# The Re-Emergence of Concentrated Poverty: Metropolitan Trends in the 2000s 

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## Findings

An analysis of data on neighborhood poverty from the 2005-09 American Community Surveys and Census 2000 reveals that:

- After declining in the 1990 s, the population in extreme-poverty neighborhoods-where at least 40 percent of individuals live below the poverty line-rose by one-third from 2000 to 2005-09. By the end of the period, 10.5 percent of poor people nationwide lived in such neighborhoods, up from 9.1 percent in 2000, but still well below the 14.1 percent rate in 1990.
progress against
concentrated
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economically
turbulent 2000s
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those gains
erased."


## "After substantial

■ Concentrated poverty nearly doubled in Midwestern metro areas from 2000 to 2005-09, and rose by one-third in Southern metro areas. The Great Lakes metro areas of Toledo, Youngstown, Detroit, and Dayton ranked among those experiencing the largest increases in concentrated poverty rates, while the South was home to metro areas posting both some of the largest increases (El Paso, Baton Rouge, and Jackson) and decreases (McAllen, Virginia Beach, and Charleston). At the same time, concentrated poverty declined in Western metro areas, a trend which may have reversed in the wake of the late 2000s housing crisis.

■ The population in extreme-poverty neighborhoods rose more than twice as fast in suburbs as in cities from $\mathbf{2 0 0 0}$ to 2005-09. The same is true of poor residents in extreme-poverty tracts, who increased by 41 percent in suburbs, compared to 17 percent in cities. However, poor people in cities remain more than four times as likely to live in concentrated poverty as their suburban counterparts.

- The shift of concentrated poverty to the Midwest and South in the 2000s altered the average demographic profile of extreme-poverty neighborhoods. Compared to 2000, residents of extreme-poverty neighborhoods in 2005-09 were more likely to be white, native-born, high school or college graduates, homeowners, and not receiving public assistance. However, black residents continued to comprise the largest share of the population in these neighborhoods (45 percent), and over two-thirds of residents had a high school diploma or less.

■ The recession-induced rise in poverty in the late 2000s likely further increased the concentration of poor individuals into neighborhoods of extreme poverty. While the concentrated poverty rate in large metro areas grew by half a percentage point between 2000 and 2005-09, estimates suggest the concentrated poverty rate rose by 3.5 percentage points in 2010 alone, to reach 15.1 percent. Some of the steepest estimated increases compared to 2005-09 occurred in Sun Belt metro areas like Cape Coral, Fresno, Modesto, and Palm Bay, and in Midwestern places like Indianapolis, Grand Rapids, and Akron.

These trends suggest the strong economy of the late 1990s did not permanently resolve the challenge of concentrated poverty. The slower economic growth of the 2000s, followed by the worst downturn in decades, led to increases in neighborhoods of extreme poverty once again throughout the nation, particularly in suburban and small metropolitan communities and in the Midwest. Policies that foster balanced and sustainable economic growth at the regional level, and that forge connections between growing clusters of low-income neighborhoods and regional economic opportunity, will be key to longer-term progress against concentrated disadvantage.

## Introduction

A
s the first decade of the 2000s drew to a close, the two downturns that bookended the period, combined with slow job growth between, clearly took their toll on the nation's less fortunate residents. Over a ten-year span, the country saw the poor population grow by 12.3 million, driving the total number of Americans in poverty to a historic high of 46.2 million. By the end of the decade, over 15 percent of the nation's population lived below the federal poverty line-\$22,314 for a family of four in 2010-though these increases did not occur evenly throughout the country. ${ }^{1}$

The poverty data released each year by the U.S. Census Bureau show us the aggregate level of disadvantage in America, as well as what parts of the country are more or less affected by poverty. Less

## Box 1. Why Does Concentrated Poverty Matter?

Being poor in a very poor neighborhood subjects residents to costs and limitations above and beyond the burdens of individual poverty. Summarized in part below, research has shown the wide-ranging social and economic effects that result when the poor are concentrated in economically segregated and disadvantaged neighborhoods. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Concentrated poverty can:

Limit educational opportunity. Children in high-poverty communities tend to go to neighborhood schools where nearly all the students are poor and at greater risk of failure, as measured by standardized tests, dropout rates, and grade retention. ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Low performance owes not only to family background, but also to the negative effects high-poverty neighborhoods have on school processes and quality. Teachers in these schools tend to be less experienced, the student body more mobile, and additional systems must often be put in place to deal with the social welfare needs of the student body, creating further demands on limited resources. ${ }^{\text {c }}$

Lead to increased crime rates and poor health outcomes. Crime rates, and particularly violent crime rates, tend to be higher in economically distressed inner-city neighborhoods. ${ }^{\text {d Faced with high crime rates, dilapidated housing stock, and the stress and }}$ marginalization of poverty, residents of very poor neighborhoods demonstrate a higher incidence of poor physical and mental health outcomes, like asthma, depression, diabetes, and heart ailments.e

Hinder wealth building. Many residents in extreme-poverty neighborhoods own their home, yet neighborhood conditions in these areas can lead the market to devalue these assets and deny them the ability to accumulate wealth through the appreciations of house prices. ${ }^{f}$ Moreover, the presence of high-poverty neighborhoods can affect residents of the larger metropolitan area generally, depressing values for owner-occupied properties in the region by 13 percent on average. ${ }^{9}$

Reduce private-sector investment and increase prices for goods and services. High concentrations of low-income and low-skilled households in a neighborhood can make the community less attractive to private investors and employers, which may limit local job opportunities and ultimately create a "spatial mismatch" between low-income residents and employment centers." In addition, lack of business competition in poor neighborhoods can drive up prices for basic goods and services-like food, car insurance, utilities, and financial services-compared to what families pay in middle-income neighborhoods.'

Raise costs for local government. The concentration of poor individuals and families-which can result in elevated welfare caseloads, high rates of indigent patients at hospitals and clinics, and the need for increased policing-burdens the fiscal capacity of local governments and can divert resources from the provision of other public goods. In turn, these dynamics can lead to higher taxes for local businesses and non-poor residents. ${ }^{j}$

[^0]clear, until now, is how these trends changed the location of poor households within urban, suburban, or rural communities.

Why does the geographic distribution of the poor matter? Rather than spread evenly, the poor tend to cluster and concentrate in certain neighborhoods or groups of neighborhoods within a community. Very poor neighborhoods face a whole host of challenges that come from concentrated disadvan-tage-from higher crime rates and poorer health outcomes to lower-quality educational opportunities and weaker job networks (Box 1). ${ }^{2}$ A poor person or family in a very poor neighborhood must then deal not only with the challenges of individual poverty, but also with the added burdens that stem from the place in which they live. This "double burden" affects not only the families and individuals bearing it, but also complicates the jobs of policymakers and service providers working to promote connections to opportunity and to alleviate poverty. ${ }^{3}$

After decades of growth in the number of high-poverty neighborhoods and increasing concentrations of the poor in such areas, the booming economy of the 1990s led to a significant de-concentration of American poverty. ${ }^{4}$ Shortly after the onset of the 2000s, however, that progress seemed to erode as the economy slowed, though until recently researchers have lacked the necessary data to fully assess the changes in the spatial organization of the poor over the last decade. ${ }^{5}$

After a brief overview of the methods, this paper uses data from the decennial census and American Community Survey to update previous analyses and assess the extent to which concentrations of poverty have changed within the United States in the 2000s. We first analyze the trends for the nation as whole, as well as metropolitan and non-metropolitan communities, but focus primarily on changes in concentrated poverty within and across the nation's 100 largest metropolitan areas, which are home to two-thirds of the nation's residents and over 60 percent of the country's poor population.

## Methodology

This paper analyzes recent changes in the spatial organization of poverty across the United States. We draw on a well-established body of research to define geographic units of analysis, data sources, and key measures of these trends over time. ${ }^{6}$

## Geographies

Census tracts make up the base units of analysis in this study. The Census Bureau divides the entire United States into tracts, which are meant to delineate relatively homogenous areas that contain roughly 4,000 people on average. They do not always align perfectly with local perceptions of neighborhood boundaries, but they provide a reasonable proxy for our purposes. Tract boundaries change over time to reflect local population dynamics; we use contemporaneous boundaries for each year of data to avoid introducing bias in the neighborhood-level analysis.?

Based on the location of its centriod, each tract is assigned to one of three main geography types using GIS mapping software: large metropolitan areas, small metropolitan areas, and non-metropolitan communities. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget identified 366 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in 2008. Large metropolitan areas include the 100 most populous based on 2008 population estimates, while the remaining 266 regions are designated as small metropolitan areas. Any tract in a county that falls outside of a metropolitan statistical area is considered non-metropolitan.

Within the 100 largest metro areas, we designate primary city and suburban tracts. Primary city tracts include those with a centroid that falls within the first city in the official metropolitan statistical area name, or within any other city in the MSA name with a population over 100,000. In the top 100 metro areas, 137 cities meet the primary city criteria. Suburban tracts make up the remainder of the metropolitan area. We also assign suburban tracts a type based on the urbanization rate of the county (or portion of the county) in which it is located. High density suburbs are those where more than 95 percent of the population lived in an urbanized area in 2000; mature suburbs had urbanization rates of 75 to 95 percent; in emerging suburbs between 25 and 75 percent of the population lived in an urbanized area; and exurbs had urbanization rates below 25 percent in $2000 .{ }^{8}$

## Key measures

Throughout this study, we use the federal poverty thresholds to measure poverty. The shortcomings of the official poverty measure have been well documented. ${ }^{9}$ However, the measure provides a stable benchmark-and is reported at a level of detail-that allows for tracking changes in the spatial organization of the poor over time.
To do so, we first measure the incidence of tracts with poverty rates of 40 percent or more in each year, referred to here as extreme-poverty neighborhoods. ${ }^{10}$ Though any absolute threshold will have its shortcomings (neighborhoods with poverty rates of 39 percent may not differ significantly from those with poverty rates of 41 percent), previous research and policy practice has established the 40 percent parameter as a standard measure by which to designate areas of very high poverty."

In addition to measuring the total number of residents in extreme-poverty neighborhoods, and the extent to which their characteristics change over time, we also calculate the rate of concentrated poverty, or the share of the poor population located in extreme-poverty tracts. Together these metrics describe not only the prevalence and location of very poor areas within a community, but also the extent to which poor residents in the community are subjected to the "double burden" of being poor in a highly disadvantaged neighborhood.

In addition, we examine trends and characteristics in high-poverty neighborhoods, or those with 20 to 40 percent poverty rates. These tracts do not register in the concentrated poverty rate, but may also experience heightened levels of place-based disadvantage and signal increased clustering of lowincome residents in lower-opportunity neighborhoods.

## Data sources

Census tract data for this analysis come from the decennial censuses in 1990 and 2000, and the American Community Survey (ACS) five-year estimates for 2005-2009.
Key differences exist between the decennial census and the ACS that could affect comparisons. First, the decennial census is a point-in-time survey that asks recipients to report their income for the last year. For example, Census 2000 was administered in April of that year, and its long form asked respondents to report on income in 1999. In contrast, the American Community Survey is a rolling survey that is sent out every month and asks participants to report on their income "in the last 12 months". The 12 months of data are then combined and adjusted for inflation to create a single-year estimate. The 2008 ACS estimates, for example, represent a time period that spans from January of 2007 to December of 2008.

Second, the ACS surveys a significantly smaller population (3 million households per year) than the decennial census long form (roughly 16 million households in 2000). To produce statistically reliable estimates for small geographies-like census tracts-multiple years of data must be pooled. The only ACS data set that contains sufficient sample size to report on census tracts is the five-year estimates. These estimates are based on 60 months' worth of surveys that ask about income in the past 12 months, meaning they span from January of 2004 through December of 2009. They do not represent any given year, but provide an adjusted estimate for the entire five-year period. This period bridges vastly different points in the economic cycle, starting with a period of recovery and modest growth and ending two years after the onset of the worst downturn since the Great Depression. The combination of such different periods likely mutes the trends studied here. For example, according to ACS single-year estimates, in 2005 the nation's poverty rate was 13.3 percent. In 2009 it was 14.3 percent. The five-year estimates place the nation's 2005-09 poverty rate at 13.5 percent, much closer to the 2005 estimate. ${ }^{12}$

To address the margins of error that accompany the 2005-09 data, we test for statistically significant differences and present the results throughout the study. To address the potential muting effect of the pooled estimates, we estimate a regression, described in more detail below.

## Projections

In light of the much higher poverty rates observed in the 2010 ACS than in the 2005-09 five-year estimates, it is likely that concentrated poverty was also higher that year than across the previous five years. To understand how more recent increases in poverty may have affected concentrated poverty in metro areas, we estimate the relationship between the change in the metropolitan poverty rate and
the change in concentrated poverty rate based on data from 2000 and 2005-09 using the following regression:

$$
C P_{\mathrm{it}}-C P_{\mathrm{it}-1}=\beta_{1}\left(P_{\mathrm{it}}-P_{\mathrm{it}-1}\right)+\beta_{2}\left(S P_{\mathrm{it}}-S P_{\mathrm{it}-1}\right)+\epsilon
$$

where $C P$ is the share of poor residents in extreme-poverty neighborhoods, and " ${ }_{t}$ " and " ${ }_{i}$ " index the year and metro area, respectively; $P$ is the metropolitan poverty rate; $S P$ is the share of the metropolitan poor population in suburbs; and $\epsilon$ is an error term.

To estimate the likely change in metropolitan concentrated poverty rates between 2005-09 and 2010, we take the coefficients derived from this regression and apply them to metropolitan poverty rates and share of the poor in suburbs reported in the ACS estimates for each year. ${ }^{13}$

While caution must be used with any projection method, we find this model provides a reasonable estimate of the direction in which concentrated poverty likely moved based on changes in metropolitan poverty levels.

## Findings

## A. After declining in the 1990s, the population in extreme-poverty neighborhoodswhere at least 40 percent of individuals live below the poverty line-rose by one-third from 2000 to 2005-09.

The 1970s and 1980s saw high-poverty neighborhoods proliferate-the number and population in such areas roughly doubled-due to a combination of economic forces and policy decisions. ${ }^{14}$ In contrast, Census 2000 recorded a significant reversal in the spatial location of the poor population. ${ }^{15}$ Between 1990 and 2000, the number of extreme-poverty tracts declined by 29 percent, from 2,921 to 2,075 (Table 1). As pockets of poverty diminished, the number of Americans living in these neighborhoods also fell, and the poor population in extreme-poverty tracts fell faster still.

These changes did not simply result from a decline in poverty. ${ }^{16}$ Over the same time period, the nation's poverty rate dropped from 13.1 to 12.4 percent-a smaller decline than the decrease in pockets of extreme poverty-but the actual number of poor individuals increased from 31.7 to 33.9 million. Thus the changes signaled a real shift in the types of neighborhoods occupied by poor individuals over that decade.

Very different poverty dynamics marked the 2000s, however. The poor population climbed to 39.5 million in 2005-09, pushing the nation's poverty rate up to 13.5 percent, and the number of neighborhoods with at least 40 percent of residents in poverty climbed by 747. By 2005-09, these neighborhoods housed 8.7 million Americans- 2.2 million more than at the start of the decade, a one-third increase. Almost half of those residents-4.1 million-were poor. In 2005-09, 10.5 percent of the poor

Table 1. Total Population and Poor Population in Extreme-Poverty Tracts, 1990 to 2005-09

|  |  |  | Percent Change** |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  | $\mathbf{1 9 9 0}$ to | $\mathbf{2 0 0 0}$ to | $\mathbf{1 9 9 0}$ to |
| Extreme-Poverty Tracts* | $\mathbf{1 9 9 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 5 - 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 5 - 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 5 - 0 9}$ |
| Total Population | $9,101,622$ | $6,574,815$ | $8,735,395$ | $-27.8 \%$ | $32.9 \%$ | $-4.0 \%$ |
| Poor Population | $4,392,749$ | $3,011,893$ | $4,050,538$ | $-31.4 \%$ | $34.5 \%$ | $-7.8 \%$ |
| Number of Tracts | 2,921 | 2,075 | 2,822 | $-29.0 \%$ | $36.0 \%$ | $-3.4 \%$ |

*Extreme-poverty tracts have poverty rates of 40 percent or higher.
${ }^{* *}$ All changes significant at the 90 percent confidence level.

Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and ACS data

Figure 1. Share of Total Population and Poor Population in Extreme-Poverty Tracts, 1990 to 2005-09

*All differences significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and ACS data

Table 2. Total Population and Poor Population in Extreme-Poverty Tracts, by Community Type, 2000 to 2005-09

|  | Number of ExtremePoverty Tracts |  |  | Total Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts |  |  | Poor Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Type of Geography | 2000 | 2005-09 | \% Change | 2000 | 2005-09 | \% Change | 2000 | 2005-09 | \% Change |
| 100 Metro Areas | 1,536 | 1,898 | 23.6 | 4,935,506 | 5,903,264 | 19.6 | 2,277,193 | 2,764,587 | 21.4 |
| Small-metro | 351 | 616 | 75.5 | 969,828 | 1,746,883 | 80.1 | 432,643 | 802,089 | 85.4 |
| Non-metro | 188 | 308 | 63.8 | 669,481 | 1,085,248 | 62.1 | 302,057 | 483,862 | 60.2 |
| Distribution Across |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Geography Types | 2000 | 2005-09 | Change | 2000 | 2005-09 | Change | 2000 | 2005-09 | Change |
| 100 Metro Areas | 74.0\% | 67.3\% | -6.8\% | 75.1\% | 67.6\% | -7.5\% | 75.6\% | 68.3\% | -7.4\% |
| Small-metro | 16.9\% | 21.8\% | 4.9\% | 14.8\% | 20.0\% | 5.2\% | 14.4\% | 19.8\% | 5.4\% |
| Non-metro | 9.1\% | 10.9\% | 1.9\% | 10.2\% | 12.4\% | 2.2\% | 10.0\% | 11.9\% | 1.9\% |

*All changes significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and ACS data
population lived in extreme-poverty tracts (Figure 1). While the 2005-09 concentrated poverty rate did not reach its 1990 level (14.1 percent), it represents a significant increase over 2000 ( 9.1 percent) and signals an emerging re-concentration of the poor.

Moreover, increasing concentrations of poverty over the decade were not confined to urban areas (Table 2). Over 60 percent of nation's poor lived in the 100 most populous metropolitan areas in 200509 , with the remaining 40 percent roughly split between smaller metropolitan areas and non-metro communities. While large metro areas experienced the largest absolute increases in extreme-poverty neighborhoods and concentrated poverty, small metropolitan areas were home to the fastest growth in extreme-poverty tracts and the number of residents living in them, followed by non-metropolitan communities. However, the nation's most populous metro areas continued to house a disproportionate
share of the nation's extreme-poverty neighborhoods in 2005-09, and retained the highest concentrated poverty rate ( 11.7 percent, compared to 10.9 percent in small metro areas and 6.3 percent in non-metropolitan communities). The remainder of the analysis focuses on changes in the spatial location of poverty within and across these large regions.

## B. Concentrated poverty nearly doubled in Midwestern metro areas from 2000 to 2005-09, and rose by one-third in Southern metro areas.

During the 2000s, roughly three-quarters of the nation's largest metro areas saw their number of extreme-poverty neighborhoods grow, along with the number of poor living in them, compared to just 16 that experienced decreases. The largest increases and decreases tended to cluster in different parts of the country, illuminating larger regional patterns in these trends and tracking with broader changes in poverty across different regions.

The Midwest experienced the most rapid decline in the incidence of extreme-poverty neighborhoods in the 1990s. ${ }^{17}$ Much of that progress was erased in the 2000s as the Midwest led other regions for growth in pockets of extreme poverty (Table 3). Taken together, Midwestern metro areas registered a 79 percent increase in extreme-poverty neighborhoods in the 2000s. The number of poor living in these tracts almost doubled over the decade, pushing the concentrated poverty rate in the region's metro areas up by a staggering 5 percentage points, to a level that surpassed that in Northeastern metro areas. While large metro areas like Detroit ( 30 percent) and Chicago ( 13 percent) drove some of the growth in the number of poor in extreme-poverty tracts, other major metro areas in the Midwest accounted for the majority of the trend.

Southern metro areas recorded a substantial 33 percent growth in the number of poor individuals in extreme-poverty neighborhoods, though this figure masks the steep declines in places like New Orleans and Baltimore that somewhat offset large gains in places like the Texas metro areas of El Paso, Dallas, and Houston. Given the region's fast growth in overall population and poor residents in the 2000s, and the mixed trajectories of metro areas in different parts of the South, the region's concentrated poverty rate rose by a modest 0.8 percentage points.

Northeastern metro areas held steady on these indicators over the decade, while the West actually experienced a drop in concentrated poverty. The Northeast's trend resulted almost entirely from New York's significant decrease in the number of poor in extreme-poverty tracts. From 2000 to 2005-09, the number of extreme-poverty tracts in the New York City metropolitan area alone dropped by 64, and poor residents of its extreme-poverty neighborhoods declined by 108,000 poor, effectively cancelling out increases in almost every other Northeastern metro area. Similarly, steep declines in the number of poor in extreme-poverty tracts in Los Angeles, and to some extent, places like San Diego and Riverside, outweighed increases in metro areas like Phoenix, Tucson, Las Vegas, and Denver.

Over the course of the decade, 67 metro areas experienced statistically significant increases in their concentrated poverty rate, compared to decreases in 21 others. Among individual metro areas, the largest increases in the rate of concentrated poverty occurred in the Great Lakes metro areas

Table 3. Total Population and Poor Population in Extreme-Poverty Tracts by Census Region, 100 Metro Areas, 2000 to 2005-09

| Number of Extreme-Poverty Tracts |  |  |  |  | Poor Population in Extreme-Poverty Tracts |  |  |  | Concentrated Poverty Rate |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Region | 2000 | 2005-09 | \% Change |  | 2000 | 2005-09 | \% Change |  | 2000 | 2005-09 | Change |  |
| Top 100 Metro Areas | 1,536 | 1,898 | 23.6\% | * | 2,277,193 | 2,764,587 | 21.4\% | * | 11.2\% | 11.7\% | 0.5\% | * |
| Midwest | 344 | 617 | 79.4\% | * | 344,958 | 672,262 | 94.9\% | * | 10.3\% | 15.5\% | 5.2\% | * |
| Northeast | 452 | 475 | 5.1\% | * | 738,579 | 752,393 | 1.9\% |  | 15.4\% | 15.2\% | -0.2\% |  |
| South | 465 | 576 | 23.9\% | * | 697,649 | 930,420 | 33.4\% | * | 10.6\% | 11.4\% | 0.8\% | * |
| West | 275 | 230 | -16.4\% | * | 496,007 | 409,512 | -17.4\% | * | 8.8\% | 6.6\% | -2.2\% | * |

*Change is significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and ACS data

Table 4. Top and Bottom Metro Areas for Change in Concentrated Poverty Rate, 2000 to 2005-09

| Metro Areas |  | 000 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| With Greatest Increases in Concentrated Poverty | Concentrated Poverty Rate Change | Change in Poor Population in Extreme-Poverty Tracts | Change in Number of Extreme-Poverty Tracts |
| Toledo, OH | 15.3\% | 16,918 | 15 |
| El Paso, TX | 14.5\% | 33,953 | 16 |
| Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA | 14.3\% | 12,390 | 11 |
| Baton Rouge, LA | 13.5\% | 16,150 | 7 |
| Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI | 13.2\% | 98,940 | 73 |
| Jackson, MS | 12.2\% | 12,383 | 11 |
| New Haven-Milford, CT | 11.3\% | 10,834 | 9 |
| Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY | 10.5\% | 8,334 | 0 |
| Dayton, OH | 9.9\% | 11,959 | 8 |
| Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT | 9.5\% | 11,023 | 11 |
| With Greatest Decreases in Concentrated Poverty |  |  |  |
| New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA | -9.3\% | -29,524 | -14 |
| McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX | -7.3\% | 11,229 | -3 |
| Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC | -6.7\% | -10,234 | -7 |
| Fresno, CA | -6.6\% | -11,064 | -5 |
| Provo-Orem, UT | -6.0\% | -1,725 | 1 |
| Bakersfield, CA | -5.8\% | -4,291 | -3 |
| Baltimore-Towson, MD | -5.5\% | -13,051 | -14 |
| Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville, SC | -4.9\% | -2,552 | -1 |
| Stockton, CA | -4.8\% | -4,373 | 0 |
| San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA | -4.6\% | -15,641 | -8 |
| *All changes significant at the 90 percent confidence level. |  |  |  |

of Toledo, Youngstown, Detroit, and Dayton, and the Northeastern metro areas of New Haven and Hartford (Table 4). Many of these areas saw poverty rise throughout the decade amid the continuing loss of manufacturing jobs.

On the other end of the spectrum, some metro areas in the West and South, like Virginia Beach, Bakersfield, Baltimore, and Stockton, exhibited among the largest declines in concentrated poverty rates over the decade. ${ }^{18}$ However, many of these regions were on the front lines of the housing market collapse and downturn that followed, and recent poverty trends suggest these gains may have been short lived. ${ }^{19}$ McAllen and Fresno also led for decreases in their concentrated poverty rate in the 2000s, but even with that progress, they rank first and fifth, respectively, for metropolitan concentrated poverty rates in 2005-09 (Map 1). They are joined in this regard by other Southern metro areas like EI Paso, Memphis, and Jackson, as well as Midwestern metro areas like Detroit, Cleveland, Toledo, and Milwaukee.

## C. The population in extreme-poverty neighborhoods rose more than twice as fast in suburbs as in cities from 2000 to 2005-09.

Historically, pockets of extreme poverty have been a largely urban phenomenon, though the geography may be slowly changing for large metro areas. Cities reaped the benefits of de-concentrating poverty in the 1990s to a much greater extent than their surrounding suburbs (Table 5).

Extreme-poverty neighborhoods grew in cities and suburbs alike during the 2000s, though the phenomenon remained a majority-urban one. In 2005-09, cities contained over 80 percent of extremepoverty tracts within the nation's 100 largest metro areas, and had a concentrated poverty rate more

Map 1. Concentrated Poverty Rate, 100 Metro Areas, 2005-09


Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and ACS data

Table 5. Change in Extreme-Poverty Neighborhoods in Cities and Suburbs, 100 Metro Areas, 1990 to 2005-09

|  | City |  |  |  |  | Suburb |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Change |  |  |  |  | Change |  |  |  |  |
| ExtremePoverty Tracts | 1990 | 2000 | $\begin{array}{r} 2005- \\ 2009 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1990 \\ \text { to } 05-09 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 2000 \\ \text { to } 05-09 \end{array}$ | 1990 | 2000 | $\begin{array}{r} 2005- \\ 2009 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1990 \\ \text { to } 05-09 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 2000 \\ \text { to } 05-09 \end{array}$ |
| Total Population | 5,174,783 | 4,027,578 | 4,662,473 | -9.9\% | 15.8\% | 900,842 | 907,928 | 1,240,791 | 37.7\% | 36.7\% |
| Poor Population | 2,529,484 | 1,871,337 | 2,193,858 | -13.3\% | 17.2\% | 429,081 | 405,856 | 570,729 | 33.0\% | 40.6\% |
| Tracts | 1,701.00 | 1,313.00 | 1,554.00 | -8.6\% | 18.4\% | 262 | 223 | 344 | 31.3\% | 54.3\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Share of Total Population | 9.5\% | 6.9\% | 7.7\% | -1.8\% | 0.8\% | 0.9\% | 0.8\% | 0.9\% | 0.0\% | 0.2\% |
| Share of Poor Population | 26.6\% | 18.3\% | 20.0\% | -6.6\% | 1.7\% | 5.1\% | 4.0\% | 4.5\% | -0.6\% | 0.5\% |

*All changes significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and ACS data

# Table 6. Change in Extreme Poverty Neighborhoods by Suburban Type, 2000 to 2005-09 

|  | Number of ExtremePoverty Tracts |  |  | Total Population <br> in Extreme-Poverty Tracts |  |  | Poor Population <br> in Extreme-Poverty Tracts |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Type of Suburb | 2000 | 2005-09 | \% Change | 2000 | 2005-09 | \% Change | 2000 | 2005-09 | \% Change |
| Suburban Total | 223 | 344 | 54.3\% | 907,928 | 1,240,791 | 36.7\% | 405,856 | 570,729 | 40.6\% |
| High Density | 79 | 114 | 44.3\% | 304,745 | 342,375 | 12.3\% | 132,628 | 158,883 | 19.8\% |
| Mature | 100 | 156 | 56.0\% | 450,095 | 629,557 | 39.9\% | 204,842 | 288,460 | 40.8\% |
| Emerging | 36 | 58 | 61.1\% | 121,603 | 193,436 | 59.1\% | 56,089 | 93,353 | 66.4\% |
| Exurb | 8 | 16 | 100.0\% | 31,485 | 75,423 | 139.6\% | 12,297 | 30,033 | 144.2\% |

*All changes significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and ACS data
than four times higher (20 percent) than suburbs (4.5 percent).
However, just as suburbs outpaced cities for growth in the poor population as a whole over the decade, they also saw the number of poor living in extreme-poverty neighborhoods grow faster than in cities. ${ }^{20}$ The number of extreme-poverty neighborhoods in suburban communities grew by 54 percent, compared to 18 percent in cities, and the poor population living in these suburban neighborhoods rose by 41 percent-more than twice as fast as the 17 percent growth in cities. As a result, though cities still remained better off on these measures in 2005-09 than in 1990, suburbs had surpassed 1990 levels on almost every count.

Growth rates differed across suburbs as well. Higher-density, older suburbs were home to a larger number of extreme-poverty neighborhoods and poor residents living in concentrated poverty than newer, lower-density communities (Table 6). Interestingly, mature suburbs-those that largely developed in the middle decades of the 20th century, in contrast to older "streetcar suburbs" bordering central cities-are home to more extreme-poverty tracts and poor population in those tracts than their more urbanized neighbors. But newer emerging and exurban suburbs experienced the fastest pace of growth among suburbs in concentrated poverty over the decade, albeit from a low base. The trends underscore that just as no category of suburb was immune to broader growth in poverty over the decade, the challenges of concentrated poverty became more regional in scope as well. ${ }^{21}$

Increases in concentrated poverty were widespread among both cities and suburbs in the 100 largest metro areas during the 2000s. Altogether, 61 experienced significant increases in city concentrated poverty rates, compared to 20 with significant decreases. Suburban concentrated poverty rates rose in 54 metro areas and declined in 16 (Table 7). By and large, city and suburban rates moved together over time, but Poughkeepsie and Fresno experienced among the steepest drops in cities concentrated poverty rates even as they topped the list for increases in suburban concentrated poverty rates.

Different factors can cause concentrated poverty to rise or fall in a region: a change in the number of extreme-poverty neighborhoods, growth or decline in the poor population living in these neighborhoods, or a combination of the two. Fifty-eight (58) percent of extreme-poverty tracts in cities in 2000 remained extreme-poverty tracts in 2005-09. However, these tracts shed total population and poor residents over the 2000s. The increase in concentrated poverty in cities was thus driven by growth of new pockets of poverty in these urban centers. Just as in cities, 58 percent of suburban extremepoverty tracts in 2000 remained above the 40 percent threshold in 2005-09. Unlike in cities, those neighborhoods added total residents and poor population over the decade. The rise in suburban concentrated poverty thus reflected growth in both existing pockets of poverty and the development of new extreme-poverty neighborhoods.

New pockets of poverty that developed in these communities may have been tracts hovering just below the 40 percent threshold in 2000, or others that experienced more significant increases in their poverty rates over the course of the decade. Not reflected in these numbers are the neighborhoods that saw significant increases in poverty, but did not top the 40 percent threshold in 2005-09. Overall,

Table 7. Top and Bottom Metro Areas for Change in Concentrated Poverty Rate, by City and Suburb, 2000 to 2005-09

| Change in Concentrated |  |  | Change in Concentrated |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Metro Areas | Poverty Rate | Metro Areas | Poverty Rate |
| With Greatest Primary City Increases |  | With Greatest Suburban Increases |  |
| Bradenton-Sarasota-Venice, FL | 36.7\% | New Haven-Milford, CT | 13.8\% |
| Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA | 36.3\% | Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY | 13.1\% |
| Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME | 25.4\% | Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL | 10.2\% |
| Dayton, OH | 25.2\% | Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH | 8.0\% |
| Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI | 24.3\% | Baton Rouge, LA | 7.0\% |
| Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT | 23.0\% | Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC | 6.9\% |
| Jackson, MS | 22.4\% | El Paso, TX | 6.7\% |
| Baton Rouge, LA | 22.0\% | Toledo, OH | 6.6\% |
| Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC | 19.6\% | Fresno, CA | 6.5\% |
| Toledo, OH | 19.4\% | Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA | 6.4\% |
|  |  |  |  |
| With Greatest Primary City Decreases |  | With Greatest Suburban Decreases |  |
| Provo-Orem, UT | -15.4\% | Tucson, AZ | -9.3\% |
| Fresno, CA | -13.9\% | McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX | -9.0\% |
| Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY | -12.2\% | Bakersfield, CA | -6.4\% |
| New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA | -11.6\% | Ogden-Clearfield, UT | -5.1\% |
| Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA | -9.6\% | Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC | -4.4\% |
| Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA | -9.4\% | Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL | -3.8\% |
| San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA | -9.3\% | Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA | -3.6\% |
| Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville, SC | -8.4\% | Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville, SC | -3.2\% |
| Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC | -8.1\% | Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL | -2.5\% |
| Baltimore-Towson, MD | -7.2\% | Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA | -2.1\% |

*All changes significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and ACS data
cities saw the ranks of the poor in neighborhoods with 20 to 40 percent poverty rates grow by 8 percent over the decade, while suburban poor populations in neighborhoods at those poverty levels grew by 41. Research indicates that residents of these neighborhoods experience disadvantages that, while not of the same severity as those afflicting extreme-poverty neighborhoods, may nonetheless limit opportunities and negatively affect their quality of life. ${ }^{22}$

Developing clusters of moderate and higher poverty are evident in places that registered increases in concentrated poverty, like Detroit, Dallas, and Chicago, as well as those that experienced declines. In the Detroit region, as extreme-poverty neighborhoods spread in the cities of Detroit and Warren, and in Oakland County (Pontiac) and St. Clair Counties (Port Huron), scores of other neighborhoods saw poverty rates climb markedly-crossing the 10, 20, and even 30 percent poverty level-in both the inner-ring suburbs and along the metropolitan fringe (Map 2). Jargowsky noted the "bull's-eye" pattern forming in this region as inner-ring suburbs experienced growing neighborhood poverty even in the strong economy of the 1990s, forecasting the worsening of these patterns in bleaker economic times, along with the potential for these areas to develop similar fiscal and social challenges facing cities with longer histories of concentrated disadvantage. ${ }^{23}$

Similar patterns played out in the Dallas and Chicago regions. The Dallas region experienced a "filling in" in the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth as well as a deepening of suburban pockets of poverty to the northwest around Denton, and northeast along highway 30 (Map 3). At the same time, an increasing number of tracts along the metropolitan outskirts crossed the 10 percent threshold. The Chicago region experienced an uptick in extreme-poverty neighborhoods in both the city and suburbs, and saw growing clusters of neighborhoods register moderate to high poverty rates. This was particularly

## B

## Map 2. Neighborhood Poverty Rates in Metropolitan Detroit


true on the west and south sides of the city, as well as in suburban areas to the north and west-like Waukegan, North Chicago, Elgin, and Aurora-and to the south around Gary and Chicago Heights (Map 4).

Atlanta-a region that actually experienced a slight decline in concentrated poverty from 2000 to 2005-09-nevertheless also experienced a proliferation of neighborhoods at higher levels of poverty (Map 5). The region added three extreme-poverty neighborhoods over the decade. Though almost all its extreme-poverty tracts were in the city in 2005-09, the largest increases in the region's poor population occurred in the suburbs, where their numbers grew by more than two-thirds over the decade.

## Map 3. Neighborhood Poverty Rates in Metropolitan Dallas



As this growth took place, an increasing number of neighborhoods crossed not just the 10 percent poverty mark, but many reached poverty rates of more than 20 or 30 percent by 2005-09 in places to south like Macon, to the northwest towards Marietta, and to the east in areas like Lawrenceville and Gainesville.

In short, concentrated poverty trends in the 2000s appear to have erased some of the progress made in central cities during the 1990s, while accelerating and spreading the growth of higher-poverty suburban communities witnessed that decade.

Map 4. Neighborhood Poverty Rates in Metropolitan Chicago


## Map 5. Neighborhood Poverty Rates in Metropolitan Atlanta

2000
$10 \%$ and under
10 to $20 \%$
20 to $30 \%$
30 to $40 \%$
$40 \%$ and above
Primary city
$\square$ Data excluded

## D. The shift of concentrated poverty to the Midwest and South in the 2000s coincided with changes in the demographic profile of extreme-poverty neighborhoods.

As concentrations of poverty increased and spread in the 2000s, the makeup of extreme-poverty neighborhoods shifted across a number of characteristics (Table 8). In particular, the traditional picture of extreme-poverty neighborhoods has been colored by research and public discussion of the urban "underclass", a term which has fallen out of favor in recent years but, according to Ricketts and Sawhill, is meant to describe a subset of the population that "suffers from multiple social ills that are concentrated in depressed inner-city areas." ${ }^{24}$

Past research has identified four factors to proxy "underclass" characteristics at the neighborhood level: the share of teenagers dropping out of high school, the proportion of households headed by single-mothers, the share of able-bodied men not in the labor force, and the proportion of households on public assistance. During the 2000s, the share of working-age men not in the labor force in extreme-poverty neighborhoods fell by 7 percentage points, as did the share of teenagers in these neighborhoods not in school and without a diploma. The share of households receiving public assistance dropped by more than 8 percentage points, and a smaller share were headed by single mothers than at the start of the decade. These shifts underscore an observation made by Ricketts and Sawhill that, while "extreme poverty areas can reasonably be used as a proxy for concentrations of social problems...they are not the same thing." 25
In addition, by 2005-09, residents of extreme-poverty neighborhoods were more likely to be white and less likely to be Latino than in 2000, though African Americans remained the single largest group in these areas ( 44.6 percent). ${ }^{26}$ The population in extreme-poverty tracts was also less likely to be foreign born, and residents were more likely to own their homes than at the start of the decade. Compared to 2000, by the last half of the decade residents of these neighborhoods were also better

Table 8. Change in Neighborhood Characteristics in Extreme-Poverty Tracts, 100 Metro Areas, 2000 to 2005-09

| Share of individuals: | 2000 | 2005-09 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Who are: |  |  |
| White | 11.2\% | 16.5\% |
| Black | 45.6\% | 44.6\% |
| Latino | 37.4\% | 33.9\% |
| Other | 5.9\% | 5.1\% |
| Who are foreign born | 20.0\% | 17.9\% |
| 25 and over who have completed: |  |  |
| Less than High School | 50.0\% | 37.9\% |
| High School | 25.9\% | 31.9\% |
| Some College or Associates Degree | 17.4\% | 20.5\% |
| BA or Higher | 6.7\% | 9.7\% |
| Who are 22 to 64 year-old males not in the labor force | 39.8\% | 32.4\% |
| 16 to 19 year olds not in school and without a diploma | 20.6\% | 13.6\% |
| Share of households: |  |  |
| That are owner occupied | 24.4\% | 29.3\% |
| That receive public assistance | 18.0\% | 9.6\% |
| Headed by women with children | 26.8\% | 22.5\%\% |
| *All changes significant at the 90 percent confidence level. <br> Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and ACS data |  |  |

educated-more had finished high school (31.9 percent) and a higher share held bachelor's degrees (9.7 percent).

These changes may capture in part the rapid growth of concentrated poverty in the Midwest, which accompanied the economic struggles of regions like Detroit, Toledo, Chicago, and Dayton across the decade. Concentrated poverty in these metro areas spread beyond the urban core to what might previously have been considered working-class areas. Poor local labor market conditions may have pushed up poverty rates across a more demographically and economically diverse set of neighborhoods than traditional "underclass" areas. The same may apply to the South, where the rapid spread of highpoverty neighborhoods to suburban areas amid the housing market downturn further alters long-held notions of concentrated poverty. At the same time, "underclass" characteristics may themselves have become less concentrated as broader swaths of metropolitan areas diversified economically and demographically.

Within major metro areas, extreme-poverty neighborhoods in cities and suburbs share a similar overall demographic and economic profile. An exception is their racial and ethnic makeup-reflecting larger differences in the racial and ethnic profile of cities and suburbs, in that suburban residents of extreme-poverty neighborhoods are more likely to be white and Latino than their counterparts in cit-ies-and a higher homeownership rate in the suburbs.

Greater demographic and economic differences emerge between neighborhoods with poverty rates of at least 40 percent on the one hand, and those with poverty rates between 20 to 40 percent on the other. The latter group housed more than one-third of the metropolitan poor population in 2005-09, compared to about one-tenth of metropolitan poor in the former group.

Residents of high-poverty neighborhoods in 2005-09 were more likely to be white and Latino, and less likely to be African American than the population in extreme-poverty tracts (Table 9). They were

Table 9. Neighborhood Characteristics by Poverty Rate Category, 100 Metro Areas, 2005-09

| Share of individuals: In Extreme-Poverty Tracts |  | In High-Poverty Tracts | Total Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Who are: |  |  |  |
| White | 16.5\% | 29.9\% | 59.7\% |
| Black | 44.6\% | 27.5\% | 13.7\% |
| Latino | 33.9\% | 35.6\% | 18.4\% |
| Other | 5.1\% | 6.9\% | 8.2\% |
| Who are foreign born | 17.9\% | 23.4\% | 16.2\% |
| 25 and over who have completed: |  |  |  |
| Less than High School | 37.9\% | 29.2\% | 14.8\% |
| High School | 31.9\% | 30.8\% | 26.8\% |
| Some College or Associates Degree | 20.5\% | 23.9\% | 27.3\% |
| BA or Higher | 9.7\% | 16.1\% | 31.1\% |
| Who are 22 to 64 year-old males not in the labor force | 32.4\% | 20.1\% | 14.4\% |
| 16 to 19 year olds not in school and without a diploma | 13.6\% | 11.5\% | 6.5\% |
| Share of households: |  |  |  |
| That are owner occupied | 29.3\% | 42.8\% | 65.1\% |
| That receive public assistance | 9.6\% | 5.2\% | 2.4\% |
| Headed by women with children | 22.5\% | 13.7\% | 8.1\% |
| *All differences significant at the 90 percent confidence level. |  |  |  |

also more likely to be foreign born. Residents of high-poverty neighborhoods exhibited higher levels of education than those in extreme-poverty tracts, with a much higher share of college graduates as well as those who attended some college or hold an associate's degree. And high-poverty tract residents are much less likely to exhibit the four "underclass" characteristics than their counterparts in extreme-poverty neighborhoods. However, when the benchmark is the metropolitan population as a whole, high-poverty neighborhoods continue to exhibit higher use of public assistance and trail behind the general population on educational attainment, dropout rates, single-mother households, and male attachment to the labor force.

## E. The recession-induced rise in poverty in the late 2000s likely further increased the concentration of poor individuals into neighborhoods of extreme poverty.

Recently released data from the ACS reveal that in 2010, the poverty rate in the nation's largest metro areas continued its upward trajectory to reach 14.4 percent. That represents an increase of almost 3 percentage points over the start of the decade, with the bulk of that increase- 2.5 percentage pointsoccurring just since the onset of the Great Recession in late 2007. The 2010 poverty rate for large metro areas also exceeds the 2005-09 estimate of 12.4 percent by 2 percentage points.
Because poverty continued to rise significantly through the end of the 2000s, and the five-year estimates likely mute the impacts of these trends over the last few years of the decade, we estimate a regression, as detailed in the methods section, to assess projected changes in concentrated poverty. Based on the relationship between changes in metro-level poverty rates and concentrations of poverty, we project the likely magnitude and direction of changes in concentrated poverty in 2010.
Based on the pace of poverty increases, results suggest the concentrated poverty rate reached 15.1 percent in 2010. That would represent an increase of 3.5 percentage points compared to the 2005-09 concentrated poverty rate, suggesting that poverty has re-concentrated in metropolitan America to a level approaching that in 1990.
Importantly, what little good news there was through 2005-09 appears to have evaporated, and then some, by 2010. Applying regression results to individual metro areas reveals that nine of the 10 metro areas experiencing the largest decreases in concentrated poverty from 2000 to 2005-09 (Table 4) showed growing concentrations of poverty in 2010. At the end of the decade, some of the greatest increases in the concentrated poverty rate are estimated to have occurred in Sun Belt places that saw

Figure 2. Estimated Concentrated Poverty Rate in 2010, by Region


[^1]poverty rates climb after the collapse of the housing market and subsequent downturn (Cape Coral, Fresno, Modesto, Palm Bay, Riverside, and Las Vegas), but also in Midwestern metro areas like Grand Rapids, Akron, and Indianapolis.

Taken together, Western metro areas experienced the largest growth in their rate of concentrated poverty from 2005-09 to 2010, followed by the South (Figure 2). Although Midwestern and Northeastern metro areas saw smaller increases, metro areas in those regions remained home to the highest concentrations of poverty. Ultimately, all but nine metro areas (Baton Rouge, El Paso, Honolulu, Jackson, Kansas City, Knoxville, Madison, McAllen, and San Antonio) are estimated to have experienced an uptick in concentrated poverty in 2010, with 50 metro areas registering increases greater than the average of 3.5 percentage points.

## Conclusion

The findings here confirm what earlier studies this decade suggested: After substantial progress against concentrated poverty during the booming economy of the late 1990s, the economically turbulent 2000s saw much of those gains erased. Success stories from the 1990s like Chicago and Detroit were on the front lines of re-concentrating poverty in the 2000s, and they and other areas such as Atlanta and Dallas also saw concentrated poverty spread to new communities. In cities, concentrated poverty had not yet returned to 1990 levels by 2005-09. However, suburbs-home to the steepest increases in the poor population over the decade-cannot say the same.

What is more, the five-year estimates likely downplay the severity of the upturn in these trends because they pool such different time periods together. Estimates of concentrated poverty trends to 2010 indicate that the positive shifts seen in many Sun Belt metro areas through 2005-09 may have evaporated in the wake of the Great Recession and the severe economic dislocation it caused.

There is also evidence that, as poverty has increasingly suburbanized this decade, new clusters of low-income neighborhoods have emerged beyond the urban core in many of the nation's largest metro areas. The proposition of being poor in a suburb may bring benefits to residents if it means they are located in neighborhoods that offer greater access to opportunities-be it better schools, affordable housing, or more jobs-than they would otherwise find in an urban neighborhood. But research has shown that, instead, the suburban poor often end up in lower-income communities with less access to jobs and economic opportunity, compared to higher-income suburbanites. ${ }^{27}$ Thus, rather than increased opportunities and connections, being poor in poor suburban neighborhoods may mean residents face challenges similar to those that accompany concentrated disadvantage in urban areas, but with the added complication that even fewer resources are likely to exist than one might find in an urban neighborhood with access to a more robust and developed safety net. Yet, as poverty continues to suburbanize and to concentrate, absent policy intervention the suburbs are poised to become home to the next wave of concentrating disadvantage.

Given that a strong economic recovery has failed to materialize, and threats of a double-dip recession loom, it is unlikely the nation has seen the end of poverty's upward trend. Trends from the past decade strongly indicate that it is difficult to make progress against concentrated poverty while poverty itself is on the rise. It is also unlikely that without fundamental changes in how regions plan for things like land use, zoning, housing, and workforce and economic development that the growth of extreme-poverty neighborhoods and concentrated poverty will abate. With cities and suburbs increasingly sharing in the challenges of concentrated poverty, regional economic development strategies must do more to encourage balanced growth with opportunities for workers up and down the economic ladder. Metropolitan leaders must also actively foster economic integration throughout their regions, and forge stronger connections between poor neighborhoods and areas with better education and job opportunities, so that low-income residents are not left out or left behind in the effort to grow the regional economy.

| Appendix A. Concentrated Poverty, 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 2000 to 2005-09 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2005-09 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Change from 2000 |  |  |  |  |
| Metro Area | Total Population | Poor Population | Extreme- <br> Poverty <br> Tracts | Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Poor in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Concen- <br> trated Poverty Rate | Rank for Concentrated Poverty Rate | ExtremePoverty Tracts | Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Poor in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Concentrated Poverty Rate | Rank for Change in C.P. Rate |
| 100 Largest Metro Areas | 195,859,881 | 23,664,093 | 1,898 | 5,903,264 | 2,764,587 | 11.7\% |  | 362 | 967,758 * | 487,394 * | 0.5\%* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Akron, OH | 686,568 | 85,090 | 13 | 23,547 | 11,466 | 13.5\% | 32 | 9 | 14,681 * | 7,727 * | 7.6\%* | 17 |
| Albany, NY | 836,001 | 83,913 | 8 | 24,334 | 11,418 | 13.6\% | 31 | 3 | 11,662 * | 5,953 * | 6.1\%* | 22 |
| Albuquerque, NM | 825,680 | 121,396 | 7 | 21,832 | 9,114 | 7.5\% | 66 | 4 | 10,833 * | 3,966 * | 2.3\%* | 55 |
| Allentown, PA-NJ | 799,168 | 70,597 | 5 | 14,966 | 6,941 | 9.8\% | 49 | 1 | 5,905 * | 2,782 * | 2.7\%* | 48 |
| Atlanta, GA | 5,213,776 | 614,121 | 31 | 82,064 | 39,519 | 6.4\% | 73 | 3 | -2,456 | -959 | -3.8\%* | 76 |
| Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC | 528,174 | 86,740 | 11 | 36,514 | 16,025 | 18.5\% | 19 | 3 | 13,865 * | 5,428 * | 4.3\%* | 32 |
| Austin, TX | 1,551,763 | 192,924 | 8 | 45,435 | 21,166 | 11.0\% | 40 | 5 | 23,957 * | 11,244* | 3.1\%* | 43 |
| Bakersfield, CA | 780,875 | 151,223 | 10 | 53,254 | 24,514 | 16.2\% | 21 | -3 | -11,583 * | -4,291* | -5.8\%* | 83 |
| Baltimore, MD | 2,648,347 | 241,499 | 16 | 39,691 | 19,512 | 8.1\% | 61 | -14 | -29,350 * | -13,051 * | -5.5\%* | 82 |
| Baton Rouge, LA | 740,111 | 115,641 | 15 | 56,285 | 26,254 | 22.7\% | 11 | 8 | 33,036 * | 16,151 * | 13.5\%* | 4 |
| Birmingham, AL | 1,130,960 | 147,058 | 11 | 34,414 | 16,016 | 10.9\% | 42 | 1 | 893 | 916 | 0.1\% |  |
| Boise City, ID | 574,086 | 66,947 | 2 | 4,731 | 1,687 | 2.5\% | 92 | 2 | 4,731 * | 1,687 * | 2.5\%* | 52 |
| Boston-Cambridge, MA-NH | 4,419,484 | 390,554 | 18 | 51,816 | 23,802 | 6.1\% | 76 | 6 | 24,773 * | 11,597* | 2.6\%* | 50 |
| Bradenton, FL | 680,457 | 71,456 | 1 | 5,269 | 1,952 | 2.7\% | 91 | 1 | 5,269 * | 1,952 * | 2.7\%* | 47 |
| Bridgeport-Stamford, CT | 883,254 | 65,434 | 6 | 12,312 | 5,732 | 8.8\% | 54 | 3 | 6,044 * | 2,854 * | 3.9\%* | 34 |
| Buffalo, NY | 1,119,517 | 148,737 | 19 | 47,443 | 23,322 | 15.7\% | 24 | 3 | $-3,430$ * | 723 | -1.1\%* | 69 |
| Cape Coral, FL | 573,537 | 59,147 | 1 | 4,579 | 2,572 | 4.3\% | 82 | 0 | -264 | -241 | -2.3\%* | 73 |
| Charleston, SC | 623,459 | 84,334 | 8 | 14,954 | 6,934 | 8.2\% | 58 | -1 | -6,325 * | $-2,552$ * | -4.9\%* | 81 |
| Charlotte, NC-SC | 1,629,566 | 189,714 | 8 | 20,149 | 10,309 | 5.4\% | 80 | 5 | 13,259 * | 7,631 * | 3.2\%* | 42 |
| Chattanooga, TN-GA | 511,934 | 70,700 | 9 | 20,484 | 10,535 | 14.9\% | 26 | 5 | 9,051 * | 4,205 * | 3.5\%* | 39 |
| Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI | 9,401,769 | 1,101,942 | 144 | 341,086 | 158,746 | 14.4\% | 28 | 39 | 112,278 * | 41,544 * | 1.7\%* | 62 |
| Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN | 2,115,000 | 238,277 | 35 | 68,091 | 33,996 | 14.3\% | 29 | 13 | 21,078* | 9,571 * | 0.8\% |  |
| Cleveland, OH | 2,083,812 | 276,762 | 66 | 128,724 | 64,919 | 23.5\% | 7 | 24 | 58,227 * | 30,376 * | 8.0\%* | 15 |
| Colorado Springs, CO | 597,471 | 60,825 | 2 | 5,337 | 2,204 | 3.6\% | 86 | 1 | 3,486 * | 1,573 * | 2.1\%* | 57 |
| Columbia, SC | 709,352 | 88,293 | 6 | 18,622 | 5,985 | 6.8\% | 69 | 2 | 7,895 * | 1,914 * | 1.3\%* | 65 |
| Columbus, OH | 1,728,212 | 212,111 | 25 | 57,225 | 29,009 | 13.7\% | 30 | 17 | 35,680 * | 19,010 * | 6.7\%* | 20 |
| Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX | 6,113,988 | 790,228 | 39 | 135,123 | 64,445 | 8.2\% | 59 | 16 | 66,636 * | 36,498 * | 3.0\%* | 44 |


| $\infty$ | $\overline{5}$ | $\stackrel{6}{\square}$ | ค | $\sim$ | $\infty$ | ¢ | $\mp$ | $\stackrel{\square}{\square}$ | $\stackrel{\sim}{\sim}$ | 은 |  | へ | $\stackrel{\sim}{N}$ | $\bullet$ | б | ロ－ | $\stackrel{\bullet}{\sim}$ | ले | ָ | ल | $\stackrel{\infty}{\sim}$ |  |  | ¢ | $\stackrel{\downarrow}{\square}$ | N | $\bigcirc$ | 암 | ¢ | $\hat{6}$ | $\wedge$ | $\infty$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{0}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{0}{\circ} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{0}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{0}{\mathrm{~N}} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{2}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\mathrm{~N}} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{i}{+} \\ & \underset{\sim}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{0}{\varphi} \\ & \dot{\varphi} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { *o } \\ & \stackrel{0}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{1}{\circ} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{1}{\circ} \\ & \infty \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} * \\ \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ \underset{\infty}{+} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{\circ}{0} \\ & o \\ & \dot{\gamma} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{0} \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \text { oi } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \text { io } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{1}{+} \\ & \stackrel{i}{\mathrm{~N}} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{1}{c} \\ & \text { ले } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \infty \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} * \\ \stackrel{*}{0} \\ \stackrel{y}{n} \\ \stackrel{1}{2} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \circ \\ & \infty \\ & \dot{o} \\ & \dot{m} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{y}{*} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ \stackrel{i}{\circ} \\ \stackrel{\circ}{\circ} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{+}{+} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Oे } \\ & \stackrel{-}{-} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{y}{c} \\ & \stackrel{1}{c} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{0} \\ & \stackrel{y}{c} \\ & \infty \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{*}{\circ} \stackrel{+}{\underset{+}{+}}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \circ \\ & \text { o } \\ & \text { N } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{\text { O}}{\sim} \\ & \stackrel{1}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{y}{c} \\ & \dot{\oplus} \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{*}{\stackrel{*}{\circ}}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\Gamma} \\ & \stackrel{1}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{0} \\ & \stackrel{0}{2} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{1} \end{aligned}$ |
| $*$ $\stackrel{3}{0}$ $\stackrel{3}{0}$ $\stackrel{-}{7}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \underset{\sim}{\star} \\ & \underset{\sim}{\infty} \\ & \infty \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & ल \\ & ल \\ & \stackrel{N}{c} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \text { ó } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{\sim}{0} \\ & \underset{\sim}{\mu} \\ & \text { ले } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} * \\ \underset{\sim}{N} \\ \stackrel{1}{N} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \text { ® } \\ & \underset{\sim}{7} \\ & 0 \\ & \hline-1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{N} \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \stackrel{N}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & N \\ & \underset{N}{0} \\ & \underset{F}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{5}{\Gamma}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{N} \\ & \underset{N}{N} \\ & \text { Nin } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{N} \\ & \underset{\sim}{N} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \underset{\sim}{0} \\ & \underset{\sim}{N} \\ & \underset{\sim}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{\sim}{4} \\ & \infty \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{0} \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \stackrel{6}{6} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { * } \\ & \stackrel{9}{\circ} \\ & \underset{\sim}{4} \\ & \text { M} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { * } \\ & \text { 0 } \\ & 0 \\ & \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{\stackrel{*}{\bullet}}{\stackrel{\sim}{\wedge}}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & 8 \\ & \stackrel{0}{8} \\ & \stackrel{0}{8} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \infty \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{\sim}{N} \\ & \underset{\sim}{F} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{+} \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \sim \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} * \\ \underset{\sim}{\text { N }} \\ \underset{\sim}{7} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{\stackrel{0}{0}} \\ & \stackrel{\sim}{\mathrm{~N}} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \mathbf{N}_{1}^{( } \\ & \underset{N}{N} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \infty \\ & \stackrel{*}{0} \\ & \stackrel{N}{N} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 60^{-1} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \underset{N}{N} \\ & \underset{\sim}{N} \\ & \underset{1}{n} \end{aligned}$ |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{\infty} \\ & \underset{\infty}{\infty} \\ & \stackrel{\sim}{\sim} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{8} \\ & \Theta_{0}^{\prime} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \text { \& } \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \hline- \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \infty \\ & \underset{\sim}{N} \\ & \underset{\sim}{\prime} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \infty \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \hline 1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \infty \\ & \omega_{1} \\ & 0 \\ & \stackrel{-}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{+} \\ & \stackrel{+}{\infty} \\ & \stackrel{-}{N} \end{aligned}$ | $*$ $\infty$ $\infty$ $\infty$ $\infty$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \infty \\ & 0 \\ & ल \\ & \mathrm{~N}^{\prime} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{*}{8} \\ & \underset{\sim}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{+}{N} \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{\infty}{\stackrel{\infty}{\sim}}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{N} \\ & \stackrel{\infty}{\infty} \\ & \stackrel{N}{\sim} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \stackrel{0}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{1}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \stackrel{*}{N} \\ \stackrel{y}{2} \\ \stackrel{y}{2} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\ominus} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\underset{~}{*}} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \hat{0} \\ & 0 \\ & \underset{\sim}{N} \end{aligned}$ | $\frac{*}{\stackrel{*}{N}}$ |  | $$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { * } \\ & \text { O } \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \underset{N}{N} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \underset{N}{*} \\ & \stackrel{0}{6} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5 } \\ & \text { O. } \\ & \text { on } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{*}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{\infty}{\oplus} \\ & \hline- \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \stackrel{*}{N} \\ \underset{N}{N} \\ \underset{N}{N} \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \stackrel{0}{6} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \vdots \\ & 0 \\ & \underset{N}{N} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & * \\ & \underset{\sim}{0} \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{p} \end{aligned}$ |
| $\infty$ | 10 | $\tau$ | ハ | $\bigcirc$ | م | ल | $\wedge$ | $\bullet$ | $\checkmark$ | F | $\bigcirc$ | N | の | $F$ | $\checkmark$ | $\stackrel{\infty}{\sim}$ | ल | ल | $\wedge$ | ल | 4 | $\wedge$ |  | $\bigcirc$ | $\stackrel{m}{\square}$ | $\stackrel{\bullet}{1}$ | $\infty$ | $\infty$ | $\sim$ | $\bullet$ | の | $\stackrel{\square}{1}$ |
| N | $\pm$ | 8 | $\bullet$ | $\sim$ | $\bigcirc$ | § | $\bigcirc$ | $\stackrel{1}{8}$ | ¢ | $\stackrel{\sim}{~}$ | $\bar{\infty}$ | ₹ | ¢ | 은 | へ | ¢ | $\stackrel{\sim}{\sim}$ | N | $\widehat{6}$ | $\stackrel{\square}{6}$ | $\bigcirc$ | 산 |  | $\ulcorner$ | ल | $\stackrel{10}{\sim}$ | の | N | ธ | 8 | $\stackrel{\infty}{\sim}$ | ल |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { oे } \\ & \dot{+} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { oे } \\ & \text { ì } \end{aligned}$ | ®̀ ले | $\begin{aligned} & \text { oे } \\ & \text { ङ் } \end{aligned}$ | $\frac{\stackrel{-}{+}}{\stackrel{\sim}{\circ}}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { oे } \\ & \stackrel{y}{n} \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{\text { ㅇ }}{\stackrel{-}{\mathrm{N}}}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\circ}{\mathrm{N}} \\ & \stackrel{1}{\mathrm{~N}} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { oे } \\ & \text { oे } \\ & \stackrel{\circ}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { O. } \\ & \text { in } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { oे } \\ & \text { oे } \\ & \hline 1 \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{\text { ®}}{\stackrel{\text { ® }}{\wedge}}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { д̊ } \\ & \underset{\sim}{N} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { oे } \\ & \text { oे } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \circ \\ & \text { O. } \\ & \text { ம! } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \circ \\ & \hline 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{\text { Ǹ }}{\text { N}}$ | $\stackrel{\text { ®}}{\stackrel{\circ}{\wedge}}$ | $\stackrel{\circ}{\circ}$ |  |  |  |  | ¢0． | $\stackrel{\circ}{\stackrel{\circ}{+}}$ | $\stackrel{\text { ¢ }}{\stackrel{\circ}{+}}$ | ¢๐ | $\stackrel{\circ}{\circ}$ | O－ o oj $\sim$ | $\begin{gathered} \stackrel{\circ}{c} \\ \stackrel{\sim}{c} \end{gathered}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \hat{0} \\ & \infty \\ & \stackrel{0}{\circ} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \hline \\ & \hline \\ & 0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { ल్ల } \\ \stackrel{\sim}{c} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \infty \\ & \stackrel{\sim}{\sim} \\ & \underset{\sim}{\tau} \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \\ & \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\bullet}{N} \\ & \underset{N}{N} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \infty \\ & \infty \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \sigma_{5} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \stackrel{0}{1} \\ & 10 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { O} \\ & \text { N } \\ & \text { Ni } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { J } \\ & \infty \\ & \text { M } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hat{N} \\ & \text { N } \\ & \text { 8, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \circ \\ & \varnothing \\ & \underset{\sim}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N } \\ & \infty \\ & \text { N } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & N \\ & \underset{N}{N} \\ & \underset{\sim}{n} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hat{N} \\ & \hat{0} \\ & \underset{N}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \infty \\ & \underset{\sim}{\infty} \\ & \underset{\sim}{c} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \bar{\infty} \\ & \stackrel{\infty}{\gamma} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { N } \\ \text { O } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \infty \\ & { }_{0}^{2} \\ & 0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\overline{0}$ 0 0 $\sim$ |  | $\begin{gathered} \underset{\sim}{\underset{~}{N}} \\ \underset{\sim}{c} \end{gathered}$ | $$ | $\begin{aligned} & \bar{\sim} \\ & \underset{\sigma}{\prime} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \circ \\ & \vdots \\ & \underset{\sim}{7} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N } \\ & \text { N } \\ & \text { N } \end{aligned}$ | － | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N } \\ & \underset{\sim}{N} \\ & \underset{\sim}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \stackrel{N}{N} \\ & N \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \circ \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{N} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\mathrm{~N}} \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{N} \\ & \mathbb{N} \\ & 0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { o } \\ & \text { on } \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{N} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 10 \\ & 8 \\ & \text { ले } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ल } \\ & \text { ल్ } \\ & \text { Ne } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N} \\ & \infty \\ & \stackrel{0}{-} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \varrho \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\circ}{n} \\ & \stackrel{n}{n} \\ & \stackrel{y}{n} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { J } \\ & 0 \\ & \text { F } \\ & F \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hat{N} \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | $\frac{\infty}{\Gamma}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \text { O} \\ & \text { N } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N} \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \text { en } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \infty \\ & \stackrel{\sim}{L} \\ & \underset{寸}{f} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \infty \\ & \underset{\sim}{\aleph} \\ & \underset{ल}{-1} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { O} \\ & 0 \\ & \text { N} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \underset{O}{O} \\ & \underset{\sim}{F} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 10 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \hline 0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{N} \\ & \underset{\sim}{0} \\ & 0^{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\llcorner }{N} \\ & \stackrel{-}{N} \\ & \stackrel{N}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \underset{N}{N} \\ \underset{\sim}{\circ} \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { o } \\ & \stackrel{N}{0} \\ & \stackrel{0}{\infty} \\ & \underset{\sim}{n} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { O} \\ & \text { m } \\ & \text { M } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \dot{-} \\ & \text { O- } \\ & \text { B } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8 \\ & 8 \\ & 8\end{aligned}$ | ¢ | $\stackrel{10}{\stackrel{10}{+}}$ | ¢ | － |  |
| $\underset{\sim}{\star}$ | $\wedge$ | $\tau$ | $\underset{\sim}{N}$ | ल | $\stackrel{\infty}{\sim}$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\infty$ | $\infty$ | $\cdots$ | 안 | $\checkmark$ | F | $\stackrel{\sim}{\sim}$ | $\stackrel{\infty}{\sim}$ | F | N | 은 | $\checkmark$ | $\infty$ | $\bullet$ | N | ® |  | ल | $\stackrel{\infty}{+}$ | $\stackrel{ \pm}{\sim}$ | $\stackrel{\square}{\square}$ | 안 | $\checkmark$ | $\stackrel{ }{\sim}$ | $\stackrel{\square}{+}$ | ¢ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\sim}{N} \\ & \stackrel{\text { O}}{\sim} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ু } \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\tau} \\ & \underset{\sim}{\sim} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { M } \\ & \underset{\sim}{\circ} \\ & \underset{\sim}{0} \end{aligned}$ | $$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N} \\ & \text { N } \\ & \text { on } \end{aligned}$ | $\circ$ $\stackrel{0}{\circ}$ $\stackrel{\infty}{\infty}$ | $\overline{6}$ ó o |  | $\begin{aligned} & \mathcal{N} \\ & \underset{O}{0} \\ & \underset{\infty}{\infty} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & m \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\circ}{\prime} \\ & \stackrel{y}{\prime} \\ & \stackrel{N}{2} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{L}{N} \\ & \underset{N}{N} \\ & \underset{N}{n} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 6 \\ & 6 \\ & \overleftarrow{\sigma} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{N} \\ & \stackrel{1}{m} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{N} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \infty \\ & \infty \\ & \infty \\ & \infty \\ & \infty \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \infty \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \rho_{n} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 5 \\ & 8 \\ & 68 \\ & \hline 8 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8 \\ & 8 \\ & \stackrel{8}{6} \end{aligned}$ | 8 $\stackrel{0}{N}$ $\stackrel{1}{2}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \ddagger \\ & \text { \& } \\ & \text { Ñ } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 10 \\ & \text { O} \\ & 10 \\ & \text { N } \end{aligned}$ |  | N N N N | $\frac{\stackrel{9}{7}}{\stackrel{i}{\sim}}$ | 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> - | J 0 0 0 $N$ | $\stackrel{ \pm}{\text { ¢ }}$ | O o － － $\sim$ | ¢ |  |
| H 0 0 0 $\infty$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \underset{\sim}{L} \\ & \sim \\ & \underset{\sim}{7} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ö } \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \underset{\sim}{\circ} \\ & \underset{\sim}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\circ$ $\stackrel{\circ}{ल}$ $\stackrel{+}{N}$ N | $\begin{aligned} & \infty \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \infty \\ & \infty \\ & \infty \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \underset{N}{N} \\ & \underset{\sim}{N} \\ & \underset{N}{n} \end{aligned}$ | m M 0 0 0 0 | 0 <br> $N$ <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 | O－ ल N－ N | $\begin{aligned} & \infty \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \vdots \\ & \sim \end{aligned}$ | N N ob $\infty$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \end{aligned}$ | N <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 | $\square$ <br> － <br> - <br> - |  | Y O oi in |  | M <br> ल <br> 0 <br> 0 | $\underset{\sim}{N}$ $\underset{\sim}{+}$ － － | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \underset{y}{6} \\ & i 5 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | 6 8 上 0 0 in | $\begin{aligned} & \text { M } \\ & \underset{N}{N} \\ & \underset{\sim}{N} \\ & \sim \end{aligned}$ | 10 <br>  <br>  <br> N | N 8 I I | $\circ$ $\stackrel{0}{0}$ 0 0 $\stackrel{0}{0}$ $\stackrel{-}{-}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hat{0} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \end{gathered}$ | $\circ$ O N N in |  | $\begin{aligned} & 6 \\ & 6 \\ & 6 \\ & 6 \\ & 6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | 4 8 0 0 0 0 | $\begin{aligned} & 5 \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & 0 \\ & \hline \\ & \Gamma \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  | $\$$ $\infty$ $\sum_{0}^{0}$ 0 0 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & z \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{O} \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \frac{0}{0} \\ & \sum \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |


| Appendix A. Concentrated Poverty, 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 2000 to 2005-09 (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2005-09 |  |  |  |  |  |  | Change from 2000 |  |  |  |  |
| Metro Area | Total Population | Poor Population | Extreme- <br> Poverty <br> Tracts | Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Poor in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Concentrated Poverty Rate | Rank for <br> Concentrated Poverty Rate | ExtremePoverty Tracts | Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Poor in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Concentrated Poverty Rate | Rank for Change in C.P. Rate |
| New York-Northern New Jersey, |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NY-NJ-PA | 18,830,016 | 2,308,909 | 200 | 792,497 | 368,806 | 16.0\% | 23 | -64 | -232,886 * | -108,340 * | -3.6\%* | 75 |
| Ogden, UT | 515,625 | 41,371 | 3 | 9,135 | 4,337 | 10.5\% | 46 | 0 | 3,827 * | 1,890 * | 2.4\%* | 53 |
| Oklahoma City, OK | 1,169,261 | 166,988 | 13 | 25,523 | 11,450 | 6.9\% | 68 | 2 | 3,076 * | 1,503 | -0.3\% |  |
| Omaha, NE-IA | 828,060 | 88,406 | - 7 | 16,411 | 8,084 | 9.1\% | 53 | 5 | 11,700 * | 5,933 * | 5.7\%* | 24 |
| Orlando, FL | 2,013,778 | 231,124 | 4 | 14,522 | 7,691 | 3.3\% | 87 | 0 | 2,528 * | 1,595 | -0.3\% |  |
| Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA | 792,313 | 70,801 | 1 | 3,193 | 1,417 | 2.0\% | 94 | 1 | 3,193 * | 1,417 * | 2.0\%* | 58 |
| Palm Bay, FL | 532,697 | 51,679 | 4 | 13,739 | 5,859 | 11.3\% | 37 | 3 | 10,209 * | 4,340 * | 7.9\%* | 16 |
| Philadelphia, PA-NJ-DE-MD | 5,853,518 | 663,329 | 82 | 292,352 | 142,110 | 21.4\% | 15 | 21 | 62,074 * | 35,672 * | 3.3\%* | 40 |
| Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ | 4,136,492 | 543,885 | 34 | 128,503 | 59,095 | 10.9\% | 43 | 10 | 53,283 * | 25,110 * | 1.8\%* | 60 |
| Pittsburgh, PA | 2,322,911 | 264,543 | 22 | 38,144 | 17,324 | 6.5\% | 71 | 5 | 7,083 * | 1,934 * | 0.4\% |  |
| Portland, ME | 514,044 | 47,818 | 2 | 4,830 | 2,645 | 5.5\% | 79 | 2 | 4,830 * | 2,645 * | 5.5\%* | 25 |
| Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA | 2,163,097 | 249,490 | 3 | 7,652 | 2,697 | 1.1\% | 97 | -1 | -561 | -348 | -0.6\%* | 68 |
| Poughkeepsie, NY | 655,154 | 64,060 | 3 | 26,569 | 17,326 | 27.0\% | 4 | 0 | 10,347 * | 8,334 * | 10.5\%* | 8 |
| Providence, RI-MA | 1,581,522 | 173,714 | 11 | 32,753 | 14,811 | 8.5\% | 56 | 1 | -3,305 * | -130 | -0.2\% |  |
| Provo, UT | 460,973 | 39,163 | 2 | 1,090 | 374 | 1.0\% | 98 | 1 | -3,326 * | -1,725 * | -6.0\%* | 84 |
| Raleigh-Cary, NC | 1,034,593 | 105,334 | 3 | 15,367 | 6,801 | 6.5\% | 72 | 2 | 11,659 * | 5,216 * | 4.1\%* | 33 |
| Richmond, VA | 1,196,232 | 121,511 | 10 | 32,112 | 13,619 | 11.2\% | 39 | 4 | 12,724 * | 4,349 * | 1.8\%* | 61 |
| Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA | 4,017,408 | 522,591 | 10 | 42,932 | 20,028 | 3.8\% | 85 | -7 | -34,555 * | -14,500 * | -3.4\%* | 74 |
| Rochester, NY | 1,011,733 | 121,243 | 27 | 55,350 | 26,705 | 22.0\% | 13 | 8 | 14,478 * | 8,523 * | 4.6\%* | 30 |
| Sacramento-Roseville, CA | 2,061,140 | 240,301 | 4 | 15,780 | 6,878 | 2.9\% | 89 | -2 | -10,318* | -3,641 * | -1.9\%* | 72 |
| St. Louis, MO-IL | 2,783,678 | 313,651 | 31 | 89,917 | 39,867 | 12.7\% | 34 | 8 | 24,489 * | 8,431 * | 0.7\% |  |
| Salt Lake City, UT | 1,089,476 | 97,402 | 2 | 4,209 | 1,880 | 1.9\% | 95 | 1 | 3,613 * | 1,636 * | 1.6\%* | 63 |
| San Antonio, TX | 2,013,350 | 310,397 | 17 | 63,800 | 30,075 | 9.7\% | 50 | 4 | 17,672 * | 11,244* | 2.2\%* | 56 |
| San Diego, CA | 2,960,154 | 330,625 | 8 | 34,460 | 13,858 | 4.2\% | 83 | -8 | -33,227* | -15,641 * | -4.6\%* | 79 |
| San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA | 4,189,200 | 392,067 | 5 | 11,766 | 4,740 | 1.2\% | 96 | -3 | -9,223 * | -4,964 * | -1.5\%* | 71 |
| San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA | 1,763,698 | 149,158 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Scranton, PA | 541,421 | 66,697 | 2 | 4,941 | 2,037 | 3.1\% | 88 | 1 | 2,486 * | 1,100 * | 1.4\%* | 64 |
| Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA | 3,282,666 | 312,401 | 7 | 17,164 | 6,594 | 2.1\% | 93 | 1 | 2,824 * | 484 | -0.3\% |  |





| Springield, MA |
| :--- |
| Stockton, CA |
| Syracuse, NY |
| Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL |
| Toledo, OH |
| Tucson, AZ |
| Tusa, OK |
| Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, |
| VA-NC |
| Washington-Arington-Alexandria, |
| DC-V-MD-W |
| Wichita, KS |
| Worcester, MA |
| Youngstown, OH-PA |

[^2]| Appendix B. Concentrated Poverty, Primary Cities of 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 2000 to 2005-09 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2005-09 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Change from 2000 |  |  |  |  |
| Metro Area | Total Population |  |  | Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Poor in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Concen- <br> trated <br> Poverty <br> Rate | Rank for Concentrated Poverty Rate | ExtremePoverty Tracts | Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Poor in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Concen- <br> trated <br> Poverty <br> Rate | Rank for Change in C.P. Rate |
| 100 Largest Metro Areas | 60,205,729 | 10,967,484 | 1,554 | 4,662,473 | 2,193,858 | 20.0\% |  | 241 | 634,895 * | 322,521 * | 1.7\% * |  |
| Akron, OH | 206,763 | 43,940 | 12 | 19,639 | 9,683 | 22.0\% | 41 | 8 | 10,773 * | 5,944 * | 11.3\% * | 24 |
| Albany, NY | 90,986 | 21,764 | 4 | 14,922 | 6,967 | 32.0\% | 20 | 2 | 8,646 * | 4,280 * | 17.6\% * | 11 |
| Albuquerque, NM | 488,818 | 73,047 | 4 | 14,513 | 5,997 | 8.2\% | 79 | 2 | 6,472 * | 2,764 * | 2.7\% * | 60 |
| Allentown, PA-NJ | 105,599 | 24,305 | 3 | 7,616 | 4,097 | 16.9\% | 55 | 0 | 2,983 * | 1,915 * | 5.2\% * | 44 |
| Atlanta, GA | 482,425 | 97,832 | 26 | 67,789 | 33,037 | 33.8\% | 16 | 2 | -572 | -581 | -3.9\% |  |
| Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC | 197,612 | 41,440 | 9 | 26,638 | 12,031 | 29.0\% | 26 | 2 | 8,541 * | 3,593 * | 6.4\% * | 37 |
| Austin, TX | 623,189 | 110,228 | 6 | 29,841 | 13,592 | 12.3\% | 71 | 4 | 18,511 * | 7,650 * | 4.9\% * | 46 |
| Bakersfield, CA | 265,119 | 50,033 | 6 | 34,921 | 15,846 | 31.7\% | 22 | -1 | 620 | 72 | -4.4\% * | 66 |
| Baltimore, MD | 627,207 | 122,085 | 16 | 39,691 | 19,512 | 16.0\% | 57 | -14 | $-29,350$ * | -13,051 * | -7.2\% * | 72 |
| Baton Rouge, LA | 196,850 | 47,827 | 13 | 45,515 | 21,490 | 44.9\% | 5 | 6 | 22,266 * | 11,387 * | 22.0\% * | 8 |
| Birmingham, AL | 225,632 | 56,983 | 10 | 30,059 | 14,038 | 24.6\% | 36 | 1 | 1,620 | 1,573 | 3.2\% * | 55 |
| Boise City, ID | 156,685 | 20,066 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Boston-Cambridge, MA-NH | 676,676 | 118,584 | 11 | 33,926 | 15,688 | 13.2\% | 69 | 3 | 14,018 * | 7,003 * | 5.4\% * | 43 |
| Bradenton, FL | 37,738 | 5,316 | 1 | 5,269 | 1,952 | 36.7\% | 11 | 1 | 5,269 * | 1,952 * | 36.7\% * | 1 |
| Bridgeport-Stamford, CT | 255,502 | 38,563 | 5 | 9,209 | 4,381 | 11.4\% | 76 | 2 | 2,941 * | 1,503 * | 2.9\% * | 58 |
| Buffalo, NY | 269,242 | 75,138 | 15 | 40,098 | 19,695 | 26.2\% | 29 | 1 | -6,957 * | -1,035 | -1.4\% |  |
| Cape Coral, FL | 148,141 | 12,292 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Charleston, SC | 109,123 | 17,072 | 4 | 5,784 | 2,913 | 17.1\% | 54 | -1 | $-2,893$ * | -1,492 * | -8.4\% * | 74 |
| Charlotte, NC-SC | 508,057 | 70,410 | 7 | 18,008 | 9,420 | 13.4\% | 68 | 4 | 11,118 * | 6,742 * | 8.3\% * | 31 |
| Chattanooga, TN-GA | 172,054 | 32,689 | 9 | 20,484 | 10,535 | 32.2\% | 18 | 5 | 9,051 * | 4,205 * | 8.0\% * | 32 |
| Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI | 3,071,382 | 593,000 | 124 | 304,139 | 140,574 | 23.7\% | 38 | 28 | 94,146 * | 31,534 * | 4.4\% * | 50 |
| Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN | 326,054 | 76,179 | 25 | 45,360 | 24,068 | 31.6\% | 23 | 6 | 3,849 * | 2,090 * | -0.3\% |  |
| Cleveland, OH | 429,113 | 125,894 | 54 | 104,427 | 52,784 | 41.9\% | 6 | 12 | 33,930 * | 18,241 * | 13.1\% * | 21 |
| Colorado Springs, CO | 377,286 | 44,185 | 2 | 5,337 | 2,204 | 5.0\% | 85 | 1 | 3,486 * | 1,573 * | 2.9\% * | 59 |
| Columbia, SC | 88,058 | 13,968 | 4 | 13,034 | 3,575 | 25.6\% | 33 | 1 | 5,220 * | 685 | 5.1\% * | 45 |
| Columbus, OH | 646,742 | 125,209 | 24 | 56,314 | 28,478 | 22.7\% | 39 | 16 | 34,769 * | 18,479 * | 11.3\% * | 25 |
| Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX | 2,251,546 | 429,675 | 38 | 134,344 | 64,137 | 14.9\% | 60 | 15 | 65,857 * | 36,190 * | 6.3\% * | 38 |



| Appendix B. Concentrated Poverty, Primary Cities of 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 2000 to 2005-09 (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2005-09 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Change from 2000 |  |  |  |  |
| Metro Area | Total Population | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Poor } \\ \text { Population } \end{array}$ |  | Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Poor in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Concentrated Poverty Rate | Rank for Concentrated Poverty Rate | ExtremePoverty Tracts | Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Poor in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Concentrated Poverty Rate | Rank for Change in C.P. Rate |
| Ogden, UT | 82,226 | 16,644 | 3 | 9,135 | 4,337 | 26.1\% | 31 | 1 | 5,168 * | 2,836 * | 13.5\% * | 19 |
| Oklahoma City, OK | 560,554 | 94,768 | 13 | 25,523 | 11,450 | 12.1\% | 73 | 4 | 5,186 * | 2,399 * | 0.6\% |  |
| Omaha, NE-IA | 390,623 | 58,344 | 6 | 14,712 | 7,404 | 12.7\% | 70 | 4 | 10,001 * | 5,253 * | 7.6\% * | 35 |
| Orlando, FL | 198,616 | 30,539 | 2 | 5,738 | 3,325 | 10.9\% | 78 | -1 | -1,609 | -427 | -3.5\% |  |
| Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA | 346,604 | 38,783 | 1 | 3,193 | 1,417 | 3.7\% | 90 | 1 | 3,193 * | 1,417 * | 3.7\% * | 52 |
| Palm Bay, FL | 97,879 | 10,902 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Philadelphia, PA-NJ-DE-MD | 1,499,285 | 352,268 | 59 | 222,434 | 109,093 | 31.0\% | 24 | 13 | 37,441 * | 20,868 * | 4.2\% * | 51 |
| Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ | 2,124,381 | 338,576 | 28 | 102,531 | 48,276 | 14.3\% | 65 | 8 | 39,275 * | 20,239 * | 3.1\% * | 57 |
| Pittsburgh, PA | 285,348 | 57,256 | 14 | 23,400 | 10,982 | 19.2\% | 49 | 4 | 7,253 * | 1,747 * | 3.4\% * | 53 |
| Portland, ME | 61,931 | 10,419 | 2 | 4,830 | 2,645 | 25.4\% | 34 | 2 | 4,830 * | 2,645 * | 25.4\% * | 3 |
| Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA | 702,319 | 107,447 | 2 | 3,166 | 1,449 | 1.3\% | 93 | -2 | -5,047* | -1,596 * | -2.3\% * | 63 |
| Poughkeepsie, NY | 29,536 | 6,687 |  |  |  |  |  | -1 | -1,855 * | -807* | -12.2\% * | 79 |
| Providence, RI-MA | 164,133 | 39,661 | 5 | 17,742 | 7,605 | 19.2\% | 50 | -3 | -13,907 * | $-5,415$ * | -9.6\% * | 77 |
| Provo, UT | 54,110 | 9,190 | 1 | 589 | 172 | 1.9\% | 92 | 0 | -3,827 * | -1,927* | -15.4\% * | 81 |
| Raleigh-Cary, NC | 323,542 | 43,777 | 3 | 15,367 | 6,801 | 15.5\% | 59 | 2 | 11,659 * | 5,216 * | 9.7\% * | 28 |
| Richmond, VA | 191,688 | 41,710 | 7 | 21,430 | 10,829 | 26.0\% | 32 | 1 | 2,042 * | 1,559 * | 2.6\% |  |
| Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA | 639,106 | 107,177 | 7 | 31,972 | 14,838 | 13.8\% | 66 | -4 | -17,577 * | $-7,821$ * | -6.2\% * | 70 |
| Rochester, NY | 202,644 | 56,813 | 27 | 55,350 | 26,705 | 47.0\% | 3 | 8 | 14,478 * | 8,523 * | 13.3\% * | 20 |
| Sacramento-Roseville, CA | 521,213 | 78,221 | 3 | 8,041 | 3,730 | 4.8\% | 87 | 1 | 1,907 * | 895 | 1.3\% |  |
| St. Louis, MO-IL | 349,357 | 82,765 | 19 | 51,445 | 22,016 | 26.6\% | 28 | 2 | 6,150 * | 489 | 0.3\% |  |
| Salt Lake City, UT | 178,111 | 29,070 | 2 | 4,209 | 1,880 | 6.5\% | 83 | 1 | 3,613 * | 1,636 * | 5.6\% * | 42 |
| San Antonio, TX | 1,242,922 | 232,557 | 16 | 59,985 | 28,451 | 12.2\% | 72 | 4 | 14,572 * | 9,847 * | 2.6\% * | 61 |
| San Diego, CA | 1,252,137 | 158,713 | 6 | 29,146 | 12,780 | 8.1\% | 80 | -9 | -36,902 * | $-16,082$ * | -9.3\% * | 75 |
| San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA | 1,380,327 | 169,044 | 3 | 7,988 | 3,209 | 1.9\% | 91 | -5 | -13,001 * | -6,495 * | -3.7\% * | 64 |
| San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA | 1,116,757 | 106,719 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Scranton, PA | 64,767 | 11,344 |  |  |  |  |  | -1 | -2,455* | -937* | -9.4\% * | 76 |
| Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA | 880,512 | 104,900 | 5 | 11,369 | 4,391 | 4.2\% | 89 | -1 | -2,971 * | -1,719 * | -2.1\% * | 62 |
| Springfield, MA | 153,170 | 40,299 | 7 | 25,142 | 13,123 | 32.6\% | 17 | 0 | 787 | 1,555 | -1.7\% |  |
| Stockton, CA | 265,602 | 53,736 | 7 | 24,404 | 10,681 | 19.9\% | 46 | 0 | $-10,013$ * | $-4,373$ * | -6.1\% * | 69 |


|  N | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N } \\ & \stackrel{\infty}{\infty} \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: |

Syracuse, NY
TTampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Toledo, OH
Tucson, AZ
Tulsa, OK
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News,
VA-NC
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria,
DC-VA-MD-W
Wichita, KS
Worcester, MA
Youngstown, OH-PA

[^3]| Appendix C. Concentrated Poverty, Suburbs of 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 2000 to 2005-09 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2005-09 |  |  |  |  |  |  | Change from 2000 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Metro Area | Total <br> Population | $\begin{gathered} \text { Poor } \\ \text { Population } \end{gathered}$ | Extreme- <br> Poverty Tracts | Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Poor in Extreme- <br> Poverty <br> Tracts | Concentrated Poverty Rate | Rank for Concentrated Poverty Rate | ExtremePoverty Tracts | Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Poor in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Concentrated Poverty Rate | Rank for Change in C.P. Rate |
| 100 Largest Metro Areas | 135,654,152 | 12,696,609 | 344 | 1,240,791 | 570,729 | 4.5\% |  | 122 | 335,836 * | 164,874 * | 0.5\% * |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Akron, OH | 479,805 | 41,150 | 1 | 3,908 | 1,783 | 4.3\% | 36 | 1 | 3,908 * | 1,783 * | 4.3\% * | 15 |
| Albany, NY | 745,015 | 62,149 | 4 | 9,412 | 4,451 | 7.2\% | 20 | 1 | 3,016 * | 1,673 * | 2.0\% * | 34 |
| Albuquerque, NM | 336,862 | 48,349 | 3 | 7,319 | 3,117 | 6.4\% | 23 | 2 | 4,361 * | 1,202 * | 1.7\% * | 37 |
| Allentown, PA-NJ | 693,569 | 46,292 | 2 | 7,350 | 2,844 | 6.1\% | 24 | 1 | 2,922 * | 867 * | 1.1\% |  |
| Atlanta, GA | 4,731,351 | 516,289 | 5 | 14,275 | 6,482 | 1.3\% | 63 | 1 | -1,884* | -378 | -1.0\% * | 56 |
| Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC | 330,562 | 45,300 | 2 | 9,876 | 3,994 | 8.8\% | 15 | 1 | 5,324 * | 1,835 * | 3.1\% * | 27 |
| Austin, TX | 928,574 | 82,696 | 2 | 15,594 | 7,574 | 9.2\% | 14 | 1 | 5,446 * | 3,594 * | 0.7\% |  |
| Bakersfield, CA | 515,756 | 101,190 | 4 | 18,333 | 8,668 | 8.6\% | 17 | -2 | -12,203 * | $-4,363$ * | -6.4\% * | 68 |
| Baltimore, MD | 2,021,140 | 119,414 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Baton Rouge, LA | 543,261 | 67,814 | 2 | 10,770 | 4,764 | 7.0\% | 21 | 2 | 10,770 * | 4,764 * | 7.0\% * | 5 |
| Birmingham, AL | 905,328 | 90,075 | 1 | 4,355 | 1,978 | 2.2\% | 53 | 0 | -727* | -657 * | -1.0\% * | 57 |
| Boise City, ID | 417,401 | 46,881 | 2 | 4,731 | 1,687 | 3.6\% | 41 | 2 | 4,731 * | 1,687 * | 3.6\% * | 21 |
| Boston-Cambridge, MA-NH | 3,742,808 | 271,970 | 7 | 17,890 | 8,114 | 3.0\% | 47 | 3 | 10,755 * | 4,594 * | 1.5\% * | 40 |
| Bradenton, FL | 642,719 | 66,140 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bridgeport-Stamford, CT | 627,752 | 26,871 | 1 | 3,103 | 1,351 | 5.0\% | 34 | 1 | 3,103 * | 1,351 * | 5.0\% * | 13 |
| Buffalo, NY | 850,275 | 73,599 | 4 | 7,345 | 3,627 | 4.9\% | 35 | 2 | 3,527 * | 1,758 * | 1.8\% * | 36 |
| Cape Coral, FL | 425,396 | 46,855 | 1 | 4,579 | 2,572 | 5.5\% | 30 | 0 | -264 | -241 | -2.5\% * | 62 |
| Charleston, SC | 514,336 | 67,262 | 4 | 9,170 | 4,021 | 6.0\% | 28 | 0 | -3,432 * | -1,060 * | -3.2\% * | 63 |
| Charlotte, NC-SC | 1,121,509 | 119,304 | 1 | 2,141 | 889 | 0.7\% | 68 | 1 | 2,141 * | 889 * | 0.7\% * | 48 |
| Chattanooga, TN-GA | 339,880 | 38,011 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI | 6,330,387 | 508,942 | 20 | 36,947 | 18,172 | 3.6\% | 42 | 11 | 18,132 * | 10,010 * | 1.3\% * | 42 |
| Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN | 1,788,946 | 162,098 | 10 | 22,731 | 9,928 | 6.1\% | 26 | 7 | 17,229 * | 7,481 * | 3.9\% * | 17 |
| Cleveland, OH | 1,654,699 | 150,868 | 12 | 24,297 | 12,135 | 8.0\% | 18 | 12 | 24,297 * | 12,135 * | 8.0\% * | 4 |
| Colorado Springs, CO | 220,185 | 16,640 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Columbia, SC | 621,294 | 74,325 | 2 | 5,588 | 2,410 | 3.2\% | 44 | 1 | 2,675 * | 1,229 * | 1.3\% * | 43 |
| Columbus, OH | 1,081,470 | 86,902 | 1 | 911 | 531 | 0.6\% | 72 | 1 | 911* | 531 * | 0.6\% * | 50 |











| Appendix C. Concentrated Poverty, Suburbs of 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 2000 to 2005-09 (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2005-09 |  |  |  |  |  |  | Change from 2000 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Metro Area | Total <br> Population | Poor <br> Population | Extreme- <br> Poverty <br> Tracts | Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Poor in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Concen- <br> trated Poverty Rate | Rank for <br> Concen- <br> trated <br> Poverty <br> Rate | ExtremePoverty Tracts | Population in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Poor in ExtremePoverty Tracts | Concen- <br> trated Poverty Rate | Rank for Change in C.P. Rate |
| New York-Northern New Jersey, |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NY-NJ-PA | 10,295,125 | 733,870 | 26 | 95,122 | 42,927 | 5.8\% | 29 | 10 | 39,126 * | 18,022 * | 2.3\% * | 31 |
| Ogden, UT | 433,399 | 24,727 |  |  |  |  |  | -1 | $-1,341$ * | -946* | -5.1\% * | 67 |
| Oklahoma City, OK | 608,707 | 72,220 |  |  |  |  |  | -2 | -2,110 * | -896 * | -1.5\% * | 58 |
| Omaha, NE-IA | 437,437 | 30,062 | 1 | 1,699 | 680 | 2.3\% | 52 | 1 | 1,699 * | 680 * | 2.3\% * | 32 |
| Orlando, FL | 1,815,162 | 200,585 | 2 | 8,784 | 4,366 | 2.2\% | 54 | 1 | 4,137 * | 2,022 * | 0.5\% * | 51 |
| Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA | 445,709 | 32,018 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Palm Bay, FL | 434,818 | 40,777 | 4 | 13,739 | 5,859 | 14.4\% | 7 | 3 | 10,209 * | 4,340 * | 10.2\% * | 3 |
| Philadelphia, PA-NJ-DE-MD | 4,354,233 | 311,061 | 23 | 69,918 | 33,017 | 10.6\% | 10 | 8 | 24,633 * | 14,804 * | 3.6\% * | 22 |
| Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ | 2,012,111 | 205,309 | 6 | 25,972 | 10,819 | 5.3\% | 32 | 2 | 14,008 * | 4,871 * | 0.5\% |  |
| Pittsburgh, PA | 2,037,563 | 207,287 | 8 | 14,744 | 6,342 | 3.1\% | 46 | 1 | -170 | 187 | -0.2\% |  |
| Portland, ME | 452,113 | 37,399 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA | 1,460,778 | 142,043 | 1 | 4,486 | 1,248 | 0.9\% | 66 | 1 | 4,486 * | 1,248 * | 0.9\% * | 46 |
| Poughkeepsie, NY | 625,618 | 57,373 | 3 | 26,569 | 17,326 | 30.2\% | 3 | 1 | 12,202 * | 9,141 * | 13.1\% * | 2 |
| Providence, RI-MA | 1,417,389 | 134,053 | 6 | 15,011 | 7,206 | 5.4\% | 31 | 4 | 10,602 * | 5,285 * | 3.8\% * | 19 |
| Provo, UT | 406,863 | 29,973 | 1 | 501 | 202 | 0.7\% | 70 | 1 | 501 * | 202 | 0.7\% |  |
| Raleigh-Cary, NC | 711,051 | 61,557 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Richmond, VA | 1,004,544 | 79,801 | 3 | 10,682 | 2,790 | 3.5\% | 43 | 3 | 10,682 * | 2,790 * | 3.5\% * | 23 |
| Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA | 3,378,302 | 415,414 | 3 | 10,960 | 5,190 | 1.2\% | 64 | -3 | -16,978 * | -6,679 * | -2.0\% * | 60 |
| Rochester, NY | 809,089 | 64,430 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sacramento-Roseville, CA | 1,539,927 | 162,080 | 1 | 7,739 | 3,148 | 1.9\% | 58 | -3 | -12,225 * | -4,536 * | -3.6\% * | 64 |
| St. Louis, MO-IL | 2,434,321 | 230,886 | 12 | 38,472 | 17,851 | 7.7\% | 19 | 6 | 18,339 * | 7,942 * | 2.3\% * | 33 |
| Salt Lake City, UT | 911,365 | 68,332 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| San Antonio, TX | 770,428 | 77,840 | 1 | 3,815 | 1,624 | 2.1\% | 56 | 0 | 3,100 * | 1,397 * | 1.7\% * | 38 |
| San Diego, CA | 1,708,017 | 171,912 | 2 | 5,314 | 1,078 | 0.6\% | 71 | 1 | 3,675 * | 441 | 0.2\% |  |
| San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA | 2,808,873 | 223,023 | 2 | 3,778 | 1,531 | 0.7\% | 69 | 2 | 3,778 * | 1,531 * | 0.7\% * | 49 |
| San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA | 646,941 | 42,439 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Scranton, PA | 476,654 | 55,353 | 2 | 4,941 | 2,037 | 3.7\% | 40 | 2 | 4,941 * | 2,037 * | 3.7\% * | 20 |
| Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA | 2,402,154 | 207,501 | 2 | 5,795 | 2,203 | 1.1\% | 65 | 2 | 5,795 * | 2,203 * | 1.1\% * | 45 |

Endnotes

1. Alan Berube and Elizabeth Kneebone, "Parsing U.S. Poverty at the Metropolitan Level" Brookings Up Front Blog, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0922_ metro_poverty_berube_kneebone.aspx, posted 9/22/2011.
2. Elizabeth Kneebone and Alan Berube, "Reversal of Fortune: A New Look at Concentrated Poverty in the 2000s" (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2008).
3. Paul Jargowsky, "Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems" (Washington: Brookings institution, 2003); Community Affairs Offices of the Federal Reserve System and the Brookings Institution, "The Enduring Challenge of Concentrated Poverty in America: Case Studies from Communities Across the U.S." (Washington: 2008).
4. Paul Jargowsky, Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1997); Paul Jargowsky, "Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems".
5. Kneebone and Berube, "Reversal of Fortune". See also, Rolf Pendall and others, "A Lost Decade: Neighborhood Poverty and the Urban Crisis of the 2000s" (Washington: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 2011).
6. See, e.g., Paul Jargowsky and Mary Jo Bane, "Ghetto Poverty in the United States" in C. Jenks and P. Peterson, eds., The Urban Underclass. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1991); Sheldon H. Danziger and Peter Gottschalk, "Earnings Inequality, the Spatial Concentration of Poverty, and the Underclass," American Economic Review 77 (1987); Jargowsky and Mary Jo Bane, "Ghetto Poverty: Basic Questions" in L. E. Lynn and M. G. H. McGeary, eds., Inner-City Poverty in the United States (Washington: National Academy Press, 1991); John D. Kasarda, "Inner-City Poverty and Economic Access" in J. Sommer and D. A. Hicks, eds., Rediscovering Urban America: Perspectives on the 1980s (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1993); G. Thomas Kingsley and Kathryn Pettit, " Severe Distress and Concentrated Poverty: Trends for Neighborhoods in Casey Cities and the Nation" (Washington: Urban Institute, 2003).
7. For a more detailed discussion of potential bias that can result for using standardized tract boundaries across years, see Jargowsky, "Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems".
8. For a more detailed discussion of geography types, see Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program, "State of Metropolitan America: On the Front Lines of Demographic Transformation" (Washington: 2010).
9. See e.g., National Academy of Sciences, Measuring Poverty: A New Approach (Washington: National Academy Press, 1995). The Census Bureau plans to begin releasing a supplemental poverty measure in 2012 that takes into account recommendations from the 1995 NAS study; however, because the estimates will be based on the Current Population Survey data, the sample size will not be sufficient to report estimates for sub-state geographies.
10. We exclude tracts where at least 50 percent of residents are enrolled in college or graduate school, as these individuals likely have only temporarily low incomes. We also exclude tracts with small populations (i.e., 500 people or less).
11. Jargowsky, "Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems".
12. In addition, as Paul Jargowsky recently pointed out in a presentation at Johns Hopkins University (9/19/2011), a region could have the same number of extreme-poverty tracts in each month for 60 months, but the exact tracts that are high poverty could change over time, due to factors like gentrification or the demolition of housing units. It would then be possible, after pooling 60 months of data, that zero tracts show up as extreme poverty in the 2005-09 estimates, thereby understating concentrated poverty in the region.
13. The model produces an R -squared of .541 .
14. Jargowsky, Poverty and Place.
15. For an analysis of concentrated poverty trends since 1970, see Paul Jargowsky, Poverty and Place; Berube and Katz, "Katrina's Window".
16. Jargowsky, "Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems".
17. Jargowsky, "Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems".
18. New Orleans' significant decline in concentrated poverty was largely the result of natural disasters, with the evacuations and destruction following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita driving this region's trend.
19. Berube and Kneebone, "Parsing U.S. Poverty at the Metropolitan Level."
20. Elizabeth Kneebone and Alan Berube, "The Rapid Growth of the Suburban Poor" The Atlantic Cities, http://www. theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2011/09/rapid-growth-suburban-poor/190/, posted 9/23/2011.
21. Kneebone and Garr, "The Suburbanization of Poverty".
22. George C. Galster, "The Mechanism(s) of Neighborhood

Effects: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications"
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University, Scotland, UK, 4-5 February 2010.
23. Jargwosky, "Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems".
24. Erol Ricketts and Isabel Sawhill, " Defining and Measuring the Underclass" Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management Vol. 7 (2) (1988: 316-325) pp.321; See also, Isabel Sawhill and Paul Jargowsky, "The Decline of the Underclass" (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2006).
25. Ricketts and Sawhill, "Defining and Measuring the Underclass" pp. 322-323.
26. Recent research has also found that the share of all whites, of all blacks, and of all Latinos living in highpoverty tracts largely stayed the same over the decade, meaning the shifts in the racial and ethnic composition of these neighborhoods was driven by changes in the composition of the larger population. See Pendall and others, "The Lost Decade."
27. Steven Raphael and Michael Stoll, "Job Sprawl and the Suburbanization of Poverty" (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2010); Kenya Covington, Lance Freeman, and Michael Stoll, "The Suburbanization of Housing Choice Voucher Recipients" (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2011).

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[^0]:    a For a more detailed review of this literature, see "The Enduring Challenge of Concentrated Poverty in America: Case Studies from Communities Across the U.S." from the Federal Reserve System and the Brookings Institution (Washington: 2008); and Alan Berube and Bruce Katz, "Katrina's Window: Confronting Concentrated Poverty Across America" (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2005).
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[^1]:    Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and ACS data

[^2]:    *Change is significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
    Source: Brookings Institution anlaysis of decennial census and ACS data

[^3]:    Source: Brookings Institution anlaysis of decennial census and ACS data

