001<sup>5</sup>**



**Total from October 7, 2001 through January 20, 2009: 2,648**

The daily Department of Defense casualty reports that we use for our monthly estimates on U.S troops wounded does not make it entirely clear when in a 24-hour period casualties were incurred. Since the reports are published at 10AM daily, there is possibility that our numbers for January 2005 and onwards are slightly off due to uncertainties about whether casualties occurred on the first or the last of each month.


**(FIGURE 1.6) BRITISH MILITARY FATALITIES IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE START OF 2006<sup>6</sup>**



**Total through January 20, 2009: 142**

**NOTE ON THIS GRAPH:** From 2002-2005, the British military suffered 5 fatalities that are reflected in the total.


**(FIGURE 1.7) CANADIAN MILITARY FATALITIES IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE START OF 2006<sup>7</sup>**



**Total through January 20, 2009: 107**

**NOTE ON THIS GRAPH:** From 2002-2005, the Canadian military suffered 8 fatalities that are reflected in the total.

**(FIGURE 1.8) NON-U.S. COALITION TROOP FATALITIES BY COUNTRY SINCE OCTOBER 2001<sup>8</sup>**



**Total through January 20, 2009: 420**


**(FIGURE 1.9) ESTIMATED U.S. WAR FUNDING FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM BY AGENCY, FY 2001-FY 2009 BRIDGE FUNDS (\$ BILLIONS)<sup>2</sup>**

	FY 2001 & 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009 BRIDGE	TOTAL
<b>Department of Defense</b>	\$20.0	\$14.0	\$12.4	\$17.2	\$17.9	\$34.9	\$31.4	\$12.5	<b>\$160.1</b>
<b>Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Ops</b>	\$0.8	\$0.7	\$2.2	\$2.8	\$1.1	\$1.9	\$2.4	\$0.6	<b>\$12.4</b>
<b>VA Medical</b>	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.1	\$0.3	\$0.0	<b>\$0.4</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$20.8</b>	<b>\$14.7</b>	<b>\$14.5</b>	<b>\$20.0</b>	<b>\$19.0</b>	<b>\$36.9</b>	<b>\$32.8</b>	<b>\$13.1</b>	<b>\$172.9</b>

AS OF: October 15, 2008



**(FIGURE 1.10) ESTIMATED ORDER OF BATTLE MAP FOR U.S. AND NATO-ISAF TROOPS**



AS OF: JULY 2008

NOTE: Map produced and provided by Christopher Radin of *The Long War Journal* ([www.longwarjournal.org](http://www.longwarjournal.org)) Estimates based on open source data.

**(FIGURE 1.11) AMERICAN TROOPS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN BY MISSION<sup>10</sup>**

Month	Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)	NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)	TOTAL U.S. Troops in Afghanistan
September 2008	19,000	15,000	34,000

**(FIGURE 1.12) TROOPS COMMITTED TO NATO’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCES (ISAF) BY COUNTRY<sup>11</sup>**


	Albania	140		Finland	110		Lithuania	200		Spain	780
	Australia	1090		France	2890		Luxemburg	9		Sweden	290
	Austria	1		Georgia	1		Netherlands	1770		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	140
	Azerbaijan	45		Germany	3405		New Zealand	150		Turkey	800
	Belgium	410		Greece	140		Norway	490		Ukraine	10
	Bulgaria	465		Hungary	240		Poland	1590		United Arab Emirates	0
	Canada	2830		Iceland	8		Portugal	40		United Kingdom	8910
	Croatia	280		Ireland	7		Romania	770		United States	23220
	Czech Republic	415		Italy	2350		Singapore	20			
	Denmark	700		Jordan	0		Slovakia	120			
	Estonia	130		Latvia	70		Slovenia	70			
										<b>Total (rounded)</b>	<b>55100</b>

AS OF: January 12, 2009

1 Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

2 Snapshot figure that includes overlapping rotations.

**(FIGURE 1.13) TOTAL NATO-ISAF MANPOWER BY REGIONAL COMMAND (RC), SINCE OCTOBER 2006<sup>12</sup>**




**NOTE ON THIS GRAPH:** Data points represent months for which an estimate is available. As the figures for a given month provide a snapshot assessment, they should be considered approximations. Figures do not reflect U.S. troops that are part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

**(FIGURE 1.14) SIZE OF AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES ON DUTY<sup>13</sup>**

Month	Ministry of Defense Forces	Ministry of Interior Forces	Total Afghan Security Forces
April 2008	57,800	79,910	137,710
October 2008	68,000	79,910	147,910

**(FIGURE 1.15.A) ANNUAL GROWTH OF AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA), BY NUMBER OF TROOPS, 2003-PRESENT<sup>14</sup>**



NOTE: Figures for 2003-2007 are as of year end. 2008 figure is through March.


**(FIGURE 1.16) ANNUAL RECRUITMENT FIGURES FOR AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA)<sup>15</sup>**

YEAR	RECRUITS
2003-2004	9,671
2004-2005	15,790
2005-2006	11,845
2006-2007	21,287
2007-2008	32,135

NOTE: As of March 2008, Year-to-Date re-enlistment is 50% for soldiers and 56% for non-commissioned officers.

NOTE ON THIS TABLE: Years run from March through the following February of respective periods.

**(FIGURE 1.15) CAPABILITY MILSTONE (CM) ASSESSMENT OF AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) UNITS AND HEADQUARTERS<sup>16</sup>**



AS OF: March 2008

**NOTE ON THIS GRAPH:** Number of units and headquarters based on an end goal of 80,000 personnel, 70,000 of whom are projected to be operational by the end of 2008 with the remainder operational by the end of 2009. CM levels are rated on a scale from 1-4 (definitions below).

**CM 1:** capable of operating independently

**CM 2:** capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support

**CM 3:** partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces

**CM 4:** formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions

**N/A:** Not yet formed or not reporting

**(FIGURE 1.17) DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF AFGHAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES<sup>17</sup>**

	Number Authorized	Number Assigned	Percent Assigned
<b>Ministry of Interior Headquarters</b>	6,015	5,237	87
<b>Uniformed Police</b>	44,319	42,969	97
<b>Border Police</b>	17,970	12,213	68
<b>Auxiliary Police</b>	0	9,318	N/A*
<b>Civil Order Police</b>	5,365	1,523	28
<b>Criminal Investigation Division</b>	4,148	2,815	68
<b>Counter Narcotics Police</b>	3,777	2,265	60
<b>Customs Police</b>	0	623	N/A*
<b>Counter Terrorism Police</b>	406	411	101
<b>Standby/Highway Police</b>	0	2,536	N/A*
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>82,000</b>	<b>79,910</b>	<b>97</b>

AS OF: April 2008

\*The auxiliary police, customs police, standby police and highway police are no longer authorized.

**(FIGURE 1.18) DEFENSE ASSESSMENT OF AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP) CAPABILITIES<sup>18</sup>**

POLICE UNITS (NUMBER OF UNITS)	CM 1	CM 2	CM 3	CM 4	N/A
Uniformed Police Districts (365)	0	6	6	296	57
Border Police Battalions (33)	0	0	0	33	0
Civil Order Police Battalions (20)	0	6	2	2	10
Counter Narcotics Police Units (15)	0	0	10	3	2
<b>TOTAL (%)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>12 (3%)</b>	<b>18 (4%)</b>	<b>334 (77%)</b>	<b>69 (16%)</b>

AS OF: April 2008

CM 1: capable of operating independently

CM 2: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support

CM 3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces

CM 4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions

N/A: Not yet formed or not reporting

**(FIGURE 1.19) RECRUITMENT FIGURES FOR THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP), MARCH 2007-MARCH 2008<sup>19</sup>**

Afghan Border Patrol (ABP)	4,795
Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP)	1,414
Afghan Uniform Police (AUP)	11,265
<b>ALL ANP RECRUITS</b>	<b>17,474</b>

NOTE: The AUP serve at the regional, provincial and district levels and carry out local day-to-day policing activities. The ABP provide law enforcement at borders and entry points. The ANCOP is a highly skilled, specialized police force that is split into urban and rural units and conducts operations in areas where government control may be weak or where added support is needed for counterinsurgency operations.

**(FIGURE 1.20) NUMBER OF U.S. AND NATO TEAMS/PERSONNEL REQUIRED AND ASSIGNED TO TRAIN AND MENTOR AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (ANSF)<sup>20</sup>**

**U.S. Embedded Training Team (ETT) Personnel for Afghan National Army (ANA)**

Number Required	2,391
Number Assigned	1,062
Fill Rate	44%

**U.S. Police Mentor Team (PMT) Personnel for Afghan National Police (ANP)**

Number Required	2,358
Number Assigned	921
Fill Rate	39%

NOTE: Each PMT is comprised of approximately 16 U.S. personnel.<sup>21</sup> 1,200 of the 3,400 U.S. Marines deployed to southern Afghanistan during the spring of 2008 are assigned to conduct ANP training missions, but only for approximately 7 months, thus they are not included in the "Number Assigned" column.

**NATO Operating Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT's) for Afghan National Army (ANA)**

Teams Committed	71
Teams Assigned	31
Fill Rate	44%

NOTE: NATO OMLT teams number between 12-19 personnel each, depending on the size of the unit with which they are embedded.

**Nations that have Contributed Full ETT's/OMLT's<sup>22</sup>**

Canada	Germany	Poland	United States
Croatia	Italy	Spain	
France	Netherlands	United Kingdom	

AS OF: September 2007

**Nations that have Contributed Personnel for Multinational ETT's/OMLT's**

Canada	France	Norway	United Kingdom
Croatia	Germany	Slovenia	
Czech Republic	Netherlands	Sweden	

AS OF: September 2007

**(FIGURE 1.21) NUMBER AND NATIONALITY OF PERSONNEL DEVOTED TO THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICE (EUPOL) MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN<sup>23</sup>**

**POLICE STRENGTH**

<b>EU CONTRIBUTORS</b>			
<b>Czech Republic (2)</b>	<b>France (1)</b>	<b>Lithuania (2)</b>	<b>Spain (9)</b>
<b>Denmark (12)</b>	<b>Germany (31)</b>	<b>Netherlands (3)</b>	<b>Sweden (4)</b>
<b>Estonia (1)</b>	<b>Hungary (3)</b>	<b>Poland (3)</b>	<b>United Kingdom (14)</b>
<b>Finland (3)</b>	<b>Italy (12)</b>	<b>Romania (5)</b>	
<b>TOTAL EU CONTRIBUTION: 105</b>			


<b>NON-EU CONTRIBUTORS</b>			
<b>Canada (8)</b>	<b>Croatia (2)</b>	<b>Norway (6)</b>	
<b>TOTAL NON-EU CONTRIBUTION: 16</b>			

**TOTALS**

<b>TOTAL POLICE CONTRIBUTION</b>	<b>121</b>
<b>OTHER INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN EXPERTS</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>LOCAL STAFF</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>TOTAL STAFFING FOR EUPOL MISSION</b>	<b>269</b>

AS OF: DECEMBER 16, 2008

**(FIGURE 1.22) U.S. DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND STATE SUPPORT TO TRAIN AND EQUIP THE AFGHAN ARMY AND POLICE, FISCAL YEARS 2002-2008 (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)<sup>24</sup>**




NOTE: FY 2008 figures reflect requested funds. Annual totals rounded to the nearest million..

TOTAL AID (FY 2002-2008 request): ANA \$10,273,000,000; ANP: \$6,199,000,000

\*Fiscal year 2008 includes approximately \$1,450 million that has been **appropriated** (approximately \$1,108 million for the ANA and \$342 million for the ANP) and approximately \$1,378 million that has been **requested** (approximately \$614 million for the ANA and approximately \$764 million for the ANP).

**(FIGURE 1.23) COMPARISON OF INSURGENT ATTACKS CARRIED OUT BY TALIBAN/ANTI-GOVERNMENT ENTITIES (TB/AGE), WEEKS 1-39 (JANUARY THRU LATE SEPTEMBER), 2007 AND 2008<sup>25</sup>**



**(FIGURE 1.24) COMPARISON OF INCIDENTS CARRIED OUT BY TALIBAN/ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS (TB/AGE) BY PROVINCE, WEEKS 1-39 (JANUARY THRU LATE SEPTEMBER), 2007 AND 2008<sup>26</sup>**

REGIONAL COMMAND/ PROVINCE	2007	2008	% CHANGE
<b>RC CAPITAL</b>			
KABUL	106	157	48%
<b>RC EAST</b>			
PARWAN	22	51	132%
WARDAK	164	241	47%
PANJSHER	0	1	N/A
LOGAR	128	170	33%
KAPISA	47	123	162%
KHOST	321	446	39%
PAKTYA	223	305	37%
GHAZNI	170	398	134%
PAKTIKA	180	229	27%
NANGARHAR	244	292	20%
LAGHMAN	93	162	74%
NURISTAN	57	66	16%
KUNAR	534	536	0%
BAMYAN	3	8	167%
<b>RC EAST TOTAL</b>	<b>2,186</b>	<b>3,028</b>	<b>39%</b>
<b>RC SOUTH</b>			
KANDAHAR	534	820	54%
HELMAND	170	490	188%
NIMROZ	33	79	139%
URUZGAN	49	130	165%
ZABUL	209	251	20%
DAI KUNDI	15	15	0%
<b>RC SOUTH TOTAL</b>	<b>1,010</b>	<b>1,785</b>	<b>77%</b>
<b>RC WEST</b>			
BADGHIS	46	121	163%
HERAT	83	100	20%
GHOR	22	36	64%
FARAH	103	136	32%
<b>RC WEST TOTAL</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>393</b>	<b>55%</b>
<b>RC NORTH</b>			
FARYAB	37	49	32%
JAWZJAN	10	21	110%
SARI PUL	15	2	-87%
BALKH	44	41	-7%
SAMANGAN	9	4	-56%
KUNDUZ	32	125	291%
BAGHLAN	55	80	45%
TAKHAR	22	23	5%
BADAKSHAN	30	50	67%
<b>RC NORTH TOTAL</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>395</b>	<b>56%</b>
<b>TOTAL, ALL REGIONS</b>	<b>3,704</b>	<b>5,601</b>	<b>51%</b>



**(FIGURE 1.25) U.S. PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) AUTHORIZED/ON HAND STAFFING BY LOCATION<sup>27</sup>**

PRT	PROVINCE	DATE CREATED	MILITARY		CIVILIAN						
			Authorized	On Hand	Department of State		USAID		U.S. Department of Agriculture		
					Authorized	On Hand	Authorized	On Hand	Authorized	On Hand	
<b>RC EAST</b>											
Asadabad	Konar	February 2004	89	89	1	1	1	1	1	0	
Bagram	Parwan/Kapisa	November 2003	63	63	0	0	2	1	0	0	
Gardez	Paktia	February 2003	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Ghazni	Ghazni	March 2004	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Jalalabad	Nangrahar	January 2004	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	0	
Khowst	Khowst	March 2004	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	0	
Mehtar Lam	Laghman	April 2005	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Kalagush	Nuristan	November 2006	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	0	
Panjshir	Panjshir	November 2005	55	55	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Sharana	Paktika	October 2004	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	0	
<b>RC SOUTH</b>											
Qalat	Zabul	April 2004	99	99	1	1	1	1	1	0	
<b>RC WEST</b>											
Farah	Farah	September 2004	99	99	1	1	1	1	1	0	
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>1,021</b>	<b>1,021</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>4</b>	

**NOTE ON THIS TABLE:** The United States operates 12 out of the 26 PRT's in Afghanistan. All American PRT's are under military command and led by a military officer.

**(FIGURE 1.26) COUNTRY LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF NON-U.S. PRT'S<sup>28</sup>**


PRT	LEAD NATION	DATE OF COMMAND	DATE CREATED AND PREVIOUS COMMAND NATION (IF DIFFERENT)
<b>RC NORTH</b>			
Konduz	Germany	November 2003	March 2003 (USA)
Mazar-e-Sharif	Sweden	March 2006	February 2003 (United Kingdom)
Feyzabad	Germany	July 2004	
Pol-e-Khomri	Hungary	October 2006	October 2004 (Netherlands)
Meymaneh	Norway	September 2005	July 2004 (United Kingdom)
<b>RC WEST</b>			
Herat	Italy	June 2005	December 2003 (USA)
Qala-e-Naw	Spain	August 2005	
Chaghcharan	Lithuania	August 2005	
<b>RC SOUTH</b>			
Kandahar	Canada	August 2005	December 2003 (USA)
Lashkar-Gah	United Kingdom	May 2006	September 2004 (USA)
Tarin Kowt	Netherlands	August 2006	September 2004 (USA)
<b>RC EAST</b>			
Bamyan	New Zealand	August 2003	
Wardak	Turkey	November 2006	
Logar	Czech Republic	March 2008	

**(FIGURE 1.27) ESTIMATED NUMBER OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN THE REGION BY LOCATION<sup>29</sup>**

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF REFUGEES
Pakistan	2,000,000
Iran	910,000
Other	90,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,000,000</b>

As of: March 2008

**(FIGURE 1.28) AFGHAN REFUGEES VOLUNTARILY REPATRIATED BY COUNTRY, 2002-2007<sup>30</sup>**



\*Through September 2008

**(FIGURE 1.29) ESTIMATE NUMBER OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDP'S)<sup>31</sup>**

<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>150,000</b>
<b>Southern Provinces</b>	<b>110,000</b>

As of: May 2008

## 2. GOVERNANCE & RULE OF LAW INDICATORS

**(FIGURE 2.1) AFGHANISTAN POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION<sup>32</sup>**

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE
<b>POPULATION (millions)</b>	<b>32.7</b>	<b>16.8 (51%)</b>	<b>15.9 (49%)</b>
<b>ETHNICITY</b>			
Pashtun	13.7 (42%)		
Tajik	8.8 (27%)		
Hazara	2.9 (9%)		
Uzbek	2.9 (9%)		
Aimak	1.3 (4%)		
Turkmen	1.0 (3%)		
Baloch	0.7 (2%)		
Other	1.3 (4%)		

**(FIGURE 2.2) SIZE, GENDER, AND ETHNIC MAKEUP OF AFGHANISTAN'S MAIN LEGISLATIVE BODIES<sup>33</sup>**

### **Wolesi Jirga (House of the People)**

	TOTAL SEATS	MEN	WOMEN
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>249</b>	<b>184 (74%)</b>	<b>65 (26%)</b>
<b>ETHNICITY</b>			
Pashtun	118 (47%)		
Tajik	53 (21%)		
Hazara	30 (12%)		
Uzbek/Turkmen	25 (10%)		
Non-Hazara Shi'a	11 (4%)		
Arab	5 (2%)		
Ismaili	3 (1%)		
Pashai	2 (<1%)		
Baluchi	1 (<1%)		
Nuristani	1 (<1%)		

**NOTE:** The **Wolesi Jirga** consists of directly elected provincial representatives. The number of representatives each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces receives is calculated according to population. The Wolesi Jirga constitutes the first step in passing legislation, with all bills passing with two-thirds majority being forwarded to the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders) and then the President. The Wolesi Jirga also has final say on the appointment of government ministers and other high-ranking officials.

### **Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders)**

	TOTAL SEATS	MEN	WOMEN
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>76 (75%)</b>	<b>26 (25%)</b>
<b>ETHNICITY</b>			
Pashtun	36 (35%)		
Tajik	32 (31%)		
Hazara	16 (16%)		
Uzbek/Turkmen	8 (8%)		
Baluchi	3 (3%)		
Nuristani	3 (3%)		
Others	4 (3%)		


**NOTE:** Two-thirds of the **Meshrano Jirga** is indirectly elected by the Provincial and District Councils while the remaining third is appointed directly by the President.

### **Provincial Councils (34 total, one for each Province)**

	TOTAL SEATS	MEN	WOMEN
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>420</b>	<b>296 (70%)</b>	<b>124 (30%)</b>


**NOTE:** Provincial Councils consist of between 9 and 29 directly elected representatives, based on the population of the Province.

**(FIGURE 2.3) WHERE AFGHANS CHOOSE TO TAKE DIFFERENT TYPES OF LEGAL CASES<sup>34</sup>**



**NOTE:** Results based on survey of approximately 6,200 Afghans polled in February 2007. Answers refer to a hypothetical situation and not actual events.

**(FIGURE 2.4) HIGHEST LEVEL DEGREE ACQUIRED BY JUDGES RESPONDING TO A RANDOM SURVEY<sup>35</sup>**




**NOTE:** Results based on a May 2006 random survey of 157 judges, of whom 17 work with the Supreme Court, 48 on Provincial Appeals Courts and 92 on Urban or District Primary Courts. “Shariat” refers to a degree received from an Islamic Law faculty. “Madrassas” are schools below the university level whose curriculum focuses mostly on traditional Islamic scholarship.

**(FIGURE 2.5) ACCESS TO LEGAL RESOURCES FOR JUDGES RESPONDING TO A RANDOM SURVEY<sup>36</sup>**


ACCESS	YES	NO
Statutes or other governmental regulations	63.7%	36.3%
Textbooks on the law	45.2%	54.8%
Written decisions of the Supreme Court	17.2%	82.8%
Professional support from an experienced mentor	19.1%	80.9%

**NOTE:** Results based on a May 2006 random survey of 157 judges, of whom 17 work with the Supreme Court, 48 on Provincial Appeals Courts and 92 on Urban or District Primary Courts.


**(FIGURE 2.6) ANNUAL POPPY CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN (HECTARES) AND PERCENTAGE OF GLOBAL CULTIVATION, 1990-2008<sup>37</sup>**




**(FIGURE 2.7) ANNUAL OPIUM PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN (METRIC TONS) AND PERCENTAGE OF GLOBAL PRODUCTION, 1990-2008<sup>38</sup>**




**(FIGURE 2.8) OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN (WITH TOP-PRODUCING PROVINCES), 2004-2008 (HECTARES)**<sup>39</sup>



**(FIGURE 2.9) SNAPSHOT COMPARISON OF AFGHANISTAN'S TOP OPIUM-PRODUCING PROVINCES, BASED ON AMOUNT OF LAND DEVOTED TO CULTIVATION, 2004 & 2008**



**(FIGURE 2.10) MONTHLY FARM-GATE PRICE FOR DRY OPIUM SINCE SEPTEMBER 2004 (US\$/KG)<sup>40</sup>**



**THROUGH AUGUST 2008**

**(FIGURE 2.11) AFGHANISTAN’S RANK IN REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS’ INDEX OF PRESS FREEDOM, 2002-2007<sup>41</sup>**

YEAR	SCORE	RANK	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES SURVEYED
2008	59.3	156	173
2007	56.5	142	169
2006	44.3	130	168
2005	39.2	125	167
2004	28.3	97	167
2003	40.2	134	166
2002	35.5	104	139

**NOTE ON INDEX OF PRESS FREEDOM TABLE:** The Index is based on a questionnaire with 50 criteria for assessing the state of press freedom in each country. It includes every kind of violation directly affecting journalists (such as murders, imprisonment, physical attacks and threats) and news media (censorship, confiscation issues, searches and harassment). In addition to taking into account abuses attributable to the state, those carried out by armed militias, clandestine organizations or pressure groups are also considered.

The lower the score attained, the higher the degree of press freedom in that respective country. Although there is no specific information given regarding how the overall score was compiled, the top-rated countries for 2007 received an overall score of 0.75, with the median receiving a score of 25.3. The overall average score for the 2007 Index was 31.5.

**(FIGURE 2.12) AFGHANISTAN'S RANK IN TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL'S ANNUAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (CPI)<sup>42</sup>**

YEAR	RANK	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES SURVEYED
2007	172 (T)	180
2006	NO DATA	163
2005	117 (T)	159

(T): Indicates years Afghanistan's score tied with one or more other country.

**NOTE ON THIS CHART:** The CPI is a composite index that draws on 14 expert opinion surveys. It scores countries on a scale from zero to ten, with zero indicating high levels of perceived corruption and ten indicating low levels of perceived corruption. Due to a lack of reliable data, Afghanistan was not included in the CPI survey for the years 2006.

**(FIGURE 2.13) AFGHANISTAN'S RANK IN THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION'S INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, 2008<sup>43</sup>**


RANK	COUNTRY	OVERALL SCORE
1	Somalia	0.52
2	<b>Afghanistan</b>	<b>1.65</b>
3	Democratic Republic of Congo	1.67
4	Iraq	3.11
5	Burundi	3.21

**NOTE:** 141 nations were surveyed. Each nation was allocated a score of 0-10 points for each of 4 broad categories (Economic, Political, Security, and Social Welfare). Overall scores were calculated by taking the average of the 4 scores. The median score (Benin, #71) received a score of 6.36 while the highest score (Slovak Republic, #141) received a score of 9.41.



### 3. ECONOMIC & QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS

**(FIGURE 3.1) ANNUAL INFLATION<sup>44</sup>**




**(FIGURE 3.2) REAL GDP (TOTAL, PER CAPITA AND GROWTH), 2003-2008<sup>45</sup>**

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007*	2008^
<b>TOTAL (\$US billions)</b>	4.4	5.4	6.5	7.0	8.8	11.2
<b>PER CAPITA (\$US)</b>	186	218	252	264	323	399
<b>GROWTH (% change YOY)</b>	15.1%	9.4%	16.4%	6.1%	13.9%	8.6%

\*Data based partly on estimates.


^IMF forecast

**(FIGURE 3.3) GDP GROWTH AND SECTOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROWTH, 2003-2007<sup>46</sup>**



NOTE: Data for 2007 are estimated.

**(FIGURE 3.4) BREAKDOWN OF AFGHAN ANNUAL BUDGET (CORE VS. EXTERNAL), FY 2005/2006 THRU FY 2007/2008<sup>47</sup>**



NOTE: The Afghan government has direct control of the Core Budget, while having only limited or no control over the External Budget.


**(FIGURE 3.5) COMPARISON OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY SOURCES AND CAPACITY: 1979, 2002 AND 2007<sup>48</sup>**

YEAR	HYDRO (MW)	THERMAL (MW)	IMPORTED (MW)	OTHER* (MW)	TOTAL SUPPLY (MW)
1979	259	137	0	0	396
2002	16	16	87	0	243
2007	90	90	167	133	652

\*Includes diesel, micro-hydro and renewable

NOTE: As of 2007, it is estimated that only 20% of the population (13% in rural areas) have access to public power on certain days for a limited number of hours.

**(FIGURE 3.6) ESTIMATED NUMBER OF TELEPHONE USERS IN AFGHANISTAN BY YEAR, 2002-2007<sup>49</sup>**



**(FIGURE 3.7) ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF AFGHANS WITH ACCESS TO WATER/SANITATION FACILITIES<sup>50</sup>**

Access to safe drinking water	23%
Access to adequate sanitation	12%

As of June 2008

**(FIGURE 3.8) HEALTHCARE METRICS**

**% PEOPLE LIVING IN DISTRICTS WHERE BASIC PACKAGE OF HEALTH CARE PROGRAM (BPHC) IS BEING IMPLEMENTED<sup>51</sup>**

<b>2003</b>	<b>9%</b>
<b>2005</b>	<b>77%</b>
<b>2006</b>	<b>82%</b>

**NOTE:** The BPHC is a program started in 2002 by the Ministry of Public Health to provide essential basic healthcare throughout Afghanistan's districts.

**LIFE EXPECTANCY<sup>52</sup>**

	<b>2004</b>	<b>2006</b>
<b>Men</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Women</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>43</b>

**INFANT AND CHILDREN UNDER-FIVE MORTALITY RATES (PER 1,000 LIVE BIRTHS)<sup>53</sup>**

	<b>2003</b>	<b>2006</b>
<b>Infant</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>129</b>
<b>Children Under Five</b>	<b>257</b>	<b>191</b>

**% OF AFGHAN CHILDREN RECEIVING VARIOUS VACCINATIONS<sup>54</sup>**

	<b>2003</b>	<b>2006</b>
<b>BCG Vaccine</b>	<b>57%</b>	<b>70%</b>
<b>Polio Vaccine</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>70%</b>

**NOTE:** The BCG is a vaccination to prevent tuberculosis.

**(FIGURE 3.9) EDUCATION METRICS<sup>55</sup>**

**LITERACY (2007 Estimate)**

<b>OVERALL</b>	<b>28%</b>
<b>Male</b>	<b>36%</b>
<b>Female</b>	<b>18%</b>

**PRIMARY/SECONDARY EDUCATION (2007 Statistics)**

<b>TOTAL ENROLLMENT (millions)</b>	<b>6+ million</b>
<b>Girls</b>	<b>2 million</b>
<b>NUMBER OF SCHOOLS</b>	<b>9,062</b>
<b>All Girls</b>	<b>1,337</b>
<b>Co-ed</b>	<b>4,325</b>
<b>NUMBER OF TEACHERS</b>	<b>142,500</b>
<b>Women</b>	<b>40,000</b>
<b>Schools Burned Down</b>	<b>117</b>
<b>Schools closed due to severe threats</b>	<b>207</b>
<b>Students and Teachers killed by violence</b>	<b>157</b>

**NOTE:** It is estimated that in 2001 less than 1 million students were enrolled in primary/secondary education, virtually none of them girls.

**(FIGURE 3.10) POVERTY LEVELS, 2007<sup>56</sup>**

<b>% Population Living Below the Poverty Line*</b>	<b>% Population Living Slightly Above the Poverty Line</b>	<b>% Population Experiencing Food Poverty<sup>^</sup></b>
<b>42%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>45%</b>

\*Defined as living on a monthly income of US \$14/month or less

<sup>^</sup>Those unable to purchase sufficient food to guarantee world standard minimum food intake of 2,100 calories/day

**(FIGURE 3.11) FOREIGN AID PLEDGED, COMMITTED AND DISBURSED, 2002-2011 (\$ MILLIONS)<sup>57</sup>**

DONOR	AID DISBURSED 2002-2008	AID COMMITTED BUT NOT DISBURSED 2002-2008	AID PLEDGED 2002-2011 (NOT COMMITTED/DISBURSED)
US/USAID	5,022.9	5,377.0	12,389.1
Japan/JICA	1,393.5	16.9	0
United Kingdom	1,266.3	188.9	0
European Commission	1,074.1	646.7	19.2
World Bank	852.7	750.7	1,023.8
Germany	767.8	458.2	0
Canada	730.7	48.1	338.9
Asian Development Bank	547.8	1,009.7	183.1
Italy	424.4	0	0
Netherlands	407.1	85.5	0
Norway	277.0	122.3	0
Sweden	217.3	41.2	11.3
Iran	213.9	13.9	126.2
ECHO*	207.7	2.2	58.3
India	204.3	650.9	86.9
Australia	194.8	0	27.6
UN Agencies	171.0	0	0
Denmark	152.8	59.9	63.0
Russian Federation	139.0	0	0
Aga Khan	119.3	0	0
France	79.9	29.5	0
Saudi Arabia	76.9	30.0	113.1
Finland	46.1	29.9	14.0
Switzerland	51.6	44.0	0
China	41.0	20.4	84.2
Spain	25.6	37.2	190.5
Turkey	20.8	22.8	46.4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>14,726.3</b>	<b>9,685.9</b>	<b>14,775.6</b>

AS OF: February 2008

\*ECHO: European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office

NOTE: PLEDGED aid is promised but yet to be devoted for a specific purpose, COMMITTED aid has been earmarked for a specific purpose but not yet changed hands and DISBURSED aid has been earmarked and delivered.

**(FIGURE 3.12) ANNUAL VALUE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, WITH TOP TRADE PARTNERS, 2002-2006 (\$ MILLIONS)<sup>58</sup>**

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Exports, total</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>274</b>
Pakistan	28	28	45	48	57
India	17	32	39	51	59
United States	4	57	23	62	42
<b>Imports, total</b>	<b>1,034</b>	<b>1,608</b>	<b>1,971</b>	<b>3,002</b>	<b>3,633</b>
Pakistan	245	449	511	1,172	1,375
United States	88	67	173	288	459
Germany	57	103	130	167	275
India	57	137	170	158	186
Republic of Korea	141	137	85	66	77
Turkmenistan	31	81	107	122	143
Japan	92	114	73	84	74

**(FIGURE 3.13) MICROFINANCE CLIENTS, BORROWERS AND LOAN AMOUNTS<sup>59</sup>**

	Active Clients	Active Borrowers	Number of Loans Disbursed	Amount of Loans Disbursed (\$ millions)	Loans Outstanding (\$ millions)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>443,740</b>	<b>375,114</b>	<b>1,155,562</b>	<b>\$453.3</b>	<b>\$111.3</b>
URBAN	308,882	262,042	801,472	\$327.1	\$81.2
RURAL	134,858	113,072	354,090	\$126.2	\$30.2

AS OF: May 2008

## 4. PAKISTAN

**(FIGURE 4.1) COMPARISON OF VARIOUS METRICS FROM PAKISTAN'S FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA) VS. THE REST OF PAKISTAN<sup>60</sup>**

	FATA	REST OF PAKISTAN
PER CAPITA INCOME (ANNUAL, \$ US)	\$250	\$500
% POPULATION LIVING BELOW POVERTY LINE	~66%	24% <sup>^</sup>
OVERALL LITERACY RATE	17%	56%
Women	3%	32%

<sup>^</sup>FY 2005/2006 estimate<sup>61</sup>

**(FIGURE 4.2) HEALTH METRICS FOR FATA<sup>62</sup>**

Hospitals to serve population of 3.1 million	41
Doctor-to-Population Ratio	1-to-6,762

**(FIGURE 4.3) FORCE STRENGTH OF PAKISTANI SECURITY FORCES WHO REGULARLY OPERATE IN FATA<sup>63</sup>**

Constabulary Forces	23,000+
Frontier Corps (FC)	~8,000

NOTE: The Constabulary Forces operate under the local political agent and are trained to do light policing, guard government facilities and secure public figures. The FC is the primary paramilitary force in FATA, traditionally serving as a border control and counter-smuggling force that is on call for law enforcement duties. It is locally trained and administered, yet reports to Pakistan's Ministry of Interior and has historically been greatly under-resourced.


**(FIGURE 4.3.A) U.S. SPECIAL FORCES (USSOF) PERSONNEL CONDUCTING COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING TO FRONTIER CORPS (FC) OFFICERS<sup>64</sup>**

Number of USSOF Trainers	32
Number of senior FC Trainees	116

AS OF NOVEMBER 2008

NOTE: As of November 2008 the training is limited in scope and focused on training a select number of senior Frontier Corpsmen who will then become the principal counterinsurgency trainers for the remainder of the force. This training is being conducted at an undisclosed location in northwest Pakistan.

**(FIGURE 4.4) PERCENTAGE OF U.S. FUNDING DIRECTED TOWARDS VARIOUS PROGRAMS IN PAKISTAN'S FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA) AND BORDER REGION, FY 2002-2007<sup>65</sup>**



**NOTE:** Total \$ shown in \$US millions. Percentages based on an approximate expenditure of \$5.8 billion. Total aid to Pakistan for this period was approximately \$10.5 billion.


## PAKISTANI PUBLIC OPINION

### TERROR FREE TOMORROW/NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION SURVEY, July

2008<sup>66</sup>

(1,306 Pakistanis were surveyed throughout the country from May 25-June 1, 2008)

**(FIGURE 4.5) QUESTION: WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF EACH COUNTRY?**



**NOTE:** Not all line items add up to 100% due to rounding


## 5. POLLING & PUBLIC OPINION

### AFGHANISTAN IN 2008: A SURVEY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE<sup>67</sup>

*Asia Foundation, October 2008*


*(6,593 Afghan adults from throughout the country were interviewed)*

**(FIGURE 5.1) QUESTION: GENERALLY SPEAKING, DO YOU THINK THINGS IN AFGHANISTAN TODAY ARE GOING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, OR DO YOU THINK THINGS ARE GOING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION? (2006, 2007 & 2008)**




**SURVEYS RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2006, SEPTEMBER 2007, AND OCTOBER 2008, RESPECTIVELY**

**(FIGURE 5.2) QUESTION: WHY DO YOU SAY THINGS ARE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION? (COMPARISON WITH 2006 & 2007)**




**SURVEYS RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2006 AND SEPTEMBER 2007, AND OCTOBER 2008, RESPECTIVELY**

**(FIGURE 5.3) QUESTION: WHY DO YOU SAY THINGS ARE MOVING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION?  
(COMPARISON WITH 2006 & 2007)**



**SURVEYS RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2006 AND SEPTEMBER 2007, AND OCTOBER 2008, RESPECTIVELY**

**(FIGURE 5.4) QUESTION: WHAT IS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM IN YOUR LOCAL AREA? (COMPARISON WITH 2006 & 2007)**



**SURVEYS RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2006 AND SEPTEMBER 2007, AND OCTOBER 2008, RESPECTIVELY**



**(FIGURE 5.5) PRESENT CONDITION OF VARIOUS INFRASTRUCTURE IN LOCALITIES, 2007 & 2008**

INFRASTRUCTURE	VERY/QUITE GOOD (%)		QUITE/VERY BAD (%)	
	2007	2008	2007	2008
Availability of clean drinking water	63	62	36	38
Availability of water for irrigation	59	47	40	49
Availability of jobs	30	21	69	78
Supply of electricity	31	25	68	74
Security situation	66		33	
Availability of medical care	56	49	44	50
Availability of education for children	72	70	28	29
Freedom of movement	72		28	


SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2007 AND OCTOBER 2008, RESPECTIVELY

**(FIGURE 5.6) PUBLIC FEELINGS TOWARDS THE PERFORMANCE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF ITS WORK, 2007 & 2008**

ASPECT OF WORK	VERY/QUITE GOOD JOB (%)		SOMEWHAT/VERY BAD JOB (%)	
	2007	2008	2007	2008
Education	88	84	11	15
Healthcare system	72	66	28	33
Creating job opportunities	35	24	64	75
Maintaining relations with neighboring countries	68	62	29	34
Reviving/developing the economy	46	33	53	64
Fighting corruption	36	31	64	66

SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2007 AND OCTOBER 2008, RESPECTIVELY

**(FIGURE 5.7) QUESTION: WOULD YOU SAY THAT TODAY YOUR FAMILY IS MORE PROSPEROUS, LESS PROSPEROUS OR ABOUT AS PROSPEROUS AS UNDER THE TALIBAN GOVERNMENT? (2006, 2007 & 2008)**




SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2006 AND SEPTEMBER 2007, AND OCTOBER 2008, RESPECTIVELY

**(FIGURE 5.8) PUBLIC'S AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT TOWARDS VARIOUS STATEMENTS ABOUT THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP), 2007 & 2008**

STATEMENT	Strongly/Somewhat Agree (%)		Strongly/Somewhat Disagree (%)	
	2007	2008	2007	2008
<b>Is honest and fair with the Afghan people:</b>				
ANA	90	89	8	10
ANP	86	80	14	18
<b>Is unprofessional and poorly trained:</b>				
ANA	62	55	36	41
ANP	65	60	33	37
<b>Needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself:</b>				
ANA	77	69	21	27
ANP	77	69	21	27
<b>Helps improve the security:</b>				
ANA	89	86	10	12
ANP	86	80	13	17

SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2007 AND OCTOBER 2008, RESPECTIVELY

**(FIGURE 5.9) QUESTION: HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT ON ITS OWN WILL BE ABLE TO CONDUCT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS? (2007 & 2008)**



SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2007 AND OCTOBER 2008, RESPECTIVELY

**(FIGURE 5.10) PUBLIC'S AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH VARIOUS STATEMENTS ABOUT DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE**

STATEMENT	Strongly/Somewhat Agree (%)	Strongly/Somewhat Disagree (%)
Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government.	85	10
Despite our differences, as Afghans we have many values that unite us.	88	11
Politicians seek power for their own benefit and don't worry about helping people.	79	19


SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2007

**(FIGURE 5.11) PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE WHO STRONGLY/SOMEWHAT AGREE WITH RESPECT TO VARIOUS STATEMENTS RELATED TO THE STATE COURT AND JIRGAS/SHURAS, 2007 & 2008**

STATEMENT	State Court (%)		Jirgas/Shuras (%)	
	2007	2008	2007	2008
They are accessible to me	78	68	83	76
They are fair and trusted	58	50	78	70
They follow local norms and values of our people	57	50	76	69
They are effective at delivering justice	58	52	76	69
They resolve cases timely and properly	51	38	72	59


SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2007 AND OCTOBER 2008, RESPECTIVELY

**(FIGURE 5.12) QUESTION: DO YOU OWN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING HERE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD IN FUNCTIONING ORDER? (2007 & 2008)**



SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2007 AND OCTOBER 2008, RESPECTIVELY

**(FIGURE 5.13) QUESTION: WHICH IS THE MAIN SOURCE FROM WHERE YOU NORMALLY GET INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE COUNTRY? (2007 & 2008)**




SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 2007 AND OCTOBER 2008, RESPECTIVELY

# **AFGHANISTAN: PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS**<sup>68</sup>


**Charney Research**

*(Multiple Surveys Conducted from March 2004- November 2007, each with 800-2,400 Afghan respondents)*

**(FIGURE 5.14) OPINION ON THE DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY**



**(FIGURE 5.15) QUESTION: HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE WORK OF THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN?**




**(FIGURE 5.16) QUESTION: DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING THINGS CAN BE JUSTIFIED OR NOT?**

TACTICS	JUSTIFIED (%)	UNJUSTIFIED (%)
Attacks against government officials	2	94
Attacks against the police	6	91
Attacks against teachers or schools*	4	95
Attacks against civilians*	5	94
Suicide bombings	8	89
Attacks against US military forces	17	75


\*2006 data. All other data reflects 2007 survey.

**(FIGURE 5.17) QUESTION: HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE WORK OF HAMID KARZAI AS PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN?**




**SURVEY RELEASED: NOVEMBER 2007**

**(FIGURE 5.18) QUESTION: IN YOUR VIEW, WHAT IS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM FACING AGHANISTAN AS A WHOLE? WHAT IS THE NEXT BIGGEST PROBLEM? (PROBLEMS MENTIONED BY 15% OR MORE IN 2007)**



**(FIGURE 5.19) QUESTION: WHAT IS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM IN YOUR LOCAL AREA? WHAT IS THE NEXT BIGGEST PROBLEM? (PROBLEMS MENTIONED BY 15% OR MORE IN 2007)**



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- <sup>13</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan", Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2008, p. 22. Accessed at: [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Report\\_on\\_Progress\\_toward\\_Security\\_and\\_Stability\\_in\\_Afghanistan\\_1230.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Report_on_Progress_toward_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan_1230.pdf) GAO-08-661, "Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces", *Government Accountability Office*, June 2008, p. 33. Accessed at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf> Major General Robert Cone, Press Conference from Afghanistan, November 12, 2008. Accessed at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4314>
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