Trading Places: America and Europe in the Middle East

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See if this story sounds familiar. A Western Great Power, long responsible for security in the Middle East, gets increasingly impatient with the hard-line position taken by nationalist leaders in Iran. Decades of historical baggage weigh heavily on both sides, and the Iranians deeply resent the way the Great Power had supported its corrupt former leaders and exercised influence over their internal affairs. In turn, the Great Power resents the challenge to its global leadership posed by the Tehran regime and begins to prepare plans for the use of military force. With the main protagonists refusing all direct diplomatic contact and heading toward a confrontation, the Great Power's nervous allies dispatch negotiators to Tehran to try to defuse the dispute and offer a compromise. The Great Power denounces the compromise as appeasement and dusts off the military plans. The West is deeply split on how to handle yet another challenge in the Persian Gulf and a major showdown looms.

The time and place? No, not America, Iran and Europe today, but the 1951 clash between the United Kingdom and the Mohammad Mosaddeq regime in Iran, with the United States in the role of mediator. In 1951, the issue at hand was not an incipient Iranian nuclear programme but Mosaddeq's plan to nationalise the Iranian oil industry. The Truman administration, sympathetic to Iran's claim that it deserved more control over its own resources, feared that Britain's hard line would push Iran in an even more anti-Western direction and worried about an intra-Western crisis at a time when a common enemy required unity. Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson, thought British plans to invade Iran were crazy – surely London understood the nationalist backlash the use of military force would provoke throughout the Muslim world – and begged Churchill to back off and accept negotiations. The British, in turn, were furious with the Americans for what they considered appeasement of a regime that could not be

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reasoned with, and refused to give an inch. The British rejected all compromise and finally persuaded the Americans to support 'regime change' with a 1953 coup as an alternative to a British invasion.

Today the tables have turned. It is now America and Iran that are headed towards confrontation while the British and other Europeans step in to offer compromise solutions and plead for dialogue. History never repeats itself exactly. But what does it tell us about the Middle East, and about America and Europe, that in a very similar Iran crisis 50 years ago, Americans and Europeans played precisely opposite roles from the ones they are playing today? Would Americans and Europeans understand the Middle East – and each other – better if they were more aware that for most of the twentieth century, on a wide range of issues, from Iraq to Iran to Algeria and Egypt, the shoe was on the other foot? Could Americans learn something by better appreciating the fact that many of their dilemmas in the Middle East are eerily reminiscent of those faced by the British and French before them? The history is relevant, because when it comes to thinking about and dealing with the Middle East over the past hundred years, America and Europe have traded places. Not all that long ago, Europeans were confident, interventionist and militaristic, while Americans were compromisers who insisted on applying international law and working with the United Nations.

Contrary to claims sometimes made on both sides, the story of the US–European role reversal in the Middle East does not demonstrate the moral superiority of one side or the other but rather underscores the degree to which a nation's policies and perspectives inevitably derive from its relative power, global responsibilities and history. In the Middle East today, the Americans are merely walking in the footsteps of Europeans who, when they were the world's great powers, also felt it necessary to use force to try to reshape the region. This does not mean that the Americans are now destined to relive Europe's fate, but it does mean that Americans would be wise to consider it. Indeed, by studying Europe's efforts to stabilise and develop the Middle East in the last century, Americans today can perhaps avoid the errors – the imperial temptations, the overconfidence, the wishful thinking, the over-reliance on military force and the lack of legitimacy – that doomed those efforts to failure.

'We come as liberators'

In the spring of 1917, British General Sir Frances Stanley Maude led his troops up the Euphrates valley in Iraq, from Basra, in a rapid advance on Baghdad, which fell quickly despite the relatively small number of British troops. The invasion's purpose was to oust the corrupt and unpopular Ottoman Empire, which had resisted Britain's earlier attempts to cooperate and instead sided with its enemies. Upon entering Baghdad, the victorious Gen. Maude declared

> our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or
> enemies, but as liberators … It is [not] the wish of [our] government to
> impose upon you alien institutions … but that you should prosper … and
> that once again the people of Baghdad shall flourish.

It was a statement that President George W. Bush or Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld could just as easily have made – and very similar to the
many statements they did make – in April 2003.[1]

Maude, no doubt, was mostly sincere, just as Bush and Rumsfeld mostly
were sincere when they kept stressing that America's intentions were pure,
and that America wanted to give Iraqis their freedom, not take it away. But if
the British did believe that they would be able to quickly restore Baghdad to
its past glory – or even to impose stability on the newly liberated land – they
were mistaken. Within months of the successful invasion, London found itself
dealing with the deep resentment of the local population, a violent insurrec-
tion and a society fractured among competing ethnic groups and tribes. Iraq
was then, as it is now, a majority Shi'ite country, but had been dominated for
decades by minority Sunnis based in and around Baghdad. By summer 1920,
observers like T.E. Lawrence were complaining that the people of England
had been led 'into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity
and honour'. The government had misled them by 'consistently withholding
information', and the situation was 'far worse' than they had been told.
'Under hard conditions of climate and supply, [British troops are] policing an
immense area, paying dearly every day in lives', Lawrence wrote. The army
was overstretched, but more troops were needed because 'the locals would
not enlist'.[2] Another influential observer, Major General Sir Frederick Maurice,
agreed that Britain was 'in for a long and costly bout of guerilla warfare in a
country with a damnable climate against an enemy who has no capital to
be occupied and no main body to be routed'. But Britain's credibility would
require it to stay the course; it could 'not withdraw now without endangering
interests which extend far beyond the confines of Mesopotamia'.[3]

Over the following years, Britain was unable to find a formula to over-
come the Iraqis internal divisions. It ended up ruling through a constitutional
monarch – the Sunni Muslim, Hashemite King Faisal I, who was seen by
the locals as a puppet controlled by London. British troops remained in the
country for decades, periodically crushing local uprisings with a combina-
tion of ground forces, air power and native police forces, until a 1958 coup,
when the British-supported king and prime minister were killed, the latter
hacked to pieces and dragged through the streets. The rest of the story is
familiar – a series of ruthless dictatorships and instability, until Saddam
Hussein finally proved the most ruthless of all, governing the country

through suppression and terror until finally ousted by the Americans in a quick march on Baghdad in 2003.

There are, of course, important differences between the British and American experiences in Iraq, and the Americans are trying to learn from some British mistakes – by organising elections, for example, rather than ruling from abroad or through local lackeys. But the similarities are also striking, almost 90 years apart. In 2003, for example, many US leaders assumed that because Saddam was so unpopular in Iraq, American troops would be 'greeted as liberators', as Vice-President Dick Cheney confidently put it. Similarly, the British assumed that discontent with Ottoman rule would lead to support for them once they liberated the country. 'There's no important element against us', British Arabist and intelligence officer Gertrude Bell wrote to a friend in the Foreign Office in February 1918. 'Amazing strides have been made toward ordered government', she reported. A year later, Bell's boss, Sir Arnold Wilson, told the Cabinet in London that 'there was no real desire in Mesopotamia for an Arab government, that the Arabs would appreciate British rule'. When the growing insurrection that summer began to prove this assertion manifestly untrue, Wilson and others argued that it was 'anarchy and fanaticism. There is little or no nationalism.'[4] One can almost imagine him adding that the insurgents were acting because they 'hate freedom'.

Ironically, just as many Europeans warned the Americans in 2003 that Iraq would be ungovernable if they evicted Saddam through invasion, in 1919 it was the Americans who doubted that Iraq could be governed. The Americans questioned British claims to altruism in Iraq and suggested instead that their real motivations were oil and empire.[5] Endorsing President Woodrow Wilson's critique of 'militarism' in France and denouncing British and French 'adventures', the *Washington Post* warned in April 1920 of 'costly imperial wars, one after another, dragging their sons into battles throughout Asia Minor'.[6] US scepticism was summed up by an American missionary who told Gertrude Bell: 'You are flying in the face of four millenniums of history if you try to draw a line around Iraq and call it a political entity! … They have no conception of nationhood yet.'[7]

In 1919 it was the Americans who doubted that Iraq could be governed

But the imperial British did not need lessons from the American upstart. The United States could not claim 'equal rights in a country in which she possessed no pre-war interests, in which she accepted no responsibility, and in which she incurred no expense during or since the war'.[8] The British were powerful, they were different and they were right – or so they thought. As historian David Fromkin wrote, 'The European powers at that time believed they could change

Moslem Asia in the very fundamentals of its political existence.'[9] Such a belief is also the basis for the President Bush's Middle East policy today.

The Battle of Algiers

On All Saints Day, 1 November 1954, only months after France suffered a humiliating defeat in Indochina, the Algerian War broke out. It began with isolated rebel attacks, mostly on French military targets, but by the following year had become a full-scale rebellion, setting new precedents for terrorist horrors. Bombs at the offices of French companies like Air France, widespread massacres of civilians, including many women and children and the extensive targeting of 'collaborators' – Muslims working with the French authorities – were all part of the rebels' strategy for driving the French out of the country.

In the face of such attacks, French leaders vowed to stay the course. Interior Minister François Mitterrand responded to the initial attacks by declaring that 'the only possible negotiation is war', and Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France vowed that France would never compromise.[10] Even Charles de Gaulle, who a few years later would end up orchestrating the French departure, argued as late as 1959 that French withdrawal would 'lead to horrible misery, frightful political chaos, rampant throat-cutting, and soon, the bellicose dictatorship of the communists'.[11]

Far from backing down, the initial French reaction was to put in more troops. After an infamous massacre at Philippeville in 1955, in which 123 civilians were killed, Paris doubled the number of French forces, from 90,000 to 180,000. French retaliation for terrorist attacks inevitably led to civilian casualties, just as the military determination to stop such attacks led it to use – and to justify – torture and prisoner-abuse. While acknowledging the use of torture, the French commander Jacques Massu later claimed that his soldiers were 'choir boys compared to the use to which it [torture] was put by the rebels'. By the end of the decade France had increased its troop presence to nearly 500,000, yet still the French could not get a grip on the rebellion – which only seemed to grow stronger the more the French fought back. One of those 500,000 troops was a young paratrooper named Jacques Chirac, who must have had some of this experience in mind as he warned Americans throughout 2002–03 that an occupation of Iraq could only lead to Arab resentment and resistance.

In the late 1950s, however, the Americans were the ones warning about the impossibility of occupation, calling for negotiations and insisting on the involvement of the UN. The Eisenhower administration worried that the French efforts would merely drive the Muslim world into the arms of the communists and distract French forces from the central strategic challenge of the day. An even harsher critic was a young Massachusetts Senator, John Kennedy, who

argued that the French were fighting a lost cause and pushed for UN involvement. In 1958, Washington abstained when the UN General Assembly voted on a resolution calling for negotiations, further infuriating the French, and leading to consumer boycotts of American goods. Indeed, as historian Irwin Wall has noted, the French were 'obsessed with keeping the war out of the UN'.[12] For de Gaulle, sounding more like Dick Cheney than like Dominique de Villepin, that body was no more than 'a group of more or less totalitarian states expert in dictatorship … a ridiculous forum for sensational speeches, people trying to outdo each other, and threats of the worst kind'.[13]

The French and American roles were also reversed when it came to a possible NATO role in the conflict. From the start, the French authorities portrayed what they were doing in Algeria as in the interest not just of France but of the West as a whole. In April 1956, Premier Guy Mollet argued that 'the Western powers should reaffirm in every part of the world, a united front … a common policy'. He informed the NATO Council of France's decision to deploy more troops to Algeria, and demanded NATO's support and endorsement. The allies, however, led by the United States, were hardly enthusiastic. NATO merely 'took cognizance' of the French position, noting that France was acting 'for its own security', again infuriating the French.[14] In 2003, it was America arguing that the invasion of Iraq was in the interests of the West as a whole and demanding solidarity at NATO. And it was France that blocked a NATO role, arguing that NATO solidarity did not automatically extend to operations of one ally outside of Europe. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called that action 'shameful' and Secretary of State Colin Powell warned that it could 'break up' the Atlantic Alliance.[15]

No one would claim that the French experience in Algeria – and the US reaction to it – has exact parallels today. The key difference, of course, is that the French then were trying to hold Algeria as part of France whereas the Americans today are trying to give Iraq back to Iraqis. But at least some similarities and role reversals are hard to deny. Indeed, the similarities are such that in September 2003 the Pentagon itself, not known for putting itself in French shoes, organised a screening of the classic 1965 French film 'The Battle of Algiers', a fictionalised account of France's failed attempt to put down the Algerian rebellion. The official flyer announcing the film read as follows:

> How to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas. Children shoot soldiers at point-blank range. Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar? The French have a plan. It succeeds tactically, but fails strategically. To understand why, come to a rare showing of this film.

Suez: the lion's last roar

No past crisis more compellingly illustrates the US–European role reversal in the Middle East than the 1956 Suez crisis. In facing the challenge from an authoritarian Arab strongman in the fall of 1956, it was the British and the French who were interventionist, militaristic and hostile to the United Nations. The Americans wanted to avoid war at all costs, worried about world opinion and international law, and believed military intervention to be a distraction from the core strategic issue of the day.

From the day he came to power in a 1952 military coup against the pro-Western regime of King Faisal II, Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser was a thorn in the British side. His fiery brand of Arab nationalism and support for revolutionary movements elsewhere in the Middle East was seen in London as a threat to the regional order for which the British were responsible. As the dominant power in Syria, Lebanon and North Africa, France also saw Nasser as a threat. In particular, after 1954, Egypt's support for the Algerian rebels was seen in Paris as a hostile act, and France believed that cutting off this lifeline was essential to winning the Algerian war. Thus, when Nasser moved in the summer of 1956 to nationalise the Suez Canal – owned largely by the British – London and Paris resolved to stop him. Nationalisation would enable this anti-Western dictator to control the passageway for the Europe's oil imports and its trade with the Far East. It could not be allowed to stand.

Immediately London and Paris began to cast the challenge from Nasser in the gravest of terms. His seizure of the canal was not only a local problem but a potential precedent that would undermine order – and the British and French positions – throughout the region. Nasser was, in British Prime Minister Anthony Eden's eyes, a 'new Hitler' who had put his 'hand on our windpipe' and had to be stopped.[16] He was a 'militarist who glories in the fact', and it could 'not be forgotten that only four years ago a large number of European civilians, including many British, were brutally massacred in Cairo'.[17] Eden warned Eisenhower of the potential consequences of inaction. 'If we do not [take a firm stand]', he wrote, 'our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will … be finally destroyed.'[18]

French Prime Minister Guy Mollet was if anything more apocalyptic. Nasser's plan to rely on Soviet arms to export his revolution throughout the Arab world was 'in the works of Nasser, just as Hitler's policy [was] written down in *Mein Kampf*'. Nasser, Mollet warned, had 'the ambition to recreate the conquests of Islam'.[19] The French parliament authorised the government to use military force by a majority of nearly three to one, and even traditionally pacifist newspapers like *Le Monde* argued that 'faced with the megalomania of a dictator, one cannot answer with ineffective judicial

procedures … but only with force'.[20] Both Mollet and Eden believed it would be necessary to humiliate, if not remove, Nasser, and send a clear message to other leaders in the region that challenges to Western pre-eminence would not be tolerated.

The Americans, however, were not persuaded. They believed neither that the threat was as great at London and Paris implied nor that military force was the solution. President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles worried that invasion would inflame Arab nationalism and undermine US relations with the entire Arab world. Indeed, in a letter back to Eden, Eisenhower stressed 'the unwisdom *even of contemplating* the use of military force at this moment'.[21] Eisenhower told Eden that he was making Nasser 'a much more important figure than he is'.[22] He warned that the use of force before all peaceful means had been exhausted 'could very seriously affect our peoples' feelings toward our Western allies [and have] far reaching consequences'.[23]

Eisenhower and Dulles worried that invasion would inflame Arab nationalism

Instead of supporting the use of force, the Americans – just as they had a few years earlier in Iran and as they were doing on the Algeria issue – advocated compromise, international law, UN involvement and appeals to the world community of nations. Dulles made this case to a conference of maritime powers in August 1956:

> We do not want to meet violence with violence. We want, first of all, to find out the opinion of the many nations vitally interested because we believe that all the nations concerned, including Egypt, will respect the sober opinion of the nations which are parties to the internationalizing treaty of 1888.

Dulles believed that moral persuasion would work, because, he said, most people would 'pay decent respect for the opinions of mankind'.[24] Eisenhower's view (in words with which Jacques Chirac would have been entirely comfortably nearly 50 years later) was that 'there can be no peace – without law. And there can be no law – if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us – and another for our friends.'[25]

The American arguments against the use of force and in favour of the UN did cause the British and French to hesitate over the use of force, though it ultimately would not stop them. Instead, London and Paris decided in October to give the UN a final opportunity to resolve the crisis. Their expec-

tation, it seems, was not really to win over the world body – though that would have been nice – but they hoped to demonstrate that, because of the world organisation's futility, they had no other choice than to act alone. Years later, Henry Kissinger called the UN approach a 'last perfunctory gesture' designed to justify the unilateral action that would come. In British and French eyes, 'the United Nations was thus transformed from a vehicle for solving international disputes to a final hurdle to be cleared before resorting to force, and, in a sense, even as an excuse for it'.[26]

When it became clear that neither the Americans nor the UN would back the use of force, the British and French decided to act anyway. The result was the development of an extraordinary scheme whereby Israel would attack Egypt, and France and Britain would intervene – ostensibly to separate the two parties but actually to topple Nasser and take back the canal. The Israelis moved on 29 October, and two days later Britain and France launched a bombing campaign to prepare the ground for their 'peacekeepers'. On 1 November the UN General Assembly passed an American-sponsored reso-lution calling for a cease-fire, but the French and British vetoed a similar resolution at the Security Council, and sent their paratroopers to seize control of the canal. Their rapid military success quickly turned into a political disaster. Concerned that unilateral British–French military action would drive the Third World into Soviet hands, the Eisenhower administra-tion moved to stop the British and French action. Instigating a run on the British currency in international markets, Washington made it impossible for Britain to continue the military operation. Faced with a British pullout France had to withdraw as well. Nasser remained in power more of a popu-list hero than ever, the canal was Egyptian and a new order – led by America instead of Britain and France – was established in the Middle East. It was, historian Avi Shlaim writes, 'the last time that the European powers tried to impose their will in the region by force'.[27]

The Suez crisis resembles the Iraq crisis not only in all these respects but finally in the degree to which it became the source of transatlantic resentment. Indeed, the Suez crisis was arguably a greater blow, at least to US–French relations, than was the 2003 Iraq war. In the latter case, France, Germany and other Europeans infuriated the Americans by *trying* to stop them from undertaking a military intervention in the Middle East, but they failed. In 1956, the Americans succeeded in pulling the plug on their allies, leading to their public humiliation and reminding them of their historic loss of relative power. Suez also had a lasting impact on French and British national strategic cultures and would end up affecting their policies nearly 50 years later. The British 'lesson' of Suez was that London should never again be on the oppo-site side of a major strategic issue as the United States. Its best hope was to try

to influence Washington through friendly, private advice – playing 'Athens to Rome', as Harold Macmillan put it. France's strategic lesson was precisely the opposite: never again depend on the United States. Those contrasting conclusions played out in British and French policy during the Iraq crisis of 2003.

Trading places

What do these episodes from 50 or more years ago tell us about America and Europe and their roles today in the Middle East? One clear conclusion – though an often unappreciated one by those living during the events – is that in the history of international politics 'where you stand depends on where you sit'. When they were great powers responsible for the fate of the Middle East, Britain and France were also the ones who saw intolerable threats everywhere and put their faith in unilateralism and military force to deal with them. Americans, essentially as bystanders, had the luxury of appealing to international law, negotiations and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Some of the keener observers of international politics on both sides of the Atlantic have recognised this essential point. Former French foreign minister Hubert Védrine, for example, candidly acknowledged a few years ago that many Europeans think that the French would be 'even more unbearable than the Americans today if they held the same position in the world'.[28] If Europeans are honest with themselves, they would recognise that the United States' recent imperial temptation in the Middle East is not some genetic defect from which Americans uniquely suffer but rather the understandable product of that US interests, roles, and responsibilities in the world. It is the same temptation that Europeans experienced when they exercised similar roles and responsibilities.

The same point holds true in the other direction. As the American writer Robert Kagan has pointed out, Europe's affection for international law and aversion to military force is not some perversion of national character but rather a rational, predictable and in many ways even welcome product of European history and Europe's geopolitical place in the world. Kagan even argues that 'Americans, when they think about Europe, should not lose sight of the main point: The new Europe is indeed a blessed miracle and a reason for enormous celebration.'[29] If more Americans were aware that not so long ago they were the ones who denounced unilateralism, appealed for concessions and balked at the use of military force, they might be a bit less quick to excoriate Europeans for appeasement and disloyalty today. 'Old Europe' has been behaving a lot like 'Old America' used to behave.

Looking back at how America and Europe have traded places in the Middle East also raises the question of how permanent current US and European perspectives on the Middle East may be. If Americans were

once from Venus and Europeans from Mars, could the situation change yet again? That does not seem likely in the short run, but over time convergence between America and Europe seems more likely – and may have already begun. With the US military now severely overstretched, the government running the biggest budget deficits in history, the dollar weakening and diminishing support for US policies around the world, it is probably at least safe to say that the confidence – or even hubris – that prevailed just a few years ago is eroding. With billions of dollars spent and thousands of Americans dead and wounded in Iraq, Americans are beginning to question approaches about which many so recently seemed so certain – a majority now believes the war has not been worth the costs, down from the nearly 80% of Americans who initially supported it.

At the same time, even the most sceptical Europeans cannot fail to be impressed by some of the most recent developments in the region, and America's role in helping to bring them about. The elections in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine, Libya's disarmament, Lebanese street protests against the Syrian occupation and even Egypt's tentative steps toward more open elections suggest that maybe, just maybe, the American attempt to transform the Middle East will prove more successful than that of their European predecessors. French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier's March 2005 statements that democracy promotion is 'the essence of the European project' and that 'a more democratic world is the guarantee of a more secure world' may be an indication that Europeans are accepting the virtues of America's democratic agenda just as Americans are recognising the costs and limits of the use of military force.[30]

Outside powers pay a high price for overconfidence and wishful thinking

If a diminishing feeling of power and confidence does lead America to start adjusting its role in the Middle East, it will, yet again, be undertaking a process that would seem very familiar to many Europeans. For another clear lesson of Europe's history in the region is that outside powers tend to fall prey to overconfidence and wishful thinking – and to pay a high price for doing so. From the First World War to the 1950s, the British and French repeatedly convinced themselves that their national interest, and indeed the global interest, required them to intervene militarily and that their relative power would enable them to succeed where previous outsiders had failed. When the Americans expressed scepticism – whether over Mesopotamia in the 1920s or over Iran, Algeria or Egypt in the 1950s – the Europeans refused to listen, confident that they had the power to succeed regardless of what the

'international community' thought. That shoe is now certainly on the other foot. The British and the French may well have been sincere in that they had the best interests in the locals in mind, that they were not intervening for oil and that the anarchy that might result if they left the region to its own devices would be in nobody's interest. But that is not what it looked like to the people on the ground, and it is not what many Arabs believe about the American role in the region today.

None of this is to say that the current American era in the Middle East is bound to end like Europe's did. The Americans have resources today that the Europeans of decades past could only dream of, and the US goal of destroying dictatorships is very different from the French and British attempts to run empires. Still, no one can look back at the American and Europe involvement in the Middle East over the past century without being impressed by the degree to which the pitfalls that befuddled the outside powers more than 50 years ago resemble those that the Americans are confronting today. If Americans want to fare better in the region than did their predecessors, they would do well to take note. If the United States can devolve power to local leaders, avoid the temptation to act like an imperial power, and legitimise its efforts by promoting democracy and winning international support, it might also be able to avoid the resentment and violent resistance that doomed the British and French the last time around.

Notes

[1]   For specific comparisons of the Maude statement with Bush and Bush administration officials, see Libby Copeland, 'Déjà Vu All Over Again: "Liberators" Have Been There Before, And Stayed for Decades', *Washington Post*, 6 April 2003; and Niall Ferguson, 'Hegemony or Empire?' Review Essay, *Foreign Affairs*, September–October 2003.

[2]   See T.E. Lawrence, 'A Report on Mesopotamia by T.E. Lawrence', *Sunday Times*, 22 August 1920.

[3]   Cited in 'Volunteer for War in Mesopotamia', *New York Times*, 24 August 1920.

[4]   Cited in David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Avon Books, 1989), p. 453.

[5]   See 'Altruism and Oil', *Washington Post*, 3 December 1920; and 'Britain Will Stay in Mesopotamia: Oil as Factor Denied', *Washington Post*, 21 February 1923.

[6]   'Not Binding Upon Americans', *Washington Post*, 3 April 1920.

[7]   Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, pp. 450–51.

[8]   From an editorial in *The Morning Post*, London, 20 November 1920.

[9]   Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, p. 17.

[10]   See *A Country Study: Algeria*, Library of Congress, www.cweb.loc2.loc.gov.

[11]   See Charles de Gaulle, 'Discours sur l'autodétermination de l'Algérie', Institut Charles de Gaulle, www.charles-de-gaulle.org.

[12]   See Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), p. 24.

13 See de Gaulle press conference of 5 September 1961 in Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages*, Vol. 3 (Paris: Plon, 1970–71), pp. 344–5.

14 See Wall, *France, the United States and the Algerian War*, p. 21.

15 Cited in Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 138.

16 Cited in Avi Shlaim, *War and Peace in the Middle East: A Concise History* (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 29.

17 From Eden's 16 September 1956 letter to Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin, reprinted in Hugh Thomas, *Suez* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 193.

18 See Anthony Eden, *Full Circle: The Memoirs of the R. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden* (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 427.

19 Mollet cited in Keith Kyle, *Suez* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991), p. 115.

20 See Maurice Duverger in *Le Monde*, 1 August 1956.

21 Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, 31 July 1956, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957*, Vol. 16, Suez Crisis, 26 July–31 December 1956 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 70.

22 Message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, 8 September 1956, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, Vol. 16, Suez Crisis, p. 435.

23 Eisenhower letter to Eden, 31 July 1956.

24 Dulles cited in Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994) p. 536.

25 Eisenhower, 31 October 1956, cited in Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 544.

26 Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 539.

27 Shlaim, *War and Peace in the Middle East*, p. 31.

28 Hubert Védrine, *France in an Age of Globalization* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 30.

29 See Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power* (New York: Knopf, 2003), p. 97.

30 See the interview with Barnier, 'Un monde plus sûr, plus démocratique devra être aussi un monde plus juste', *Le Monde*, 2 March 2005.