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AMERICA'S RESPONSIBILITIES NOW

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. JONES: Good evening. Welcome everybody. My name is Bruce Jones. I'm the vice president for Foreign Policy here at Brookings. I'm delighted to welcome you all here for this very special event, this evening's talk and reception, and book signing. And it's a pleasure to have you all here on a rainy Friday afternoon -- Thursday afternoon, so there we go; (laughter) too much jet lag.

This event actually serves two purposes for us. It is a kind of a soft launch for a new project that we are going to launch here at the Brookings Foreign Policy program, called "Democracy at Risk," which is going to look at the sources of challenge to democracies, both established and new, and to understand the foreign policy implications of those challenges.

I confess that thinking about the event today, I thought that that title of "Democracy is at Risk," feels unfortunately all too apt, but there we go.

More importantly, it's an opportunity to hear from one of the leading thinkers in foreign policy over the last several decades, and practitioners, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, on this very topic of: democracy is at risk, and its implications for American foreign policy.

I'll be very brief. Dr. Rice's story is well known. Born in Birmingham, Alabama, attended the University of Notre Dame, and eventually her Ph.D. from the University of Denver. Came to Washington, was the staff for the Joint Chiefs, and eventually served as director for Soviet and Eurasian affairs, in the National Security Council, under George Bush, the elder.

Went back to Stanford where she became the provost of Stanford, famously, in 1993, the youngest provost in Stanford's history. And was then brought back to Washington in 2001 to serve as the national security adviser to Bush the younger; and then in 2004 as secretary of state. She then returned to Stanford, where she is a professor of public policy, and an avid football fan.

She will be joined on stage by Leon Wieseltier, the Isaiah Berlin professor of culture and politics here at Brookings, and will have a discussion about this book, which she's just produced, "Democracy: Stories from the Long Road to Freedom."

So with that, please join me in welcoming Dr. Rice to the stage. (Applause)

MR. WIESELTIER: Hello, everybody. Good weather to be discussing democracy. Don't you think? I'm very, very happy to have the opportunity to speak with old friend, Condi Rice. In fact, what

you'll be -- you'll basically not be hearing us, you'll be overhearing two friends talk about what we've been talking about for more than three decades.

And what I want to do. Condi has just written this very significant book on democracy. It's a mixture of a memoir and a kind of historical conceptual analysis, the memoiristic and the analytical are mixed very, very skillfully, and it really is, if I wanted a book, the first book to give to someone to present not just the glories of democracy, but the problems attending its realization, it might be this book.

So, on the basis of this book I'm going to have us talk about two subjects generally. First, I want to talk to you about democracy, and then I want to talk to you about democratization, which are not the same subject.

You know, it has -- I think it's by now no longer controversial to suggest that we are living in the age of an ascendancy of authoritarianism. You know, the record is mixed, the results in France the other day were reassuring, but the storm has certainly not passed. And authoritarian ideas, nativist ideas, xenophobia ideas, racist ideas, isolationist ideas have acquired a prestige that they didn't enjoy before, even though they were there; even though they were there.

I was reading, just the other day, an old lecture by Thomas Mann; he travelled across the United States in 1938, coast to coast, and gave a lecture called "The Coming Victory of Democracy." It was a very famous lecture in its time, and in this lecture he said that democracies should put aside the habit of taking itself for granted. He said that democracy is characterized by what he called self-forgetfulness. And certainly that was true in the breakdown of democracy in the 1920s and '30s.

I wonder, would you say that our democracy, or Western European democracy, has likewise been characterized by self forgetfulness.

DR. RICE: Well, thanks for very much. And first of all, thank you very much to Bruce and the Brookings family for inviting me to be with you. It's always a great place, and you are all thought leaders, and so thanks very much for having me here. Thanks, Leon, for having this conversation.

I do believe that democracies can engage in a kind of forgetfulness because it's very easy to take for granted this really rather fragile and somewhat mysterious thing that we call democracy. When I think of democracy, I think not of just freedom or liberty, but as the institutions in which freedom and liberty become encased so that they can actually be practiced by human beings, and that rights can

be protected.

Now, it is a somewhat mysterious process by which people come to trust these abstractions called constitutions, or rule of law, or for that matter elections, to carry out their concerns, their aspirations, to advocate for change if they need to, and to do it peacefully, rather than adhering to clan or family or religious group, or going into the streets, but that's a really pretty mysterious process.

And so we can, those of us who've lived with it for a long time, tend to forget how really hard it is to achieve and stay there. And so one thing that I wanted to do with this book, was to remind people, first of all, of our own American experience, which has actually been a very tough and difficult experience, to getting to even where we are now.

And to relate that long road, which is why it's called that, to our long road, to others who've just begun that journey. But I think it's really quite easy to take it all for granted until something breaks. And then it's too late.

MR. WIESELTIER: It's also the case that people famously aspire for democracy. We saw that when the Soviet Union collapsed, and in other cases, when there was a kind of renaissance of democratic development, and yet only a few decades later, we are where we are. And sometimes I think that it's important to remember that democracy is also the most taxing and demanding upon the individual citizen of the all the political systems.

DR. RICE: That's right because -- the term that I like very much is one that de Tocqueville actually used. He said, "The citizens of democracy have to engage in ceaseless agitation in order to keep their democracy." And in authoritarian systems you don't have the right to ceaseless agitation, so perhaps you can't be blamed if something goes wrong.

But in a democracy, without that kind of spirit of constantly using your institutions, testing them, pushing them to the next level, they start to wither, and so a lot is required of citizens in a democracy.

MR. WIESELTIER: And there is an enormous intellectual, even, responsibility put on ordinary citizens, in so far as we govern ourselves by our opinions, everything depends on the quality of our opinion formation.

DR. RICE: That's right.

MR. WIESELTIER: And if we think thoughtlessly, as it were, or if we allow our opinions to be manipulated, et cetera, et cetera, we actually degrade the political system in which we live.

DR. RICE: And of course it's on us to make sure that that doesn't happen, you know --

MR. WIESELTIER: That's exactly right. You know, when one looks at -- and you write about this very well in the book. When one looks at what's happening in Western Europe now, and I guess what's happening here, one of the things that one notices, is that people somehow have come to find democracy inefficient. There is some way in which -- sometimes I think actually that the single greatest democratic virtue is patience, not only because of the complexity of the issues and the complexity of the structure of governments that are required to address these issues, but also because if you are going to have checks and balances, you are going to slow things down, to the point at which citizens may find their governments emotionally unsatisfying.

DR. RICE: If you want efficiency, then have an authoritarian.

MR. WIESELTIER: That's correct. Right, that's correct.

DR. RICE: Oh. By the way, though, if you are going to be omnipotent, all powerful, you'd also better be omniscient, all knowing, and one of the problems for --

MR. WIESELTIER: God understood that, yeah. (Laughter)

DR. RICE: God understood that. That's right. And that doesn't need to be a democracy, but in any case, if you are an authoritarian you can act quickly. But democracies make actually fewer big mistakes. So, the Chinese, very quickly instituted something called the One-Child Policy, and now 30 million Chinese males don't have mates.

So, sometimes in democracies we do, and then look I'm frustrated too with the slowness sometimes, and what are they doing in Washington, and why don't they move along? But particularly in the case of American democracy the founding fathers intended for the system to move slowly, and incrementally.

Madison was famous for saying that nobody should ever permanently lose in a democracy. So the first time we have a policy dispute maybe I'll win that round, but I don't want to completely defeat you because I'm going to need you the next time around, when we move to some other policy issue. And so, of course it can be frustrating, but far preferable to the authoritarian who is

omnipotent but not really omniscient.

MR. WIESELTIER: Right. Well, here we may be breaking new ground in this taxonomy, and we may develop a kind of bumbling authoritarianism.

DR. RICE: Well, that's the other problem of course. We criticize democracies as inefficient, but the only two examples people will give you when they say, but you know authoritarians -- I have a chapter in here it says, "Are authoritarians so bad?" Well, it was meant to be a rhetorical question. Yes, they are bad.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yes, okay.

DR. RICE: But the two examples that people cite to show that: well, they are actually not so bad, are China, the largest country in the world, where I would say the jury is still out; and Singapore, one of the smallest countries in the world which actually happened to have the good fortune of having an extremely wise man named Lee Kuan Yew, who managed to govern wisely.

They forget about all of those authoritarians that actually aren't so good. Just ask people in Zimbabwe or in Caracas, or Malaysia for that matter, which is neither free nor prosperous. And so we tend to grade democracies much more harshly than we do authoritarians.

MR. WIESELTIER: And on our knowledge, I mean, scholarship has shown over the last 50 or 60 years, that in the old debate that characterized the Russia Revolution and others about whether political equality or economic equality, which should come first. We now know that you can't even dream of economic equality unless you have political liberty.

DR. RICE: Absolutely!

MR. WIESELTIER: I think that debate has been settled.

DR. RICE: Well, and I think we are starting to see -- in China, for instance, which again, let's give the Chinese credit, this is a --

MR. WIESELTIER: If you insist.

DR. RICE: Well it's a country; it's a country that has achieved, to this point, prosperity as its source of legitimacy. So, it's lifted hundreds of million people out of poverty, people have come out of the rural areas. I first visited China in 1988, Beijing was a bunch of horse carts, a lot of bicycles and a few automobiles. That's not Beijing today. They have made a very successful transition from

totalitarianism, everybody in Mao jacket, everybody with their little red book, to authoritarianism, where Alibaba exists as a powerful company.

But we would be mistaken to think that that journey is finished, and when they now start to look for a different kind of economic development, one that's supposed to be based on creativity, one that's supposed to be based on markets. Now, the top-down authoritarian command political structure, comes into conflict with an economy that --

MR. WIESELTIER: And populist, yes.

DR. RICE: -- and populist, and so that jury isn't completely decided either.

MR. WIESELTIER: That's right. We could extend the discussion of this particular theme. I wonder, if we come back to the situation here in the States. I sometimes think, you know, we've talked a lot about polarization in this country in the last 8 to 10 years, and we are infamous for gridlock here, and one of the major parties, actually your party, never mind (laughter), but one of the major parties has made a kind of theology out of the hatred of big government.

And sometimes I wonder whether the hatred of big government and the creation, the strategic creation of gridlock, wasn't in fact partly responsible for the alienation of so many people in America from some of the democratic workings of our system.

DR. RICE: Well, possibly --

MR. WIESELTIER: Because they actually came to hate --

DR. RICE: They came to hate, yes.

MR. WIESELTIER: -- the government that was established as a centralized, as a strong central government by our Constitution.

DR. RICE: Yeah. But not so -- I mean, it was established as strong for the time, and it was certainly stronger than the Articles of Confederation, but let's not forget that the founding fathers put the federal government after a brief time in New York, they put it in a swamp between Maryland and Virginia --

MR. WIESELTIER: Which we are draining now.

DR. RICE: Right. Yeah.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yes, yes, yes.

DR. RICE: And they all went home to the state houses, where they expected things to actually take place, so one of the answers that we have to gridlock in this lovely fair city in which we sit today, is federalism. Is the ability of the states to act in realms that the federal government doesn't enter, even though the accretion, obviously, federal power over time is notable, we still have federalism as an answer to gridlock at the center.

And I think sometimes people forget that when they talk about governing. Those of us who live 3,000 miles away from California are less likely to forget it.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yes, yes, yes. So, I used to find myself in recent years more and more in discussion with Republicans and Conservative friends, just insisting, and I thought it was utterly uncontroversial thing, that government and even strong government is one of the most beautiful creations of civilization. That there is something about government and rational government that is not to be ever sneezed at.

DR. RICE: No. Absolutely! As long as it doesn't enter too many places.

MR. WIESELTIER: Right, right.

DR. RICE: I mean, do you know, let's take a phrase from the American Founding Documents. So, the founding father said, "Life, liberty in the pursuit of happiness." Now, life and liberty we get, but could they honestly have been promising the pursuit of happiness? No. They were promising an environment, a context in which people could pursue happiness on their own basis -- on their own grounds.

So, I'm actually, I'm not quite as small a government person, as many of my friends and my party as you call it. But I --

MR. WIESELTIER: Quite well -- You know, you've got to live with it, Condi. I mean, I've got a --

DR. RICE: But I do believe in limited government, let me put it that way.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yeah -- No, of course. But the key thing I think, the key thing is: we must never speak about government in a way that alienates our citizens from our democracy.

DR. RICE: That's absolutely right.

MR. WIESELTIER: That's really important.



DR. RICE: That's absolutely right; or our public service, if I could just say a bit about that.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yes.

DR. RICE: Now, I teach at Stanford, and it's a school on the West Coast located between San Jose and San Francisco in Palo Alto.

MR. WIESELTIER: They do a lot of computer stuff there, right? Yeah.

DR. RICE: A lot of computer stuff, that's right. But one of the really troubling things that I'm seeing in my students is that they will actually come to me and say: should I try to do public service? I mean, should I try to be in government? We have so degraded the notion that public servants are actually people who are trying to do good, and we so assume that anybody who goes into public service must be doing it because eventually they want to come out and be wealthy. There are a lot better ways to do that than to go into public service.

And so I say to them: I hope you really will go ahead and serve, because you get the democracy that you deserve if you are not prepared to. So, your point about using language about governing, that is antithetical to bringing people into the democracy, that's absolutely correct.

MR. WIESELTIER: I would add to that. I mean, what I would add to the wise advice you gave them, is that they should recognize that sooner or later the finest public service has to happen in public institutions.

DR. RICE: That's right.

MR. WIESELTIER: Because one of the things I've noticed, say, about young people, is that they want to improve the world, but they want to improve in a way that allows them to get around the institutions of politics or government.

DR. RICE: Yes. That's right.

MR. WIESELTIER: And the truth is that it's good to work in a village in Africa for a year or two, I'm not in any way against saying that, but the discreditation of institutions is actually one of the things that brought us to our present political impasse. I mean, if you look, if you listen to Trumps' inaugural address, it was a text we could give a seminar on it.

I mean, it was a state-of-the-art populist -- we'll get to what populism is in a minute -- argument according to which there are the people, here is the leader, the people are one homogenous

thing, they know what they want, he knows what they want, but thwarting them both, and intervening, and disrupting their beautiful direct communication of all these institutions of politics and government, and we have to actually make institutions glamorous again in some way.

DR. RICE: Yes. But we also have to make them work, right, and I think that one thing, if you want to get to the populist issue.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yes. Let's talk about that. Yes.

DR. RICE: I think that one thing that has happened, is that what do populists do? Well, populists give you an explanation for why you are not succeeding, and it's usually an "other-based" explanation. So, you are not succeeding because of some other force, the illegals, or the Chinese, or the big banks.

MR. WIESELTIER: A scapegoat is -- Yes.

DR. RICE: And then you have to ask, well, what makes the ground fertile for a populist. I started this book more than three years ago, I had no idea it was going to sort of be dropped into the current circumstances. But as I was finishing it, I wrote a little epilogue called 2016.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yes. You did, yes.

DR. RICE: Because I think that what happened in 2016 with Brexit, with our own election, with the shockwaves across Europe, we were having what a friend of mine calls the: do you hear me now moments. From people who felt that they had been left out of the system.

And by the way, elites who denigrated their values, denigrated who they were, told them they ought to divide into every smaller identity groups with their own narratives and their own grievances, and basically they kind of got mad.

Now, the good news for democracy is that they still perceived that they could go through those very institutions to change their circumstances. So, that's good news for democracy. The bad news is that even if populism, it begins to stabilize, so people look at Macron winning in France, and they say, oh, thank goodness, you know, everybody is relieved.

The populists have changed the conversation a lot, just by their very nature, just by being there. Centrists no longer defend free trade, centrists no longer defend immigration, centrists talk about industrial policy. So, they are changing the conversation, and somebody had better respond to what

created populism, not just decry it.

MR. WIESELTIER: I think you are right. And I think that the populist phenomenon, there is the policy dimension of it, but sometimes -- when I looked at -- Well, I had this epiphany of during the summer, I'm certainly one of those people who never gave the people in the Rust Belt much of the time of day. Now, by the way, I think everybody was guilty of that.

DR. RICE: Yes.

MR. WIESELTIER: I think Republicans didn't like them because they were losers, and Republicans prefer winners. And Democrats didn't like them because they were culturally so embarrassing, they just didn't want to hear about them. But one night when I couldn't sleep I turned on Turner Classic Movies and the Deer Hunter was on. And I watched the first hour of that movie, and I went: right, that's what I was missing.

But I think that what happened was that by the time we paid attention to these people, their frustration and their fear of disappearing had grown so great that their politics had left the realm of policy into the world of psychology and identity.

In other words, you know, this is what Clinton didn't understand, that these people wanted validation and recognition, and affirmation, and not necessarily an earned income tax credit, even if it was good for them.

DR. RICE: Yes. Good point. Yes.

MR. WIESELTIER: Even if it was good for them. You know, for 100 years Democrats and Liberals, and a long time ago, Socialists, were always puzzled by why poor people vote for reactionary governments, which seems to be against their own economic self interests. And the answer is obviously, that they don't always vote on economic grounds. But just that politics is something deeper than that.

DR. RICE: Well, and had a global dimension too, because those of us who favor the kind of Liberal Order that was created after World War II, free peoples, free economies, free trade, international economy that's integrated and growing. Those of us who favored that forgot that there actually are people who don't win in that system.

MR. WIESELTIER: That's correct.

DR. RICE: And so, I'll have a student at Stanford in the Graduate School of Business and have roughly this profile. Born in Brazil, went to college at Oxford, had a first job in Shanghai, now is in graduate school in Palo Alto, the next job is going to be in Dubai.

And they move seamlessly around the world. And they are perfectly comfortable in this kind of global elite, and frankly we are all a part of that. Most people never move more than 25 miles from where they were born, and so there was bound to be a kind of culture clash eventually. And so I think you are right, it wasn't just the economics of it, there was something deeper. And because it's something deeper, economic growth will help, but it won't solve the problem.

MR. WIESELTIER: And I would turn the screw one more time and say that precisely for that reason, the question we have to -- the debate we are going to have, that the Democrats are already having, and I think they may be coming out at the wrong end of it, or might, is whether or not the moral failings of globalization or of capitalism delegitimize it entirely in some way.

What worries me is that, in other words, we can add worker protections to our trade deals, and still make trade deals, but there are those who are now so understandably indignant at economic inequality, and some of the consequences of globalization, that I hear, especially among young people, resurgences of good, old-fashioned Marxist class warfare kinds of analyses.

DR. RICE: Yes.

MR. WIESELTIER: In which we are going to have to have a debate about capitalism.

DR. RICE: I hear those too, and I think it's mostly people who didn't actually ever visit the Soviet Union.

MR. WIESELTIER: Well, yes. Right.

DR. RICE: And I would put a lot of my kids in that category, but --

MR. WIESELTIER: The only thing worse than undialectical materialism is dialectical materialism.

DR. RICE: Was dialectical materialism, exactly. But I want to return to this problem of, you know: what do we do about? And so, one thing that America has always had an answer is that we mobilize human potential really well, because you were not a prisoner of the class into which you were born. And the key to that was everybody had access to a high quality education. So, now if I can have a

high quality education I can move up, and even if I'm not rich, I think my kids might be.

And it has kept us actually from too harsh a critique of capitalism. You know, the day I can kind of look at your zip code, and I can tell whether you are going to get a good education. So, it's a little harder to say, it doesn't matter where you came from, it matters where you are going.

And so, while I'm fully one who believes in American engagement in the world out there, and I make the case in the book, I'm also a believer that there are few things we had better worry about back here, and you start with, you know, don't create anymore third graders who can't read.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yeah. Absolutely! You mentioned earlier that it was one of the objectives of the Founding Fathers to slow democracy down, as it were. And they did so when they rejected direct democracy in favor of representative democracy. What do you think -- In your view, because sometimes I have a very dim view of populism myself, and one of the reasons I have that, it's because I don't see a significant difference between populism and direct democracy.

That is to say, in so far as the system that we have here, that was created here, requires deliberation, right, than the emotionalism; however warranted by circumstance. I mean, no one is telling them not to feel what they feel, and by "them" I mean everybody who has got a grievance, however warranted by circumstance, there is a sense in which the more emotion that gets injected into our constitutional political process, the more our representative democracy begins to look like direct democracy.

DR. RICE: Well, I have just three quick comments about it. The first is that, look, democracy is always on this kind of nice edge between chaos and authoritarianism, and the sweet spot is democracy. And that means that we all agree, at some level, that we are going to funnel our concerns, our cares, our grievances, our differences through these institutions, we are going to elect people if we don't like the ones that are governing us.

We are going to go to court if we think we've been wronged. We will go all the way to the Supreme Court if we think you violated my rights. And so we've always channeled these grievances and differences through these institutions. That's what makes democracy. And by the way, that's why liberty and freedom and democracy are not the same thing.

MR. WIESELTIER: Not the same thing at all.

DR. RICE: So, when we are doing that, democracy works. Now, we face a couple of -- The second point is, we face a couple of new challenges to that. One is that because of social media, which I like very much, and like you, I actually have a Facebook page, and all of that, while I live in Palo Alto, you can't not have one.

MR. WIESELTIER: Right. They wouldn't let you vote.

DR. RICE: Yes, that's right. It's a requirement. So, we have this social media, and we have the Internet and everything, responses are very rapid and they are very direct. And so instead of waiting to sort of take something through these institutions, now we just fight it out on social media, we fight it out in very atomized media.

And oh, by the way, since I can now go to my cable news channel, my blogger, my aggregator, my websites, I never actually have to encounter anybody who thinks differently. So, now it's just an echo chamber, in which I'm doing my grievance thing over and over and over again, it's being reinforced by others who have the same grievance.

And our politicians react to that. And then they start tweeting, and going to the microphone, before anybody has had a chance to deliberate. And so I think the rapidity and the atomization of information is a second challenge to the system.

And then I think the third challenge to it, and perhaps the most traumatic challenge to it is that, you know, we are just all more impatient than we've ever been in this on-demand world. And when people say, well, you know, why couldn't they get anything done? Okay, fine, they should get something done, but when I hear: well, when they get that done that will make that party lose the next election. And oh, by the way, then they'll get something done, and then they'll lose the next election. I think to myself: is this what this is really all about.

I thought this was supposed to be our -- and that's I think, why Americans are losing confidence in their governing institutions. It's become very un-Madison-like.

MR. WIESELTIER: Well, yes.

DR. RICE: It's not about the next round or getting to the next round, not having any losers, it's about defeating you and you defeat me. And it can't work that way.

MR. WIESELTIER: Where the analogue to the un-deliberativeness that we are

describing at the political level, the analogue at the personal level when it comes to social media, is this very peculiar assumption that social media encourages which is that a person's first thought is his best thought. (Laughter) And we kind of --

DR. RICE: Well put.

MR. WIESELTIER: We know that not to be the case.

DR. RICE: Yes, that's well put.

MR. WIESELTIER: You know, and spontaneity is actually not a political virtue.

DR. RICE: Yes.

MR. WIESELTIER: And it's not a characteristic of reflection.

DR. RICE: You said that, not me, but -- (Laughter)

MR. WIESELTIER: Good. Now let's move on to the second realm of questions that I wanted to talk about and then we'll open it up to spontaneous thoughts. And that is the question of democratization, and of democratization and foreign policy. And I think that I'll start with a slightly controversial question, and that is this, and I think you know what my answer to this is.

The question is: should democratization be one of the pillars of American foreign policy? I say this, I ask this question, I should state that my assumption is that over the last eight years the place of democratization has been demoted in our foreign policy. You worked for a President who had something called the Freedom Agenda, the consequences of the Freedom Agenda are infamously controversial, as you know.

It led to some very, very disputed and contested policies, but there was something called the Freedom Agenda. President Bush's successor, President Obama, for various reasons, that we don't have to go into now, at least by my lights, was content to demote democratization so that we had essentially a kind of realist foreign policy with a patina of moralistic eloquence. But it was really -- and so that my question -- And I know, I know. I will say this is --

DR. RICE: But that's very eloquent, you know --

MR. WIESELTIER: Well, you know, I'm in that business, Condi.

DR. RICE: Right.

MR. WIESELTIER: I mean it's just -- But my question to you is: what should be the place

of democratization in American foreign policy?

DR. RICE: Well, I'm a firm believer that the United States, which is an idea, we are not a nationality, we are not an ethnicity, we are not a religion, we are an idea, and that idea is that human beings reach their full potential through liberty. And that can't be true for us and not for them.

And so the moral case, I think is that as long as there are men and women who are under the most horrid circumstances, and with everything on the line, willing to fight for the very freedoms that we enjoy, the right to say what you think, worship as you please, be free from the knock of the Secret Police at night, and have a chance to chose those can govern you.

As long as there are men and women who want to fight for that, we ought to support them. And we ought to speak out for them, because it makes us less than we could be -- it makes us our lesser self, if we don't.

Now, that's the moral case. And I'm always struck by, the people who are most critical of democracy and want to see it receding in its (inaudible), may not be for everybody; or those of us who actually have the benefit of living in it.

MR. WIESELTIER: Right.

DR. RICE: And so, that's the moral case. Now I'm going to make a practical case, but in order to make the practical case I have to clear up one thing. The Freedom Agenda got very much associated and so did democracy promotion with Iraq and Afghanistan. And one of things I say in the book is that I regret that because of Iraq and Afghanistan, people can't see what democracy promotion really is.

We didn't go to Iraq to bring democracy to Iraq, we went to Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein, who we thought was reconstituting those weapons of mass destruction, and who we knew had been a threat in the region. It was a security problem.

We didn't overthrow the Taliban to bring democracy to Afghanistan; we overthrew them, because they were harboring al-Qaida in a safe haven after 9/11. There were security problems in the same way that we overthrew Adolf Hitler because he was a security threat, and Imperial Japan because it was a security threat.

Now, once we had done that, it was a separate decision as to whether or not to try to



advocate for a post-Saddam, or a post-Taliban Iraq or Afghanistan that would be democratic, or that would be given a chance for democracy. And we actually debated whether that ought to be the case, but we felt, particularly in the Middle East, we had done enough of support authoritarians, because they are stable, and then watch them ultimately not be stable.

So, Iraq and Afghanistan were -- the use of military force not to bring democracy but for security problems. And I would never have said to President Bush, use military force to bring democracy to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Democracy promotion is usually far less dramatic than that. And indeed those are most stressing cases, because you've lopped off the head of something that has no institutions underneath; totalitarian societies, after Mussolini totalitario that is a system with nothing underneath.

So, Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union, Prokofiev and Shostakovich are persecuted for not writing music that's socialist enough. So everything belongs to the state. When that leadership goes away it's really barren out there. But most of the cases, and I cite some of them in the book, when you look at Colombia, what did we do there? We helped them come back from failed state, recapture their territory, and Democratic Security, which is what they called it, has reestablished Colombia as a stable democracy.

Kenya, they have a bad election in 2007. I go to help Kofi Annan to find a way for the Kenyans to get to a power-sharing arrangement, the next time they have a contested election they go to the constitutional court, that's democracy promotion that 1,000 don't die.

It's what we did in Liberia, to help them after their Civil War, and I can count -- cite countless cases of that. So, usually the demands are much less than what we now associate with Iraq.

So, now let me briefly make the practical case. I've heard a lot about realistic, well, realism which is actually, in political science means, there are just states out there in the international system, and they are basically billiard balls, and it doesn't matter what's inside of them.

What matters is, how big is the billiard ball? How much power does it have? That's what matters. But I think I can argue that the balance of power that favors freedom for the United States has worked very well. That means that what is inside the billiard ball matters, because if inside the billiard ball is a democracy, it's not going to traffic in child soldiers, it's not going to harbor terrorists as a matter of

state policy, it's not going to invade its neighbors, it's not going to treat its women badly, and make them second-class citizens. And on and on and on; and it's going to be a more stable environment, it's going to be a more prosperous environment, and we are going to benefit from it.

Nobody is sorry today that we took the risk that a democratic Germany would actually never threaten its neighbors again, or that a democratic Japan would never threaten its neighbors again. And so given the rather, actually, modest investment that the United States has to make, in helping those men and women who are still fighting for freedom, we ought to do it. We ought to support them without words, we ought to support them with our money, and it's both a moral and a practical case.

MR. WIESELTIER: You know, I couldn't agree more. I wanted to develop something that you just said, which is one of the implications of what you are saying, is that sovereignty, which was the absolute irreducible principle of the Westphalian system, is no longer a sufficient protection, according to this analysis, from interference, intervention meddling, assistance, you call it what you want, but democracy promotion does involve taking an interest in what regimes or governments are doing to their peoples.

DR. RICE: Absolutely! And we ought to --

MR. WIESELTIER: We should be candid about this.

DR. RICE: We should be candid about it, and we should absolutely take an interest, especially when it's our allies, because I was in Egypt in 2005 and --

MR. WIESELTIER: And I was going to ask you. That's a good case.

DR. RICE: Yes. And I gave a speech, and actually, at the time Mubarak was making some reforms. He was actually running for the presidency, it was actually a contested election, the press was relatively free, and just imagine if had continued with those reforms. Well, he might not have been hounded out of office in 2011. So, we should want our allies to reform before their people are in the streets, and before there is a revolution.

And so, it's even more important in working with our allies. But just so you don't think I've lost my marbles and, you know, I was Secretary of State. Yes, it still means that you have to invite the President of Egypt, and yes it means you have to invite the President of Turkey, even if you don't like what they are doing, home. But you should be encouraging them to have better policies at home as well.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yes. This is a great concern to many people about Sisi, because on the one -- you know, he may solve a whole host of temporary problems for the United States, and for Israel, too, but he's obviously -- he's an ISIS-making machine, is what he is.

DR. RICE: And even the Muslim Brotherhood which is -- you know, Muslim Brotherhood which has been driven underground, if you really think that this stable in the long run, it's not stable in the long run.

MR. WIESELTIER: Exactly! The other word you used that I found -- that I absolutely concur with, that is absent from the discussion of democratization, as an objective of our foreign policy, is the simple word "help" that is to say that too many times, in my view, our interventions, and I mean, here soft power, hard power, smart power, not dumb power, we leave dumb power out of it.

But, you know, sooner or later somebody will come out for dumb power. But however we do it; too many people describe those as unwarranted, quasi imperialistic meddling. Now sometimes they are.

DR. RICE: Yeah.

MR. WIESELTIER: You know, our record is not perfect on this, sometimes they are. We haven't always covered ourselves in glory, but I remember when, in June 2009, when Iran, when the streets of Teheran and other Iranian cities erupted in that democratic rebellion, and of course which was one of the most exhilarating moments of our lifetime because in that region, there may be, even more than region, there is no greater prize than a change of regime in Teheran. I mean, it's really that important.

DR. RICE: Absolutely. Yeah.

MR. WIESELTIER: When those kids on the streets who were being beaten up, they were screaming, they were shouting Obama's name, Obama, Obama, Obama, he was in the White House thinking -- he was in the White House thinking about 1953.

DR. RICE: Yes. Right.

MR. WIESELTIER: And about Mossadegh, and these kids, they don't know who Mossadegh is, they are 20.

DR. RICE: Well, we were also saying, we don't want to contaminate their revolution by --

MR. WIESELTIER: Well, this is it.

DR. RICE: -- and they were carrying signs in English. So they weren't too worried about people contaminating their revolution, they were asking for our support and help.

MR. WIESELTIER: They were asking help.

DR. RICE: Yes.

MR. WIESELTIER: It really was. And I think it has to be -- and help, whether you call it democracy promotion, humanitarian assistance, rescue, whatever you want, but there are circumstances in which, not just the moral reason. One of the disasters of our policy in Syria will have been, that one fine day, when there is a new government in Damascus, we will have no friends in it. We will have no friends in it.

DR. RICE: Yes. And Leon, that's a really important point. And I want to just make this point. Sometimes, even if you can't do anything, if you can stand for the right thing it matters. So, when I was special assistant for Soviet and East European affairs for George H.W. Bush, I had a stamp on my desk that said, the United States does not recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union.

So, from 1945 until 1990 we did not recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. We couldn't do anything about it, but it was a moral stand, and today the people of the Baltic States remember that. And when they were freed in 1991, America was their best friend; and so sometimes just standing for the right thing, if you are as powerful and the United States, standing for the right thing matters.

MR. WIESELTIER: Well, the cruelest thing you can do to a dissident in an oppressed society, or to an oppressed society, is to make it feel like it has been abandoned.

DR. RICE: Left alone.

MR. WIESELTIER: The sense of aloneness is actually the dictator's most powerful weapon, and we know this. I remember friends of mine who were dissidents in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, when they came out and we became friends, and they told me their stories, they know exactly who their friends here were, and how many there were, and it was -- it kept them alive spiritually. It kept them alive.

Without getting into personalities here, John McCain recently wrote a piece in The Times in which in which he criticized Rex Tillerson for a speech he gave at the State Department, in which he said that Tillerson had advocated a transactional foreign policy in which he had said that that an overly excessive emphasis upon values may actually become an obstacle to the pursuit of our interests.

I mean, you had that job, and you see what's happening here. In the most general ways possible, how on earth does one balance values and interests?

DR. RICE: And I read that speech that had considerably more nuance than I think was picked up. Look, the fact is, on any given day, you may have to find yourself dealing with, working with, even coming -- trying to cooperate with people that don't share your values, it's the nature of the job. The United States is not an NGO, and therefore there are going to be people that we have to deal with.

After I gave that speech in Cairo, calling for Egypt to lead the world, or lead the Arab states in democracy, people said, how could you have gone and met with Mubarak? Well, of course I was going to meet with Mubarak. We had to talk about Gaza, we had to talk about problems with Iraq. And so sometimes policy, you have to do that.

You know, I didn't exactly love sitting across from Muammar Gaddafi, or from, you know, Bashir in Sudan, but sometimes you have to do that. Sometimes even with your friends, you have to deal with them even they are disappointing you about values. But if in the long run, you always remember that those two are inextricably linked for both the moral and the practical reasons that we've been talking about, it will be fine, because you'll never lose your North Star, you'll never lost your compass, even if you sometimes, in policy terms, you can't execute on them.

MR. WIESELTIER: A final question. Do you think that the -- I don't know the answer to this question, I think about it these days. Do you think that the loss of interest in recent years, on the part of our -- the makers of our foreign policy and democracy promotion, has anything to do with the loss of prestige of democracy in various -- in the West or in other places?

DR. RICE: Well, I don't doubt that --

MR. WIESELTIER: You know what I mean?

DR. RICE: I do. I think there is -- First of all, there is a little bit of almost embarrassment, of, you know, well, who are we talk to people about functioning democracy, kind of look at us, and so forth

and so on, and I've even had some friends abroad say, well, you know, the United States, I mean, really, you are kind of a mess. And I say to them: yeah, we are not perfect, we struggle, we make mistakes, we yell at each other, it's a cacophonous. Sometimes we don't get things done but, you know, the reason that you look to that, is because we are not perfect, and because we are a work-in-progress, and that's good news for anybody who is starting out on this road to democracy.

And then I remind people how far American democracy has come. You know, I start the book really about the American cases, because I think this book has been -- I've wanted to write this book for a very long time, because I grew up in segregated Birmingham, Alabama, when democracy was not guaranteed for black citizens.

My father couldn't register to vote in 1952 in Birmingham. And I remember once incident in particular, I was with my uncle, and I was 6 or so years old, and it was election day, and George Wallace was running for governor. And there were long, long lines of black people going and standing to vote. And I said to my uncle, oh, well, obviously Wallace is going to lose because all these people are voting. I knew in my 6-year-old self, that Wallace wasn't good for black people, I think I had been told that. And my uncle said --

MR. WIESELTIER: That was very precocious. Yes.

DR. RICE: I was very precocious. And my uncle said, no, he said, we are minority, and we are large minority he said, but Wallace is going to win. And I said, then why do they bother? And my uncle said, because they know, and they believe that one day that vote will matter. And I never forgot that, and as I saw people standing in line in South Africa, or in Iraq, or Afghanistan, or Liberia --

MR. WIESELTIER: Or Salvador, yes.

DR. RICE: -- or Salvador. And I would think to myself: you know, somehow they know that one day that vote will matter. It might not be tomorrow, but one day the dignity of that vote will matter.

And if I look at our own progress, I think about a country in which that wonderful constitution once counted my ancestors and three-fifths of a man; and yet, I still stood there, under a portrait of Ben Franklin, in the Franklin Room of the State Department, and took an oath of office to that Constitution. Sworn in by a Jewish woman, Supreme Court Justice, named Ruth Bader Ginsburg. And I

kept thinking to myself: what would Ben think of this, right, what would think of this?

MR. WIESELTIER: But we both got our revenge that day. (Laughter)

DR. RICE: Yes. Yes, exactly. We got our revenge. So, you know, some day it will matter, and when people say to me, well, you know, they aren't ready, yes, they need to get started and we need to help them.

MR. WIESELTIER: That's right. And it is also important to remember that democratization is not an event it's an era.

DR. RICE: It's an era.

MR. WIESELTIER: It's an era.

DR. RICE: And it's a long, long era.

MR. WIESELTIER: It is not an event, it does not take place overnight, it didn't happen that way in the West, it didn't happen here. You have to keep your head, you really do.

DR. RICE: Exactly! That's right. And you have to reject one other idea, and that is that there are just some people who just aren't ready for it.

MR. WIESELTIER: That's correct.

DR. RICE: Or just don't have the DNA. And you know, so political scientists when they can't explain something they say it is culture. Right?

MR. WIESELTIER: Yeah.

DR. RICE: So, that's our residual category, it is culture.

MR. WIESELTIER: Right, right.

DR. RICE: Now, Asians were too Confucian, but of course there are many now Asian democracies. Africans were too tribal, but there are African democracies. Latin Americans, well they preferred men on horsebacks -- but now there are Latin American democracies. Germany, you know, they were martial, and they've done all right on democracy. And then, of course, Blacks were too childlike, they didn't care about the vote. So, that patronizing attitude only now really can be spoken about the Middle East.

And people still say it about people in the Middle East. There are lots of reasons it's really hard in the Middle East, and yes, it comes down to whether Islam can find a place that political

Islam can respect the individual rights and liberties and all of that. But the idea that something is just wrong with them, you know, we've got to -- we've got to kill that notion.

MR. WIESELTIER: But in so far as democracy is founded on a conception of freedom, freedom is either universal or it's meaningless.

DR. RICE: Or it's meaningless, that's right.

MR. WIESELTIER: It's meaningless. It's literally nonsense. Okay. We take questions now. I'm sure there are a lot. I guess, all right, there's one right there. I think the microphone is on its way.

DR. RICE: Right there, in the white jacket, yes.

SPEAKER: Hi. Good evening. Thank you for being here with us. Earlier you briefly mentioned international liberal order. I wanted to touch more on that in terms of, what, in your opinion, is the biggest threat to the international world order? And what, if anything, should the U.S. do to defend that?

DR. RICE: Yes. Thank you. Well, I think there are really kind of several threats, you know, because when we think of the Liberal Order, we think of free markets and, you know, growing the international economy. We think of free peoples, imperfectly as Leon said, but we think -- and we think protected by American military power. That's how I think about it.

9/11 and terrorism is a threat because how you use -- how you protect when you are talking about ungoverned spaces, and you are talking about terrorists who are home-grown, and so the whole security dimension has changed pretty dramatically, and we are still just trying to figure that out.

We've got some great powers behaving badly. So, you've got China which is behaving badly in its region, but more importantly you've got Russia that -- and look, I know Vladimir Putin pretty well, and he believes he is reestablishing Russian greatness. So be it if you have to take somebody else's territory to do it, or fly bomber runs up and down the coast of Sweden. I mean, what have the Swedes done to the Russians in the last 300 years? So, it takes --

MR. WIESELTIER: They gave Solzhenitsyn the Nobel Prize.

DR. RICE: Well, maybe that was the problem. Maybe that's why we are having the bomber runs, but you've got some great powers that are pressing. But I think ultimately the biggest threat



is this concern that people left out of the benefits of it will not find a way in it. And then they will change the politics to a point that even centrist politics are afraid to defend it. And I think that's probably the biggest threat.

MR. WIESELTIER: Martin, you had a question.

MR. INDYK: Martin Indyk from Brookings. Condi, welcome; and thank you very much for writing the book, and for honoring us with your presence.

I want to focus on the Middle East, and you've had a lot of exposure to that. And there were the two particular instances. One that you lived through which was while you were in office, which was the Palestinian elections, which produced Hamas, one legitimately, and then we turned against that result, and would not accept its legitimacy.

And then of course there was, under President Obama's watch, the revolution in Egypt which he supported, and the counter revolution, which are the true legitimately-elected government of the Muslim Brotherhood, and we wouldn't call that a coup. So, I just wonder, how do you deal with those really messy problem when the people that you don't like, and who are basically illiberal, actually win democratic elections?

DR. RICE: Thanks, Martin. Well, I talked a little bit about the problem of elections in the book. And elections, as you know, you have to have a context for everything around them, and so I think one problem that we get ourselves into is that the elections take place, and there's kind of nothing on the other side. And so the most organized forces are actually the Islamists.

In both the case of Hezbollah, or the Muslim Brotherhood, or for that matter even Hamas, they are organizing in the radical mosques and the radical madrasases. If you take Egypt, I remember Mubarak used to say to me all the time, the only thing standing between Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood is me. I'm sure he said that to you as well.

Well, yes, because you destroyed all the liberal forces. You put Ayman Nour in jail, you've shut down the parties of Liberals, you've closed their newspapers, you've hounded people in universities, of course there's nothing but the Muslim Brotherhood.

And so it's a little bit of a false with these authoritarian setups, because they've created the conditions in which decent forces can't organize. So, my first answer would be, let's try not to get to

that place where the only choice, the only organized choice is an Illiberal Islamist Party that is going to then act in an undemocratic way.

Secondly, one of the mistakes I think we made in the Palestinian Election, is we should have, and we wanted to, by the way, and we had the entire quartet, Russia, the United States, U.N. and the European Union, behind the idea that if you are going to participate in election you have to disarm. Armed militia should not be participating in elections, but it was the boss who didn't want to do that because he said: I will be saying Hamas can't participate.

So, that's a second principle that I think you ought to follow. And the third principle is, if in the final analysis -- Oh. By the way, on the matter of having more people in the mix, Tunisia is an example of Islamists who are contained, in part, by a national labor union that has real roots in the society. Women's groups that have real roots in the society, so they can't pull the kind of Muslim Brotherhood trick on democracy.

But the third point is, you know, if it happens, and after all of your efforts an illiberal force wins, I think we recognized the legitimacy of Hamas' election. But we said, you know, that doesn't mean we have to fund you, and it doesn't mean that we can't organize the international community to quarantine you. And that's what we did.

And in 2007, the reason they launched that coup is they were in real trouble in Gaza, because as a Palestinian friend of mine said, they suddenly, when they were governing showed that they didn't know how to run the sewer system either. Now, sometimes I wonder if it's not better when they are trying to participate in governance, if they are not exposed, it's not the great resistance.

But as a Palestinian friend of ours, who I won't name, call them, just a bunch of thugs who want to call themselves the Great Resistance.

MR. YERGIN: Dan Yergin of Brookings, trustee. This is a question I'm sure you've thought a lot about. At this troubled time in relations with Russia, given you knowledge of Russia and Putin, what's the path forward?

DR. RICE: Well, yeah. (Laughter) Well, I want to make a point about dealing with Russia under Putin, and then I want to make a broader point about Russia. And you know better than even I. This is an extractive industry syndicate, that's what Russia is; personal power, political power, power of

the state, oil and gas and minerals, and a little political violence thrown in, and a highly aggressive, assertive foreign policy.

I find it hard to believe that you are going to find much in common with that profile. But it's also a power that you have to find some areas of cooperation if you can, and I think there are actually two. One, I think people will easily agree, one I may get some pushback. The easy agreement is, if a North Korean, if a kind of unhinged North Korean leader gets a nuclear weapon that can reach Alaska, it can also reach Vladivostok. So, how about we figure out a way to deal with North Korea? I would think that would be something the Russians might even be interested in.

When it comes to Syria, the sad fact is, because we didn't act four or five years ago, we don't have real leverage on the ground. They do. That war needs to end in Syria, it is a humanitarian disaster, it is straining Lebanon and Turkey and Jordan, it is changing the face and politics of Europe. It's got to end. And Moscow can end it.

Now, one reason that I think the strike by President Trump on the Syrian airbases was useful in a lot of ways, was that it said to Moscow, you know, we are a little bit back in the game here. And are you really sure that you want to put all of your eggs in the Assad basket? Because I don't think the Iranians and the Russians are necessarily on the same page here. The Iranians want Assad. I think the Russians just want their interest protected. And so maybe that's an area -- probably not immediately - - but maybe that's a place that we can all still cooperate.

But now to the broader question; we've got find a way to isolate Putinism without isolating Russia, because Russia's future is not Putin. A lot has happened in 25 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russians travel, they work in American and European banks, they are in my classes at Stanford, the middleclass Russians spoil their kids at Toys "R" Us, and buy their furniture at IKEA. You know, there is a different Russia there.

When I was a graduate student there in 1979, they looked at their feet; they didn't even look at you. Now, you know, they are a proud people. Some place in here, there is a natural constituency for better politics than they have now. And so I think we've got to keep reaching out to that generation of people, and hoping that they find their political voice.

MR. WIESELTIER: Two more questions, quickly.

MR. EIDE: Thank you. My name is Kai Eide. I'm Norwegian. I've been in your office many times when I used to work in Afghanistan.

DR. RICE: Many times, yes.

MR. EIDE: You've talked about the pursuit of happiness, you mentioned, and the fact that more and more people, or an increasing number of people who want that moment, the do you hear me now moment. So, it raises the question also, how do you ensure the pursuit of happiness? And I've spent my couple of months here in the U.S., and will stay another couple of months, is in the middle of a debate about the health care system.

One of the tools, access to health, access to education, will you then look and Europe and the way Europe has organized its democracy. Do you see -- Does that lead you to reflect over how these tools are being organized in the U.S. democracy?

DR. RICE: Thank you. Well, you know, first of all Europe is having its challenges, right. I've been in Britain not too long ago, and reading about the British National Health Service, I'm not so sure it's the best -- you know, the best example of how to organize health care.

But that apart, what works for Europe works for Europe. The United States is very different. We are far bigger, far more diverse, far more given to decentralization and federalism. And so I think the solutions that we take have to be uniquely American solutions.

I'm a big proponent of letting the states resolve some of these problems. What it takes to do something in Alabama, or California, or Vermont, or Texas, is just very different. These are just very different environments, and I think it's why state government helps us a lot.

But when it comes to something like education, the one thing that we, as a country, have to insist upon, is no matter where you live you are going to get a good education, and you know, look, right now, I'll just tell you what I think about our K-12 system right now.

Right now we have an opt-out system in our K-12 system. If URF means you will move to a district where the schools are good. That's why houses are expensive in Fairfax County, and they are expensive in Hoover, Alabama, where my relatives live outside of Birmingham, or Palo Alto. Palo Alto High School, wonderful high school, just built a performing arts center that almost puts to shame the one across the street at Stanford.

So there are great public schools if you can afford to live in that neighborhood. Others send their kids to private schools. So who is stuck in failing neighborhood schools? Poor kids; and when somebody wants to write an editorial in The Washington Post or The New York Times about how charter schools or school choice is collapsing the public schools, they say fine, send your kids to school in Anacostia, and then you can write that editorial. But don't send your kids to Sidwell Friends and tell me that poor parents don't deserve choice.

So, I think this is the civil rights issue of our time, is access to high quality education, because without it you are done. And by the way, then our democracy is going to be done, because we are going to be two societies, one capable and one not.

I think we have a human potential problem along the continuum as well. We are producing 18-year-olds, and 20-year-olds and 21-year-olds with community college degrees and college degrees that have nothing to do with the job market. So, how about we do better at a skills job mix -- match, so that people can actually find a job. Not everybody needs to go to a four-year college.

Oh. By the way, universities are whistling past the graveyard on technology, because if universities think that people are going to continue to pay \$50,000 a year to go to camp, when they can do the first year online. So these are ways that we can, I think, improve the educational landscape, and then you've got to retrain people, and all of that, but my first answer to the pursuit of happiness, is arm somebody with a high quality education and they will be able to pursue happiness.

I hope that those populists, wherever they may be, who promise to people that life was going to get better; they gave them the wrong prescription -- the wrong diagnosis. It wasn't those people that are taking your jobs, it's a country that hasn't paid enough attention to its human potential, and that's the first thing we've got to do. And by the way, then, we'll be confident enough to act on behalf of others.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yes, one final. Yes, sir, that will be the last question. Yes, you? Yes, you, believe it or not. Yes, sir.

SPEAKER: Dr. Rice, thank you very much for your service, and for your speech today. My question is about another largely American-made democratic institution, the United Nations, I'm wondering what you see as the future. I know the U.N. is in a lot of things, but I'm speaking mostly about security and resolving territorial disputes. My hunch is the international order you describe, people are

okay with the free trade, free market, but the third point you made about America providing the security for the world, I don't know how much support that has. Thank you very much.

DR. RICE: Thank you. Yes, it's a good point. Well, you know, the United States, the Liberal Order also had institutions like the United Nations, where we were to have shared responsibility for peace and international security. And of course it broke down immediately because of the Cold War.

And then there was just a brief moment, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, where it looked like it was going to work again, and now we seem to be back in a situation where the Security Council has trouble acting, because ultimately the U.N. is made up of member states.

There really is no such thing as the U.N. qua U.N. It's member states. And in the Security Council where you have the permanent five; China, the United States, Russia, Great Britain and France, nothing is going to get through if the interest of one member of that permanent five is somehow at risk.

So, the Security Council, it's made it harder and harder for it to act, not impossible. One of the reasons that I think we finally got to the negotiating table with the Iranians, was that we got a series of Security Council Resolutions with ever tougher sanctions. We've been actually pretty successful in sanctions on North Korea, now the most sanctioned country in the world, even though it hasn't really paid off in terms of policy.

So, the Security Council isn't impossible, but it's hard. I think we should try and supplement the U.N. machinery with regional organizations when they can act. I think it's easier to act on North Korea with the Japanese, South Koreans, China, Russia, and the United States, than it is with the whole world, and then you go and you present that.

I'm watching Venezuela with just alarm. Perhaps the OAS can actually do something in Venezuela with the support of the major powers there. So, I think regional organizations are actually probably going to be more effective in terms of peace and international security.

And when they have worked things out, they can take it to the U.N. The African Union was actually very effective in helping to deal initially with the T-ROC, so there are lots of examples.

I will say to those who want nothing to do with the U.N. There are a couple of things the U.N. does particularly well. One is peacekeeping, it's not perfect, and I'm the one who helped pass the

resolution that sometimes peacekeepers get themselves even into sexual crimes against populations, so it's not perfect. But there are peacekeeping missions that have worked brilliantly, Liberia. That peacekeeping mission under a Nigerian general worked extremely well.

Even Haiti, the peacekeeping mission worked really well; Côte d'Ivoire, places that American forces don't want to go, to your point that Americans don't want to police everything. And the other thing that the U.N. does well is some of the agencies. So, the World Food Program, UNICEF, so when I talk about the U.N., or think about the U.N., I think about trying to break it down into its component parts.

The most challenged is the peace and the international security piece of it. But there are many other things that the U.N. actually does quite well.

MR. WIESELTIER: Friends, it's my job to tell you now, that there is a reception next door, and in 10 minutes Secretary Rice will be back to sign copies of her book.

I want to thank my friend for a very illuminating afternoon. Thank you for coming.

(Applause)

\* \* \* \* \*

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

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