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## *Iraq Index* *Tracking Variables of* *Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*

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Updated June 30, 2005

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
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# SECURITY INDICATORS

## U.S. TROOP FATALITIES SINCE MARCH 19, 2003<sup>1</sup>




### Total from March 19, 2003 (start of major combat operations) through June 28, 2005:

Fatalities (all kinds): **1,738**

Fatalities in hostile incidents: **1,341**

Fatalities in non-hostile incidents: **397**

### MOST FREQUENT CAUSES OF U.S. MILITARY FATALITIES IN IRAQ SINCE MAY 1, 2003<sup>2</sup>




### Through June 2, 2005

#### NOTE ON U.S. TROOP FATALITIES SINCE MARCH 19, 2003 TABLE:

The daily Department of Defense casualty reports that we use for our monthly estimates on U.S. troops killed doesn't make entirely clear when in a 24 hour period casualties were incurred. Since the reports are published 11AM daily, there is the possibility that our numbers for January 2005 and onwards are slightly off due to uncertainties about whether casualties occurred on the first and last day of each month. We have chosen to interpret the numbers in the casualty report as representing fatalities that occurred throughout the previous day. Total fatalities include four civilians working for the Department of Defense.

**TOP FIVE LOCATIONS OF FREQUENT U.S. MILITARY FATALITIES SINCE MAY 1, 2003<sup>3</sup>**



**Through June 1, 2005: 857 (51% of total)**


**AMERICAN MILITARY FATALITIES BY CATEGORY MARCH 19, 2003 –JUNE 4, 2005<sup>4</sup>**

<b>Total fatalities</b>	<b>1,665</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Male: 1,630</b> <b>Female: 35</b>
<b>Age</b>	<b>Younger than 22: 494</b> <b>22-24: 388</b> <b>25-30: 414</b> <b>31-35: 166</b> <b>Older than 35: 203</b>
<b>Component</b>	<b>Active: 1,304</b> <b>Reserve: 143</b> <b>National Guard: 218</b>
<b>Military service</b>	<b>Army: 1,124</b> <b>Marines: 490</b> <b>Navy: 32</b> <b>Air Force: 19</b>
<b>Officers/Enlisted</b>	<b>Officer: 180</b> <b>E5-E9: 518</b> <b>E1-E4: 967</b>
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>	<b>American Indian or Alaska Native: 15</b> <b>Asian: 32</b> <b>Black or African American: 181</b> <b>Hispanic or Latino: 187</b> <b>Multiple races, pending or unknown: 21</b> <b>Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander: 17</b> <b>White: 1,212</b>

**GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF AMERICAN MILITARY FATALITIES MARCH 19, 2003-MARCH 20, 2005<sup>5</sup>**

<b>Geographic distribution of Americans military killed March 19, 2003- March 20, 2005</b>
<b>26.2% were from cities and large towns in the U.S.</b> <b>40.5% were from suburbs in the U.S.</b> <b>33.3% were from rural areas in the U.S.</b>


**U.S. TROOPS WOUNDED IN ACTION SINCE MARCH 2003<sup>6</sup>**



**Total from March 19, 2003 through June 28, 2005: 13,190**


*As of February 1, 2005 the numbers for previous months have changed slightly due to more detailed information becoming available from the Defense Department.* The daily Department of Defense casualty reports that we use for our monthly estimates on U.S troops killed does not make it entirely clear when in a 24 hour period casualties were incurred. Since the reports are published at 10AM daily, there is possibility that our numbers for January 2005 and onwards are slightly off due to uncertainties about whether casualties occurred on the first or the last of each month.

**BRITISH MILITARY FATALITIES SINCE MARCH 19, 2003<sup>7</sup>**




**Total through June 29, 2005: 89**

**NON-U.S. & U.K. COALITION MILITARY FATALITIES SINCE MARCH 19, 2003<sup>8</sup>**




**Total through June 29, 2005: 97**

**NON-U.S. COALITION TROOP FATALITIES BY COUNTRY SINCE MARCH 19, 2003<sup>9</sup>**



**Total through June 29, 2005: 188**

**IRAQI MILITARY & POLICE KILLED MONTHLY<sup>10</sup>**



**Total June 2003 through June 29, 2005: 2,474**

**1,300 Iraqi military and police were killed between June 2003 and January 4, 2005** according to Iraqi Minister of Interior Falah Hasan Al-Naqib. "Iraqi Officers, Police Members Killed so Far Total 1,300," Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) January 4, 2005.

**IRAQI INTERPRETERS WORKING FOR COALITION FORCES KILLED**


<b>Total number of Iraqi interpreters killed January, 2004 - September 18, 2004</b>
<b>52</b>

**ESTIMATES OF IRAQI CIVILIANS KILLED SINCE THE START OF THE WAR**

Source	Estimate
<b>Iraq Body Count</b>	<b>22,600 – 25,600 as of June 19, 2005<sup>11</sup></b>
<b>Statement by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw</b>	<b>&gt;10,000 as of February, 2004</b>
<b>Shaik Omar Clinic, Baghdad</b>	<b>10,363 as of September 8, 2004 (in Baghdad and surrounding towns alone)</b>
<b>Amnesty International (London)</b>	<b>&gt;10,000 as of September 8, 2004</b>
<b>The Human Rights Organization, Iraq</b>	<b>&gt;30,000 as of September 8, 2004</b>
<b>Iraq Index (assume 5,630-10,000 Iraqi civilians killed from March 19, 2003 - April 30, 2003 as reported in detail by Iraq Body Count)</b>	<b>Not including deaths from crime as of May 31, 2005: 12,700-23,000 Including deaths from crime as of May 31, 2005: 29,700-60,800</b>



## IRAQI CIVILIANS KILLED AS A RESULT OF ACTS OF WAR SINCE MAY 1, 2003




**Total May 2003 through May 31, 2005: 7,063-12,700**

These numbers do not include Iraqi civilians killed during major combat operations March 19, 2003-April 30, 2003.


*287-500 Iraqi civilians were killed June 1-19, 2005.*

## CAR BOMBS IN IRAQ (LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL)<sup>12</sup>




**NOTE ON IRAQI CIVILIANS KILLED AS A RESULT OF ACTS OF WAR TABLE:** Our lower bound for each month is based on detailed reports from Iraq Body Counts.org. Because the organization's reports of Iraqi civilian fatalities are not necessarily reported in the order they occur, the estimated number of civilians killed up until a certain date may change as more cases are reported. We recognize that these estimates are most probably lower than the actual number since many separate incidents go unreported or unnoticed. We are doing our utmost not to include suspected Iraqi insurgents killed deliberately by U.S. forces or Iraqi civilians killed as a result of crime. (Iraqi security forces are included in the lower bound.) Our higher bound for each month is simply 1.75 times the lower bound. This is a rough estimate, and reflects the fact that the estimates for civilian casualties from the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior were 75 percent higher than those of our Iraq Body Count based estimate over the December 2003 – May 2005 period. Ellen Knickmeyer, "Iraq Puts Civilian Toll at 12,000." Washington Post, June 3, 2005.

**MULTIPLE CASUALTY BOMBINGS<sup>13,14</sup>**



**Total as of June 29: 302 (whereof 178 suicide bombings)**

**KILLED AND WOUNDED IN MULTIPLE CASUALTY BOMBINGS<sup>15</sup>**



**Total as of June 26:**


**Killed: 3,006**

**Wounded: 6,800**

**NOTE: Attacks that kill more than 2 people are considered multiple casualty bombings.**

Roadside bombs (improvised explosive devices) are not included in the tally of multiple casualty bombings.

**CRIME-RELATED DEATHS IN BAGHDAD SINCE MAY, 2003<sup>16</sup>**



**NOTE ON CRIME RELATED DEATHS IN BAGHDAD:** Estimates for each month are typically based on the number of bodies brought to the Baghdad morgue with mortal gunshot wounds. We recognize that our estimates could be too high as a result of that some of the gunshot victims could be insurgents killed intentionally by U.S. military, but also that they could be too low since many murder victims are never taken to the morgue, but buried quickly and privately and therefore never recorded in official tallies. The homicide rate is calculated based on an estimated population of 5.6 million people in Baghdad.


**NOTE ON CRIME RELATED DEATHS IN BAGHDAD:** Interpol lists the following nationwide numbers per 100,000 citizens for countries in the region: Libya 2.08, Jordan 6.33, Lebanon 3.38, Saudi Arabia, 0.71. However, Interpol notes that these [nationwide] statistics cannot be used as a basis for comparison between different countries. This is partly because "police statistics reflect reported crimes, but this only represents a fraction of the real level. The volume of crimes not reported to the police may depend on the actions, policies and perceptions of the police. These can vary with time, as well as from country to country." Because of the inherent difficulty in interpreting and comparing international murder rates, all such statistics - including those stated in the table above - should be interpreted guardedly.

**CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS WORKING ON U.S. CONTRACTS KILLED IN IRAQ**

<b>Civilians working on U.S. contracts in Iraq (both military and reconstruction) killed</b>	
<b>As of December 31, 2004</b>	<b>232</b>

## NON-IRAQI CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS KILLED IN IRAQ<sup>17</sup>


### By date:



**NOTE ON NON-IRAQI CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS KILLED IN IRAQ:** This list is incomplete and does not include an additional 44 contractors that were killed up until December 31, 2004. Since we do not know during which month these deaths occurred or the nationality of these individuals they are not represented in either of the two graphs above.


As of March, 2005, there were more than 20,000 foreign (non-Iraqi) private military contractors in Iraq. 6,000 of these are in armed tactical roles. Peter W. Singer, "Outsourcing War," *Foreign Affairs*, March 2005.

**NON-IRAQI CIVILIANS (INCLUDING CONTRACTORS) KILLED SINCE MAY, 2003<sup>18</sup>**



**Total through June 29, 2005: 289**

**COUNTRIES WITH MORE THAN 10 CIVILIANS KILLED  
IN IRAQ SINCE MAY 1, 2003 (EXCLUDING IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES)<sup>19</sup>**




**Through June 29, 2005**

**FOREIGN NATIONALS KIDNAPPED IN IRAQ SINCE MAY 2003**

Month	Number of foreigners kidnapped	Status
Date of capture unknown	14	11 unknown, 3 killed
May 2003 - October 2003	0	
November	1	1 released
December 2003 -March 2004	0	
April	43	3 killed, 30 released, 2 still held, 1 escaped, 7 status unknown
May	2	1 killed, 1 still held
June	3	2 killed, 1 escaped
July	26	3 killed, 13 released, 6 still held, 1 rescued, 1 escaped, 2 unknown
August	30	15 killed, 15 released
September	31	4 killed, 4 released, 22 still held, 1 rescued
October	7	3 killed, 2 released, 2 still held
November	5	1 killed, 3 still held, 1 released
December	2	2 still held
January 2005	13	10 released, 3 still held
February	10	2 still held, 8 released
March	5	2 still held, 3 released
April	7	6 released, 1 still held
May	4	2 still held, 1 rescued, 1 killed
June	0	
<b>Total through June 29, 2005</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>36 killed, 93 released, 48 still held, 3 escaped, 3 rescued, 20 status unknown</b>

**NOTE ON FOREIGN NATIONALS KIDNAPPED IN IRAQ TABLE:** The Iraqi Interior Ministry estimates that 5,000 Iraqis were kidnapped between December 2003 and late April 2005. Haifa Zangana ,”Blair Made a Pledge to Iraqis Once,” *The Guardian*, April 22, 2005.

**TOTAL NUMBER OF INSURGENTS DETAINED OR KILLED<sup>20</sup>**



**NOTE ON TOTAL NUMBER OF INSURGENTS DETAINED OR KILLED TABLE:** The estimate of suspected insurgents killed or detained since May 2003 is a very rough one. The substantial increase in number of people detained or killed in November 2003 and onwards may not imply a huge increase in people detained or killed but rather that the data improved starting that month.

**IRAQI PRISON POPULATION**

<b>Peak prison population in 2003</b>	<b>10,000</b>
<b>June 2004</b>	<b>5,435<sup>21</sup></b>
<b>July 2004</b>	<b>5,700</b> <b>(of which 90 are foreign nationals)</b>
<b>September 2004</b>	<b>5,500</b> <b>(whereof 2 are women, 65-70 are juveniles and 130-140 are foreign nationals)</b>
<b>October 2004</b>	<b>4,300</b>
<b>November 2004</b>	<b>8,300</b>
<b>January 2005</b>	<b>7,837<sup>22</sup></b>
<b>June 2005</b>	<b>10,783<sup>23</sup></b>

**ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF INSURGENCY NATIONWIDE**

<b>Month</b>	<b>Estimated strength of insurgency nationwide</b>
<b>November</b>	<b>5,000</b>
<b>December</b>	<b>5,000</b>
<b>January 2004</b>	<b>3, 000-5,000</b>
<b>February</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>March</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>April</b>	<b>5,000</b>
<b>May</b>	<b>15,000</b>
<b>June</b>	<b>15,000</b>
<b>July</b>	<b>20,000</b>
<b>August</b>	<b>20,000</b>
<b>September</b>	<b>20,000</b>
<b>October</b>	<b>20,000</b>
<b>November</b>	<b>20,000</b>
<b>December</b>	<b>“more than 20,000”</b>
<b>January</b>	<b>18,000</b>
<b>February</b>	<b>18,000</b>
<b>March</b>	<b>16,000</b>
<b>April</b>	<b>16,000</b>
<b>May</b>	<b>16,000<sup>24</sup></b>

**ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN THE INSURGENCY**

<b>January 2004</b>	<b>300-500</b>
<b>July 2004</b>	<b>“Low hundreds”</b>
<b>September 2004</b>	<b>“Less than 1000”</b>
<b>November 2004</b>	<b>3,000</b>
<b>January 2005</b>	<b>“Fewer than 1,000”</b>
<b>February 2005</b>	<b>“Fewer than 1,000”</b>
<b>May 2005</b>	<b>1,000</b>

**NOTE ON IRAQI PRISON POPULATION TABLE:**

The detainee prison population as of January 21, 2005 only included 224 foreign fighters. The January, 2005 entry does not include 1,200 suspected insurgents being detained at smaller facilities at military brigade and division level. About 75% of those individuals are typically freed after a few days.

**NOTE ON IRAQI PRISON POPULATION TABLE:** Military official claim that the duration of processing those arresting and releasing those who are innocent has been decreased to an average of 60 days from between 120 – 140 days. Only 25 individuals of those released have been recaptured for being suspected of conducting attacks against American forces. Dexter Filkins, “General Says Less Coercion of Captives Yields Better Data,” *New York Times*, September 7, 2004.

**NOTE ON ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF IRAQI INSURGENCY NATION-WIDE TABLE:**

U.S. military believe foreign fighters are responsible for the majority of suicide bombings in Iraq. Independent researchers estimate that 44-70% of suicide bombers in Iraq are Saudi citizens. Susan B. Glasser, “Martyrs in Iraq Mostly Saudis,” *Washington Post*, May 15, 2005. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, said on December 16, 2004 that Saddam loyalist, and not foreign fighters remain the main threat in Iraq. “Baathists Main Threat,” *Bahrain Times*, December 16, 2004.

**COALITION TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAQ SINCE MAY**

Month	U.S. troops in Iraq			Other coalition troops in Iraq (excluding U.S. & Iraqi forces)	Total international troop strength in Iraq
	Active	Reserve (includes National Guard)	Total		
May 2003	~142,000	~8,000	150,000	23,000	173,000
June	~126,000	~24,000	150,000	21,000	171,000
July	~124,000	~25,000	149,000	21,000	170,000
August	~114,000	~25,000	139,000	22,000	161,000
September	~103,000	~29,000	132,000	24,000	156,000
October	~102,000	~29,000	131,000	25,000	156,000
November	N/A	N/A	123,000	23,900	146,900
December	~85,400	~36,600	122,000	24,500	146,500
January 2004	N/A	N/A	122,000	25,600	147,600
February	N/A	N/A	115,000	24,000	139,000
March	N/A	N/A	130,000	24,000	154,000
April	N/A	N/A	137,000	25,000	162,000
May	N/A	N/A	138,000	24,000	162,000
June	89,700	48,300	138,000	23,000	161,000
July	N/A	N/A	140,000	22,000	162,000
August	84,000	56,000	140,000	23,700	163,700
September	82,800	55,200	138,000	24,600	162,600
October	82,800	55,200	138,000	24,000	162,000
November	82,800	55,200	138,000	24,000	162,000
December	82,800	55,200	148,000	25,000	173,000
January 2005	90,000	60,000	150,000	25,300	175,300
February	N/A	N/A	155,000	25,000	180,000
March	N/A	N/A	150,000	22,000	172,000
April	N/A	N/A	142,000	22,000	164,000
May	N/A	N/A	138,000	23,000	161,000
June	N/A	N/A	135,000 <sup>25</sup>	23,000 <sup>26</sup>	158,000

N/A= Not available

**NOTE ON COALITION TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAQ SINCE MAY TABLE:** In late 2003 the Department of Defense announced that it planned to draw down the number of American troops in Iraq to 105,000 by May 2004. "GAO-04-902R Rebuilding Iraq," June 2004, General Accounting Office.  
**NOTE ON COALITION TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAQ SINCE MAY TABLE:** All numbers are end of month estimates or latest data available for the current month.



**TOP TEN NON-U.S. COALITION CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN IRAQ**

Coalition country	Military personnel in Iraq <sup>27</sup>
United Kingdom	8,000
South Korea	3,600
Italy	3,000
Poland	1,700
Ukraine	1,650
Georgia	850
Romania	800
Japan	550
Denmark	530
Bulgaria	400
Remaining 17 coalition countries	1,920

As of May 6-June 15, 2005.


**“HIGH-VALUE” INTELLIGENCE REPORTS**

Increase in number of “high-value” intelligence reports drawn from interrogations	September 2004 compared to January 2004
	50%

**INSURGENT ATTACKS WITH REMOTELY DETONATED BOMBS**

Time	Average number of bomb attacks	Bomb attacks injuring or killing U.S. troops
April 2004	25/day	90%
End of February 2005	30/day	25%


**ATTACKS ON IRAQI OIL AND GAS PIPELINES, INSTALLATIONS & PERSONNEL<sup>28</sup>**



**Total through June 23, 2005: 244**

**NOTE ON TOP TEN NON-U.S. COALITION CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN IRAQ TABLE:** In addition to the United States, 27 countries have troops in Iraq as of June 8, 2005: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” *Department of State*, June 15, 2005.

**VIOLENT INCIDENTS AGAINST THE COALITION AND ITS PARTNERS AS REPORTED BY THE G.A.O.**




Source: MNC-I SigActs. 050000CMAR05

<sup>a</sup>According to DIA officials, June 2003 data are incomplete.


**NOTE:** Exact numbers for each month are not available.

**NUMBER OF DAILY ATTACKS BY INSURGENTS<sup>29</sup>**



NOTE: Numbers for June 2003 are incomplete.

**AMERICAN MILITARY HELICOPTERS DOWNED IN IRAQ<sup>30</sup>**



Total through June 27, 2005: 37

**COALITION FORCES ABILITY TO FIND AND DISARM IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDs)**

Time	Percentage of IEDs found and disarmed <sup>31</sup>
December 2003	40%
December 2004	50%
April 2005	40% <sup>32</sup>

NOTE ON AMERICAN MILITARY HELICOPTERS DOWNED IN IRAQ TABLE: Of the 37 helicopters downed in Iraq since May 2003, at least 20 were downed by enemy fire.

**PERCENTAGE OF THE 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION (3RD ID) ON THEIR SECOND TOUR IN IRAQ**

<b>Percentage of the 3rd ID on their second tour in Iraq since March 2003</b>
<b>50%</b> as of February 26, 2005

**MILITARY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN SEPTEMBER 2001-JANUARY 2005**

<b>Service</b>	<b>Personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan September 2001-January 2005</b>	<b>Percentage of total deployed more than once September 2001-January 2005</b>
<b>Army</b>	<b>Active Duty: 307,019 National Guard: 120,054 Reserve: 74,104</b>	<b>Active Duty: 37% National Guard: 30% Reserve: 34%</b>
<b>Air Force</b>	<b>Active Duty: 160,508 National Guard: 42,807 Reserve: 24,038</b>	<b>Active Duty: 33% National Guard: 47% Reserve: 49%</b>
<b>Marines</b>	<b>Active Duty: 104,244 Reserve: 15,938</b>	<b>Active Duty: 28% Reserve: 12%</b>
<b>Navy</b>	<b>Active Duty: 185,538 Reserve: 12,837</b>	<b>Active Duty: 26% Reserve: 21%</b>
<b>Coast Guard</b>	<b>Active Duty: 1,602 Reserve: 195</b>	<b>Active Duty: 12% Reserve: 1%</b>

**NOTE ON PERCENTAGE OF THE 3<sup>RD</sup> ID ON THEIR SECOND TOUR IN IRAQ SINCE MARCH, 2003:** 10,000 of the roughly 20,000 soldiers in the 3<sup>rd</sup> ID took part in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the immediate occupation thereafter. Rowan Scarborough, "Army's 3<sup>rd</sup> Division Returns to Iraq, Washington Times, February 26, 2005.

**NOTE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN TABLE:** The average number of American troops deployed to Afghanistan was 6,000 in 2002, 9,800 in 2003, 18,500 in 2004, and 17,300 up until February 2005.

**BAATHIST & OTHER RESISTANCE LEADERS STILL AT LARGE**

<b>Month</b>	<b>Iraqi 55 most wanted plus an additional 25 ex- Baath party leaders still at large</b>
<b>April</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>May</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>June</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>July</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>August</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>September</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>October</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>November</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>December</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>January 2004</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>February</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>March</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>April – December 2004</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>January 2005</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>February</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>March-May</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>June</b>	<b>30<sup>33</sup></b>

**SIZE OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES ON DUTY**

Month	General police capabilities	National Guard	Iraqi armed Forces	Border patrol	Total Iraqi security forces
May	7,000-9,000	N/A	0	N/A	7,000-9,000
June	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A
July	30,000	N/A	0	N/A	30,000
August	34,000	670	0	2,500	37,170
September	37,000	2,500	0	4,700	44,200
October	55,000	4,700	700	6,400	66,800
November	68,800	12,700	900	12,400	94,800
December	71,600	15,200	400	12,900	99,600
January	66,900	19,800	1,100	21,000	108,800
February	77,100	27,900	2,000	18,000	125,000
March	75,000 22% partially or fully trained	33,560 100% partially or fully trained	3,005 100% partially or fully trained	23,426 39% partially or fully trained	134,991 65% partially or fully trained
April	80,016 22% partially or fully trained	23,123 partially or fully trained	2,367 partially or fully trained	18,747 49% partially or fully trained	124,253 68% partially or fully trained
May	90,803 28% partially or fully trained	24,873 partially or fully trained	3,939 partially or fully trained	16,097 57% partially or fully trained	135,712 71% partially or fully trained
June	83,789 32% partially or fully trained	36,229 partially or fully trained	7,116 partially or fully trained	18,183 partially or fully trained	145,317 83% partially or fully trained
July	31,300 partially or fully trained	36,229 partially or fully trained	7,700 partially or fully trained	19,859 partially or fully trained	95,088
August	32,942 partially or fully trained	37,925 partially or fully trained	6,288 partially or fully trained	14,313 partially or fully trained	91,468
September	40,152 partially or fully trained	36,496 partially or fully trained	7,747 partially or fully trained	14,313 partially or fully trained	98,708
October	44,728 partially or fully trained	41,261 partially or fully trained	6,861 partially or fully trained	18,148 partially or fully trained	110,998
November	49,455 partially or fully trained	43,445 partially or fully trained	6,013 partially or fully trained	14,593 partially or fully trained	113,506
December	53,571 partially or fully trained	40,115 partially or fully trained	14,500 partially or fully trained	14,267 partially or fully trained	118,009
January 2005	58,964 partially or fully trained	36,827 partially or fully trained	14,796 partially or fully trained	14,786 partially or fully trained	125,373
February	82,072 "trained & equipped" Unauthorized absences personnel <u>are</u> included	59,689 "operational" Unauthorized absences personnel <u>are not</u> included		N/A	141,761
March	84,327 "trained & equipped" Unauthorized absences personnel <u>are</u> included	67,584 "operational" Unauthorized absences personnel <u>are not</u> included		N/A	151,618 <sup>34</sup>
April	86,982 "trained & equipped" Unauthorized absences personnel <u>are</u> included	72,511 "operational" Unauthorized absences personnel <u>are not</u> included		N/A	159,493
May	91,256 "trained & equipped" Unauthorized absences personnel <u>are</u> included	76,971 "operational" Unauthorized absences personnel <u>are not</u> included		N/A	168,227
June	92,883 <sup>35</sup> "trained & equipped" Unauthorized absences personnel <u>are</u> included	75,791 <sup>36</sup> "operational" Unauthorized absences personnel <u>are not</u> included		N/A	168,674
Stated goal	142,190 (revised up from 89,369 in June 2004)	61,904 (Revised up from 41,088 in June 2004)	36,635 (Revised up from 35,000 in June 2004)	29,360	272,566

N/A= Not available

**IRREGULAR IRAQI SECURITY FORCES**

February, 2005	“As many as 15,000 soldiers”
June, 2005	100,000 ( <i>peshmerga</i> only) <sup>37</sup>

**IRAQI POLICE EQUIPMENT**

Iraqi police component	Status of equipment available as of September 13, 2004							
	Weapons		Vehicles		Communications		Body armor	
	On hand	Required	On hand	Required	On hand	Required	On hand	Required
Iraqi police service	93,093	213,185	5,923	22,395	13,245	67,565	42,941	135,000
Civil Intervention Force	0	11,490	0	1,002	0	10,240	0	4,800
Emergency Response Unit	500	1,020	0	58	300	352	270	270
Total as percentage of requirement	41%		25%		17%		31%	

**BORDER PATROL EQUIPMENT**

Department of Border Enforcement	Status of equipment available as of September 13, 2004							
	Weapons		Vehicles		Communications		Body armor	
	On hand	Required	On hand	Required	On hand	Required	On hand	Required
	16,442	42,601	1,798	8,271	1,627	8,271	4,000	28,626
Total as percentage of requirement	39%		22%		20%		14%	

**NOTE:** The discrepancy between equipment needed and equipment on hand might not be as severe as these numbers suggest, considering that equipment requirements are based on numbers of security personnel needed, and not the number of security personnel currently serving.

# **ECONOMIC & QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS**

## **FUEL**

Time	Fuel supplies available						Overall fuel supplies as percentage of goal during that month (the goals have shifted)
	Millions of barrels/day		Millions of liters/day			Tons/day	
	Crude oil production	Crude oil export	Diesel (Prod. & Imp.)	Kerosene (Prod. & Imp.)	Gasoline/Benzene (Prod. & Imp.)	Liquid Petroleum Gas (Prod. & Imp.)	
Estimated prewar level	2.5 (prewar peak)	1.7-2.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
May 2003	0.3	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	10 %
June	0.675	0.2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	23%
July	0.925	0.322	6.5	4.75	13.5	1,880	44%
August	1.445	0.646	10.25	6.2	14.0	2,530	57%
September	1.7225	0.983	14.25	6.9	17.3	3,030	70%
October	2.055	1.149	14.75	9.6	16.35	3,700	78%
November	2.1	1.524	13.14	13.3	11.792	3,610	76%
December	2.30	1.541	12.29	9.4	12.9	3,460	72%
January 2004	2.440	1.537	13.91	11.3	13.32	3,445	78%
February	2.276	1.382	15.21	13.05	16.65	4,670	88%
March	2.435	1.825	15.03	17.28	17.19	5,010	92%
April	2.384	1.804	22.75	4.46	19.3	3,607	79%
May	1.887	1.380	22.92	4.005	18.07	3,264	73%
June	2.295	1.148	16.47	4.9	22	3,086	75%
July	2.2	1.406	17.95	5.75	22.3	3,820	80%
August	2.112	1.114	16	4.2	15.1	3,417	84%
September	2.514	1.703	16.35	6.35	14.6	2,707	72%
October	2.46	1.542	16.15	7.95	18.6	3,044	80%
November	1.95	1.320	16.5	7.7	17.9	3,324	77%
December	2.16	1.520	18.3	10.5	17.6	4,222	88%
January 2005	2.10	1.367	12.7	6.7	20.65	5,017	75%
February	2.10	1.431	15.9	8.55	21.2	5,003	84%
March	2.09	1.354	19.7	8.05	20.3	4,894	93%
April	2.14	1.398	18.3	7.6	23.7	5,219	97%
May	2.1	1.319	22.2	4.4	22.5	5,030	93%
June	2.17 <sup>51</sup>	1.382 <sub>52</sub>	18.9 <sup>53</sup>	6.25 <sup>54</sup>	18.3 <sup>55</sup>	5,137 <sup>56</sup>	97%
Stated Goal:	2.5 revised down in February 2005 from 2.8-3.0	N/A	18 revised up in March 2005 from 17.5 in February	5.4 revised down in May 2005 from 6.8 in April	18 revised down from 19.1 in September 2004	4,300 revised up from 4,000 in September	We assume that the maximum supplies as percentage of goal for each category can only reach 100%

N/A= Not available

NOTE:

NOTE: Kerosene imports began 5 October, 2003. All previous months cover only production

NOTE: LPG= Liquefied Petroleum Gas

**OIL REVENUE FROM EXPORTS**

<b>Time</b>	<b>Oil revenue (\$ billions)</b>
June 2003	0.2
July	0.36
August	0.44
September	0.73
October	0.89
November	1.21
December	1.26
January 2004	1.26
February	1.10
March	1.61
April	1.50
May	1.36
June	1.28
July	1.40
August	1.24
September	1.75
October	1.99
November	1.25
December	1.44
January 2005	1.49
February	1.34
March	1.55
April	1.89
May	1.58
June	1.15 <sup>57</sup>
Total as of June 22, 2005	31.25

**GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ACCORDING TO THE WORLD BANK<sup>58</sup>**

<b>Time</b>	<b>Gross domestic product (\$ billions)</b>
2002	18.4
2003 (estimate)	12.1
2004 (projection)	21.1



**ELECTRICITY**

Time	Average amount of electricity generated (Megawatts)		Average hours of electricity/day nationwide	Average of mega watt hours (MWH)
	Nation-wide	Baghdad		
<b>Estimated prewar level</b>	<b>3,958</b>	<b>2,500</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>95,000</b>
<b>May 2003</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>June</b>	<b>3,193</b>	<b>707</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>July</b>	<b>3,236</b>	<b>1,082</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>Aug.</b>	<b>3,263</b>	<b>1,283</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>72,435</b>
<b>Sept.</b>	<b>3,543</b>	<b>1,229</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>75,000</b>
<b>Oct.</b>	<b>3,948</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>79,000</b>
<b>November</b>	<b>3,582</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>70,000</b>
<b>December</b>	<b>3,427</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>72,000</b>
<b>January 2004</b>	<b>3,758</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>79,000</b>
<b>February</b>	<b>4,125</b>	<b>1,307</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>90,000</b>
<b>March</b>	<b>4,040</b>	<b>1,192</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>86,000</b>
<b>April</b>	<b>3,823</b>	<b>1,021</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>78,000</b>
<b>May</b>	<b>3,902</b>	<b>1,053</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>80,000</b>
<b>June</b>	<b>4,293</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>93,500</b>
<b>July</b>	<b>4,584</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>100,300</b>
<b>August</b>	<b>4,707</b>	<b>1,440</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>109,900</b>
<b>September</b>	<b>4,467</b>	<b>1,485</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>107,200</b>
<b>October</b>	<b>4,074</b>	<b>1,280</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>99,306</b>
<b>November</b>	<b>3,199</b>	<b>845</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>76,550</b>
<b>December</b>	<b>3,380</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>81,114</b>
<b>January 2005</b>	<b>3,289</b>	<b>985</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>78,925</b>
<b>February</b>	<b>3,611</b>	<b>1,180</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>86,675</b>
<b>March</b>	<b>3,627</b>	<b>994</b>	<b>11.8</b>	<b>87,051</b>
<b>April</b>	<b>3,390</b>	<b>854</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>81,350</b>
<b>May</b>	<b>3,712</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>89,088</b>
<b>June</b>	<b>4,153<sup>59</sup></b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>9.4<sup>60</sup></b>	<b>102,525<sup>61</sup></b>
<b>Stated Goal:</b>	<b>6,000 to have been reached by July 1, 2004</b>	<b>2,500 to have been reached by October 2003</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>120,000</b>

N/A = Not available

**NATIONWIDE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE SINCE MAY , 2003**

Month	Unemployment rate nation-wide
May 2003	N/A
June	50 - 60%
July	N/A
August	50-60%
September	N/A
October	40 - 50%
November	N/A
December	45-55%
January 2004	30 - 45%
February	30 - 45%
March	30- 45%
April	30 - 45%
May	30-45%
June	30-40%
July	30-40%
August	30-40%
September	30-40%
October	30-40%
November	30-40%
December	28-40%
January 2005	27-40% <sup>62</sup>
February	27-40%
March	27-40%
April	27-40%
May	27-40%

N/A= Not available

**INFLATION**

Time	Inflation
July 2004	0.6%
August	3.6%
September	5.4%
October	8.5%
November	5.4%
December	3.3%
January 2005	13.9%
February	11.4%

**TRAINED JUDGES<sup>63</sup>**

Time	Number of trained judges
May 2003	0
June 2004	175
May 2005	351

**NOTE ON NATIONWIDE UNEMPLOYMENT TABLE:** Estimates of Iraq's unemployment rate varies, but we estimate it to be between 28-40%. The CPA has referred to a 25% unemployment rate, the Iraqi Ministry of Planning mentioned a 30% unemployment rate, whereas the Iraqi Ministry of Social Affairs claims it to be 48%. "Reconstructing Iraq," *International Crisis Group*, Report, September 2, 2004, p. 16, footnote 157. There is an inherent difficulty in measuring the Iraqi rate of unemployment over time. Because recent estimates are likely to be more accurate than older ones, but also higher, this means that despite an improvement in the economic situation nationwide, the numbers give the impression that it is getting worse. Considering the increase in entrepreneurial activity after the end of the war, we have for the purposes of this database assumed that there has been an improvement in unemployment levels, and hence weighted information supporting such a conclusion heavier than contradictory data reports.

**TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBERS**

Time	Telephone subscribers
Estimated prewar level (landlines only, no cellular network)	833,000
September	850,000
December	600,000
January 2004	600,000
February	900,000
March	984,225
April	1,095,000
May	1,220,000
June	1,200,000
July	N/A
August	1,463,148
September	1,579,457
October	1,753,000
November	2,135,000
December	2,152,000
January 2005	2,449,139
February	2,569,110
March	2,982,115
April	3,172,771
May	3,172,771
June	3,680,699 <sup>64</sup>
Previous goal (Jan. 2004)	1,100,000

**INTERNET SUBSCRIBERS**

Time	Internet subscribers (does not include unregulated users of Internet cafes)
Estimated prewar level	4,500
September 2003	4,900
January-April 2004	N/A
May	54,000
June	59,000
July	73,000
August	87,000
September	95,000
October	102,978
November	110,000
January 2005	124,293
March 2005	147,076

**MEDIA<sup>65</sup>**

Time	Commercial TV stations	Commercial radio stations	Independent newspapers and magazines
Prewar	0	0	0
May 2003	0	0	8
June 2004	13	74	150
January 2005	10	51	100
March 2005	N/A	N/A	200
April 2005	24	80	170
May 2005	23	80	170

**WHEAT PRODUCTION**

Time	Tons (in millions)
Prewar	1.9
2003	2.6
2004	N/A

N/A=Not available


**WORLD BANK ESTIMATE OF IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION NEEDS**

Category	Millions of dollars		
	2004	2005-2007	Total
Government Institutions, Civil Society, Rule of Law & Media	99	288	387
Health, Education, Employment Creation	1,880	5,310	7,190
Infrastructure	5,836	18,368	24,204
Agriculture and Water Resources	1,230	1,797	3,027
Private Sector Development	176	601	777
Mine Action	80	154	234
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,301</b>	<b>26,518</b>	<b>35,819</b>

**C.P.A.-ESTIMATED NEEDS IN SECTORS NOT COVERED BY THE UN/WORLD BANK ASSESSMENT**


Category	Millions of dollars		
	2004	2005-2007	Total
Security and Police	5,000	-	5,000
Oil	2,000	6,000	8,000
Culture	140	800	940
Environment	500	3,000	3,500
Human rights	200	600	800
Foreign Affairs	100	100	200
Religious Affairs	100	200	300
Science and Technology	100	300	400
Youth and Sport	100	200	300
<b>Total of CPA estimates</b>	<b>8,240</b>	<b>11,200</b>	<b>19,440</b>

**AMERICAN AID APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED AND DISBURSED TOWARDS THE IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND (IRRF I & II)<sup>66</sup>**



**NOTE:** An 'appropriation' is defined as a plan, approved by the Office of Management and Budget, to spend resources provided by law. *Quarterly Update to Congress: 2207 Report*, October 2004. An 'obligation' can be defined as "a definite commitment which creates a legal liability of the Government for the payment of appropriated funds for goods and services ordered or received." GAO/OGC-91-5: *Principles of Federal Appropriations Law*, Office of the General Council, July 1991. A 'disbursement' is an actual payment (check goes out the door) for goods/services received. *GAO-04-902 R: Rebuilding Iraq*, General Accounting Office, June 2004.

## NON-AMERICAN AID PLEDGED AND DISBURSED TOWARDS IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION<sup>67</sup>



### PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT

Year	Children enrolled in primary school
2000	3.6 million
2003/2004	4.3 million

### COMMERCIAL AIRPORT DEPARTURES NATIONWIDE

Time	Commercial aircraft departures nationwide (per day)
Prewar	2-3
January 2004	40
April	20
May	20
June	45
July	45
August	45
September	45
October 2004	45
Stated goal for July 2004	200-300

### HEPATITIS OUTBREAKS

Rate of incidents (all types of hepatitis)
2002=100
2003=170
2004=200

### RELATIVE AMOUNT OF CAR TRAFFIC

Relative amount of car traffic (Prewar level 1.0)	
July 2003	1.0
January 2004	2.0
July 2004	3.0
January 2005	5.0

### TYPICAL LENGTH OF GASOLINE LINES


Typical Length of Gasoline Line (miles)	
July 2003	0.1
January 2004	0.5
July 2004	1.0
January 2005	1.0

NOTE ON HEPATITIS OUTBREAK TABLE: The hepatitis level in 2002 is defined as 100.


# POLLING/POLITICS

*MAY 27, 2004 – APRIL 20, 2005: INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE*


## QUESTION TO IRAQIS: IS IRAQ MOVING IN THE RIGHT OR WRONG DIRECTION?



## QUESTION TO IRAQIS: HOW DO YOU THINK YOUR LIFE WILL BE A YEAR FROM NOW?



**PERCENTAGE OF IRAQI POPULATION IN SUNNI AREAS WHO THINK IRAQ IS MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION**



**2-11 FEBRUARY 2005: AMERICAN MILITARY<sup>68</sup>**  
*(90% of sample from Baghdad, 10% from Mahmoudiya, Istiqlal, and Taji)*

**SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE TOWARDS POLITICAL ENDS, AGAINST IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, AND IRAQI INFRASTRUCTURE**

Time	Do you support...		
	...the use of violence towards political ends?	...attacks against Iraqi security forces?	...attacks against Iraqi infrastructure?
August 2004 (Urban only)	Yes: 9% No: 89% Don't know: 1%	Yes: 6% No: 91% Don't know: 3%	Yes: 6% No: 91% Don't know: 3%
February 2005 (Urban only)	Yes: 4% No: 93% Don't know: 3%	Yes: 2% No: 96% Don't know: 2%	Yes: 4% No: 93% Don't know: 3%

**WHO CAN IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN IRAQ: IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, U.S. MILITARY FORCES OR THE ARMED NATIONAL OPPOSITION?**

Time	How would you rate your confidence in...		
	... the <i>Iraqi National Guard</i> improving the situation in Iraq?	... <i>U.S. military forces</i> improving situation in Iraq?	... the <i>armed national opposition</i> improving the situation in Iraq?
August 2004 (Urban only)	A great deal/Quite a lot: 74% Not very much/None at all: 15% Don't know: 11%	A great deal/Quite a lot: 8% Not very much/None at all: 86% Don't know: 6%	A great deal/Quite a lot: 32% Not very much/None at all: 55% Don't know: 13%
February 2005 (Urban only)	A great deal/Quite a lot: 76% Not very much/None at all: 17% Don't know: 7%	A great deal/Quite a lot: 15% Not very much/None at all: 76% Don't know: 9%	A great deal/Quite a lot: 20% Not very much/None at all: 51% Don't know: 29%

**SUPPORT FOR/OPPOSITION TO THE COALITION**

Time	How much do you support or oppose the presence of Coalition Forces in Iraq?
August 2004	Support: 17% Oppose: 77% Don't know: 6%
February 2005 (Urban only)	Support: 23% Oppose: 71% Don't know: 6%

## **SATISFACTION WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ACCESS TO UTILITIES**

Time	How satisfied are you with the local government?	How satisfied are you with the availability of electricity in your neighborhood?	Do you have water service in your home?
August 2004 (Urban only)	Satisfied: 34% Dissatisfied: 63%	Satisfied: 7% Dissatisfied: 92%	Yes: 70% No: 29%
February 2005 (Urban only)	Satisfied: 28% Dissatisfied: 70%	Satisfied: 4% Dissatisfied: 96%	Yes: 79% No: 20%

## ***ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT***

### **COMPOSITION OF IRAQI GOVERNMENT**

		Ethno-religious group (gender)	Ethno-religious group (gender)
		Interim government (Allawi)	Transitional government (Jafari)
<b>Presidency</b>	President	<i>Sunni</i> (M)	<i>Kurd</i> (M)
	Deputy President	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Deputy President	<i>Kurd</i> (M)	<i>Sunni</i> (M)
<b>Prime Minister</b>	Prime Minister	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Deputy Prime Minister	<i>Kurd</i> (M)	<i>Kurd</i> (M)
	Deputy Prime Minister	Position did not exist	Shiite (M)
	Deputy Prime Minister	Position did not exist	<i>Sunni</i> (M/F)
	Deputy Prime Minister	Position did not exist	<i>Turkman</i> (M/F)
<b>Key Ministers</b>	Defense	Shiite (M)	<i>Sunni</i> (M)
	Electricity	<i>Sunni</i> (M)	Shiite (M)
	Finance	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Foreign Affairs	<i>Kurd</i> (M)	<i>Kurd</i> (M)
	Interior	<i>Sunni</i> (M)	Shiite (M)
	Justice	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Oil	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
<b>Ministers of State</b>	National Assembly	Position did not exist	Shiite (M)
	National Security	Position did not exist	Shiite (M)
	Provinces	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Women	<i>Kurd</i> (F)	<i>Sunni</i> (F)
<b>Other Ministers</b>	Agriculture	Shiite (F)	Shiite (M)
	Civil Society	Position did not exist	Shiite (M)
	Communications	Shiite (M)	<i>Kurd</i> (F)
	Culture	Shiite (M)	<i>Sunni</i> (M)
	Displacement and Migration	<i>Christian</i> (F)	Shiite (F)
	Education	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Environment	Shiite (F)	<i>Kurd</i> (F)
	Health	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Higher Education	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Housing and Reconstruction	<i>Sunni</i> (M)	Shiite (M)
	Human Rights	<i>Kurd</i> (M)	<i>Sunni</i> (M)
	Industry and Minerals	<i>Sunni</i> (M)	<i>Sunni</i> (M)
	Labor and Social Affairs	Shiite (F)	<i>Kurd</i> (M)
	Planning	Shiite (F)	<i>Kurd</i> (M)
	Public Works	<i>Kurd</i> (F)	<i>Kurd</i> (F)
	Science and Technology	<i>Turkmen</i> (M)	<i>Christian</i> (F)
	Tourism and Antiquities	Position did not exist	<i>Sunni</i> (M)
	Trade	<i>Sunni</i> (M)	<i>Kurd</i> (M)
	Transportation	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Water Resources	<i>Kurd</i> (M)	<i>Kurd</i> (M)
	Youth and Sport	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)



**IRAQI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQI PEOPLE**

Do you feel that the new Iraqi Transitional Government is representative of the Iraqi people as a whole?	Very representative: 35.5% Generally representative: 37.3% Not all are represented: 14.7% Not at all representative: 4% Don't know: 7.5%
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***FEBRUARY 27- MARCH 5, 2005: INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE***

(Interviews conducted across the country except for Anbar (Ramadi), Ninewah (Mosul), and Dohuk for security reasons)

**IRAQI VIEWS ON SITUATION IN IRAQ: FEBRUARY 27 – MARCH 5, 2005**

<b>Thinking about your life today, to what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?</b>	
<b>I am hopeful for the future</b>	Strongly agree: 65.7% Agree: 25% Disagree: 4.3% Strongly disagree: 2.1%
<b>I fear for the safety of myself and family</b>	Strongly agree: 53.2% Agree: 23.5% Disagree: 7.4% Strongly disagree: 13.9%
<b>Things will get better slowly</b>	Strongly agree: 56.2% Agree: 33.5% Disagree: 5.5% Strongly disagree: 2.2%
<b>My life was better before the war</b>	Strongly agree: 21.9% Agree: 15.4% Disagree: 20.6% Strongly disagree: 40.1%

**ISSUES IRAQIS MOST WANT THE GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH**

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Inadequate electricity</li> <li>2. Unemployment</li> <li>3. Healthcare</li> <li>4. Crime</li> <li>5. National Security</li> <li>6. High prices</li> <li>7. Presence of coalition forces</li> <li>8. Terrorists</li> <li>9. Drafting of a constitution</li> <li>10. Lack of adequate housing</li> </ol>	
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**IRAQIS ON POLITICAL REPRESENTATION**

Do you feel that the Transitional National Assembly will represent the Iraqi people as a whole?	Yes: 70% No: 18.6% Don't know: 8.3% No answer: 3.2%
Is there a political party or figure that you currently support or feel shares your values or ideas?	Yes: 20.8% No: 72.9% Don't know: 4.2% No answer: 2%

**IRAQI JANUARY 2005 VOTER TURNOUT & ELECTION RESULTS**

<b>Voter turnout</b>	<b>Election results</b>
<b>8.46 million (58% of the eligible population)</b>	<b>United Iraqi Alliance (Shiite): 48% Kurdish Alliance: 26% Allawi's Iraqi List : 14%</b>

***JANUARY 19 – JANUARY 23, 2005: ABU DHABI TV/ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL POLL***

<b>Do you favor U.S. forces withdrawing either immediately or after an elected government is in place?</b>	<b>Sunni Arabs: 82% Shiite Arabs: 69%</b>
<b>Do you believe that the U.S. will “hurt” Iraq over the next five years?</b>	<b>Sunni Arabs: 64% Shiite Arabs: 49%</b>
<b>Do you believe that the ongoing insurgent attacks are a legitimate form of resistance?</b>	<b>Sunni Arab: 53%</b>
<b>Do you prefer an Islamic government or a political system where citizens are allowed to practice their own religion?</b>	<b>Own religion: 59% Islamic government: 34%</b>

***SEPTEMBER 24-OCTOBER 4, 2004: INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE***

**IRAQI PERCEPTION OF OVERALL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY: SEPTEMBER 24-OCTOBER 4, 2004**

<b>Question</b>	<b>Findings</b>
<b>In the past year and a half, has your household been directly affected by violence in terms of death, handicap, or significant monetary loss?</b>	<b>Yes: 22% No: 77.5%</b>
<b>Thinking about the difficult situation in Iraq currently, whether in terms of security, the economy or living conditions, who – in your view – is most to blame?</b>	<b>Multinational forces: 33.4% Foreign terrorists: 32.1% Armed supporters of the former regime: 8.1% Ourselves: 5.3% United States: 1.5% Combinations of all listed factors: 12.2%</b>

**MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES TO IRAQIS: SEPTEMBER 24-OCTOBER 4, 2004**

<b>Five most important issues to Iraqis</b>
<b>Unemployment: 17.6%</b>
<b>Crime: 14%</b>
<b>Infrastructure: 9.5%</b>
<b>National security: 9%</b>
<b>Multinational forces: 6.8%</b>
<b>Other: 56.9%</b>

**PROSPECT OF CIVIL WAR: SEPTEMBER 24-OCTOBER 4, 2004**

<b>Question</b>	<b>Findings</b>
<b>Do you believe that the prospect of civil war, widespread ethnic, sectarian or other armed struggle - is now:</b>	<b>Unlikely to happen in Iraq: 68.8% Always possible, but unlikely: 14.8% Likely to occur in the near-term: 7.8% Don't know: 8.3%</b>

**AUGUST 10-20, 2004:**  
**INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE & INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
 AND CIVIL SOCIETY STUDIES POLL**

Since the Fall of the Baath regime in April 2003, do you feel that your life has gotten better, worse or stayed the same?	Better: 46.5% Worse: 31.3% Same: 20.8% Don't know: 1.1%
Do you feel that there are enough opportunities for you or people like you to play a role in improving the quality of life in your community?	Yes: 40% No: 42% Don't know/No answer: 10%
To what degree do you feel that democracy in Iraq is likely or unlikely to succeed?	Very likely: 20.2% Somewhat likely: 37.8% Somewhat unlikely: 13.9% Very unlikely: 18.3% Don't know: 9.3%

**JULY 24 - AUGUST 2, 2004:**  
**INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE & INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
 & CIVIL SOCIETY STUDIES POLL**

**IRAQI PERCEPTION OF CURRENT SITUATION: JULY 24 - AUGUST 2, 2004:**

Thinking about the last two months, do you feel that the economy and security have gotten better, worse, or stayed the same?	<u>Economy</u>	<u>Security</u>
	Better: 47.36% Worse: 13.99% Same: 36.08%	Better: 56.77% Worse: 19.96% Same: 21.63%

**END OF JUNE, 2004: IRAQ CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND STRATEGIC STUDIES POLL**

Do you strongly or somewhat oppose the presence of coalition forces?	Yes: 67%
Should coalition forces leave either immediately or directly after the election?	Yes: 80%
Would you feel safer, less safe, or would it make no difference if coalition forces left now?	More safe: 41% Less safe: 34% No difference: 17%
Should coalition forces stay as long as is necessary for stability or leave immediately?	Stay as long as is necessary for stability: 13% Leave immediately: 30%
Do you feel very safe in your neighborhood?	End of June: 50% End of April: 25%
Have your family's economic situation improved from before the war?	Yes: 50%
Do you expect the economy to get better over the next six months?	End of June: ~60% End of April: 36%
Have conditions for creating peace worsened over the past three months?	Yes: 49%
Are the current difficulties a price worth paying for toppling Saddam?	Yes: 54% No: 37%

**9-19 JUNE, 2004: COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA) POLL**

**CONFIDENCE IN IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: 9-19 JUNE, 2004**

Do you support the new Iraqi Army?	Yes: 70%
Do you support the new Iraqi police?	Yes: 72%

**14-23 MAY, 2004: COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA) POLL**

**CONFIDENCE IN SELECTED INSTITUTIONS: 14-23 MAY, 2004**

Month	Iraqi Police	Iraqi Army	Coalition forces
November 2003	84%	71%	N/A
January 2004	80%	63%	28%
March	79%	61%	13%
April	67%	62%	7%
May	76%	62%	10%

**HOW LONG SHOULD COALITION FORCES STAY IN IRAQ: 14-23 MAY, 2004**

Question	Findings
How long should Coalition Forces stay in Iraq?	Leave after a permanent government is elected: 45% Leave immediately: 41% As long as Coalition Forces think it is necessary for stability: 6% Two years: 4% Don't know/No answer: 4%

**PRISONERS ABUSE AT ABU GHRAIB: 14-23 MAY, 2004**

Question	Findings
Were you surprised when you saw the abuse of prisoner's at Abu Ghraib?	Yes: 71% No: 22% Don't know/No answer: 7%
Do you believe that the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib represents fewer than 100 people or that all Americans behave this way?	All Americans are like this: 54% Fewer than 100 people: 38% Don't know/No answer: 8%
Do you believe anyone will be punished for what happened at Abu Ghraib?	No: 61% Yes: 29% Don't know/No answer: 10%

**ABILITY OF IRAQI POLICE AND ARMY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN IRAQ: 14-23 MAY, 2004**

Question	Findings
Do you think it is likely that the Iraqi police and Army will maintain security without the presence of Coalition Forces?	Very likely: 62% Somewhat likely: 25% Not very likely: 6% Don't know/No answer: 4% Not at all likely: 3%

**IRAQI PERCEPTION OF INSURGENTS: 14-23 MAY, 2004**

Please indicate if and how the following statements apply to those who attack the Coalition Forces and those who work with them	
They believe that the Coalition is trying to steal Iraq's wealth	Totally true: 66% Partially true: 12% Not true: 7%
They believe all foreign forces must leave at once	Totally true: 59% Partially true: 15% Not true: 11%
They believe national dignity requires the attacks	Totally true: 53% Partially true: 15% Not true: 13%
They want democracy, but do not believe the Coalition will help democracy	Totally true: 41% Partially true: 22% Not true: 15%
They want to establish an Islamic state with no outside influence	Totally true: 31% Partially true: 28% Not true: 21%
They are trying to go undermine the transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces	Totally true: 27% Partially true: 18% Not true: 36%
They are trying to help us create a better future	Totally true: 23% Partially true: 23% Not true: 32%
They do not want democracy in Iraq	Totally true: 17% Partially true: 21% Not true: 45%
They are angry because they lost the privileges they had under Saddam	Totally true: 15% Partially true: 17% Not true: 48%
They want to return to Saddam and the Baath party	Totally true: 9% Partially true: 11% Not true: 61%

**NOTE ON IRAQI OPINION OF COALITION FORCES:** Although not represented by the original polling information, we assume that the 131 of the 1068 people whose opinions were not accounted for in the "leave" or "stay" categories either did not know or choose not to answer the question.

**MARCH 22-APRIL 9, 2004: CNN/USA TODAY/ GALLUP POLL**

<b>Question</b>	<b>Findings</b>
Has the coalition invasion in Iraq done more harm than good or more good than harm?	More harm than good: 46% More good than harm: 33% The same: 16% Don't know: 4%
Is Iraq much better off, somewhat better off, somewhat worse off, or much worse off than before the U.S. and British invasion?	Much better off: 11% Somewhat better off: 31% About the same: 17% Somewhat worse off: 24% Much worse off: 15% Don't know: 2%
Would you prefer for the U.S. and British forces to leave immediately (in the next few months), or do you think they should stay in Iraq for a longer period of time?	Leave immediately (in the next few months): 57% Stay in Iraq for a longer period of time: 36% Don't know: 7%
Do you think of the Coalition forces mostly as occupiers, or mostly as liberators?	Mostly as occupiers: 71% Mostly as liberators: 19% Both equally: 8% Don't know: 2%
At the time of the invasion last spring, did you think of the Coalition forces mostly as occupiers, or mostly as liberators?	Mostly as occupiers: 43% Mostly as liberators: 43% Both equally: 9% Don't know: 4%
Over the past three months, have conditions for creating peace and stability in Iraq improved or worsened?	Improved: 25% Worsened: 54% Stayed the same: 19% Don't know: 2%
If the Coalition left Iraq today, would you feel more safe or less safe?	More safe: 28% Less safe: 53% No difference: 12% Don't know: 8%

**9 – 28 FEBRUARY, 2004: OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL/BBC/ABC NEWS STUDY**

**IRAQI PERCEPTION OF OVERALL SITUATION**

<b>Month</b>	<b>How are things compared with a year ago?<sup>69</sup></b>
<b>February</b>	<b>Better: 56.5%</b> <b>Worse: 18.6%</b>

**STATE DEPARTMENT STUDY AND GALLUP POLLS**

**IRAQI PUBLIC OPINION NATIONWIDE AND BAGHDAD: NOVEMBER 19-28, 2003**

	<b>Nationwide</b>	<b>Baghdad</b>
Do you agree that in general, the local Iraqi police force is trusted by most members of the community? <sup>70</sup>	Agree/somewhat agree: 77%	Agree/somewhat agree: 80%
Do you feel that the attacks emphasize the need for continued presence of Coalition Forces in Iraq? <sup>71</sup>	Agree: 66%	Agree: 61%
If coalition forces left immediately, would you feel more safe, less safe, or no difference? <sup>72</sup>	More safe: 11% Less safe: 71% No difference: 10%	More safe: 12% Less safe: 75% No difference: 13%

**BAGHDAD PUBLIC OPINION: AUGUST 8 – SEPTEMBER 4, 2003**

<b>Question</b>	<b>Findings</b>
<b>Will Iraq be in a better condition five years from now than it was before the U.S.-led invasion?<sup>73</sup></b>	<b>Better off: 67%</b> <b>Worse off: 8%</b>
<b>Is Iraq better off now than it was before the invasion?<sup>74</sup></b>	<b>Better off: 33%</b> <b>Worse off: 47%</b>
<b>Was ousting Saddam worth the hardships endured since the invasion?<sup>75</sup></b>	<b>Yes: 62%</b> <b>No: N/A</b>
<b>Would you like to see U.S. troops stay longer than a few more months?<sup>76</sup></b>	<b>Stay longer: 71%</b> <b>Not stay longer: 26%</b>
<b>Are there circumstances in which attacks against U.S. troops can be justified?<sup>77</sup></b>	<b>No: 64%</b> <b>Sometimes justified: 36%</b>
<b>Have you been afraid at times to go outside your home during the day within the past four weeks?<sup>78</sup></b>	<b>Yes: 86%</b> <b>No: N/A</b>
<b>Is Baghdad a more dangerous place now than before the invasion?<sup>79</sup></b>	<b>Yes: 94%</b> <b>No: N/A</b>

N/A= Not available

<sup>1</sup> Fatality numbers from January 1, 2005 and onwards are reported as documented daily from “Operation Iraqi Freedom U.S. Casualty Status,” *Department of Defense*. ([www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf)).

<sup>2</sup> Calculations based on data made available at ([icasualties.org/oif/](http://icasualties.org/oif/)).

<sup>3</sup> Calculations based on data made available at ([icasualties.org/oif/](http://icasualties.org/oif/)).

<sup>4</sup> Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, “Operations Iraqi Freedom Military Deaths,” ([web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/casualty/OIF-Deaths-After.pdf](http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/casualty/OIF-Deaths-After.pdf) [June 13, 2005]).

<sup>5</sup> Lawrence J. Korb and Nigel Holmes, “Two Years and Counting,” *New York Times*, March 20, 2005.

<sup>6</sup> Casualties update daily from “Operation Iraqi Freedom U.S. Casualty Status,” *Department of Defense*, ([www.defenselink.mil/news/](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/)).

<sup>7</sup> “Details of British Casualties,” *British Ministry of Defense*, ([www.operations.mod.uk/telic/casualties.htm](http://www.operations.mod.uk/telic/casualties.htm)).

<sup>8</sup> Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, ([icasualties.org/oif/](http://icasualties.org/oif/)).

<sup>9</sup> Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, ([icasualties.org/oif/](http://icasualties.org/oif/)).

<sup>10</sup> Monthly figures from January 2005 and onwards from Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, ([www.icasualties.org/oif/IraqiDeaths.aspx](http://www.icasualties.org/oif/IraqiDeaths.aspx)).

<sup>11</sup> Iraq Body Count, ([Iraqbodycount.net](http://Iraqbodycount.net) [September 17, 2004]).

<sup>12</sup> Paul Richter, “No ‘Timetables’ for Iraq Pullout, Bush Promises Visiting Premier,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 2005.

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