

B | Center for
East Asia Policy Studies
at BROOKINGS

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE OUTREACH,
AMERICANS AND NORTH KOREANS

Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, September 23, 2014

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P R O C E E D I N G S

DR. MOON: Ambassador Gregg, welcome to Brookings. Welcome back to Washington. I heard you had a fantastic, successful book launch. He is the author of "Pot Shards." And why don't you tell us a little bit about your book, and then we'll make that the intro to the questions.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Thank you. It's good to be here. John Merrill would get me down here occasionally for highly classified discussions. But this is the first public utterance I've made in Washington for about 10 years.

What brought me here was the launching of this book, which took place last night. And it's called "Pot Shards: Fragments of a Life Lived in CIA, the White House and the Two Koreas." And I love the title. A lot of people -- I ran into somebody yesterday who thought why are you writing about Pol Pot and Cambodia. I won't tell you who that was. And also, I'm not writing about marijuana.

But what I am writing about is fragments of memory sort of survive the way fragments of pottery do. And you don't know why certain things survive and certain things don't. And so, I wrote about what I remember, and I wrote about what really was important to me. And it's come through. I'm very happy with it.

I was a philosophy major in college, and I -- the death of my father when I was 16 was a very shattering thing for me. It sort of knocked off my religious beliefs, but I picked up some thoughts in philosophy that I carried with me into CIA. Probably the chief one is the, man does not have a nature. He has a history for which he is responsible.

I teach a course at Williams on intelligence work. I don't try to recruit anybody into CIA, but I try to get them to think like intelligence officers, no matter what

job they pursue. So, I'm very glad to have gotten this off my chest. I'm now chairman of the Pacific Century Institute in Los Angeles, and my major focus there is continuing to work on laying a foundation for eventually developing a policy and a relationship with North Korea. So, we'll get into that further. Thank you.

DR. MOON: The PCI, Pacific Century Institute, does quite a lot of work - - various types of work, especially related to North Korea, humanitarian issues, educational issues. So we do have a -- their most recent newsletter that we did make copies of, available to you out in the registration area. So, I hope you'll pick one up if you haven't already.

There's one thing that I do want to say about Ambassador Gregg that is never written in any of your official bios, which is that -- something that I respect tremendously in human beings, and we just had lunch talked about Eleanor Roosevelt, and she fits into that category, is a capacity to grow and to learn, no matter what age, what station in life you are, and the capacity and the willingness and the desire to transform one's self into a better human being.

And I have deep respect for you, Ambassador Gregg, in that capacity, because you have, as you talk about often, this incredible curiosity about life in the world and the willingness to use the information and insights to make yourself into a more thinking, more open minded and more caring human being.

The second thing that does not appear on your profiles ever, is that you have a wickedly good sense of humor. And for those of you who haven't experienced it, it's a real loss, let me tell you. I have been in some situations after conferences where I'm just holding my stomach and trying to breathe, because he's telling good jokes and can do a really fun Japanese accent. He speaks Japanese fluently, but can tell jokes in a

Japanese accent very well, too. So, I will not forget those moments.

On the more serious side, in our conversations, I learned that Ambassador Gregg visited North Korea six times since 2002, and you know, a lot of people use how many times they visited North Korea as sort of their business card. And Ambassador Gregg is not that type. He takes these trips incredibly seriously and purposefully.

And what's interesting is that he told me that he has reported, after every trip -- he has reported in detail to the White House and the State Department all of the goings on and issues and insights, observations, and that you've said you've never heard back from the White House or the State Department.

So, one question is, why do you keep going? It's not an easy place to travel in or to get to, and the people that you would like to get responses from, not only the North Koreans, but Washingtonians are not responding. Why do you go?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Wonderful question. I think my interest in going to North Korea was sparked very much by Kim Dae Jung. I had helped keep him alive on two occasions, and when he was inaugurated president, he said, you know, you've been working hard on the Korea society to improve America's relations with South Korea, but you haven't done anything with North Korea. So, I want you to plank the Korea Society flag in North Korea. So, that's what really got me started.

And I had started to build some relationships with North Korea, and was at the dinner in Washington, or the lunch in Washington for Jo Myong-rok given by Vice President Gore late in the Clinton administration, where he invited Bill Clinton to go to Pyongyang, and Clinton sent Madeleine Albright to check it out.

And then, the term came to an end, and in came George W. Bush. And

the axis of evil pronouncement which ranks among the most stupid remarks I've ever heard a president say, and I've heard a number -- that killed everything with North Korea.

And the North Koreans sort of reached out to me and said, you know, can we get something started? And one or two attempts were made. Nothing came of it. And so, I decided to write a letter to Kim Jong-il. And I wrote it and told Fred Carriere about it. He was the only one I told. And I took it down to the North Korean Embassy in New York, and a guy named Ri Gun was there. A lot of you know him.

And he read it, and he said, how dare you write a letter like this to my leaders? Who do you think you are? Very Korean response. And so I said, well, you know who I am. You dropped leaflets denouncing me when I was ambassador to South Korea. And I said, I'm writing this letter because there are things we really need to talk about. And he said, how do you know what we need to talk about?

And I said, well, I've talked to George Toloroya who's talked to Kim Jong-il, who says that's what Kim Jong-il wants to talk about. And I've talked with Madeleine Albright, and I've talked with Kim Dae Jong.

And I said, oh, I said, I think we need to talk about how to avoid having a war. So he said, okay, that's a good answer. I'll send your letter. And so they sent the letter, and shortly thereafter, I was invited to go. And so I then decided to tell the State Department.

Now, I teach a course at Williams, and dealing with the government is always one of the issues. And so I say to them, what if I had gone to the State Department and said, hey, would you mind if I wrote a letter to Kim Jong-il? I think I would have been told, in no uncertain terms, not to do it. So, I wasn't at all sure how they would feel when I told them that I had written a letter and been invited. They were very

pleased, and I was relieved. And they sent a fine young Korean speaking foreign service officer with me.

The first question I was asked by Kim Kye-gwan was why is George W. Bush so different from his father? I said, well, we're a big country, and the father was raised in New England. The son was born in Texas, and that makes a big difference. And so, it sort of went from there.

I suggested that they return the Pueblo. And they were about to do that when we accused them of a second tract toward nuclear weapons, and things went very much awry. I went back to North Korea the second time and was given a written offer from Kim Jong-il to start dialogue with the United States.

I got into the White House to the National Security Office of Condo Rice's deputy. I've worked there for 10 years. I was in and out in 20 minutes. He read the message. Said, no, we won't talk to them. That would be rewarding bad behavior. And so that was sort of -- that's sort of the response I have had from the government all along. So, why do I keep going?

It's imperative, eventually, that we have a relationship with North Korea. I totally reject the idea that they're going to collapse. And it's counterproductive for us to keep pushing in the hope of a collapse, which if it took place, would be a disaster. So, what we need to do is help draw them out of isolation, so that they can eventually establish a decent relationship with the outside world.

And that's moving slowly, but we are undertaking things which I think will lay a foundation so that when the decision comes to start talking and building a relationship, there will be people there who have relations with the outside world. There will be organizations with which there is a certain degree of trust, and there will be something to

build upon.

The North Koreans in February, said north -- Obama has too much on his plate. He's not going to talk to us as long as he's president. We understand that. The sky is the limit for us with Kim Jong-un. That's an exact quote from the Vice Foreign Minister. So, we will just prepare and work and become stronger, and we'll talk to the next president. And so, in this period of the next two years, I'm going to do all I can to continue to build that foundation.

DR. MOON: You mentioned Kim Jong-un right now. So, you have dealt with the father. You know a lot of about the grandfather, obviously, and you've studied him in depth, I'm sure. And now, we're dealing with the grandson.

When you say that it was conveyed to you from Kim Jong-un that the sky is the limit, when the U.S. is ready, do you find that credible? How do you view his leadership in North Korea? Is it intact? Will it stay intact? For what time? Where is he going?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Yeah. I had long been interested in him. I knew that he was being educated in Switzerland. I did all I could to find out as much as I could about that. I did not find out very much, but he arrived in North Korea -- his father was still alive, and I felt that we had an opportunity to get to know him.

So, I wrote the vice president, whom I knew -- I had testified before his committee two or three times. Keith, you probably remember at least one of those. And I suggested to Biden that we -- the vice president, that we invite Kim Jong-un to the United States for an orientation tour. I said, we don't know very much about him. He knows -- doesn't know very much about us. And that would be a real opportunity to get to know him, and he's going to be around for 30 years.

And I added, the invitation might not be accepted, but the fact that it was offered would make a real impact. Well, it was turned down. I worked in the vice president's office for six years, and I was a master at turning down letters from people who suggested things that we weren't able to undertake, and I got a beautiful copy from Vice President Biden. And so later, I said, what was the real reason? And the real reason was that if they did that, the Republicans would have just tried to have laughed them out of town. So, we didn't do it.

But, I have felt from the get go that he was in for the long run. The hardest pill I've tried to -- had to swallow was the killing of his uncle, but that's the way things often work in a totalitarian society. There was some corruption involved in the part of the uncle, and I guess those around him felt that that was the best way to deal with it. Terribly unfortunate, but that's the way it has been.

But he is interested in economic development, and the last trip I made, we got six questions from the North Koreans devoted to the kind of thing they hope to do economically, and they all are pointed toward the development of the -- of an economy that will interact with all of the neighbors. There's nothing about totalitarianism or Juche or any of that. It's about how do we become accessible to foreign investment and foreign cooperation.

And so, I think he's -- they're in there in the long run. I'm walking with a cane and getting to Pyongyang via Beijing is not an easy trip. And I said to Ri Yong-ho, I said, there's no other leader I'd make this long trip for, but he's going to be around long after everybody else who is in power is gone.

So, I think it's worth reaching out to him, because we need to get to know him better. We need to support what he's trying to do, because he's taking North Korea in

different directions, and a collapse, I think, would open up all kinds of possibilities, none of which would work to our benefit.

DR. MOON: Thank you. It's a lot to chew on, especially for a Washington audience who is not used to hearing about -- in the sincere way that you've spoken about, Kim Jong-un's potential vision of economic development and reform in North Korea.

But in the exchanges that you and I have had, these are some of the issues that have been raised. North Koreans want to learn about international treaties on investments. They want to learn about international business law. Also, issues -- principles of land lease contract, building and equipment lease contract. These are very, very concrete examples of some of the ideas and training and skills development that they seem to be interested in. And they also very much want to know about lessons learned from other places with SEZs. What works? What doesn't work and why?

So, they're very specific, and when I see specific concrete things, I think that's better than abstract generalizations. But to what extent do you think that these can be carried out in North Korea, both in terms of the political will and human capacity.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: The first thing that we did after coming back in February was to go Jerry Cohen, who is a board member from PCI who is a lawyer, a renowned scholar on China who is trying to teach the Chinese what living up to international legal standards means, and it's not easy. And he really goes after them.

And so, we said, will you take on some North Koreans? And he said absolutely. So, four or five of them went down to Hong Kong. Spencer Kim sat in on it, and he said it was fascinating, because the willingness to learn was absolutely there. Their ignorance was abysmal. And when we talk to them about what they want to do

economically, they listed the kind of thing that Kathy has just laid out, but they said, we don't know how to do any of it.

It was just -- there was not -- it was very impressive to me, the admission of their ignorance and their need for help. And I mean, I just think it's so important to do that. James Min is here. He's been doing business in North Korea with the DHL for many -- longer than perhaps any other American businessman. And you're a pioneer. And more people ought to follow what you're trying to do.

The second thing we did was to have 20 young scientists from North Korean Ministry of Scientific Development meet in Dalian with six or seven faculty members from Syracuse. I've been working with Syracuse for over 10 years, and so we had these 20 people there for three weeks. And teaching them -- improving their English. That was one of the key things that the North Koreans said.

We know how important it is to send people into the world who really can speak English. And we know that they've got to do it much better than they do it now, but we don't have good English teachers. They're still frightened about sending people away for a full year. I have a two year -- I have a year scholarship open for two economists open at Williams, full tuition, everything paid. And they still don't dare do that.

But they will send -- because they think they would learn and never come back. So they don't have enough that -- they haven't built up that much faith in themselves in terms of what they're doing. But they will send people for shorter periods. And the people who interacted with these 20 youngsters for three weeks said it was just a life changing experience.

Most of them had never been out of North Korea. They had no idea about what a modern city -- well, they're beginning to see it in Pyongyang, but they were

fascinated to learn about the Internet, and the conversations and the questions that they were willing to ask, particularly after they had been together for a week or so. And everybody there just felt it was a life changing experience.

So, that's the kind of thing we're going to try to continue to do. The next thing PCI would like to do is to have a meeting in Hawaii with some of the American Institute there, but at this point, we can't get the promise of any visas being issued by the State Department. So, we probably will be reduced to doing more things in China, because it's closer, it's cheaper, but it's much less convenient, and it's not the same as getting North Koreans into the United States, where they really can see how we live and what we're made of, as people.

DR. MOON: I think we should mention that the North Koreans have established a particular agency, the National Economic Development Commission, and you've spoken about that with me in the past. And that was established in October, 2013. And you know, if you think about these dates, it's interesting, because October, 2013, is also the time when there was so much internal turmoil, and yet, there are these other tracts of bureaucratic, political life that are being paved, in a way.

And this commission, the National Economic Development Commission, sometimes referred to as the state development -- State Economic Development Commission is in charge of developing any and all special economic zones. I assume, meaning the ones that exist as well as the ones that will be planned for the future, and that it wants to learn "and open up to all the help it can get." And so, there isn't a body that is directly connected to the cabinet under Kim Jong-un that's in charge of this.

What I'm curious about is, if -- let's talk a little bit more in depth about the actual people to people aspects of this. What kind of transformations have you

witnessed in your dealings with North Koreans, and also your colleagues, having had experience in dealing with them, from when you started these projects to now? And where do you see them going to in terms of what will they do with the training, with the mind opening experiences they have when they meet people from the U.S. or from other countries. What is your sense of their transformational capacity?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: That's a tough question, but a very good question. I should add at this point, that we are not the only people doing this. I think there's someone here from the German embassy, and I want to give credit to the Fredrich-Ebert-Stiftung, FES, which has been very much involved in this same kind of thing and sponsored largely, a meeting in New York in March, 2012, which was probably the most substantive exchange I've had with high level North Korean representatives. John Kerry was there. He was not yet secretary of state. He said to them, we have no permanent enemies. There was talk of his going to North Korea very shortly, but then, the Leap Day agreement fell through, and so that stopped.

I've gotten to know them quite well, and there was sort of a lag one afternoon in the meetings, and I spoke up and said, you know, I'm dealing with people I've known for 10 years. We still have this terrible tendency to demonize people we neither like nor understand, and I used an evil word to describe what I meant by that. It began with B.

And it sort of stunned everybody, and Choe Son-hui, who a lot of you know, spoke up and said, if you will give us a guarantee of security through a peace treaty, we will give up our nuclear weapons. Flat, unadulterated statement. Nobody had ever heard that before from a senior North Korean. And John Kerry was told about it, and he came later that afternoon, and I think there was a plan to send him to North

Korea, which was undercut by the collapse of the Leap Day agreement, which was very, very unfortunate.

I find growing confidence. There are people who in 10 years, are now in much more senior positions than they were before. The words we can use, the sense of cooperation is greater, and I just feel there are an increasing number of people in North Korea who, thanks to work done by FES -- the Canadians have done some things, the Australians have done some things.

There are more and more people in North Korea ready to enter the outside world with a certain degree of sophistication and trust. It's all a sense of empathy. You can't prove it, because they haven't had the opportunity, but the desire to do it and the competence to do it, I think has grown over the 12 years I've been going there.

I think a sample of that -- were you going to get into the Philharmonic?

DR. MOON: Yeah, but go ahead.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Well, I was going to use that as an example.

Is that all right?

DR. MOON: Sure. It's your show.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: In 2008, there was a discussion about going -- the New York Philharmonic going to Pyongyang. And it's funny, because in 2004, the Philharmonic was going to South Korea, and there was a concern about whether that was safe. And so, I had to go over and talk to the New York Philharmonic saying, it's okay to go to South Korea.

And so in 2008, we got them to go to North Korea. And it was -- Lorin Maazel did just a masterful performance. He learned to speak some Korean. He played Arirang. And then most importantly, the next day, there were master's classes. And both

sides were blown away by it.

The North Koreans had no idea that our musicians would do it, and our musicians had no idea that the North Koreans were as skilled as they are. And in February, when I was there, they took me to a concert of their state symphony orchestra, which they would love to send here. It's a hundred people, and it would cost an -- you know -- but they had three different conductors, and it's a magnificent orchestra. So, there was just one area where effort counts and endeavors pay and a link has been forged, which I think can be built on in the future.

DR. MOON: Well, after I -- when I was doing a little bit more research after our numerous you know, give and take, which was research enough, I found this article. It's in Korean and by Yonhop News. I know Yonhop News is here, and this is really interesting; that next month in the UK, both at Oxford, Cambridge and then in London, there is a group of disabled North Koreans -- North Koreans with disabilities, especially young people; children up to the age of 20, I believe, who are dancers, singers, et cetera.

And they have been invited by the Brits to tour, and to give concerts; performances. So they have several of these lined up towards the end of October, and then, there is some hope that some arrangement can be worked out between the British government, the musical and dance training centers and the North Korean government to enable some of these kids to be able to study in the UK.

So, I thought it's an interesting -- not exactly a follow up directly, but a continuation of this kind of cultural diplomacy. But of course, the British do have diplomatic relations with --

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Yes.

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DR. MOON: -- North Korea, which makes a huge difference in --

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Yes.

DR. MOON: -- enabling these kinds of activities. And also, the North Koreans -- the North Korean government does allow North Koreans to stay in the UK for long periods of time, much longer than in the U.S.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Yes.

DR. MOON: And I assume that has something to do with the normalization of relations, as well as trust building, because they --

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Absolutely.

DR. MOON: -- have been able to get to know one another for a longer time on an official basis. And they even talk about human rights issues as issue -- agenda issues, whereas we can't actually do that officially. So, there are some interesting developments here when we compare what's going on or not going on in the U.S. with what's going on in Europe, in particular.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Yeah.

DR. MOON: And going back to the Philharmonic, can you tell me a little bit about or tell us -- I was particularly interested, because I wrote an Op-ed about this, and I dug it out. It's from 2009. But that to me, what was so striking was the background stories, the untold stories of that program, that project, that huge project to take the New York Philharmonic to North Korea; that there was a Japanese European woman who was a major funder. Right?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Yeah. Right.

DR. MOON: Right.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Right.

DR. MOON: So, a woman of Japanese descent who said she doesn't care about politics, she just loves music and wants it to be shared everywhere, especially in places where it can't be shared freely. And you had a lot of individuals who played very behind the scenes roles who made it possible -- why do people do this? And what kind of organizational capacity is needed, if we were to be able to institutionalize these kinds of exchanges in the long run?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: I think it takes pioneers. I think it takes people who are interested in the results, not introduced to -- not interested in accruing credit for what they have done. Spencer Kim, the founder of the Pacific Century Institute was very much involved; a lubricant, in terms of finance. And he worked with that woman. And he wasn't anxious to take credit. He just wanted this trip to take place. And that is, I think, very, very important.

In another completely different capacity, the trip I took in February, involved sort of peacekeeping in a one-on-one basis. I've known Pete McCloskey, a former Congressman for about 15 years. McCloskey is a retired -- was a Congressman for 16 years. Before that, he was a Marine. He was known as the Beowulf of the Fifth Marines. He received the Navy Cross and the Silver Star.

Paul Newman made a film about him called "Leading from the Front," and said he had led more bayonet charges than anybody since the Civil War. And Pete heard I was going to North Korea, and he said, will you take me with you? I am haunted by what I did, and I would like to meet a North Korean soldier and compliment him for his bravery, and tell him that we just must not let this kind of thing happen again."

So, this was sent to the North Koreans. And I think I knew the people up there well enough to do this, so they didn't think that I was some kind of a nut case. And

so they said, yeah, bring him. And so they had located a retired lieutenant general who was a docent in one of their -- in their new museum. And there is a picture of him in this book. He's a tiny little guy. And Pete is a great, big Irishman.

And so, we met in the museum, and he didn't know what the hell was going on, because here was this big American saying, you know, I really want to make peace with you after all of these years. And it didn't really work. And I talked to the man, and I said, this man is very sincere. He'd love to meet you again.

So, Pete went back the very next day, and they started talking, and he said well, how many times were you wounded? And the man said three. And he said to Pete, how many times were you wounded? And Pete said, well, only two. And then Pete said, well how old were you? And he said, I was 17. And what was your weapon? He said heavy machine gun. And then he volunteered -- he said, I think I killed 400 of you.

And Pete did not tell him how many he had killed, many of them in hand-to-hand combat, but he said, this must never happen again. And so they embraced and saluted and made peace with each other, and there was a very fine article about it in the New York -- in the "L.A. Times."

And the North Koreans are -- last time I met with them in New York 10 days ago, they said, we would welcome a larger group of American veterans to come back and do the same thing that McCloskey did. And I got this message from McCloskey. He said the healing therapy of that wonderful trip to Pyongyang has stayed with me. I haven't had one of those dreams of emptying a 30 round carbine magazine at full automatic into the upturned, terrified faces of a bunch of Korean 16 year olds since I returned.

So, those are some of the costs of war that people carry with them, and

this is, I think, a step in the right direction. Now, to cheer you up a little bit, McCloskey has a tremendous sense of humor, and he is a great admirer of George Herbert Walker Bush. And so, they knew each other when they were in Congress.

And so, McCloskey, a couple of years ago said, my wife and I are going down to Houston. We'd love to call on President and Mrs. Bush, the good Bush, and so I said, yeah, I can arrange that. So, they went in and saw George and Barbara Bush. And he wrote me an email and said we had a great hour together.

And he said, I don't know what possessed me, but when I left, I had a button -- one of those things you put on your refrigerator door, and I said, Mr. President, I think you'll enjoy this. And he pressed it into his hand Bush looked at it and howled with laughter. And what it said was, Jesus loves you. Everybody else thinks you're an asshole.

And so anyway, that's the kind of guy McCloskey is. So, a couple of months ago, I was here in Washington, and Jim Baker was being given a dinner at ADST, so I hadn't seen him for years. And I went up to him and we exchanged notes. And I said, by the way -- and then I told him this story. And he sort of lowered his glasses and looked at them, and he said, Bush sent that button to me.

So, you know, I'm a great believer in the strength of humor. So, McCloskey is -- he's tremendously humorous. But he was vulnerable to what he had done, and he's been cured by it, and he would like to lead another larger group back. And the fact that the North Koreans are enthused about it, I think is very meaningful.

DR. MOON: That's a very interesting story in terms of North Koreans, in a way, informally inviting a delegation of American veterans. You bring up the issue of war and the human costs and the legacy of those human costs that haunt people.

What struck me on my trip there two summers ago was, I was ready for all of the militarized placards and everything else -- posters, you know, that just cover up every wall and every you know, surface in the public. But I was just amazed and truly awed in the sense of -- awestruck, not knowing what to do and how to think about the hyper militarization of the society, the absolute contortion and distortion of history.

And in some ways, I started thinking about, you know, we talk a lot about human rights as something that happens to one's body and one's mind. But you know, I thought about history and the distortion of it and the everyday living experience of it as a distorted history, the official history, not the individual ones, as one of the greatest human rights violations in a sense, on a collective level, because people aren't even aware of it many times.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Right.

DR. MOON: And I've always been wondering since then -- you know, people talk about reconciliation, unification between the two Koreas. And I think, what do we do with history? How do we reconcile peoples with histories that are so divergent is putting it mildly, and with a North Korean version in particular that is so hyper militarized and villainized. You talk about the dangers of vilifying the other, but you know, obviously, this happens both ways -- North Koreans to the U.S. as well as U.S. to North Koreans.

But do you have any thoughts, given your interactions on the human level of how we might be able to deal with this hyper militarized -- you know, they still live in a state of war, literally. Right?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Right.

DR. MOON: And in a mindset of war. So, they have all of these projects and plans and aspirations, but how do these aspirations for a new North Korea, a more

sustainable, livable, hopefully -- livable North Korea --

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Yeah.

DR. MOON: -- mesh with or square with, if at all, with this hyper militarized war state?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Very good question. A couple of comments. Ri Yong-ho, the Vice Foreign Minister, said on our meeting, you know, we -- the B29 is still in our DNA, because it was the B29 that just absolutely flattened Pyongyang, bombing, napalm, all of that. And when you fly B52s at us with nuclear weapons, it really gets us riled.

And so, I feel when I was ambassador, one of the things I did was to stop for one year, the holding of the team spirit training exercise, which gets the North Koreans just on a hyper alert, because it's a memory of that. And then, Dick Cheney, without telling the embassy or the State Department, put team spirit back in place, and undid virtually everything that had been accomplished.

So, it is there, and it's not going to go away easily. I mean, I -- you won't like this, but I think it's something that should be raised. Think of our own country. Think of the issue of slavery, which still divides our country, 150 years after Gettysburg. What has arisen in our hearts and minds with Obama as president is a reminder of how difficult it is to deal with the kind of differentiation with the North Koreans are doing. So, it isn't going to come quickly and it isn't going to come easily.

I think one of the quickest ways to do it would be to have sufficient economic development in North Korea, so that when the Army is disbanded, there is a place for them to go to work. And when we crazily disbanded the Iraqi Army, left them with nothing but their guns and their discontent, you had hell to pay. And so, we've got to

think ahead as to how that can be avoided. And so that's quite easy. Economic developments are so important.

John Delury is a man who used to be at the Asia Society. He's now teaching at Yonsei and he's written a very good book on China called "Wealth and Power." And I asked him about this very issue, Kathy, and this is what he said: Geostrategic insecurity in North Korea is the main reason for slow economic reform and opening up. They don't have a need for security. We keep threatening them with exercises, so their own sense of the need for security is reinforced.

He said the Chinese, with whom he deals all the time, says North Korea reminds them of China in 1970, waiting for a security guarantee such as that which they got from Nixon, and which caused them then to open up. But he said the cycle of hostility is self sustaining, because when we do things in a hostile fashion, the hawks in North Korea and they are there, they respond.

DR. MOON: Right.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: And so, this cycle of hostility which delays the start of an unraveling of these two different sets of history is further delayed.

DR. MOON: Okay. That's a lot to chew on here. I think I'll make this the last question, so you can have some time with the audience; continue the discussion. But based on your many years both in government as well as in these track two processes, what kind of advice would you give both to NGOs, track two types of people who want to be pursuing whatever type of work on a people-to-people level? And what kind of advice would you give to U.S. policymakers regarding their agendas?

So, whether it's NGOs or whether it's the government, the policy priorities, their organizational agendas, strategy for getting done what they want to get

done, what to expect when dealing with North Koreans, both at the governmental and non-governmental level, and some of the communication processes or particularities to expect, and how to overcome them.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: That's an awful lot to chew on there. I get very discouraged about the bureaucratic mentality. I think it is very difficult for bureaucrats to change their position or to say, I was wrong. And I think everybody has a vested interest in the value of -- what is it, strategic patience? And they keep finding new ways of saying, yes, it works, and we have to be patient and we have to continue it.

They never -- I think they avoid talking with me. But they occasionally will reach out to people with whom I work, and they haven't had a new idea about North Korea for a decade. I was asked by the Obama administration, the campaign, before he was elected --

DR. MOON: Right, right.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: -- to speak to a bunch of Koreans in New York. And my Republican opponent was head of the Republican party in New York State. And we were talking about Korea, and I knew a hell of a lot more about it than he did, and so, I think I was fairly successful. And I thought, well, I may be hearing more from Obama.

The man he had in charge of those affairs knew nothing about Korea. And I could tell that from the questions he asked and the things he didn't know. Well, he stayed in place. He was a China specialist. And I think it was really through that channel that they picked up the line from the Bush administration, and that is, we bought that cow two or three times. Talking for the sake of talk is not worth it. Talking to them is rewarding bad behavior.

And I don't think you'll get any of these people to change their minds. And I think the North Koreans have reached that position. They have said Obama isn't going to talk to us. We need a new president and a new team. And I don't have any quarrel with that.

As far as the NGOs are concerned, I think that this is a terribly important time to keep laying the foundation for a change that is going to come. And don't get discouraged at this point, because you just don't have any real support from the bureaucracy here in Washington. It's all the more important that we continue to reach out and lay a foundation upon which a better relationship can be built.

So, I find great receptivity to that. I am really encouraged by what is happening in places like Germany and Australia and England. And as more and more countries see this -- in Pyongyang in February, we had fascinating conversations with the Swedish ambassador who takes care of our interests there, and he is very well plugged in, and he is all for this kind of thing that we are doing.

So, I have no answer as to what to do about people in Washington, but I have a desire for continued energy and patience in terms of the NGOs, and I have great confidence that they will respond.

DR. MOON: Thank you very much. If you recall, I was the moderator of that president -- surrogate presidential debate that you had on foreign policy. U.S. policy toured the Koreas in New York. Right? And you were speaking for the Obama campaign and Mr. Cox was speaking for the --

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Oh, I had forgotten that was you.

DR. MOON: Yeah, that was --

AMBASSADOR GREGG: And by clean is clock?

DR. MOON: I would say given that I moderated, I would say you're the victor.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Thank you.

DR. MOON: You definitely, I would say -- I won't say obliterated him. You're too gracious for that. But it was definitely a good debate, and you definitely won. But what was interesting is the number of Korean Americans who showed up for that event.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Yeah.

DR. MOON: And I know that group quite well, and they have been growing. And so -- and that's another group in the U.S. that has a lot invested in what goes on the peninsula for both personal -- his family historical as well as political reasons. But it was an incredibly useful, informative and -- you know, it was an exchange that was very helpful.

And I, too, thought you were going to be asked to do more for the Obama administration, but instead, you're now here in Brookings. And once you come to Brookings, you do get heard. You will be heard. So who knows? They may be -- you may be getting a phone call from the White House tomorrow.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: I won't hold my breath, but thank you very much for those thoughts.

DR. MOON: At any rate, there's a lot I could ask of Ambassador Gregg, but I won't take up more time, and I'll open the floor to you all so that you can ask him your own questions and share with him your comments. I'll just continue as moderator, and then we'll go to Sam Yoon and then to Scott. Just please tell us who you are and where you're from.

MR. YOON: Sam Yoon, president of the Council of Korean Americans. We're a new organization and network of Korean American leaders. I really appreciate your talk and your lifetime of service. I also have like a dozen questions. I'm going to limit myself to one.

But I want to talk about public opinion, because what you're telling us is that you've kind of given up on U.S. policy and government responsiveness to new ideas. Well, you know, if we believe in our democracy, they should be responsive to you know, the public opinion. But even that, I can see, is quite a challenge.

I believe Secretary Kerry today is -- or soon will be addressing the UN, and his job is obviously, to amplify the human rights report --

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Right.

MR. YOON: -- that came out and to draw attention to the abuse. So, in this kind of public conversation about North Korea, where it seems the human rights question is dominant, and it's something that no one in this room would say is not relevant, I wonder the dynamic -- because we're talking about people to people and just the -- almost the emotional response that people have to words and concepts and messages, to the extent that folks are going to be, including Secretary of State and our government, amplifying the issue of human rights.

What is the relationship between the conversation we're having now about the need to engage, the need to open up? Because basically, to me, it comes down to human nature. There's one guy over here saying, you're bad. You know? You're bad. And the other person says, I want to talk to you. So, can those two conversations happen in the same voice, or can we -- even the person who says you're bad and the other person who says I want to talk to you, can they even have a dialogue?

Should they have a dialogue?

And so, the idea of having two tracks, I think historically seems to be something we've done only because maybe the two tracks really haven't talked to each other. Is there a need for that, or is this just something where we do need the multi faceted, kind of -- even if it's contradictory sometimes, kind of a, you know, engagement with North Korea.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: I worked in the White House for 10 years, and the White House has limited ability to deal with multi faceted crises. I saw the Carter administration paralyzed by the Iran hostages. I saw the Reagan administration paralyzed by Iran-Contra. And the president has a -- we were saying at lunch, has a Rubik's Cube of foreign policy issues.

Secretary Kerry, I think is doing a magnificent job in trying to make progress with the Arabs and the Israelis, with Putin and Ukraine, and now with ISIS. And there is zero political benefit to reaching out to North Korea. Zero. And so, for us to start petitioning the embattled White House at this point saying, hey, you know, you've got to reach out to North Korea, you would get nowhere, and you would just annoy people, saying for heaven's sake, don't bother us at this point.

I think the North Koreans have reached that analysis. I think it's realistic. I think there is going to be no change on Obama's thinking on North Korea unless something totally expected -- I mean, if they suddenly released all three of the people and said, we're shutting off Yongbyun, that might do it. I don't think that they're going to do that.

So, I think for the next two plus years, the best thing we can do is to continue to cultivate relations with the north. I dealt with Mr. Kirk -- is he the one who

wrote the human rights report?

DR. MOON: Kirby.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Kirby.

DR. MOON: Right.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: I spoke with him when he presented his report to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and I said, your report is a call to action; not to try to overthrow North Korea, but to get them to face up to the realities of what they've done and to try to change. And he very much agreed with that.

And he indicated, and I know it's hard to judge, but he said he thought things had improved somewhat under Kim Jong-un, the conditions and the number of people involved. And I think that's about the best we can do. And I know Kerry fairly well. I admire him, but I think to come at him with another controversial thing at this point, would just be counterproductive in every way.

DR. MOON: Not to mention North Koreans not being able to play multi-tasking games too well.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Right.

DR. MOON: Scott, you had your --

MR. SNYDER: Yes, Scott Snyder, Council on Foreign Relations. First, I just want to thank you, Don, for your lifetime of passion for the U.S. relationship with both Koreas, and I'm sure I'm looking forward to reading your book.

The question that I want to ask is, your analysis of the inter-Korean relationship at this stage. And maybe, particularly in historical perspective, since you mentioned Kim Dae-jung and his engagement. And you know, what do you think the prospects are at this stage with Park Geun Hye? And then also, how do you see the

relationship between the intra Korean relationship and prospects for U.S. and North Korean engagement, even at the non-governmental level?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: As one would expect from you, a very tough, good question. Park Geun Hye -- what I've said about President Park is that in my opinion, Korea has had three great presidents. Her father, for his economic development, Roh Tae-woo for his diplomacy and for the progress he made with North Korea, and Kim Dae-jung.

I said I think she has the ability to become the fourth really great president, only if she reaches out to North Korea in a convincing way, and she has not done it. And I think she's a very disappointing -- she's very disappointing to me, and I had nothing -- I knew her father. I had met her when she was a little girl. She went to Sogang University, which gave me an honorary degree, so we have that in common.

And I saw her at the opening game of the World Cup in 2002, and she had been to North Korea, the year before, and had met with Kim Jong-il. And I said, I want to compliment you for doing that. That was magnificent, given the fact of who killed your mother and who tried to kill your father two or three times. And she said, I'll never forget it. We must look to the future with hope, not to the past with bitterness.

And I was hoping that that would be the motto of her presidency. It has not been. She has brought some of the hardliners from her father's time forward. The intelligence reminds me of KCIA at its worst under Lee Hu-rak. So you know, I'm extremely disappointed in what she's done. And I don't really expect much from her.

And it makes it difficult -- even more difficult for people like me, who think we ought to talk, because there's some Americans who say, oh, well, yeah, we would, but the South Koreans don't want us to. And so it's kind of a Rubik's cube. Now, I'll be

very interested to meet the Mayor of Seoul tomorrow and to see you know, what he has on his mind. But it's also a generational problem.

One of my closest Korean friends, a woman who was head of the Catholic women's association in Seoul, I mean, she thinks Kim Dae-jung is a secret Communist. I mean, she just couldn't believe that I -- she thought it was a mistake that I helped keep him alive. And she still feels that way. And I think a lot of Koreans feel that way. Now, that has to pass, and time will take care of that.

I think that there is a new study. Somebody is doing proportionate recommendations --

DR. MOON: Or tailored engagement?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Tailored engagements.

DR. MOON: Yeah, Shin Gi-wook. He's coming next week. Next Monday.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Good. I mean, I think that sounds like --

DR. MOON: He's coming right here.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Good. Long may he wave, because I think that kind of thing is extremely important to do. I say to young South Koreans and young Korean Americans who are wondering, what are you going to do, I say get really expert in Korean, because there's going to be a lifetime of careers in helping bring North Korea back into the family of nations. There are going to be all kinds of teaching jobs opening up in North Korea that will be absolutely fascinating. But it's going to come slowly, and I hope very much that the next president in South Korea will be much more active in reaching out to the north.

DR. MOON: And Roberta?

MS. COHEN: Roberta Cohen. I'm with Brookings Institution, and also co-chair the committee --

DR. MOON: Sorry. Would you speak up, because I think we're getting some of this recorded, so --

MS. COHEN: Roberta Cohen. I'm a non resident senior fellow at Brookings, and I also co-chair the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. I wanted you to go back to some of what you were talking about meeting North Koreans who are interested in learning more about business and being accessible to foreign investment, et cetera.

Do you build into these dialogues other issues? For example, I don't imagine you can just technically discuss business. There is the question of information, Internet, freedom of information. There is the question of transparency, of transactions.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Right.

MS. COHEN: There is the whole question of having to do with just communication and a sense of -- really, I don't want to say human rights, but courts, rule of law. Many of these issues, and they are human rights issues, actually, are the foundation for that kind of business transactions that will be successful. How do you address this in the work you're doing?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Did you all hear that? I mean, how do you address these issues of the law of human rights, of transparency and so forth? It's very tough. I mean, I've spent enough time in the south to know how difficult it is to get at some of those issues in Mississippi, and you know, the whole issue of how our local police handle people. We've had examples of that in Ferguson. So, we are far from perfect.

And it's very difficult to get people who are indoctrinated in the system as the North Koreans have been, to get them to change. I think the only way to get that change to come is to get them to see that it is in their interest to change. They can't -- they won't do it because they think we ought -- we think that they ought to. They will not do it.

You can explain to them why we think certain ways are necessary, certain ways are beneficial, and then, they have to come to their agreement that it is. But I think in a hortatory, finger wagging basis, you don't really get very far with anybody in lecturing them on those issues.

MS. COHEN: What I actually meant was, how would business and how would foreign investment -- how would this work effectively in their interest --

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Yeah.

MS. COHEN: -- without these other issues being the foundation? That is what I mean. I'm not talking about --

(Simultaneous discussion)

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Well, let me ask James. How do you -- you've been doing business there. I mean, how do you -- you give an answer to her question. I mean, I'm sure you ran into all kinds of problems of corruptions, of non transparency, of broken promises. How did you deal with that?

MR. JAMES MIN: Yeah, I mean, it's a great question, Roberta, and I think because this is on the record, I can't really divulge too much. But business does have an impact in those areas. People are shocked when they hear that yeah, we can email our personnel in Pyongyang when we need to track a shipment, and there's communication. And there's greater Internet access available.

At some of the meetings we've had, we've shown them Google Maps and Google Satellite. And so, those things are entering the minds of North Koreans, especially from the business perspective.

DR. MOON: Just to supplement a bit, I think Ambassador Gregg, you had already mentioned that one of the main projects that PCI, Pacific Century Institute, conducts is international business law training.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Yeah.

DR. MOON: And contract law, as well as international norms about conducting commerce trade, et cetera. And Jerome Cohen, Jerry Cohen, is, for those of you who don't know, one of the longstanding, very well regarded Chinese law or legal systems professors in the world, and very much committed to issues of human rights as well as all sorts of other legal issues.

And so, the fact that he has stepped in and thinks it's worth his time, to me, says a lot -- just that he is willing to invest his precious time and energy, and he's also not exactly a spring chicken. So, that's a lot of work for him to be traveling to Asia periodically to be doing this. And he has made great progress dealing with the Chinese, so he knows of what he speaks.

I think what's also important is that from some of the exchanges you and I have had, that the North Koreans themselves want to learn about law. And perhaps, that's the most important thing, because we can offer curricula that touches law, but if people don't want to learn -- but the fact that they are asking for it says something.

And I think what's interesting in the communications is also from one of your colleagues at PCI that I had a privilege to look in on was the insights of this PCI, or I guess one of the people who had -- delegation members who went to the Dalian group --

that the folks -- and many of these people were from the North Korean government, or at least seconded to the delegation.

They were fascinated to have access to the Internet in Hong Kong, and that that was one of the highlights for them. And they knew about it, but some knew more than others. Some had had access. Some had not. And the fact that they could not have full access, because of Chinese law was a bit of a constraint. But nevertheless, they were able to access it.

Also, to find friends of their in different parts of Asia just by emailing, they found fascinating. And so, the sense of connectedness that these folks from North Korea were able to have, even for a relatively short period of time, it seemed to me from the travel reports, left a very you know, serious imprint on them. So, who knows, in terms of what you know, kind of cravings they will have in the future?

And let's move toward this side of the room. We'll go to Nick and Andrew, and anyone here, I'll take next.

MR. HAMISEVICZ: Thank you. Nicholas Hamisevicz from the Korea Economic Institute. Because government-to- government relations are so limited and poor, often, when we have an opportunity for these people-to-people connections, there seems to be hope that that will lead to better government-to-government connections.

And so, how should we or governments think about how to properly use the opportunities of these people-to-people whether they're Incheon games or other type of opportunities to use those better relations or that better opportunity to create better to better -- better government-to-government contacts and relations?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: I think it depends on who you choose to be in those positions. There are certain people who are open to new ideas, and there are

certain people who are not -- many people who are not. Now, you have Sung Kim coming into a senior position. He's been in South Korea as an ambassador.

I think now is the time to go to him. When he is new in the job, when he is stacking up his priorities and his time, he isn't particularly locked into everything else that's been said and thought. And I think it's when somebody is new to a job that he is most open to new ideas. I think the old horses who have been in the same job for several years, I think it's very difficult to get them to really open up a new approach.

DR. MOON: Could I just add to your question? What about the flipside? Because often, North Koreans expect a lot from the NGOs or individuals you are dealing with who are non-governmental; that they actually can deliver something to the governments or from the governments.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: We have found that the key to being successful is to not raise expectations artificially; not to promise something that we're not pretty sure we can deliver, because we have found that consistency and reliability and discretion are really the keys to trust with them.

It's interesting, because North Koreans know of my intelligence background. And so, I have gone out of my way to never give them cause for concern, and they have accepted me as basically a career intelligence officer, whom I think they have grown to trust. But I think if it came out that I had been working for the CIA or if I had been carrying an official agenda with me, that would have wiped out everything that I was trying to do.

I would say -- I would never speak critically of my own government any more than I would expect them to speak critically of their government. But I just said, I will deal honestly with you. And when they gave me a secret message to take to the

White House, I said now, I'm going to pass through Seoul. I said, do you want me not to say anything to the South Koreans. And they said, that's up to you. Now, that impressed me, that they didn't say, you know, oh, no, no, no, no. You mustn't say anything. They said it's up to you. And so, that's -- I mean, a good point, but that's what I have to say.

DR. MOON: Okay, great. Andrew?

MR. YEO: Hi. Andrew Yeo, Catholic University.

I was wondering if you could say a little bit more about the leadership at the top, Kim Jong-un, and how serious you think he is with some of these -- you said that there was a request for more -- things like learning about business law or English.

There's a National Economic Development Commission that's been established.

You know, North Korea, it's not -- there are different voices within North Korea, but it's really the top that matters. So, one question that I had for myself was, what if -- if there is an opening and there are these great reforms, is it possible that Kim Jong Un, like a flip of a switch could just stop this, because he sees that his own leadership becomes threatened?

So, I was wondering, again, how serious do you see Kim Jong-un right now in these reforms that you had suggested earlier?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Yeah, we see -- everybody who went on the -- there were four of us who went in February. And we all sense a great change of atmosphere in the four or five years since we've been there; that there was a willingness to tell us what they were planning, and a willingness to say, we don't know how to do it. And there was not that kind of willingness under Kim Jong-il.

And so, we sensed that from everything we heard, that they have a young leader who is saying, look, we've got to do better than we have been doing. You

know, we can't admit it publicly, but we need to learn how to relate to the world economically. Now, find out how to do it. And there was just a different atmosphere, which I think, because it's such a hierarchical place, that I felt that this was the trickle down atmosphere from Kim Jong-un.

And as I watch him going around talking to various people, and the kind of people he makes himself open to -- he's much more confident. I mean, what I've said to the North Koreans is this. I am a consultant to ABC News, and so Diane Sawyer would love to go and interview Kim Jong-un.

And so I said that to Ri Yong-ho, and his -- he began to roll his eyes. And I said, okay, forget that. But you know, you have got a leader who is like his grandfather in that he's very confident in leading people. His father was not. And you have somebody who needs to stop sending smoke signals from a cave -- and this was a phrase I used with Ri Yong-ho -- I said you need to get him out front and have him talk to the world about where he wants to take North Korea.

And you haven't had anybody really do that, so we don't have anything to really hang on. And I said, but you now have -- Kim Jong-il wouldn't do that. He wasn't that confident. I mean, Madeleine Albright and I had a long talk about that, and she was very funny about that. She said, well, he and I are about the same height and we both wear high heels and we both put mousse in our hair.

But he also was -- you know, he wasn't very confident. But Kim Jong-un is. And I said, get him out front and start saying this is what I'm trying to do. And he said, I get it. So, I haven't seen any results of that, but that's what they ought to do, because they've got a kid there, a young man who is capable of projecting really, what he wants to do. That would be a new factor, and I think it would be tremendously beneficial.

DR. MOON: Yes, Larry?

MR. NIKSCH: Ambassador Gregg, I'd like to ask you about the North Korea media. Everything that we see about North Korea tell us that the agitation and propaganda department of the workers party has tremendous power and authority, and that North Korean leaders, certainly Kim Jong-il, paid great attention to what the media said; what the messages coming out of the propaganda are -- were saying.

Now, just this year, the highest level North Korean media organs have repeatedly described President Park as a prostitute. They called President Obama a monkey -- a direct racial slur. I understand they've come out with something similar about Secretary Kerry now. Two or three years ago, they described Secretary Clinton as a grumpy, dumpy, old school marm type -- something like that.

Have you ever had a chance to talk to them about these kinds of personal attacks and slurs, and get from what they think they get out of it? Why do they engage in this kind of media strategy, if you will? What are their objectives? What do they think they gain from this?

AMBASSADOR GREGG: The particular -- I was very upset by that particular line, which happened after I got back from North Korea. I have said, you're still doing things that are unworthy of you. And if I had a chance to talk with those same people, I would have said that about them. Now, the answer I get from that is that it's a stovepipe kind of organization, and that these people are still very powerful and they sort of answer to themselves.

Now, once Kim Jong-un is fully in charge, I think he will shut them down, and he needs to hear that. He absolutely needs to hear that from friends. And if and when I go back, I will make a point to raise that. But I hope that some of the other people

who are going to him from the -- or to them, are saying that kind of thing. But you never know.

I mean, I sent a -- when I went into -- when his father was there, I took movies, because I knew he was a -- you know, he loved movies. So, I carefully selected three movies, and I heard that he enjoyed them all. One was "The Patriot," which was the Revolutionary War, another was "Training Day," which is a police thing. And the best of all was "Ronin," a great shoot 'em up with Robert DeNiro, directed by a classmate of mine at Williams. And I got feedback saying, hey, he really liked them.

Now, I sent this book personally inscribed. Now, do I think he will see it? I have no idea. But it will be very interesting, if I got something saying, well, he -- thank you for the book. He enjoyed it. You know? But you don't get that kind of thing. I mean, the hierarchy -- and I found that in dealing with the Soviets all through the Cold War.

You never knew how far up the truth was in getting to the ears of the leader, because there is a tremendous fear of taking bad news to the leader. When I was chief of station in Seoul, I told President Park's bodyguard that he needed minister of bad news and to tell him the things he didn't want to hear. And we played ball -- I played golf with him one time, the president, and I spoke to him in Japanese. He was fluent.

And he sort of looked at me, you know, with sort of a hard eye thing -- we both -- neither of us were very good golfers, and we both hit our ball into the rough. And he looked at me, and he said, you know, Gregg, if you didn't work so hard, you'd be a better golfer. So, I said I think I heard that they took my idea to him, that he needed a (Inaudible) and he would make no answer to it, because I don't think they want to hear bad news. And so, that's the problem of getting what you just said to the ears of the person who could shut it down.

DR. MOON: I think we'll take one last question.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: Uh oh. Last questions are always very dangerous.

DR. MOON: Well, hopefully, nothing will be thrown at you, so I don't think you have to worry. Right there? Yeah?

MS. TSAI: Hi. Thank you for speaking to us today. My name is Sabrina Tsai. I'm from the Project 2049 Institute, and I just have --

DR. MOON: Which institute?

MS. TSAI: Project 2049 Institute. We're based in Virginia -- Asia-Pacific think tank. My questions are -- I actually have two questions, if you could just touch on --

DR. MOON: Please just do one.

MS. TSAI: Just one? Okay. In terms of engagement, I do agree that engagement is very, very important, even in a time like this when the administration is not able to do as much or chooses not to. Could you differentiate between if there is a strategy for smart engagement versus just any type of engagement? Do you think that all engagement is good, or is there like good engagement versus bad? So what is --

AMBASSADOR GREGG: No, I don't think all engagement is good. I think you have to be very careful about that. But that kind of thinking usually goes on when there's a new administration moving in, or when there's a new relationship or a new direction being taken. But it's very important to lay those things out, and I think that there have been some examples of NGO stuff that hasn't been so good.

I mean, I think of the three guys that are in jail, I think all of them -- it was really unfortunate that they did some things that they were very foolish in doing. When I went to North Korea with Pete McCloskey, he is very impetuous and he writes a lot of

notes at night. And I was very careful every morning, when we woke up in the morning to say, don't leave anything behind in your room.

And so, we were aware of that. But it's a very good point, and I think that the kind of engagement is extremely important. If I could just end, if that is the last --

DR. MOON: Sure.

AMBASSADOR GREGG: -- with sort of a Korean anecdote, one of the reasons that I maintain such an interest in dealing with Koreans, when I was ambassador, I'd been there about a month. And one morning, six young students from Busan broke into the embassy residence by climbing over the wall, and they tried to set fire to it. And the issue was beef exports.

And so, the Korean police eventually got there and carried them off. I called up Blue House and I said, you know, don't be too hard on them. So, that was in October of 1989. Three out of the six have personally apologized to me. Two of them are in the National Assembly, and one of them came to see me in 2006 when I was staying there, with a camera, and formally apologized.

And this winter, on a very snowy day, I got a call saying that this man was in New York and he wanted very much to see me. And so, out he came with several people -- he's now quite a prominent member of the National Assembly. And he came in and he had a picture of us shaking hands several years ago. And he said, I want to say -- I want to meet your wife. And so, in my wife came, and he got up and he said, I want to apologize to you for what we did, and he wept.

And it was so Korean. It was just -- ugh, it was very moving -- everybody. And we had a terrific talk, and I think he's going to go far. And that is just a -- to me, a wonderful, wonderful Korean story, that this -- he did this when he was 18 or 19,

and now that he's 50, he's thinking back on it and wants to make amends.

And I love that story. It's very Korean, because the Koreans are willing to say hey, I'm sorry about that. And we're going in a new direction. And that's one of the reasons I so enjoy working with Koreans in either north or south. So, thank you very much for your attention.

DR. MOON: Thank you very much. (Applause)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

) Signature and Seal on File)

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