

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

2014 POST-ELECTION AMERICAN VALUES SURVEY:
WHAT MOTIVATED VOTERS DURING
THE MIDTERM ELECTIONS?

Washington, D.C.

Wednesday, November 12, 2014

PARTICIPANTS:

Moderators:

E.J. DIONNE, JR.
Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

WILLIAM A. GALSTON
Ezra K. Zilkha Chair and Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

Presentation of Survey Results:

ROBERT P. JONES
Chief Executive Officer
Public Religion Research Institute

Panelists:

MELISSA DECKMAN
Louis L. Goldstein Professor of Public Affairs
Chair of the Political Science Department
Washington College

HENRY OLSEN
Senior Fellow
Ethics & Public Policy Center

JOY REID
Host, *The Reid Report*
MSNBC

* * * * *

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. DIONNE: I just want you to know Brookings installed this fantastic screen because Robbie does such good power points that we thought his power point deserved our renovating this whole room. So welcome, everybody; it's really great of you to be here today. We had an election where not much happened so I'm shocked that there are so many people here -- not. I'm E.J. Dionne. For today's purposes I'm a Senior Fellow here at the Brookings Institution, and on behalf of the Religion Policy and Politics Project here I want to welcome all of you. Thank you for coming. And we've had the great pleasure of good fortune of working with Robbie Jones, Dan Cox, Juhem Navarro-Rivera, at the Public Religion Research Institute, and this is actually PRRI's fifth American Values Survey, and the fourth we've had the pleasure to work with them on.

One of the really cool things about what we're doing today, I think, is that we can learn an awful lot from the exit polls about the election. And I'm a big fan of exit polls. They have limitations but they're still great. But what you can't learn from exit polls are the people who don't show up to vote and take one of those exit poll papers, and as Robbie will explain what we did here today -- the survey we're talking about today involved re-interviewing as many of the same people we talked to about a month ago to see what they did and what they were thinking after the election, as well as before. And so in this beautiful report that you should have in your hands you'll see that we could actually see who didn't vote and talk about them as well as the people who did. And so that alone is worth the cost of admission, but there's a lot more here as Robbie will say.

I'd like to thank all the people who helped us organize the event. I like to do that at the beginning so we don't forget in the great discussion afterward. Robbie and Dan and Juhem, obviously, Anna Goodbaum, Christine Jacobs, Beth Stone, Elizabeth McElvein, and not least my dear and wonderful assistant, Elizabeth Thom. Thank you

guys very, very much.

This morning Robbie will present the survey in a way only he can do and then we will hear from our very distinguished panelists who represent different points of view. Two of them are back from our earlier incarnation, so they're part of our panel study. Henry Olsen and Joy Reid, we can carefully compare what they say today with what they said a month ago. And we are also deeply honored to have -- she's the control group -- we are also deeply honored to have Melissa Deckman join us. Bill will introduce the panel.

Robbie is CEO of the Public Religion Research Institute, a leading scholar and commentator on religion, values, and public life. He is the author of books, peer reviewed articles, and all sorts of other stuff. He is perfectly situated to comment on all the issues he comments on. He's got a Ph.D. in religion from Emory University, a Masters in divinity from Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, and as you are about to learn he does the best power points in this city and maybe elsewhere too. Welcome to Robbie Jones. (Applause)

MR. JONES: Thank you, E.J., and also to Bill Galston. The two of them I will say a quick shout out helped us shape both the pre-election survey and the post-election call back survey, so helped us make the questions smarter and more insightful. So thanks to them and to the Brookings team for helping us all get here today. I do want to say a quick shout out to my staff who haven't slept much in the last couple of days, right. So we got data back late Sunday night and you have a report in your hands this morning, right? So we have had a bout a 48 hour turnaround (applause) so yes, for the staff -- if you see people bumping into walls or, you know, mainlining coffee you'll know who they are. That's the staff here.

So thanks for coming out today on a beautiful fall day. And we're going

to try to get a look back at the elections. As E.J. mentioned, this survey is made up of about 1400 people that we called back from our pre-election survey. So we were able to kind of get their vote intentions in the front end and things they cared about and then ask them how they actually voted, or whether they voted, in the mid-term elections today. So I also want to say thank you before I jump into the data to the Ford Foundation and the Nathan Cummings Foundation without whose generous funding we would not have the data that you have in front of you.

So with that let me jump in here. I'm going to pull one slide up to harken back to some of the main findings from our pre-election survey and that is this, the economic anxieties that we saw going into the election. So these are two findings from the pre-election survey that we were in the field back in August. And two striking things, one, at that time more than 7 in 10 Americans told us that they thought that the recession was still on; that we were still in a recession. About 4 in 10 Americans are living in what we classified as either high or moderate economic anxiety households, right. And we measured that by a number of things like not being able to pay a bill on time, reducing meals for economic reasons. Those are some things. So about 4 in 10 Americans in some significant economic distress.

In this survey we asked about some other things that I think contribute to the kind of general anxieties that people brought into the election. We had two questions on this survey, one was about concerns about Ebola and one was concerns about terrorism. So in the kind of lead up to the election we had a lot of press around ISIS and sort of acts of brutality, and we also had a lot of press around Ebola. And we asked some questions that were very personal questions. So these questions we didn't say, are you generally worried about terrorism or are you generally worried about Ebola, we phrased this in a very personal way, how worried are you that you or someone in your

family will be a victim of terrorism, right; so very personal questions. Among all Americans, you'll see about a third of Americans said that they were at least somewhat worried that they or someone in their family would be a victim of terrorism. And if you look at the party breaks here you'll see that there's not a lot of differences between Democrats and Independents in the general population, and even Republicans stand out a little bit. But the group that really stands out here are members of the Tea Party here. So that number -- we got 61 percent of those who identify with the Tea Party, say that they are at least somewhat worried that they or someone in their family will be a victim of terrorism. We asked a similar question about Ebola, how worried are you that you or someone in your family will be infected by Ebola. More than 1 in 5 Americans, 22 percent, said that they were at least somewhat worried that they or someone in their family would be infected with Ebola. So these are kind of -- in addition to the economic anxieties we had a significant number of Americans carrying these other kinds of anxieties into the election as well. And the patterns for the Ebola question were roughly the same here. Here's the other side, you can see the people who are not too worried on these questions as well.

All right. So all of this adds up to a pretty pessimistic public heading into -- and a kind of anxious public- heading into the elections. And one this kind of basic question that's been asked -- kind of has a long degree in polling, is the country heading in the right direction or is it off on the wrong track. One of the things that we found is that 6 in 10 Americans in post-election survey say no, the country is off on the wrong track. And when you look even at some of the sort of strongest supporters of the President, and Democrats themselves, nearly 4 in 10 say that the country is off on the wrong track. And if you look at -- I've got young adults, I've got women, men, seniors, Independents, Tea Parties, and Republicans, and you look at these numbers for everyone else, right, they

are up around 6 in 10 or more. That includes young adults, by the way, and we'll be coming back to young adults, but 6 in 10 young adults saying the country is off on the wrong track, 6 in 10 women, and it just goes up from there. So that's a pretty negative mood for the country to be in on the election.

This I stole from the U.S. Elections Project. It's not our data, but I couldn't resist just putting it in here. It was in the *New York Times* editorial page this morning, some of you may have seen it. But just to kind of, you know, nail this down the election turnout was the lowest that we've seen since 1942. And if you look at that there's only one more little trough there, and that's the Great Depression. So World War II, the Great Depression, and this last election, right, in terms of very, very low turnout. So that's the context that we're looking for and it kind of gives you some comparisons here to kind of understand low, low context.

So as E.J. said one of the interesting things we're able to do is to see who voted and who did not vote. So I've got a number of categories up here. The green bars are the percent of voters; so what percent did they constitute of all voters. The orange bars here are what percentage this group constituted of all non voters, right. So if you look at whites, so whites in this election constituted 73 percent of all voters, only 56 percent of non voters. The grey bars here are the percent of all Americans that they represent, just for a kind of reference point here. One interesting thing we'll be coming back to white working class Americans turned out in this election. So you could see there's not a lot of difference between the part that they make up of voters and non voters. White college educated Americans, you can see here, made up 26 percent of voters, only 12 percent of non voters. African Americans about even as well. But you see a big jump here in Hispanics, right. So Hispanics only constituted about eight percent of voters in this, but they made up 22 percent of non voters, right. So this is one

of the stories here in terms of turnout. Here's a couple of other groups. Men and women, fairly even, although women turned out constituted a slightly higher percentage of voters than men, but not a huge number. But here's young adults, right. So again the story here, young adults constituted only 12 percent of voters, 35 percent of non voters in the last election whereas seniors are the opposite, 24 percent of voters, only 13 percent of non voters were seniors. And here's education level. A similar story. Those with a high school education are less, constituted 38 percent of voters, but they constituted 53 percent of non voters. Those with a college degree, 33 percent of voters, but 23 percent of non voters. So you can basically see this pattern, Latinos, lower educated Americans, younger Americans, much less likely to constitute the size proportion of the electorate this time.

We also asked about voting problems. So we wanted to kind of understand, like why people didn't vote. And we decided to ask this question of everyone and not just people who tried to vote. And one of the things we found out here is that 12 percent of Americans reported that they had some kind of voting difficulties this year, so a little more than 1 in 10 Americans said that. What's notable about that number is that only 2 percent of people who actually voted said that they had voting problems, but 32 percent of people who did not vote said that they had voting problems, right. So now -- yeah, the chuckle is here because, you know, there may be some excuse making here. But here's what people told us when we said, what trouble did you have voting? What were the problems you had? And this was among all Americans. By and large the two biggest ones are similar kinds of things. They're basically logistical problems, getting to the polling place, right. So either had difficulty finding it or difficulty with transportation and getting there, about 28 percent of Americans said that; 24 percent -- a quarter of Americans said they had difficulty getting off work. We'll come back to this and talk about

early voting and some of the differences between early voters and Election Day voters here. And then another 14 percent ineligible to vote. And that by the way includes -- this is mostly actually people who said they had problems with their registration, not that they were not citizens, but that they were told they were ineligible to vote because they had a problem with their registration. Five percent didn't have ID and then a smaller number say the lines were too long or the ballot was confusing. But one thing to also note here is the differences in demographic groups. So only 9 percent of whites, but 19 percent of non whites reported having some kind of difficulty in voting. Only 7 percent of seniors, but 25 percent of young adults under the age of 30 said that they had some difficulties in voting. And in most cases in the earlier numbers as I said actually whatever the difficulties that they had actually prevented them from showing up and voting in the election.

So let's say a little bit about the vote, kind of break this out. So the first thing is one little piece of explanation. This was a post election survey; it was not an exit poll. So to say that -- some of you have been, you know, reading the tea leaves and the exit polls, one number I want to point here to, in our survey, we had 46 percent reporting that they voted for Republican candidates in the election, 45 percent reporting that they voted for Democratic candidates in the election. The official exit polls have that at 53-47. But that's a two party vote. So if we re-percentage our numbers to two party vote we have 52-48 when we re-percentaged it. So we're pretty close on the money. But the big difference is that we have 7 percent of people who wouldn't tell us who they voted for when we talked to them on the phone. So that's the biggest difference here. So having sort of set the stage there, the one thing to say about the religion vote is that it actually is fairly stable. Even if you go back a decade these patterns look roughly like you see here. white evangelical Protestants, about 8 in 10 supporting Republican candidates, white

Catholics about 6 in 10 supporting Republican candidates, white mainline Protestants a little more divided by leaning toward Republican candidates fairly strongly. And on the other hand minority Protestants and the religiously unaffiliated strongly supporting Democratic candidates here. One way in the pre-election survey we did this, but one way of kind of thinking about this and to kind of put this in context, we take all Christians. One of the notable things you'll see here is that there are racial and ethnic differences that really divide difference Christian groups fairly strongly. So if we lump together all white Christians; 26 percent say they supported the Democratic candidate, 64 percent reported the Republican candidate. All non white Christians is nearly a mirror image of that; 72 percent supported Democratic candidates, 23 percent support Republican candidates. So very, very big divides running through Christian groups along the lines of race and ethnicity.

So here's another -- take a look at votes among whites by class. So here's all voters. Among all white voters, 55 percent supported Republican candidates. But notice here this white working class number which I'm sure we'll come back to here. Sixty one percent of white working class -- this is non college educated- so whites who do not have a college degree and are paid by the hour at their jobs. So 61 percent supporting Republican candidates. It's notable that Democrats here are down 9 points if we just go back to 2012, right. So the 2012 Democrats got 35 percent of white working class votes in our post-election survey in 2012. So this is a big drop off just in the last 2 years among white working class voters for Democrats. That's a pretty important finding I'm sure we'll come back in the discussion. The other thing that sort of structured people's votes was things that they saw as important issues heading into the election. There were two issues where Republicans had an advantage. So among voters who said that the most important issue to them was national security or the most important

issue to them was immigration, they supported Republican candidates fairly heavily; 65 percent national security voters and 62 percent of those who said immigration was most important. On the other hand among those who said the economy was most important, supporting Democrats more than Republicans, but not by a huge margin here. And this is typically an area where Democrats have a pretty strong advantage, but this is still a Democratic advantage but not a huge one. And those who said healthcare was the most important issue to them strong supporting Democratic candidates, 65 to 26 on the other side.

Here are the two other things that I mentioned earlier: worries about being personally affected by terrorism or personally effected by Ebola. If you're worried about those issues, for example if you're worried that you or a family member is going to be affected by Ebola you voted for Republican candidates, 55 percent to 34 percent. Very similar picture here; it's actually a little more pronounced, if you're seriously worried or at least somewhat worried about terrorism affecting you or your family, 61 percent voted for Republican candidates, 32 percent voted for Democratic candidates. So, you know, you're looking at nearly 30 point -- a 20 point gap appeared, 30 point gap here, between the two parties. And here's the other side, if you're not worried about either of those things, you support more consistently Democratic candidates.

So what about the coalitions? If we look back to Romney's coalition, Obama's coalition, what do we see? Did they hold together, did they not hold together; was there a lot of switching? Turns out there wasn't a lot of switching. So here is among those who report that they voted for Romney in 2012, this is their 2014 vote. So you can see that 90 percent of those who voted for Romney in 2012 also voted for a Republican candidate in 2014; however there were this 4 percent that I've kind of pulled out here that actually switched and voted for Democratic candidates. If we look at the Obama side of

this equation, it looks a little different, right. So fewer, 84 percent, but still overwhelmingly majority stayed voting for Obama, but 8 percent actually switched their vote in support of Republican candidates here. The other thing we're saying here is that there was a turnout differential between Obama supporters and Romney supporters. While 14 percent of Romney voters told us that they didn't vote and they stayed home, 20 percent of Obama voters said that they didn't vote and stayed home. So a combination of some switching with lower turnout rates adds up to a clear Republican advantage when those two things are put together.

One other thing that we asked about is the question of problems in U.S. elections. And there's been some debate about whether there is a problem with voter fraud for example, that is people casting votes who aren't eligible to vote, or whether the problems are more about eligible voters being denied the right to vote, like voter disenfranchisement. It turns out there are pretty big differences by party on this question, right. So Americans are basically divided on the question with slightly more Americans saying they're more concerned about eligible voters being denied the right to vote. But Republicans, those associated with the Tea Party, more than two thirds saying no, the bigger problem is people casting votes who are not eligible to vote, while Independents are divided and Democrats are mirror opposites on the other side, right, saying no, the bigger problem is voter disenfranchisement, that eligible voters being denied the right to vote it -- I'll note here too, I can get the numbers for when we talk about it later, but younger people, minorities, basically people who had difficulty voting, maybe not surprisingly, are much more concerned about eligible voters being denied the right to vote than they are about voter disenfranchisement.

One more window on this is that we also found that this question is heavily structured by media consumption. So we had a standard question that we've

asked in our surveys about which television news source do you most trust. We have Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, PBS, Jon Stewart; we have a number of other things that we ask about here. So I'm going to give you this number first. So here is the number of folks who say they most trust any other news source other than Fox News, right. So if you lump them all together it's 52 percent say they're more concerned about eligible voters being denied the right to vote than they are to say people cast votes who are not eligible to vote. Here is the number for Fox News, those who most trust Fox News. Three quarters say that the biggest problem in the U.S. elections today is people casting votes who are not eligible to vote. So just huge, huge divides on this question.

All right. So let's look ahead to the 2016 election and we're all ready to do that, right now, ready to look ahead to the 2016 elections. So just a couple of things and then we'll jump into the discussion. So the Republican field, look at this chart. It is wide open, right. And in fact interestingly enough Mitt Romney still heads the pack here at 17 percent, saying that that would be their preferred nominee. But I mean, no one's really breaking 20 percent anywhere at all. You know, there's a number of double digit candidates but barely. It is really a pretty equal pie here among a whole range of folks that we asked. And we asked this question of Republicans and people who lean Republican here. So here is on the opposite the side the Democratic nominee. Does anyone want to take a guess what this one looks like? (Laughs) So there it is, right, sort of like a Pac Man thing eating the other candidates here. (Laughs) So we've got 6 and 2 from Hillary Clinton, 6 and 10 saying Hillary, and really no one within striking distance at least right now with this survey. One thing I want to point out about Hillary versus Obama here that we saw in our survey is when we look at perceptions of their ideology, or this is -- we asked Americans do you think the Democratic Party is very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, very conservative? Do you think Barack Obama is very liberal,

liberal, moderate, conservative, very conservative? One of the things that you'll notice is that 64 percent of the country identifies Barack Obama as either liberal or very liberal, right. Basically the same for the Democratic Party, liberal or very liberal, although there are more people in the more intense category, very liberal, for Barack Obama. But look at Hillary Clinton here, right, perceived to be considerably less liberal than either Obama or the Democratic Party. And you can see the other piece here is also considerably more moderate, right. So 26 percent see Hillary Clinton as moderate, only 19 percent see Barack Obama as moderate. The other thing we're seeing here is if we look back -- we asked this question in 2012, so just a couple of years ago, and 2 years ago only 57 percent said Obama was either liberal or very liberal, so 7 points lower than say that today. So the perception of Obama as being liberal or very liberal has gone up by 7 points in the last couple of years here.

All right, two more slides and we'll jump to discussion. We also ask about various attributes of political parties, so thinking about the party brands and which strengths and weaknesses both parties are going to bring to the next presidential election. And so we have which party is better at keeping American safe, which party shares your values, and which party cares about people like you. So on the first one, cares about people like you, Democrats have about a 10 point advantage here with more Americans saying this better describes the Democratic Party than describes the Republican Party. On shares your values, dead heat here. The country is evenly divided on this question of which party better shares their values. And the Republican Party holding a clear advantage on being better at keeping America safe. So 50 percent say this better describes the Republican Party, 34 percent better describes the Democratic Party.

Now some attributes that might not be so positive here, more influenced

by lobbyists and special interests, more extreme in its position, wants to radically transform American society. So on this last one notably more Americans say this phrase applies to Democrats than to Republicans, 53 percent say Democrats want to radically transform American society; however we got a little flip here and the Republican Party being seen as more extreme in its position. So about half saying that versus 39 percent saying it's about Democratic Party. And the Republican Party is seen as more influenced by lobbyists and special interests, 42 percent to 35 percent; but I would note that 14 percent in the middle, right, both equally, is worth kind of putting a little highlight around. This is something that neither party really escapes fully, this perception.

I'm going to close with one other slide that's not related to the election, but I do think it's related to a kind of -- some of the racial divisions that we saw in the surveys and a kind of continuing conversation around race that we're going to have, you know, in the country moving forward and toward the end of President Obama's presidency, especially. We asked a question about -- we were actually in the field with our pre-election survey before, during, and after the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, so we were actually able to collect data before that event and then we were still in the field a few days after that event and then we asked the question again in the post-election survey. So we have three data points to measure American's attitudes about the fairness of the criminal justice system. So the statement was blacks and other minorities receive equal treatment in the criminal justice system, do you agree or disagree with that statement? So what I'm going to show you is the percent of Americans, whites, and non whites who agree with that statement at those three points in time. So before the shooting this is what the divide looked like, 38 percent of Americans agreed with the statement, 44 percent of whites agreed with it, only 29 percent of non whites Americans agreed with the statement; so a significant racial gap. Measured right

after the shooting this is what we saw, so not a lot of movement in the general population, but a big movement among whites and non whites. So a 13 point drop among non whites. This 44 to 48 I should be clear is not significant, it's not a significant movement up, so it's 4 points up but it's not a statistically significant movement, so basically level there. But that's sort of notable in those five days, very big shifts among non white Americans and not a shift among white Americans. And here is the numbers from our most recent survey here. And so one of the things that we're seeing is a very interesting phenomenon, that basically non white Americans have sort of gone back to their pre shooting levels in their kind of macro evaluations. Sometimes we see this kind of thing when there's a lot of press coverage and then it sort of falls off, we see levels move back up to where they were before an event. However, the difference between 44 and 53 is significant, right. So what has actually happened is that there are more whites agreeing with the statement today than there were before the shooting whereas, non white Americans are basically in the same place that they were before the shooting. So, you know, I think the big takeaway here is a real effect that we saw among non white Americans, no effect and if anything maybe even a little uptick the other direction on white Americans that leaves us with a more than 20 point gap on this question of whether the criminal justice system treats blacks and other minorities fairly. So some of these questions about inequality will I think continue to be with us as we move forward.

So I will stop there, and we can move to our next phase of the discussion. (Applause)

MR. GALSTON: Well, first of all I want to award Robbie the annual FedEx fast talkers award. And speaking of fast talking, we have a lot to crowd in and a relatively short time to do it because we must end promptly at 12:30 p.m. So without further ado I will introduce myself and the panelists. I'm Bill Galston, a senior fellow in

Governance Studies here at Brookings, and one of the indicted co-conspirators in the production of this report. And our three commentators, and let me just associate myself, as we say in your nation's capital, with the remarks of E.J. Dionne, we are really thrilled to have all three of them. In the order of which they will speak, in the order in which they appear on the dais, Henry Olsen, who is a senior fellow at the Ethics & Public Policy Center where he studies and provides commentary on American politics. His work focuses on how to address consistent with conservative principles the electoral challenges facing modern American conservatism. This work will culminate in a book entitled, *New Century, New Deal: How Conservatives Can Win Hearts, Minds, and Elections*. And I hereby pledge to hold a book event here at Brookings as soon as your book is out. Joy Reid is the host of The Reid Report on MSNBC. Prior to that role she was the managing editor of TheGrio.com and *The Reid Report* political blog. Joy was also a freelance columnist for the *Miami Herald* for several years, and produced and hosted a talk radio show called Radio One. And Melissa Deckman is professor of political science and the Louis L. Goldstein professor of public affairs at Washington College, where she also chairs the Political Science Department. An expert on religion, gender, and American politics, she the author or co-author of more than a dozen scholarly articles and four books. Her most recent work examines the impact of the war on women on the 2012 Presidential election, a theme we will have occasion to revisit I suspect during this discussion.

Each of the commentators has a maximum of 10 minutes. Those 10 minutes will be policed by Elizabeth McElvein who has my proxy, and terrible things will happen to you if you run over, but I'm not going to specify your punishment in advance.

So without further ado, Henry Olsen.

MR. OLSEN: Thank you very much, Bill. I'd like to talk briefly about

turnout and then a little bit about the white working class, and then finally a little bit about the challenges I think both parties face going forward in 2016. I'm going to do something that, you know, might be mind blowing here at the Brookings Institute. As a conservative I'm going to quote the Daily Kos; this is from this morning's Daily Kos Elections Morning Digest in a section entitled Turnout, "Talking about turnout in a mid-term election is kind of a misleading mixed bag because without a presidential election at the top of the ticket you get a lot of variation between states depending on whether there are hotly contested races or not." I think that when you look at the national turnout figures that's exactly right, in part because the number of states that did not have significant statewide contested elections that are large and Democratic leaning, or which have, in the case of Texas, large minority populations as part of the Democratic constituency, is one of the reasons why you saw young voters who tend to be disproportionately Hispanic, and Hispanic voters, down. California is home to a very large Hispanic population, they had no contested races that would cause them to turn out, nor presidential race that would cause them to turn out simply to support the national campaign. Ditto in New York. In Texas the Democratic candidate, even in the primary, was completely unappealing to Hispanic voters. Even though she had no significant opposition, Wendy Davis lost many of the Hispanic dominated counties the Rio Grande Valley to somebody who literally had no campaign. So you need to take national figures with that into account. Even so the national figures that Robbie has, 73 percent white are only 1 percent more white than the 2012 exit poll, which was 72 percent white. That could be a rounding error it could be a slight uptick of -- taking Robbie's figures, even on a national level, even taking the state to state into account, it was not a huge shift in the electorate.

Now let's take a look though at state races which is where it matters. Colorado, if you take a look at the exit poll from 2014 which I'm doing literally right now,

having checked it out beforehand, it shows 14 percent Latino voting. If you take the 2012 percent turnout it shows 14 percent Latino voting. If you take a look at the African American turnout in both years, you see 3 percent in each year. The electorate in Colorado, which elected Cory Gardener, was only 1 percent more white according to the exit polls than the one that elected Barack Obama. I've also looked at turnout by region as -- you know, I did this by hand, comparing 2014 turnout to 2012 turnout by county and found there's very little difference between the regions. Denver metro area still reporting some ballots and those ballots tend to be Democratic so that will bring up the share of the 2012 vote cast in 2014 in the Denver area. But at best, the turnout maybe shifted a point in Republican's favor in the State of Colorado. Cory Gardener won because he convinced persuadables, not because of a turnout differential. North Carolina, however, is a different matter. North Carolina the turnout among African American was significantly down. It was 23 percent in 2012; it was 21 percent according to the exit polls in 2014. The white percentage was 74 percent in this election, 70 percent in 2012. That is probably the reason why Thom Tillis, not Kay Hagan, is the victor. But what should Democrats take from that? Well, if we go back we know that African Americans voted slightly below their percentage in the population for every election, midterm and non midterm. Going into the 2008 election they jumped up when Barack Obama was on the ticket, they jumped down when he wasn't in 2010. They jumped up again when he was on the ticket, and now in 2014 they've gone back. This is a problem the Democratic coalition needs to address, which is that without an African American turnout that is on par with white turnout as far as share of citizens how cast a ballot, they will be at a disadvantage compared to 2012 going to the 2016 election. That seems to be an Obama-specific problem rather than an issues problem because again we can see that there's only 2 elections in history where African Americans have voted roughly on par, or

according to some surveys in 2012, a little bit more heavily than whites, and that's when African American Barack Obama was on the ticket. So you have different turnout problems and different degrees of turnout issues for the Democrats going into 2016.

Going then into the white working class. The white working class, according to some of the data that was sent to us, but which is not in the report, which is to say detailed crosstabs or banners as PRRI calls them, are quite interesting. But I'll just try and not drown you in data and go through a couple of things. First, if you take a look at the difference in the white working class overall it was noted that there's 5 points more Republican, 5 points less Democratic. I doubt that came in the South. The white working class is heavily southern focused as far as weighting, but I doubt if you look that there were substantially more white working class voters in the south who voted for President Obama in 2012, but voted for a Republican this time. My guess without looking at data, is that it substantially came in the North. And you can see anecdotal data to back that with the substantial wins of Joni Ernst, that Joni Ernst won by 8 points in Iowa, a state where a near majority of voters are white working class voters. It was 50 percent the last time the question was asked in 2008. It's surely less than 47 percent now. Scott Walker won by 6 points in the state that Romney lost by 5. Rick Snyder won by 5 points in a state, Michigan, that Romney lost by 9. Paul LePage won in Maine and he did not win the college educated areas of Portland, he won the non college educated areas by large margins, and in fact, the non-college-educated House District, Maine 2, elected a Republican. I could go on and on, but it suggests to me that the constituency that I've tried to educate my party about, white working class, non-evangelical voters, tilted towards Obama or stayed home in 2012, tilted heavily towards Republicans this time.

So then the question is, to paraphrase that old question, what do white working class voters want? Well, they tend not to want the same sort of things that white

college educated Republicans want. Let's take a look at one question that says, "What do you think the most important priority should be for Republicans in Congress?"

Dividing whites into working class and college educated voters, 47 percent of college educated voters who voted for Republicans believe that balancing the Federal budget is number one. Only 28 percent of white working class voters believe that. And that's very consistent with other studies that show that white working class voters are economically to the left in a standard right-left continuum than white college educated voters. And for the Democrats, you've got a problem with the discord between the base and the white working class. The same questions asked for white working class who's voted for the Democrats, what should the priorities be for white college educated, 14 percent said pass comprehensive immigration reform, 13 percent said pass climate change legislation. The combined total for those two among white working class was 13 percent. 26 percent of Democrat voting white working class voters said raise the minimum wage.

White working class voters outside the South tend to be in play between the two parties, they tend to be as, Canadian political strategist for Stephen Harper, Patrick Muttart, told me years ago, that they tend to be morally moderate, which is to say they may have conflicting views but they don't get moved on social issues, they're moved on issues of patriotism, they're move on issues of opportunity, and they're moved on issues of support in the economy. We'll just say they don't fall neatly between the traditional left and the traditional right.

I don't want to take up too much more time; there's lots more I could say. But going forward to 2016 this also plays into some of the differences, the Republican Party has been perceived, and the conservative movement, has been perceived as the uncaring party and movement since the Great Depression. So the fact that Democrats have a 10 point edge on "cares about people like me" not only comes as no surprise, it

ought to come as no surprise to my fellow party members, although when one mentions it continually comes as a surprise. (Laughter) What does interest me is the comparisons between that and the question "shares our values," because what is it about the words "care" and "values" that means there's a shift? So one I'd say you could have a Pavlovian response to putting the word "care" in front of Republican is like putting the words "modest dresser" in front of Lady Gaga. (Laughter) But when you look at the differences, and as I did between different crosstabs, you find that certain groups do not move very much, but groups that do shift between saying Republicans share my values but Republicans don't care are mainline Protestants and Catholics. Well, guess who dominates the upper Midwest? Mainline Protestants, Lutherans and Methodists, and Roman Catholics. And for a Republican who is trying to win the White House understanding that gap is the key to winning the upper Midwest, ending the Democratic lock on the upper Midwest -- in the industrial Midwest in the Electoral College. From the Democratic perspective, you have a base and a persuadable problem that the issues that motivate your base do not motivate the people in the middle. And, you know, I would be perfectly happy if you wanted to spend the next 2 years focusing on how to raise turnout among people who are already going to vote Democratic, because that sends a message to the people that would possibly vote for Republican, that you're out of step. Of course my party then has to respond with something that's convinces them that they're in step which Mitt Romney did not, which is the great reason why Barack Obama held onto enough of the white working class vote in the upper Midwest to re-win the Presidency.

But as a non passionate observer and as somebody who cares about America, I would advise Democrats to think that this is not simply a base versus base election, it's not Fox News and the *Wall Street Journal* versus the *New York Times* and MSNBC, this is both parties have trouble connecting with the middle. We have seen in

the last five years more frequent Senate shifts in a row than we have seen at any time at least since the beginnings of the New Deal. I mean it has now become normal to think that each election is going to be a wave. That's not normal. When we have five elections in a row where one party or another gains at least six seats in the Senate, that tend to gain 20 or more seats in the House, and the one election that doesn't fit that pattern is the reelection of a Democratic president with a majority of the vote, which has only happened two times in our history before that, FDR and Andrew Jackson. Then something is going on where both parties are disconnecting with the middle. And the first party that figures that out and a way to reconcile their base with the middle rather than put them at conflict with one another is the party that's going to much happier over the next 10 years than they are right now.

MR. GALSTON: Thanks so much, Henry. We'll have a lot of time for Q & A, but I want to rise to Lady Gaga's defense (Laughter) and say simply if she's good enough for Tony Bennett she's good enough for me.(Laughter)

Joy?

MS. REID: I too like Lady Gaga in many ways. I think she's very entertaining. All right. Well, thank you very much again to Brookings for inviting me here. It's always a pleasure. It was so much fun last time. Substantially less fun in the wake of an election that probably from my ideological sensibilities wasn't a joy, but I think it was very interesting and instructive for the Democratic Party, and for the Republicans, in a lot of ways. So just first of all not surprisingly I'm going to disagree with some of the things that Henry said, but I actually think that for Democrats this was a failed base election. Because we kind of have in this country, if you take a look at it in a broad sweep, what you might call a permanent voting class and an intermittent voting class. The permanent voting class, if you go back probably to the last 20 years, are white, married Christians

essentially, particularly mainline Protestants, and increasingly evangelicals who used to be a more intermittent voting pool but who in a lot of ways thanks to the first George W. Bush campaign and a real concerted effort to bring evangelicals to the polls, have become really a relatively stable and permanent voting class, so that you do have to Henry's point, a relatively stable kind of white overall share of the electorate because this is a sort of stable voting class. The intermittent voting class consists of younger voters, but when you say "younger" you have to remember that from millennials down that is a much more minority laden demographic. So when you say "young voters," there are more non whites in the younger voter pool just by default. So as you get younger and younger, you get less white. And so this younger voting pool is intermittent. You also have unmarried women, who are a very highly intermittent voting class. They are not acclimatized to going to the polls in large numbers every two years. And then you have non white voters, but the caveat there is the Democrats have actually in a lot of ways improved upon the kind of sign wave nature of African American voters in part because of Barack Obama. There has been less drop off among African American voters; there was less drop off between even 2010 and 2014 among African Americans than say among Latinos who experienced a significant drop off. And something like what Henry was saying, part of this is regionally. You have to remember there are three Senate classes. This was a very, very Southern Senate class. It was substantially in the part of the country where Latino voters are fewer in number. Other than Colorado and Florida, there weren't any states that had a really substantial Latino vote at play, and in Florida where it was a very narrow election and a win for the Republican sitting governor, Hispanics went net for Charlie Crist, but volume wise there just weren't enough of them for him to overcome a close to 70,000 voter gap with Rick Scott. In Colorado, I think you had a combination of a poor campaign, frankly, on the part of the sitting Democrat and probably

some issue problems in terms of connecting with the base vote. That was a campaign that was run almost on one issue, which was issues related to abortion and contraception. It probably was disparate -- it didn't make sense for the electorate that he was trying to go after.

I want to go back to the Table 2 that Robbie presented. I think E.J. and I are both a little obsessed with it, but I hope we won't preempt him. But I am fascinated by the difference between the voter and the non voter electorate because for Democrats, you know, in a midterm your goal is to get at you base vote. Yes, there are persuadable voters, but persuadable tend to net fall between the two parties in a way that I'm not sure how much it changes an election, particularly one that is substantially in one region, in the South where 50 percent of African Americans live. Remember half of all African Americans still do live in the American South, and where you're fighting an election in which a huge wave of black voters, who by percentage voted above the white voting share, carried into office some Senate candidates who might not otherwise have had any chance of winning and who then had to defend those seats six years later. You're thinking of places like North Carolina and then where there are open seats like Georgia where there are heavily African American votes.

Just before I get into this chart, what Democrats tend to do in base elections is that they go after African American voter registration really, really heavily. And that has an impact in a country where, as we saw in that other chart, there is a perception among particularly Fox News viewers, older voters, white voters, that there is fraud baked into the Democrats, capital D, Democrats process. And so that these waves and waves and waves of voters who were being registered in Georgia triggered a perception that there was fraud just rife throughout that process. And it triggers a sense that the party that's doing that is against people like me, if you are white working class, I

believe, voter. So you did have a huge actually successful voter registration effort, but you also had a huge reaction to it and a backlash to it that was I think of a piece with the Obama overall backlash. So when you look at this non voter pool, the problem for Democrats is that the intermittent voter class are largely Democrats. The sharp drop off between voters and non voters in percentage who are white, it is incredibly significant, only 56 percent of non voters are white non Hispanic versus 73 percent of sort of what I call the permanent voting class. African Americans, again much more stable, in part because you have had substantial interest in these elections since 2008, but you've also had a really massive voter registration campaign that I would put akin to the Jesse Jackson campaigns in the 1980s, where you just had a massive effort that was heavily concentrated in the Southern states because that's where black voters are. I think those two things have combined to make African American voters not really the drop off vote. Then you get the Hispanics who already under vote their population share more than any other population, but who dramatically under vote it in midterms. And in Florida that really matters, in Colorado that really matters. And you also have within Hispanics a settling -- a friend of mine, Fernand Amandi, who is a pollster in Florida, has talked about the fact that Latino voters are beginning to settle into an African American style pattern of being net Democratic voters, almost 2 to 1, if not more during the 2012 and 2008 elections. But there's a huge drop off between the attitudinal placement of Latino voters and their actual behavior, particularly in midterms; they just don't come out. And then in this particular election, I think you had an extreme lack of motivation even to vote for the Democrats because other issues like Immigration which were unfulfilled wishes that the Democrats just didn't fulfill them.

Among women, I think that Democrats tend to look at women voters as one group instead of two, because you have a marked difference between the behavior

of married and single women, and issues that I think Democrats put forward, like abortion and contraception, really are not motivating to married women the way they are to single women, and are not motivating to white voting women the way they might be to non white women. And they're not motivating to older women as they are to younger women. So I think the failure to sort of parse that out didn't help either.

But the other big difference really is on this religion question, particularly main line Protestants and evangelical Protestants have just culturally become Republican. And I'm not sure that Democrats can do much about that in much the same way that I'm not so sure Republicans can do much about the cultural identification of African Americans with the Democratic Party. I think that you just have a lot more tribalism in our voting behavior as a country, regionally, ethnically, and age wise, and again age being heavily seeded with race.

One of the other interesting pieces of this thing that really sort of stuck out to me in terms of that religion was that while Catholics tended to be somewhat more down the middle, particularly when you add in non white Catholics, the white evangelical Protestant identification with the Republican Party is almost as substantial as African American identification with the Democrats. And so the challenge facing Democrats I think going forward as they look to this, you know, sort of lurching back and forth between full participation elections -- well, not even full, something like 60 percent participation elections when the White House in play to sort of 40 percent and in this case lower than 40 percent participation elections, is that that drop off is substantially in their camp. And Democrats have not found a way to both motivate their base vote of non white voters, but also run what I think was a very off-putting sort of campaign in which Democrats attempted to solve their southern problem by presenting as not Democrats, and sort of presenting themselves as people who've actually never heard of the Democratic Party,

don't know who that guy is in the White House, have absolutely nothing to do with him, but at the same time really need to get out African American voters who are most motivated of all by that same President.

And the last thing I'll say is I think that one of the things the Democratic Party failed across the spectrum to do was to try to reach whatever persuadable white working class voters were available on the economy. If you look again at Robbie's numbers, voters who perceived the economy as doing well went for the Democratic candidates. Voters who perceived the economy as doing poorly did not. Democrats never messaged on the economy. I can't think of a single race in this cycle where Democrats messaged positively on the macroeconomic data. Now people's personal perception of the economy is one thing, but telling the story of the economy is quite another. And Democrats just massively failed to do that and I think that was part of their problem.

MR. GALSTON: Thanks so much. Melissa?

MS. DECKMAN: Great. Well, thank you very much to E.J. and to Bill for having me here. And I just want to again say to Robbie, Dan, and Juhem, and the other folks at PRRI, they have just done a tremendous job turning around this data and writing really a comprehensive and wonderful report.

I'm not prepared to talk about Lady Gaga today; I didn't realize that was on the agenda. So I'm going to instead talk about the role of gender and religion in the midterms. And because I can't help myself like the rest of us, I'm going to talk a little bit about 2016 and what all these results might mean for the future of the parties.

First let's talk a bit about the gender gap in voting. So the results of the 2014 Post Election American Values Survey show that the gender gap is alive and well with women favoring Democratic candidates and men favoring Republican candidates.

The gender gap that Robbie and his team found is not quite as pronounced as the national exit polls, which found a 20 percent gap. Here men favored Republican candidates by 16 percent, women favoring Democratic candidates by 4 percent, but the trends and peerized data are certainly the same. Now you may recall back in 2012, Republicans did not fare so well with women voters. Obama won the women's vote by 11 percentage points. The GOP lost in part because they had engaged in a war on women, or at least that was the narrative, right, that was used by many Democratic Party candidates. My own research on this area shows it was far more nuanced than that and we might have some time to talk about it a little bit later. I might add too that similar rhetoric used by some Democrats this election cycle -- I'm talking to you, Mark Udall -- was far less successful in this election.

So despite the shellacking -- and I guess that's the term we have to use now, right, the shellacking that the GOP took among women voters in 2012, the Republican Party was really able to mitigate some of its losses among women, losing the women's vote by just 4 percent this time around compared to 2012. So many of us who analyze the gender gap typically think of it in terms of the women's vote, and I'm guilty of doing often in my writing. However the gender gap really cuts both way. I think the more interesting takeaway in this election is the male vote. And I think we need to start asking why it is that Democrats do so poorly with men. Here are just a few statistics I want to point out coming right from the survey research that Robbie presented. So just 36 percent of male voters approve of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President. Just 36 percent of male voters believe that the Democratic Party compared with the Republican Party best shares their values. Just 37 percent of male voters believe the Democratic Party can be better described as the party that cares about people like you. And here, just 27 percent of male voters believe that the Democratic

Party is better at keeping America safe. I think these data really give us some insight into why Republicans did much better with men this election cycle. If you think about the narrative that the GOP was using, the rising threats of ISIS and Ebola, ensure that national security reemerged as a midterm issue in a way that it really hadn't in 2010. And the Republican candidates really hammered home this message in the last month, also on Fox News of course, that the Obama administration was not effective and not up the task of dealing with these national security concerns. I think moreover this targeted appeal about national security fit into the larger GOP narrative that played upon Obama's unpopularity. So in essence, the GOP made this a referendum about Barack Obama. Historically this is nothing new, right? Most of the time in midterm election, some notable exceptions, but most of the time in recent history, the President's party tends to lose seats in Congress in a midterm election.

Just anecdotally, I'll give you an example of some of this sort of campaign dialogue. So my husband was in Little Rock, Arkansas last month on a business trip and he was watching the television news, and here of course you have Representative Tom Cotton, Republican, trying to unseat Democrat Mark Pryor. And so my husband basically said every ad was a picture of Mark Pryor next to Barack Obama in an unflattering way. That was all that you needed to do in a state like Arkansas. And Cotton won by 17 percentage points, which is pretty remarkable, right. So it's also important to remember that compared to the 2012 electorate though, the 2014 midterm electorate was more male. Men increased their proportion of the voting population from 47 percent to 49 percent in 2014. So I think the GOP's success with men had an even more pronounced impact in the election results. So I think in short, based on the exit poll data, based on the results of some of the survey research here, I think we might want to shift from saying -- and posing the question why the Republican has a woman problem to

maybe why the Democrats have a man problem.

But I want to switch now and talk a little bit about religion that hasn't been brought up as much yet. Whenever I get data about elections the first thing I do when it comes to the religious votes is to look at Catholics, because I think Catholics are truly the bellwether. So Bush in fact carried the Catholic vote in 2004, Obama Carried the catholic vote in 2008 and 2012, although Obama was not able to capture the white Catholic he did extremely well with Hispanic Catholics by a margin of 3 to 1. So I didn't have this data that Robbie presented, but they collapsed the Catholic vote together to include both whites and Latino voters. In Robbie's data there it was a draw, 47 percent to 46 percent of Catholics voted for Republican candidates, and clearly we see today that the white Catholic vote was much more pronounced and went with the Republican Party. And so my hunch though is that even though we don't have the specific breakout numbers here, I suspect that the GOP was successful at peeling off some of those Latino voters, personally. Some of the other religious results I think are also interesting. The data here showed the alliance between the GOP and white evangelicals continues to grow and is stronger than the alliance shared by Democrats and non white Protestants. Just 14 percent of white evangelical voters in Robbie's data said that cast a ballot for a Democratic candidate. And that was down from 20 percent in 2010. More importantly there's evidence that white evangelicals' turnout was really, really strong in states like Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, which likely tipped the scales for the GOP in those important Senate races. I think what's also interesting is looking at white main line Protestants there was I think this feeling that white main liners might be up for grabs in recent presidential elections; Obama had made some headway here, but I think they've returned to their more traditional routes as Republicans, right. Just 39 percent of white main line Protestants voted for Democrats, compared to 50 percent who voted for

Republicans. So I think that perhaps we're seeing white main liners going back to the Republican fold.

Lastly, I wanted to comment on the two groups that were large Democratic constituencies. So 70 percent of minority Protestants voted for Democrats, 65 percent of the religiously unaffiliated voted for Democrats; that's not a huge surprise. But I do think that the fact that 1 in 4 out of those voters did pull levers for Republican candidates is pretty interesting, it's something to watch. I'm not suggesting we see a wave where minority Protestants and unaffiliated start going back to the GOP, but I do think it's an interesting statistic.

So I want to close with some thoughts I have about 2016. I think for both parties, meaningful job creation and the state of the economy will matter the most. Stagnant wages I think are a big part of the problem, people's perception about the economy. And going back to the pre-election survey you saw that really in earnest. People essentially are very down on the economy and they're feeling personally some sense of economic anxiety. Again the fact that 70 percent of Americans think that we're still on a recession, I think, is a pretty telling statistic. But I think there are some other things to consider in 2016. And I'll talk for both the Democrats and the Republicans here; I'll try to be balanced. So the Democratic Party, I would say, all hope is not lost, right. So the midterm electoral is whiter, it's older, it's more male compared to a presidential electorate, and turnout is likely to be about 20 percent higher than it was in the midterm. So I think the Democrats will be able to take advantage of this more diverse electorate and down ballot races in 2016. Younger voters, non white voters, women voters, all hold more positive views of the Democratic Party than their respective counterparts. And I think that will likely help the Democrats in 2016. The Senate races that were lost moreover by the Democrats were largely in red states that Obama carried in both election

cycles. In 2016 we have the reverse situation happening, right. So remember in 2010, you have the Tea Party wave and you have all of these Republicans being elected in red states. So the GOP is going to have to defend 7 seats in very deep blue states in 2016. So I think it's going to be harder for them to do that. Moreover, if Democrats can craft the right policy message, particularly concerning the role of government in society, I think they can be poised to do much better. So for example, drawing again from the pre-election survey, by a 2 to 1 margin, Robbie and his team found that Americans believe that the government should do more to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. So in other words, in terms of public policy, I think Americans in fact are more likely to share common ground with the Democratic Party's orientation toward the government, that government is not necessarily an enemy, that it's in fact necessary in society. This philosophy of course is anathema to most Republicans right now in Congress and to those that just got elected.

Well, what do Republicans need to do to return to the White House and maybe even build on its congressional majority? So I have argued recently -- in fact a few weeks ago in the Brookings FixGov blog post -- that the GOP should consider returning to a compassionate conservatism. Remember those days? That was a phrase first brought to us by President George W. Bush. Now critics of Bush will maybe say that his politics and policies are anything but compassionate, but I do think that Bush recognized there was a constructive role for government to play in helping people take individual responsibility for their own lives. And so what is conservatism if it's not about promoting individual responsibility? So if were the GOP I'd consider backing minimum wage increases and requiring companies to provide paid family leave and sick leave. Both of these policies as the pre-election survey showed are immensely popular even among non Tea Party Republicans, right. Republicans who identify as members of the

Tea Party are sort of outliers on these positions. So, of course I think that the minimum wage is going to be a harder sell for many Republicans currently in Congress, but all the GOP has to do is to look at the election results in four red states, Arkansas, Nebraska, Alaska, South Dakota. Voters passed referendums that would raise the state minimum wage there. Economists can debate whether raising minimum wage is actually going to improve the economy, but I do think symbolically it sends a message that the GOP cares about those who are at the lower end income scale. And I think it would hopefully do much to mitigate the damage that Mitt Romney did with those voters in 2012.

So I'll just stop there. Thanks.

MR. GALSTON: Well, those were three fabulous commentaries. Thank you so much. E.J., we have 20 minutes left and so I have a proposal. You get a quota of one question, I assign myself a quota of zero, and then we have fifteen minutes for the audience.

MR. DIONNE: An extraordinarily fair man he is. I just want to say, I think every single person in this room, myself included, knows a lot more about the 2014 election now than when he or she walked in. So I salute Robbie and our panelists. And, Henry, I did tweet your Lady Gaga line. I couldn't resist. (Laughter) So if you're allies give you grief on that just say I quoted you out of context and I'll go with that. (Laughter)

I want to bring together two concerns here. I'm going to skip my second question, but I'll mention it to keep in the back of your head which is the numbers that show voters' concern about immigration favoring Republicans 62 to 28 seems to me to tell Republicans they may have more an interest in blocking immigration reform than passing it. But we can leave that for later.

What I want to ask is bring together two issues that have been raised very well by our panelists and by Robbie. On the one hand you see the Democrats

losing white working class votes compared to the past. On the other hand, you clearly see this turnout drop off on the part of the Democratic base. I want to suggest and ask your reaction that maybe these two things are linked, because the lack of any clear economic argument by the Democrats to make a case for why in the world should anybody vote for them, not only hurt them within their base, but also lost them votes in the white working class. And so to me their challenge -- if the Democrats forget about the white working class, they can forget about every midterm election forever. But I also think that's a fundamental problem, they can't win without them. But I don't think appealing to the two groups is necessarily contradictory. So I'd just like people's response to that.

MS. REID: If I could just jump into that, I think that one of the issues that the Democrats face is that, indeed, they don't have an economic message that's coherent to white working class voters, so what winds up filling the void is the optics of what they're actually doing which is heavily pursuing non white voters and courting them with things like immigration reform in a way that is off-putting, particularly to older white voters. And so in the absence of something else, I mean I think that you could sort of see a world in which a Kay Hagan, rather than sort of running a middling campaign that really wasn't about anything other than promising she really wasn't really, really, really part of Washington would be to say -- to run an economic populist message, an economic populist message that was race neutral, but that really touted the things that were being done in Washington that could actually help both white and non white working class voters, touting the fact that if her state were to change its mind and accept the Medicaid expansion, how many citizens in her state could actually get coverage. If a candidate like Alison Lundergan Grimes in Kentucky had messaged hard on the fact that, you know, hers was the party that had delivered Kynect, a highly popular Medicaid expansion and

ACA program in her state, and really run hard on the fact that theirs was the party trying to keep healthcare in the hands of Kentuckians versus the party trying to take it away. I think Democrats sometimes do themselves a disservice because they're nervous about the racial aspects, they're nervous about the demographic change in their party, because while it's helpful to them in presidential years, the optics of it do hurt them in midterms. And so they sort of avoid any messaging that's strong in any direction. They're trying to be as weak tea as possible, and sort of maybe not be seen and get back into office. And I think that that is a problem. I think Democrats lost the handle on messaging to working class voters about what they've done already with power and what they could do.

MR. OLSEN: When I look at the election I'm much more impressed with the Republican victories for governor than I am for senate. That if you take a look at what Republican needs to win the White House, they need a shift of about two and a half points on the popular vote to win a narrow Electoral College majority. In the senate races, they only broke that measure in one state. That everyone who ran in the South ran behind Romney, even Cory Gardener only won by about two and a half percent, which is right at the cusp of what you need to win a national -- only Joni Ernst did better. But among the governors, with the exception of Rick Scott, they did substantially better. And again, they were in white working class areas. And what did they do that was different? Well, Rick Snyder signed the minimum wage increase. Every Republican governor in a purple state has either endorsed Medicaid expansion, or in the case of Scott Walker, used a particularly generous state Medicaid program to take advantage of the federal exchange so he could increase healthcare enrollment without taking any federal dollars. I mean it was pure fortune that gave him the ability to look conservative and govern from the center.

We are in a populist moment. The Republican Party doesn't want to see

that, and so consequently they too often adopt a message that doesn't recognize that many people are falling behind, more people are in the moderate insecurity group, the people who are working harder to stay in place, who are one more financial catastrophe away from falling behind, and these people are particularly concentrated in the lower education groups. I'm of the belief that a less doctrinaire free market approach would have benefits for the Republican Party among both working class whites and working class Hispanics, who are even more less educated and have lower incomes. But I would agree with E.J. in the sense of looking at it from a Democratic perspective, that they're not necessarily in conflict, but there are some things where elements of the Democratic Party base are in conflict, and those need to be from your party's perspective massaged better than they are right now if you want to try and put together that coalition. In that sense, the Republican difficulty is in putting together its anti-government base and its pro-business base with a swing vote that is favorable neither to no government, nor favorable towards their boss' ruling them anymore than they would like bureaucrats in Washington to.

MS. REID: And can I just add that I think that E.J.'s other stat that he put out there, that 62-28 split where people who cared most about the immigration reform issue actually preferred the Republican Party. I think that with high economic insecurity traditionally historically has come a real discomfort with the idea of increasing the pool of what are seen as low skilled competitive workers, who would also be essentially blue collar working class workers. So I think that the anti-immigrant messaging on the Republican Party also is a sense a populist message. And if you look in Florida and other states it's one of the ways that Republicans have actually tried to recruit African American voters, by essentially holding out "illegal" immigrants as potential competition for jobs and trying to sort of message that, we're the party that they're going to keep them

out of your job market.

MR. OLSEN: But that's also a key point of tension in the Republican Party coalition, that the business conservative is group -- in the Pew survey, the typology that came out in the summertime, you know, take a look at the Republican leading groups. The business conservative group is overwhelmingly in favor of immigration.

MS. REID: Right. The Chamber of Commerce.

MR. OLSEN: Right. Well, what's called in the *Washington Insider* -- you know, the Chamber of Commerce Republican. Yeah, I mean those sort of people are extremely favorable towards immigration and the voters that they need to win the White House are split between Hispanic voters who are generally pro immigration and white working class voters, who are at best suspicious of immigration. And of course the Chamber of Commerce Republicans want to create the Hispanic alliance precisely because they see that symmetry of interest, but they don't recognize that to do that they have to be much more pro government and pro redistribution than they want to be. So these are tensions, as I mentioned some of the -- Democratic Party has tensions between the middle and the base. This is almost placed, you know, item number one for one element of the Republican base and its tension with the working class of both races.

MS. DECKMAN: Can I just say one thing about economics? I felt like in general, the Democratic Party, there was a lot of low hanging fruit that they didn't really grab. It's inconceivable to me if someone had told me that a president and his party were able to cut unemployment from 10 percent a few years ago, just to 5 percent why are they not running on that message, right. Why are they not running on the fact that nationally speaking, even in states that did not adopt the -- take Medicaid expansion -- the only state where there are in fact fewer Americans uninsured is Kansas, which of course that's a whole separate category. And the fact that Sam Brownback was able to

be reelected is pretty astonishing, but generally speaking more Americans are now insured as a result of Obamacare. And so I found it really shocking that Democrats weren't able to sort of take that message and run with it. And I think they would have been a lot more competitive in some of those states.

MS. REID: And by the way white unemployment, white male unemployment I believe, is 4.1 percent and white female unemployment seasonally unadjusted is 4.8. So actually the constituency Democrats do the worst with which is white voters, they've actually done the best with in terms of macroeconomic change.

MR. GALSTON: Well, let me just quote a union official from Missouri, when this "conundrum" was put to him he said, yeah, there are more jobs but they don't pay nothing.

I've been accused every single time that I've moderated of being unfair to the rear. So I'm going to start with the rear. That gentleman with his hand up. And please identify yourself; pose a quick question because we don't have time for filibusters.

MR. SKINNER: Hi. I'm Richard Skinner from American University. Normally if you look at statistics like this with Republicans doing very well with white working class voters, doing phenomenally well with Evangelicals who -- oh, cultural issues are really big, but if you look at this past campaign, it was Democrats generally who were bringing up abortion and contraception, gay rights was sort of falling away as an issue, Republicans were kind of on the defensive. Are we seeing a new cultural agenda for the Republican Party that's much more based around issues of nationalism and identity, where immigration and national security are more important than abortion and gay rights?

MR. GALSTON: Good question.

MR. OLSEN: I think you're going to see a tension within the Republican

Party for that. There is still a very strong constituency in the Republican Party for opposition to same sex marriage, for life issues. They tend to come to the fore in the presidential nomination contest because that's when an opportunity comes for somebody to support those views, to rise to the forefront. You see Mike Huckabee number two in the poll. He's going to be the sort of person who campaigns on a Christian themed populism. He's economically more centrist than the Republican Party base, but more focused on cultural issues. In this election there's really no need for the Republican Party to bring those issues up, but all of the candidates who won were very reliably either within or slightly to the right of the pro life consensus. Nobody came out in favor of same sex marriage who was actually, you know, in a contested race here. So there was no need to bring it up because the national dynamics didn't demand it, and the candidates quietly supported the positions that the evangelical base of the party likes.

MR. JONES: I'm just going to say one quick thing on this. One thing the Republican Party will need to do even among evangelicals is look at generational differences on same sex marriage, right. So even if you look at younger evangelicals under the age of 40, 42 percent of them support same sex marriage versus only 20 percent of seniors, right. So there's a generational sea change happening even inside the most conservative group of the Republican Party, that certainly anything that's around sort of culture or politics is going to have to account for in the future.

MS. DECKMAN: Can I also add really quickly, I think that the Republican Party was better poised to address the war on women issue. So we're looking at Cory Gardener as a success story. I think what's notable about Cory Gardener and many other Republicans is they actually were on the offensive not the defensive on birth control. Cory Gardener had this great ad where he was talking about how he would like to see birth control, oral contraception be available over the counter, and other

Republicans were also running this. What I think essentially deflated the Democrats chances for making this into a big issue. I'm going to hold my breath as to whether this is the first bill that Cory Gardener actually puts in the hopper in the Senate, but I think it's interesting that they were more aggressive in dealing with that issue.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. I see a hand right there, sir. Yes, you.

SPEAKER: With the Republican governors controlling a lot of purple states and taking some blue states and controlling the House and Senate, is it likely that they will try and pass more voter ID laws and things of the such to maintain the voter turnout that they benefitted from in the midterm elections, to use that in the presidential elections?

MS. REID: I would guess yes. I think that voter restrictions are going to be a fact of life for Democrats, particularly in states with heavy minority populations and states where college campuses are a huge source of both voter registration and voting activity. I think the Supreme Court kicked open the door and you're going to see a lot more litigation around this issue because you still have Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and you still have organizations on the Civil Rights that are motivated to litigate it. And depending on who the AG is, particularly if the one who is nominated is the attorney general, I think you're going to see at least in the Obama years, a lot more litigation around it, but yes, I think you can expect more voting restrictions.

MR. DIONNE: But in the states not federally because --

MS. REID: In the states.

MR. DIONNE: -- if the Democrats will filibuster for 560 consecutive days if they have to kill it at the national level.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. I see a hand here.

MR. SHORE: My name is Steven Shore. Has any analysis been done

as to the consequences of having referendums on raising the minimum wage? Did that help the Democrats or did most people who voted in favor of the minimum wage then vote for Republican candidates for Congress, Senate, or governors?

MS. DECKMAN: I'm not aware of any. I think that this data here is probably the quickest turnaround of any sort of a thorough analysis, but I haven't seen any seen any data on that since. But that's a good question.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. The gentleman on the aisle right here.

MR. BIRNBAUM: The race for the Republican nominee for the presidency is extremely open. Ostensibly the Democratic race is far more settled, but who knows. What would -- I'm sorry, my name is Norman Birnbaum from Georgetown -- what would the panel recommend to the parties by way of personal and political characteristics for a winning candidate?

MR. OLSEN: I think a Republican candidate needs to be somebody who is not connected with the Congressional wing of the party. The Republican candidate needs to be someone who is economically more populist, without being outside of the party mainstream. I think that a Republican candidate who would come from the upper Midwest like Scott Walker, Rob Portman who is less in line with the Chamber of Commerce, John Kasich, who is more line with the party base, would probably be the ideal candidate looking at it at two years in advance. You know, even Mike Pence who was so conservative in Congress that he voted against Medicare Part B, endorsed Medicaid expansion, which suggests that his prudential presidential campaign would be more economically populist. Two years out that would be my recommendation for the Republicans.

MS. DECKMAN: I recommend Susana Martinez. I am always struck by the fact that no woman governor gets mentioned here. Nikki Haley just won reelection

very solidly; Indian American Susana Martinez, very popular in New Mexico. To me it seems like this would check off a lot of boxes for the GOP. And so I'd like to see more attention maybe paid to some women governors.

MR. GALSTON: Well, she should be every Republican's top choice for Vice President. She will not be the nominee.

MS. REID: I think Joni Ernst might have something to say about that. I think she's probably seeing herself in that role.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. We have time for two more questions. I'm going to recognize the gentleman over there and then come back to this young man here.

MR. CHECCO: Thank you very much. Larry Checco, Checco Communications. Interesting discussion. We've talked a lot about the quantity of vote, what about the quality of vote? Is there any indication of how well informed these voters are? To Melissa's point, when you have 70 percent of the voter thinking that we're still in a recession, that's a sad commentary of the quality of the vote. So is there any effort being made on that point? And quality of voters, but quality of people we are electing. Joni Ernst's name has come up a couple of times --

MR. GALSTON: I'm going to have to cut you off here; you've made your point.

MR. CHECCO: Okay. Squeal. I don't get it, you know.

MR. GALSTON: Your point. Okay. Quick. One person gives a quick response.

MS. REID: Go on.

MR. JONES: I can jump in on the recession point. So it's one thing to answer a question about the recession based on whatever economic data out there. I mean when we're talking to respondents on the phone they're answering the question out

of their own lives, right, so I think that it's less important to say it's an indicator that they're ill informed than it is to say they're pretty well informed about their own lives. And it doesn't mesh with the economic data that they're hearing from, you know, reported on in the *The Times*, or even in their local papers. And I think that gap is one I think certainly the Democratic Party didn't quite, I think, take all the way in and could have done I think better on that point.

MR. GALSTON: Sir? Last question.

MR. FINBERG: Max Finberg, previously with the White House Faith-Based Office. And to return to E.J.'s question about immigration. It appears that none of the white evangelical efforts to promote immigration reform have trickled down to the party's base. Anything more than that on that?

MR. JONES: Yeah. So I would like to address this because we've actually interviewed since April 20,000 Americans on the topic of immigration, specifically a path to citizenship; so we've got a lot of data on this. Over that time, we've basically seen 6 in 10 Americans supporting a path to citizenship for those who are in the country illegally, including a very slim majority of rank and file Republicans, and in our last poll 56 percent of white evangelical Protestants. So that's where the public is. I think the politics on this question are much different actually than the public, where actually rank and file people are on this question. So the politics are much more wrangled, I think, than the rank and file folks are. But it is still simultaneously true that the people who care most about immigration as a voting issue are staunchly opposed to it.

MR. GALSTON: At least one member of the panel has a hard stop at 12:30, which I'm determined to respect. And I will just leave the assembled company before we thank this splendid panel with the following question, was Chris Matthews more right than wrong when he talked about the daddy party that keeps us safe and the

mommy party that nurtures us, and if so what are the implications for 2016? (Laughter)

Join me in thanking this wonderful panel.

(Applause)

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

) Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2016