City Hall Has Been Hacked! The Financial Costs of Lax Cybersecurity

Filippo CurtiIvan T. IvanovMarco MacchiavelliTom Zimmermann*Richmond FedChicago FedUniversity of MassachusettsUniversity of Cologne

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*The views stated herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the Chicago Fed, the Richmond Fed, or the the Federal Reserve System.

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Motivation

State and local governments are attractive targets for cyber attacks:

- Store and manage substantial amounts of personal identifiable information (PII)
- Inadequate cybersecurity
- States and localities operate the nation's infrastructure
 - Cyberattacks such as data breaches more disruptive than attacks on corporates
- Data breaches have the potential to impose large welfare losses:
 - Remediation and litigation costs absorb public resources/taxpayer money
 - Negative externalities—leaked PII facilitates fraudulent activity

Cybersecurity at State and Local Governments

Effect of data breaches on governments:

- Negative abnormal bond returns in the secondary market
- Increase in financing costs in the primary market

▶ The implementation of data breach notification laws at the state level:


- Staggered implementation between 2002 and 2021 (penalties in some cases)
- No effect on the incidence of future data breaches
- Incentives to bolster cybersecurity may still be insufficient

Data

- Data on operational risk incidents (external and internal) from Advisen:
 - Over 1,000 attacked public entities, over 2,200 external data breaches since 2004
 - Bridge to other data via the Census of Governments
- Primary market issuance from Mergent:
 - Detailed information on bond characteristics, yields, and amounts.
- Secondary market data on municipal bond trading from the MSRB:
 - All transactions since 2010.
- Hand-collected data on state breach notification laws:
 - National conference of state legislatures (NCSL), LexisNexis
 - Enactment and effective dates, covered entities, penalties for violations (if any)



Risk of external data breaches across government size and type.



A. Government Size

B. Government Type

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▶ We follow (Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen 2022) to estimate abnormal returns:

$$r_{b,s,k} = (D_{b,s} \cdot y_{b,s} - D_{b,k} \cdot y_{b,k})$$
$$ar_{b,s,k} = r_{b,s,k} - \sum_{t=k+1}^{s} R_t^l$$

- $y_{b,t}$ $(D_{b,t})$ yield to maturity (duration) of bond b at time t
- \triangleright $r_{b,s,k}$ duration-adjusted return on bond b btw two adjacent trades, s and k
- lndex return, R_t^l , l denotes remaining maturity-credit rating buckets

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Negative abnormal returns around external data breaches of about 16-17 bps.

Abnormal Bond Poturns

Abnormal bond Returns						
Duration Adjustment	Yes Yes		Yes			
Risk/Maturity Adjustment	No	Yes	Yes			
10-day Return	No	No	Yes			
Bond Return	-16.112***	-17.744***	-5.301***			
	(2.433)	(1.295)	(1.516)			
Observations	36,179	35,679	35,677			
Number of Events	2,582	2,573	2,573			

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Returns larger in magnitude for subordinated bonds.

	Collateral			Priority	
	Rev	GO	Double	Senior	Subordinated
Bond Return	-17.808***	-18.233***	-17.518***	-15.154***	-18.891***
	(1.987)	(1.727)	(6.267)	(2.025)	(1.786)
Observations	14,844	18,960	522	10,947	24,732
Number of Events	1,674	810	117	1,533	2,221

Abnormal bond returns and bond heterogeneity

Returns slightly larger for entities with higher 'attack surface'.

Govt Type	City/Twp	County	District	State
Bond Return	-16.976***	-21.722***	-15.215***	-19.235***
	(1.509)	(3.241)	(5.613)	(4.997)
Observations	26,036	5,210	1,439	2,940
Number of Events	1,372	609	213	378


Panel B: Abnormal Bond Returns and Government Type

Data Breaches and Issuance Costs

- Primary markets provide unique insights into consequences for taxpayers
- Use yields of muni bond offerings as a measure of issuance costs
- Offering yields increase by about 10 bps after cyberattacks
- Effects are persistent

Data Breach Notification Laws

- Most states now have data breach notification laws
- Public entities required to notify residents of data breaches



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Data Breach Notification Laws

- Role for regulation?
 - Higher financing costs detract resources from the community
 - Loss of personal data increases chance of fraud
 - Regulation may incentivize investment in cybersecurity by penalizing breaches

Data Breach Notification Laws


Use the Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess (2021) estimator:

$$Y_{i,s,t} = \sum_{j=-3}^{3} \beta_j Law_{s,t+j} + \mu + \epsilon_{i,s,t}$$

 \blacktriangleright Law_{s,t+j} equals one if entity i in state s is covered by law is enacted j years ago

treatment whenever law allows for monetary penalties and apply to local govt

Effect of Data Breach Notification Laws



C. Prob. of Cyberattack (Local)


- No improvement in cybersecurity
- No significant reduction in the likelihood of future data breaches

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D. Prob. of Cyberattack (Any)

Effect of Data Breach Notification Laws



No spending changes around the implementation of breach notification laws

Data Security Laws


> Explicit requirements for governments to strengthen cybersecurity

A state oversight body that:

- sets cybersecurity standards
- conducts audits and employee training

Greater potential incentive effects to strengthen cybersecurity

Effect of Data Security Laws



No significant reduction in the likelihood of future data breaches

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Effectiveness of State Cybersecurity Laws

> Data breach notification laws not associated with better cybersecurity

► Tradeoff between ex-ante cost to improve cybersecurity + ex-post remediation costs

Alternative incentive schemes:

- Safe harbor against data breach lawsuits if comply with industry-recognized cybersecurity programs
- Possibly providing incentives to invest ex-ante

Conclusion

- Significant costs of neglecting cybersecurity
 - Data breaches expose municipalities to additional financing costs
 - This is in addition to the loss of privacy and fraud
- Data breach laws appear ineffective at reducing cyber risk:
 - Do not reduce the likelihood of future external data breaches

- Borusyak, Kirill, Xavier Jaravel, and Jann Spiess, 2021, Revisiting event study designs: Robust and efficient estimation, arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.12419.
- Cornaggia, Kimberly, John Hund, and Giang Nguyen, 2022, Investor attention and municipal bond returns, *Journal of Financial Markets* p. 100738.