

# Discussion of “Monetary policy, employment shortfalls, and the natural rate hypothesis” by Michael T. Kiley

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of its monetary policy framework

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*The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily represent those of others in the Federal Reserve System.*

# What framework best achieves price stability and full employment?



- Model-based evaluation of different policy frameworks → compare policy rules
- Methodology:
  - Simple “three-equation models” provide key insights and useful intuition
  - Simulations with FRB/US allow for quantitative evaluation in more detailed model
- Key findings:
  - Make-up policies (lower-for-longer, threshold rules) can substantially alleviate ZLB problems
  - Strong response to output/unemployment improves performance despite mismeasurement
  - Focusing on employment shortfalls “can exacerbate shortfalls and create inflationary pressures”

# The Fed's mission and strategy

- Dual mandate: *maximum employment* and *stable prices*
- Operationalized in policy framework: “**Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy**”
- Framework 2012-2020: aim for two percent PCE inflation “over the longer run” and mitigate “**deviations of employment from [its estimated] maximum level**”
- Framework since 2020: flexible average inflation targeting (FAIT) and mitigate “**shortfalls of employment from [its estimated] maximum level**”
- *What insights from economic research motivated the change in focus from “deviations” to “shortfalls” of employment?*

## Difficult to assess overheating and reliably predict rising inflation

- Assessment of maximum sustainable employment requires estimate of *natural rate of unemployment*,  $u^*$  (NAIRU?) but highly uncertain (Staiger, Stock, Watson 1997) and revised down over 2010s (e.g., Crump et al., 2019)



- Overheating,  $u < u^*$ , predicts higher inflation based on *Phillips curve*, but post-GFC experience and empirical research suggest that relationship is weak (Ball and Mazumder 2011, Hazell, Herreño, Nakamura, Steinsson 2023, Smith, Timmermann, Wright 2023)


# Focusing on employment shortfalls may raise social welfare

- Plucking model (Dupraz, Nakamura, Steinsson 2022)
  - Economic fluctuations are occasional drops below full potential
  - Stabilization policy can raise average level of output and employment
  - Standard methods overestimate  $u^*$
- Tail risks/asymmetry/skewness in business cycles (Morley and Piger, 2012)
- Positive hysteresis and distributional benefits (Aaronson et al., 2019; Feiveson et al., 2020)

## Possibility of inflation bias may not be a big problem

- Paper shows that focus on shortfalls can cause upward inflation bias (see also [Surico, 2007](#), and [Gust, Lopez-Salido and Meyer, 2017](#))
- But ZLB causes downward inflation bias (e.g., [Kiley and Roberts, 2017](#)) so some upward bias could be a welcome antidote.
  - Chair Powell: “persistent undershoot of inflation ... cause for concern” ([2020 JH](#))
  - Higher average inflation lowers likelihood of hitting the ZLB
- And central bank can put more weight on inflation deviation to reduce bias ([Bundick and Petrosky-Nadeau, 2022](#))
  - Policymakers “can achieve their inflation objective on average while still significantly reducing the probability of encountering the zero lower bound”

# Little evidence of inflation bias in ten-year CPI inflation expectations



Source: Federal Reserve Board (TIPS yield curve) and Survey of Professional Forecasters

# Importance of effective communication about monetary policy

- Model-based results assume complete information, but research has demonstrated importance of incomplete information and learning.  
(Blinder et al., 2008; Eusepi and Preston, 2010; Taylor and Williams, 2010; Cogley et al, 2015, ...)
- Public does not know reaction function or loss function.
  - Part of the reason for *monetary policy surprises* (Bauer and Swanson 2023a,b)
  - Bauer, Plueger, Sunderam (2024): survey-based *perceived monetary policy rules* vary over time, differ from actual rule, matter for transmission
  - Bernanke review: BoE should provide information about its reaction function
- Shortfalls approach likely easier to communicate to the public.
  - Mitigate *deviations*? “In practice, the Committee has not conducted policy in this way” (Chair Powell, Jackson Hole, 2020)
  - Focus on shortfalls directly follows from maximum employment mandate.