THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

SYRIAN DISPLACEMENT: VIEWS FROM THE REGION

Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, September 16, 2014

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FERRIS: Welcome to Brookings. My name is Beth Ferris. I'm a Senior Fellow here at the Brookings Foreign Policy. I'm delighted to welcome you this panel that we've co-organized with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The topic is to look at regional perspectives on Syrian displacement with a particular emphasis on Lebanon and Turkey where certainly some of the most complex dynamics emerge with respect to refugees and host communities.

But this is part of a much larger phenomenon -- three and a half years of brutal war, at least 190,000 dead, 10 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. These numbers become numbing somehow and you hear them over and over again. You know, 10 million people is more than the population of Sweden or Switzerland or Austria. The number of people in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria is huge.

And before we turn to the situation of refugees in the region -- and I should mention that while we're focusing on Lebanon and Turkey, Jordan has large numbers of refugees, which have poured across its border for the past two and a half years. Egypt hosts 140,000 or so and perhaps 200,000 or 250,000 have gone into Iraq in search of shelter, some of whom have returned as a result of that violence.

But perhaps the situation of Syrian IDPs, internally displaced persons, estimated to number some 6.5 million -- but I emphasize we really do not know how many people are displaced within the country because for obvious reasons it's difficult to count, to estimate, and most of all people move all the time. I remember a couple of years ago talking with somebody from the International Committee of the Red Cross who said, and this was two and a half years ago, most people inside Syria are not sleeping in their homes. They stay for a while. They go stay with a relative. They move someplace

else. They hear that assistance is available in the city. So it's a very dynamic situation.

Access to provide assistance to people displaced within Syria is enormously difficult. In government-controlled areas we know there are sieges where people can't get in. There are bureaucratic delays, problems with visas, problems with checkpoints. Delivery of assistance in those areas is difficult. It's also quite difficult perhaps for different reasons in areas that aren't under the control of the government, people living in the so-called rebel-held areas. And even our use of these terms seems to imply there's a line somewhere. This is government controlled and this -- and those lines change all the time. It's hard to know who is in control of a particular area or to what extent aid will get in.

Unlike other situations, we know that there are a lot of nontraditional actors providing assistance. Many of these are Gulf-based organizations motivated by humanitarian concerns and charity and trying to do their best and working under enormous pressures, but some also have political motivations. Some of the Syrian organizations who see humanitarian relief for displaced people in political terms is a reality for people on the ground. Cross-border operations are taking place, but this is kind of a shadowy world. Who makes sure aid is delivered? Do they go to the people most in need? The international community is developing new systems of remote management, of working with local groups who often are the most knowledgeable about how to get it to those in need, but may not be used to working with Western organizations and monitoring and reporting.

So even as we look at the situation of refugees in the region -- and we'll hear that the challenges are enormous -- I ask you to keep in mind the needs of those we're not going to hear so much about, who aren't able to make it out of the country. I remember just last year talking with a Jordanian official who said something like, you

know, for the refugees arriving in Jordan, we are stop number four. Most people have been displaced two or three times within Syria before they even make it to us.

So as we look at this issue of Syrian displacement, we see it's kind of a mammoth problem. We were talking beforehand and I said something like, you know, a year ago I would never have thought that Syria might drop off the headlines. Now we've got Iraqi displacements in Gaza and Ukraine and in Bola, and to keep the spotlight on and the concern for the Syrian refugees I mean is an issue not just of humanitarian aid, but also of security long-term.

We have a distinguished panel that's here to talk with us. We'll begin with two speakers from UNHCR. Brian Hansford who's based here in Washington, but spent quite a bit of time in Lebanon, and we'll be talking about the Lebanon situation and receiving large numbers of refugees. I think something like a fourth of its population are now Syrian refugees. Brian has worked in both journalism and at the U.N. for many years.

And we have Carol Batchelor who is now completing more than four years in Ankara as UNHCR's Representative who will talk about Turkey's response to Syrian refugees and some of the challenges they face. You can see from her bio that she, too, has long years of experience working with UNHCR and before UNHCR in the private sector.

And then we'll turn to Andrew Tabler who's a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Middle East Policy who will really put this discussion of humanitarian issues into a broader political perspective. What does this mean for the region and the rise of ISIS or the Islamic State in the region and what are some of the political dynamics that we should be considering as we look at the situation.

So welcome, everyone, and we'll begin with you, Brian. Tell us about

Lebanon.

MR. HANSFORD: Thank you, Beth. Thank you for that introduction and thank you for the opportunity to (audio skip). If I may be allowed, I want to pick up on a point that you made about (audio skip) and then I'll talk about my experience (audio skip).

Last month, at the end of last month, actually the 29th of August, UNHCR issued a huge statement that the number of Syrian refugees are now (audio skip).

MS. FERRIS: Can you speak into your mic a little bit more?

MR. HANSFORD: Is that better? How's that? Maybe it's my Welsh accent. So going back, last month, at the end of last month, the 29th of August to be precise, UNHCR issued a statement stating that we've now registered the 3 millionth Syrian refugee and that in particular is an amazing figure. As Beth mentioned, the numbers are staggering, but these are not just statistics. These are boys, girls, women, children, mothers. But for me it did particularly strike home because 3 million people is the population of Wales where I'm from, and so North, South, East, and West Wales. I'm from South Wales. The human equivalent of the entire country of Wales.

Most of them are in the region, mostly in Lebanon and I'll come to that. (audio skip) in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and (audio skip).

I've recently returned from Lebanon. I spent July and August there and I recently came back. And 1.2 million Syrian refugees are in (audio skip) which is 1.2 million, which in real terms again, these figures (audio skip). That's over 25 percent of the population and these Syrian refugees are not in the classic refugee camps (audio skip).

Before I came to Washington to work for UNHCR, I spent many years in Afghanistan and I'd spoken (audio skip) working for the U.N. I'd spoken to Afghans

who'd returned from Pakistan, from Iran. We'd spoken of their lives in the camps. But these refugees in Lebanon are living in over 1,700 locations, (audio skip) settlements among the Lebanese, so that presents specific problems. They're not in camps. They're not sort of visible if you like, openly visible in camps, but they're in makeshift shelters. They're in sort of disused factories. They're in disused houses. They're on empty spaces of land where they've put up shelters, some of which have been provided by UNHCR in terms of tents, tarps, plastic sheeting that they use, so a staggering number.

In the north and south and east of Lebanon where I travelled on work missions, traveling throughout Lebanon, most of the refugees are in the Beqaa Valley in the east of the country, which borders (audio skip). (audio skip) where 400,000 are registered, but living amongst the poorest of the poor Lebanese as well (audio skip) where 80 percent of these refugees (audio skip).

So that's why we as UNHCR focused around 25 percent of our budget on direct support to Lebanese refugees on water, health care, sanitation in Lebanese communities because by doing that, we help the Syrians who are living amongst the Lebanese. (audio skip) of dealing with 1.2 million refugees in a country, tiny Lebanon, which is less than a third of the size of Maryland.

We work primarily through the Ministry of Social Affairs, so while I was in Lebanon I was with our team there, with our teams and our colleagues on the ground and also our partners on the ground as well as the government. We work with over 80 partners on the ground from education, which is, of course, (audio skip) local NGOs, local government, national NGOs, Save the Children, (audio skip).

Three things sort of struck me while I worked and while I was speaking with refugees and working with the team and one was the number of children. Wherever you go -- and we're talking here (audio skip) 50 percent if not more (audio skip)

settlements (audio skip). And you see all these small trousers, small peasant trousers, drying on the (audio skip) and little blouses, little shirts, (audio skip) just drying. And the number of children is staggering. And I remember visiting an informal school in the Beqaa with (audio skip) seeing a classroom with UNICEF, our U.N. partners. Children everywhere. They're 8 year olds (audio skip) Lebanese children, like Welsh children, like (audio skip). And one Lebanese teacher working in a Save the Children Fund supported school -- they partnered with us -- and she was teaching 8 year olds. She said children, the biggest complaint from the children she taught was why are we having breaks because we've got (audio skip). So that was one of the things that struck me.

The other thing that struck me was speaking with refugee families, speaking (audio skip) and the overwhelming desire to return to Syria, to return to their homes, to go back. And the Lebanese people frankly have been immensely generous, have brought a number of people into their (audio skip). But they all expressed a desire to go home once the situation (audio skip). Like I said, I used to be a journalist so I did a little bit of journalist probing. So when do you think (audio skip). When is peace likely to break out? That was the question I would ask. And then a look of confusion on their faces. Well, I don't know. Do you know what's the situation in your village? Do you know what's the situation with your home? Do you have a home to go back to? Again, a look of confusion. And so (audio skip) that was the reality. That's another thing that struck me, the desire to go home, the strong desire to go back to their lives, but to what lives remain and, again, a look of confusion.

The third thing that struck me is -- and, again, Beth alluded to this and it's not a new phenomenon, but I think it is a growing phenomenon -- the number of times Syrians have moved within their country, within Syria, before being able to cross the border. And I know, I mean in Lebanon I remember speaking to a man who only had

three toes on his left leg, on his left foot, and his leg was all shattered by a tank explosion. He was a small businessman and ran a tire shop. He was in Homs. The fighting in Homs forced him to move to Kalamoon, then the fighting in Kalamoon, and then he was wounded in Kalamoon and finally his wife and his brother-in-law helped him to move across the border. He left some of his sons, two of his sons, in Syria. But then he managed to cross the border into Lebanon where his wife managed to get him to a hospital. And he's now, apart from his foot and his leg, recovered, but pretty much arrived destitute and he's living on the support of UNHCR and our partners.

So the number of times people have moved within Syria and as Beth alluded to, the number of IDPs, internally displaced people, is at least 6.5 million or more within Syria itself. So those were the three sort of takeaways.

So I guess to wrap up, one takeaway as well from the actual situation in Lebanon -- and bear in mind, of course, that Lebanon is a country that itself from '75 to '90 experienced a devastating civil war, which it's still dealing with the legacy of. And the amazing generosity, frankly, of the Lebanese government in maintaining open borders and the Lebanese people in welcoming such a large number of Syrians to live amongst them was phenomenal. There are difficulties. I'm not going to sugar coat it. There are tensions certainly. But, frankly, it's something that we should remember and it's something that the international community needs to remember I think in terms of the support to the Lebanese government and the Lebanese institutions.

I think I'll leave it there and hand over to my colleague, Carol.

MS. FERRIS: Carol, welcome.

MS. BATCHELOR: Thank you very much. Thank you, Beth. Thank you, everyone, for coming today. You know as Beth mentioned, I passed my fourth year in Turkey as the Representative there and you become so involved and so absorbed in

your activities, you’re not always aware of how little information may move out of the country. So it’s a wonderful opportunity to come and listen to you as well and see what are your impressions from afar, what is the information that you need and we all need together, to try and motivate at least the humanitarian response.

Of course, at the end of the day what we need are political solutions. But as my colleague has mentioned, the situation in the region is extremely dire. As Representative for Turkey, I’ll just focus primarily on the Turkey context and I would like to outline that in Turkey in addition to the Syrians, we have our largest ever refugee non-Syrian population. You can imagine the borders. Turkey borders Iran, very close to Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Caucasus, across the sea the Crimea. We also have refugees from Ukraine, from Iran, from Afghanistan, from Iraq. Turkey has been quite active in opening embassies throughout the African context. We see a lot of people now coming from Africa, from Central Asia.

UNHCR actually has its largest refugee status determination operation in the world in Turkey without the Syrians. And last year we processed over 60 different nationalities. Then you add the Syria emergency into this. In the Turkey context, it’s about 1.35 million Syrians of whom 830,000 are registered. This is where it doesn’t -- again, this is information that doesn’t always come out because our statistics outline the numbers who are registered, but the government has identified over 1.3 million Syrians. And as my colleague mentioned, the vast majority are children, over 50 percent are children. So 500,000, 600,000, 700,000 children on your territory, and, of course, what’s unique to Turkey as a neighboring host country is that the language is not the same. What do you do with half a million or more children on your territory who don’t speak your language and who are going into their fourth year not having education in their home country?

So these are major, major challenges. And, of course, the numbers just continue to grow. Now in addition to the Syrians, we have over 200,000 Iraqi arrivals in Turkey, of which over 100,000 are registered and on the books already with UNHCR. And I'd like to outline -- there's a lot of information in the news. We've seen the horrific circumstances that some particular groups, the Yazidi and others, have faced in Iraq. I think it's also important to know that of the Iraqis who have come to Turkey, the vast majority are actually Sunni who are fleeing Iraq. That's how dire the situation is in Iraq and the majority are indeed fleeing either because of attacks by IS or imminent attacks by IS. So this is very complicated. If you are a neighboring country, this is your neighborhood. These are the types of movements that you have. And you have, of course, Cyprus on the other side. You have the European Union if you like, Greece and Bulgaria with the borders very, very tightly controlled. So you see a lot of movement into your country and very, very little positive outlook on the horizon for solutions. These people will stay in your country for the foreseeable future.

I also have been struck over three and a half years that Syrians are deeply connected to their country, and indeed in Turkey it's the same. People will say we want to go home. The problem is that there's no safety. There's no infrastructure. All of what they would have used to sustain themselves in Syria is gone. So it's a very, very challenging environment to be operating in.

Now, in response to the Syria emergency, again Turkey was unique, although UNHCR has its largest refugee status determination operation in the world in Turkey because Turkey has a geographical reservation to the refugee convention. So we process the asylum applications of all non-Europeans and, of course, Syrians are non-European. Nonetheless, when the Syria emergency erupted, the Turkish state took a very strong position, said our borders are open. These are our brothers and sisters.

They can come. They will not be forced to return, and we will protect and assist them. And they went to great lengths to try and do this. And up through the first year of the crisis, there were between six and ten camps all set up by the Turkish state and by the Turkish Red Crescent. In one province in Turkey the numbers didn't go too much beyond 15,000. There was ebb and flow. And so the plan of assisting all Syrians who came, placing them in camps that are of a good consistent quality where material support is given, was working for some months. But, of course, things went in a very different direction and many, many have fled into Turkey since.

Today, there are 22 refugee camps in Turkey with 230,000 people in them, so 1.1 million Syrians do not live in the camps. I would really like to impress this upon you because some of the early images in Turkey were -- sometimes you'll hear reference made to so-called five-star camps and people being in -- for refugee standards -- rather deluxe accommodations. I don't know. I was visiting recently some women in a camp called Midyat. And they said, indeed, we have food. We have shelter. We have medicine. We have security. But we're losing our minds. We've been living three years in a tent. So however wonderful the accommodations might be, you are still a refugee, so I really would like to stress that. People are displaced. As was mentioned, some are multiply displaced by the time they even get to be a refugee. Then they live in a tent. They're very uncertain about what the future holds, so even the best scenario is extremely troubling.

Having said that, once things went in a different direction in Aleppo -- this was April and May of 2012 -- and significant numbers started fleeing Syria, the Turkish government's policy evolved. They said it's no longer possible. If you need 22 camps for 230,000 people, imagine the number of camps you'll need for 1.35 million people. And imagine what that might mean to the Turkish psyche. Turkey has a long tradition of

hospitality and of many refugee populations flowing through or to the country. But, of course, this is very challenging for any government to inspire its population to have hundreds and hundreds of camps and so on.

So most of the Syrians in Turkey today do not live in camps and this is quite important because while in the camp, you may have access to food, to medicine, to shelter, to security. Outside of the camp the policies are not clear. Outside of the camp you do not have access to food. You do not have shelter provided. You do have access to medical services, but they can be extremely difficult to access not least because you can't communicate with anyone. So going to the hospital, saying I am entitled to a service, you need a translator even to ask for the help.

Of course, education -- and this is a remarkable statistic and I want to underline here not all of the Syrians have been registered, so the statistics are against the 830,000 who are registered. But of the neighboring host countries, the children outside of school -- this is outside of the camps -- children outside of the school are highest in Turkey; not in Lebanon where more than 25 percent are Syrian and not in Jordan. This is an extremely challenging statistic.

And, of course, now as the situation drags on, many people resort to what we call negative coping mechanisms. There have been challenges of children even begging in the street and actually being the breadwinner of the family. So even if you provide the education, would the child go to the school because the child is the source of income? Why? Because the parents can't work, they don't speak the language, et cetera, et cetera, so all of these elements are linked.

And it's important to know that the Turkish government in the middle of all of this crisis -- we don't know of a single other state that has done this -- in April of 2011, with hundreds and hundreds of thousands of refugees on its territory, they adopted

their first-ever refugee law. So this is just remarkable. The Turkish state says it has spent over $3 billion on assisting the Syrians in the camps and with what resources are available outside of the camps, they have adopted their first law. The law created their first refugee institution, which opened its doors in April of this year. So they are making efforts and strides to keep pace with the challenges. And we are currently discussing with them what will the policies be? You have now a law. Turkey declared temporary protection for Syrians even as early as 2011. They were the first country to do this. You have now a law. It provides for temporary protection. There will be a regulation outlining what are the rights and entitlements for Syrians under temporary protection, and we're very hopeful that will be in place shortly and would look to address some of these social challenges.

For example, if the parents are given access to the labor market, maybe not all sectors. Many states manage which sectors foreigners can work in. But at least if they're able to provide for themselves, then this frees the child from being the breadwinner. The child can go to school. We're looking at what these policies might be for education and a parallel system where the child will have education in Arabic, but also be learning Turkish so that they can move into the Turkish system.

I think as was mentioned now, UNHCR is looking in 2015 for how national structures can support and sustain the response to the Syria emergency. And one very clear illustration in the case of Turkey is if you have someone in the camp, you must give the tent. You must give the food. You must give the medicine. You must provide the security. And you do it today. You do it tomorrow. You do it next week, next month, next year. There's no way out of that. This is a good emergency response, but it is not a long-term strategy.

A long-term strategy is some version in which people can fend for

themselves. This is a kind of empowerment. And let's face it, whatever the durable solution might be, if they return to Syria -- we hope for this -- they need to be sound of mind, sound of body because this will be one of the greatest challenges a population could ever face to try and rebuild that country. So they need good skills. They need to be psychologically able to take on that challenge. And if, as these ladies told me, after three years sitting in a tent, they are not ready for that.

So this is important if they return. It's important for resettlement. We are discussing that Turkey has welcomed in particular from the United States the significant numbers offered for resettlement of Syrians. We have our largest resettlement program for non-Syrians with the United States, so this is very important. And, of course, in order for somebody to go to yet another country and learn yet another language and integrate in a new culture and so on, again they need to be empowered. They need to feel that they can rise to that challenge.

And finally for those who might stay in Turkey or any of the host countries, likewise living in a camp for five years, ten years, 20 years, does not help them and does not help the host country. So there needs to be a transition out of an emergency phase into a longer term strategy. And this is what we are discussing now with the Turkish officials.

So I thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today. Thank you, again, Beth. And we'll hand it to the final panelist.

MR. TABLER: It's always easier to go last. First of all, thanks very much to the organizers today for putting this very timely panel together, and thanks very much to the UNHCR for your hard work. I've met with officials from the UNHCR throughout the crisis, and I can say definitely that you make the world a better place. I know a lot of Syrians count on you.

I'm going to try and tie this up a little bit at the end -- that's the reason why it's good to go last -- but I think there are more questions emerging from what used to be known just as the Syria crisis than there are answers, and I think this is important to point out.

For those of you that maybe know me or know my background, I spent about 15 years in the region, seven of which were in Syria and Lebanon. I've certainly never seen a crisis like it. It is no longer just about Syria. Most of my work, at least half of my work, is not about Syria any more specifically, and there are very good reasons for that. I can boil them down to three general areas. One I think has been outlined already and is just the shear drain on resources that is being generated by this conflict. The Syrian war in a lot of ways is reminiscent of the war in the former Yugoslavia in terms of the number of different actors, the number of displaced persons, the political problems that sort of come along with it. And I think it's in this realm that it's very good that we have the accounting that we do on those who are refugees, who are in neighboring countries.

But as our speakers have pointed out, the biggest problem or what I've described from my previous visits are the known-unknowns and officials and agencies in each country deal with these. We have the refugees who are inside of camps who are well taken care of and are accounted for. We know their identities and so on, but there are so many more who are outside of those camps. And then there's a third realm that's called outside of outside of the camps. And that's where they've entered the country, we think, but we're not sure where they are and who's taking care of them. And it's this deteriorating situation inside of Syria, this endless war back and forth, that's generated this reality and has then generated the associated security threats that go along with that both in terms of human security, in terms of providing for these individuals and their

welfare and that of their children -- I think that's enormously important -- but also gets into the overall security threats both inside of Syria, both in liberated areas and in areas controlled by the regime, but most importantly in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, which we've been discussing today.

I don't have to highlight to you how troubling that is when it comes to a country like Iraq. The emergence of the Islamic State and its breakout has changed the chessboard substantially and also the international community's security response to the Syria crisis in I think fundamental and unchangeable ways.

The coalition I think that's being put together to deal with ISIS is also a coalition I think to deal with the Syria crisis as a whole, at least in terms of its effects. I don't think it's going to be designed to settle the Syrian war, but I think that overall the response is welcomed. I know it's welcomed by many in the region maybe in different ways. And I think over the last few days you've seen mixed responses out of those countries in the region and actors in the region to the president's plan. It's not necessarily because they don't want more assertive American action, but rather it's the plan itself, the rate at which it's rolled out, and also the president's commitment to it.

And this gets us back to the situation in Syria and surrounding Syria has deteriorated enormously since what they call in the government the non-strike incident last year. That's actually what it's called. It's a great phrase. Now, that got chemical weapons out of Syria and that was a good thing, at least most of them, not all of them. But the associated political damage that was done in the process and also the fact that while that was all going on, international attention was diverted from the Syria crisis to other things. I'm not saying that the world isn't a busy place, but meanwhile we had a marked uptick in violence, particularly during the Geneva talks earlier last year. I believe in the words of Samantha Power, the death toll during the Geneva talks was the highest

during any period in the Syria crisis. And the responsibility for that can be placed solely on the Assad regime because of particularly the use of barrel bombs.

Now, that doesn't mean, though, that the regime has exclusively had the monopoly on violence, particularly horrific violence over the course of this year. And that has then further generated outflows and changes in outflows to neighboring countries. And we were talking a little bit earlier, I remember I was with Andrew Harper at UNHCR in Jordan earlier this year. And we were trying to figure out why it was that suddenly more refugees were coming out from eastern Syria. This was before the ISIS outbreak. Now we know that there are many more coming out from those areas and we know the reason. So it's not just that they're fleeing the fighting with the Assad regime, but that with ISIS.

I'm going to break a taboo perhaps and say there are a lot of people who will argue that the Sykes-Picot boundaries are still there and they're still stable and they're legal and that's true. Legally they're there. I'm not doubting that and I'm not saying that they shouldn't be there. What I'm telling you as an analyst and someone who's been dealing with Syria for a long time, long before this broke out, is that those borders no longer dictate how analysts or even the international community deal with Syria. I would point to in terms of assistance to the Security Council Resolution earlier this year that allowed in unprecedented ways the delivery of aid across borders into the Syrian Arab Republic without the agreement of the host government. That was a decision that was taken against the will of the Assad regime. There were a lot of complaints over the control of aid that went into Syria, but I thought it was an interesting turn.

But, of course, that's not the only indicator that we have a change in boundaries. The declaration of the Islamic State in its caliphate in a way is I think the

second step towards changing that part of the Middle East map. And it's there perhaps that we can find some opportunity going forward, and I think that's what the current plan outlined by the president indicates to me. It indicates to me that the support that will be soon voted on for the Syrian opposition will be used not only to counter ISIS, but also to carve out areas of influence inside of Syria, particularly in Sunni-dominated opposition-controlled areas for that of neighboring countries, which are allies of the United States, that could help stabilize the situation, particularly for those in those areas, and could actually set up more stable governing structures that could eventually negotiate as part of a final settlement in Syria.

However, I would like to just add there that I don't see this in the cards anytime soon. I think this conflict will go on for a very long time partially because of the positions of each side, particularly the Assad regime and its hardening position over the last six to nine months, but also because of the increased regional aspects of the crisis as a whole.

So I'm going to end my comments there and we can move to questions. Thanks very much.

MS. FERRIS: Well, thanks to all three of you. Before we open it up to questions generally, maybe I could ask you, what's going to happen? I was terrified when Carol kind of nonchalantly mentioned five years, ten years, 20 years. Are we looking at a protracted refugee displacement situation? Are there any prospects for political solutions? I wonder. You said a very long time, Andrew. How long? What's going to happen? Where are we going to be in a year when we have another panel on Syria refugees?

MR. TABLER: One of my good friends in Syria once told me those who gaze into crystal balls are destined to eat ground glass. I think it's a great saying. I don't

know if he made it up; I doubt it. I think most of those in the region expect this to go on -- I used the term a very long time. I think we're looking here at in terms of the Syria crisis itself probably upwards of -- until you would have some kind of workable settlement. It could be upwards of five years. In terms of an overall settlement where you're bringing everybody back home, I think you're probably looking at a decade or more, but it could be longer.

I also wanted to emphasize that I'm not sure Syria will be the same. I don't think Syria will be the same after this. Iraq is a slightly different situation. I don't think putting the pieces of Syria back together again is something that the Syrians are capable of at the moment, obviously, but maybe the international community is committed to enough. I think maybe in recognizing that we can deal with more of the realities of the people that suffer from this war.

MS. FERRIS: Are there things the international community could do to support the governments of Lebanon and Turkey to ease some of the burden of these large numbers of people? Are we doing enough?

MS. BATCHELOR: Well, speaking for the Turkey context, you know when the emergency erupted, it was clear it would go for at least some time. UNHCR under its lead and coordinating role for refugees launched with many partners the Regional Refugee Response Plan. That was in March of 2012. This is now morphing into something that is intended to support not only refugees, but also host communities because the infrastructure is under such great challenges in all of the countries hosting significant numbers.

And now under that plan, just in the case of Turkey, what is requested for Turkey -- although the numbers of refugees are at least the same or higher than in the other countries -- what is requested for Turkey is less because Turkey is a better

resource country. Turkey's taken a very strong leadership role. Turkey is investing heavily on its own and Turkey understands that. We've discussed it with the authorities and that's fine.

The problem comes that in what is requested is 37 percent funded -- this is how it was closed in 2013 -- 37 percent funding for Turkey versus roughly 70 percent funding for all the other host countries. This year we're at 21 percent and it's September. So the problem here is one of a message of solidarity. Turkey's funding is less than the other countries, but I think in all of the countries and throughout the region, as you mentioned, Beth, in your opening comments, it's slipped off the radar and now a sense starts to evolve within the region. Of course, these states speak to one another -- Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon -- and they compare notes and so on. A little bit of sense of we're being left on our own to deal with this crisis. And the world wants to take it in a different direction, maybe militarily, maybe politically, whatever it is, but on the humanitarian front we're not receiving enough.

I think in order to keep the doors open, in order for refugees to have access, we've seen a new phenomenon in Turkey with the numbers coming from Iraq. We did not get a statement from the highest officials saying our doors are open, everyone can come, these are our brothers and sisters and you'll never be asked to go back, as was the case three and a half years ago for the Syrians. And there's a reason for that. They're tired. Their populations are tired. Their resources are limited. And politically you can imagine what it means for any state to be placed in this.

So to answer your question, there's a lot that can be done financially. There's a lot that can be done through resettlement in these types of programs. And there's a lot that can be done through advocacy. Institutions like Brookings Institution, having liaison as you do with some of the academia think tanks and so on that are

emerging in this region, I think is very important to help them think of the medium- and longer term strategies rather than short-term reactive mode.

MS. FERRIS: Brian, would you like to add a word and then we'll open it up for questions, so be thinking of your questions.

MR. HANSFORD: I mean just to basically back up what my colleagues have said I think one of -- we work very closely, certainly in Lebanon, the office works very closely with the World Bank in terms of longer term institutional support and also with the UNDP, the U.N. Development Program as well. And that's where it has to go I think because beyond the emergency response, as Carol has mentioned and Andrew has mentioned, we're now into the fourth year of fighting. And I'm not going to make predictions about -- I mean predictions, who was that said, are always tricky, particularly when they involve the future. I'm not going to -- it's a very desperate situation, but certainly long-term institutional support for the governments themselves is what's needed.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. We'll open up now for questions. And if it's okay, we'll take two or three or four questions and then you give answers, and if you could identify yourself. I think we'll start in the middle. This woman here and then here and then we'll move over to this side.

QUESTIONER: Hello. My name is Sherre and I'm with the Public International Law and Policy Group. You had mentioned or a few people have mentioned sort of how you've been seeing a lot of children throughout this crisis. And I think it was Carol who mentioned specifically negative coping mechanisms. There have been a lot of articles recently about the selling off or marriage of young brides in Turkey. I was wondering if specifically representatives from the UNHCR could talk more about what kind of information is available for this and what's being done to sort of combat this

emerging crisis within Turkey. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Great question. Yes, sir?

QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. My name is Ahmed. Actually I'm from Syria. More surprising, I came like a few months ago, so I lived the whole situation there. I almost got killed. Technically, I can describe myself as a refugee because I had to flee. My brother, he's in Egypt. My mother and my other two sisters are IDP, and we lost our homes and it's a very sad story. It's not the time for that right now.

Actually, the situation is so complicated and I agree that it will last for an additional five years. I'm basically a journalist. I worked with many organizations inside Syria before my departure. So the problem is that's the way the mentality there is, it's like very tense. If you are not with us, so you are my enemy, worse than enemy. And people are actually very aggressive against each other.

My question is I heard a recent story in Lebanon and Turkey about the problems between the locals there and the Syrian refugees. Like in Lebanon in Bourj Hammoud, they said that there should be no longer any existence for Syrians there and there were some videos. I don't know the credibility of those stories, but there were some videos about some Turkish people trying to break cars and workshops for Syrians there. So considering the fact that we will stay for at least a couple of more years, what could be like the procedures in order to contain that and to prevent that from escalating, especially because the bad economy in both countries affecting badly on people because Syrians, and I know they are working with less payment than the Turkish, and especially like Syrians in Turkey they are handicraft persons. So they can cook, they can carpenter, they can do anything. So they can do it cheaper. So what is the mechanism for UNHCR to do this, to prevent that from escalating? Thanks, again, and actually I'm ready to help any person in terms of Syria based on my background as a journalist and as a

researcher. I'm still following what's happening there. Thank you very much.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you, Ahmed. And we'll have the young man here, yes. We'll take these additional two here.

QUESTIONER: Faysal Itani. I'm from the Atlantic Council. For anyone who can comment, can you say anything about the relationship between these refugees who are outside the country and the host security forces, the regime forces over the borders, and the opposition groups themselves, whether civilian or military. And do you have a sense for the refugee attitudes towards the politics of the war itself and the trajectory? Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. I think that was about four questions. And we'll have this young woman and then we'll have some responses and I'll come over here.

QUESTIONER: Austin from TRAC, Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium. My question is what is the actual number of refugees because you have listed 3 million, but the Jordanians have listed that they have 1.4 million in their country, but you have listed 615,000. So I was wondering if you could clear up those numbers. That's all.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. One more and then we'll come to the panelists.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Kristin Collier. I work for the DOD. With the new coalition to try and combat the Islamic State, I'm wondering now that this is becoming a larger problem for multiple countries in the area how you see this affecting their policies towards refugees when they're concerned about the Islamic State coming back into their own countries, the potential for recruitment inside of the camps. Do you see this affecting countries' policies toward refugees and a potential securitization of the

camps?

MS. FERRIS: Okay, we have a number of questions. We have child brides and the particular impact on women. We have questions about the relationships with the host communities and the refugees. A question -- maybe the easiest question -- what is the total number of refugees in the region? What are the relationships between refugees and various security forces, both government and opposition, how they see the politics of it, and the impact of the coalition, vis-à-vis the Islamic State? Now, the first person who gets to answer gets to choose which of those questions you would like to respond to. Brian, you want to start?

MR. HANSFORD: Possession is nine-tenths of the law, so I have the microphone. I'll answer the numbers question I suppose first because there's a lot of confusion over that. But U.N. Refugee is the lead United Nations organization dealing with refugees. We register refugees so that the numbers -- at the end of last month as I mentioned, August 29, we put out a statement saying that we had registered the 3 millionth Syrian refugee. Now the figures -- as soon as you put figures up, they're redundant because refugees are coming across the borders in the region every second, every minute, every hour of the day still, unfortunately. So we've registered over 3 million Syrian refugees.

Now, the numbers as Carol mentioned and as Andrew mentioned as well and Beth alluded to, there are people coming across, of course, who may not register with UNHCR as refugees, who may not qualify as refugees; i.e., people who are in the criterion that we use in terms of a U.N. organization who fled persecution, they may not register with us. They may not be deemed as refugees, so that's why there is confusion. In Lebanon, for example, there is no clear way of monitoring people coming across the border in terms of electronic numbering of people, so that's why it's so difficult. And, of

course, when I spent years in Afghanistan, similarly, the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan are extremely porous. People go back and forth all the time. So that's where the numbers are.

MS. BATCHELOR: Well, thank you very much. And just to fill out a little bit for the Turkey context on the numbers, again, because of the government's initial policy that these were brothers and sisters, you don't register your brother or your sister. You don't take their fingerprints. So it was well over a year and a half into the crisis with many efforts at advocacy and encouragement that they even began to have a registration program. The program was different from one province to the next. For a long time they could not compare data if a person moved from one province to another province. There are 81 provinces in Turkey. And, of course, like the context in Lebanon now, Syrians are spread out through the whole of the country. I don't think there's a province where they don't reside.

So in the Turkey context, the difference between the 1.35 million and the 830,000 is just the catch-up. The government is in the process of registering everyone now. With good support from the United States, we have provided mobile coordination centers where this registration can be done, but it's challenging to do it across a country with the size of Turkey with that number of people. And, of course, to also encourage people to come forward because initially when Syrians came to Turkey, they didn't need to register to get assistance. So what was the motivation to register? So it's been a long process of getting to what was a starting point for some other countries.

On the selling of the brides, this is an interesting issue. Of course, within the region there are cultural norms where people marry at much younger ages. In Turkey this is now contrary to legislation, but it doesn't mean that the practices have always followed the legislation for Turkish citizens. And Syrians live in very close proximity, so to

some extent there is still a tendency for people to marry at a younger age and to think -- and this is the key issue -- to believe that by marrying their daughter that the girl will be protected. It's not always something that is done with bad will. It's something that is done, and I think this may be the case in Jordan and elsewhere as well, to say look, our society is in upheaval. We don't have our head of household. We don't have our standard structures any longer. And the male patriarchal system is the system, so people marry their girl child to ensure that there can be safety and protection and protection of the family honor, et cetera, et cetera.

Now this becomes, of course, very complicated with the large movements and the disruption in the family. And we do see now -- and, again, it's another reason why the registration is so important and the outreach is so important -- we do see now problems of smuggling and trafficking emerging. And if the children are as I mentioned main breadwinners for some families and they're out exposed without any safety put in place -- they're begging in the street, whatever it is -- it's very easy for these problems to be there. In fact, Turkey just introduced very strong legislation to say that there will be no begging, and they took people off of the street, took them all to one camp. It was complicated because it was too many people arriving at once and it led to other problems. But the root cause of that decision was people begging in the street, particularly children, and they didn't want to be accused that people were disappearing and trafficking was taking place and so on.

So something that might have a sense of normalcy in the culture from a certain angle at one phase in the crisis is now evolving into something else. The bottom line in Turkey, it's contrary to legislation. UNHCR along with UNFPA have worked very closely with the Ministry of Family and Social Policy to look at sexual- and gender-based violence, to look at issues of early marriages whether they're forced or otherwise, and to

ensure that the legislation is upheld and that the best interests of the child are considered and secured. And, of course, that means that the girls should have the opportunity to go to school and have a future that could unfold for them. But with 600,000-700,000 children, as I said, this is not easy.

The situation in Gaziantep: There was an instance about a month or so ago where a Turkish landlord came to evict the Syrian tenants because they were not able to pay their rent, and the situation became quite provoked. It escalated, and the Syrian tenants were accused of shooting to death the Turkish landlord and then a great deal of unrest erupted.

I'm simplifying a little bit because there were other tensions; it wasn't only one incident. But this was in an extremely heated moment and the government was challenged. You should round up people. They shouldn't be living side by side and so on.

And, again, they're trying -- just to make the long story short -- we are discussing with the authorities as I mentioned what is in the law, the temporary protection regulation? Well, you provide a managed legal way to work. There are over 20,000 Syrians working in Gaziantep alone and they are earning an income. But they're not able to have labor law protection. They're not able to pay taxes, for example, and so on, so if it's simply regulated -- and the mayor of Gaziantep who's the former minister of the Ministry for Family and Social Policy is very much pushing the government in this direction. So there are ways to regulate it by law. Then one has to ensure its implementation and a lot of work needs to be done on advocacy and consultations between the refugees and the host community. And, again, in Turkey there's the added language complication. So we're really trying to encourage the government to very, very much strengthen the communication channels with their communities and with refugees.

Maybe I will leave it there and turn to you for some of the other questions.

MR. TABLER: Sure. Concerning securing the refugee camps, which you had referred to, I've had officials tell me that wishfully, that they could put -- I think if they wish they had a situation where they could provide -- they used the word provide -- for refugees in refugee camps. I think there's also a term of securing them and making sure they're not involved in the fight, which is hard to do. I think it would be -- there's the way that the refugees have been handled officially, and then there are all these known-unknowns who've entered the country and we're not sure where they are, which gets us to Faysal's question, at least what I think it was, in terms of the relationship between -- are you talking about officially registered refugees and groups inside of the country or just Syrians in general and -- yeah.

Well, my understanding is just by the way it works in terms of those that are inside of the camps, that's harder to do rather than those that are outside of the camps for a number of reasons. It doesn't mean that they're not in communication with the groups inside of the country, particularly armed groups inside of the country, but it's harder to do because of the security regimens that have been placed around the camps themselves. Now, it doesn't mean that people can't come and go from these camps. I think, for example, I would point to -- the concerns growing out of both of your questions -- would point to Jordan's construction of the new Azraq camp earlier this year. Some people said that it was there for environmental reasons because of the pressure that it has placed, the Zaatari camp in particular has placed -- and I don't dismiss those concerns, but I think with the distance from populated areas that it could be better controlled and it is better controlled than the Zaatari camp.

They also provide I think more comprehensively for refugees in some

ways and are what we can expect into the future concerning refugees in providing for them because of the concerns about mixing Syrian refugees with local populations. Now, it's a concern. I don't think they can correct it because of the way that these societies have cross-border relations already. And I think it will continue to be a concern of officials. I think that's it. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Now, I think that there's kind of a stereotype both in the humanitarian and the more general world that refugees are in camps. And if you can control camps and if you can design assistance in camps, you can have some degree of control over who's there. But this situation really challenges all of us, providing assistance to people dispersed in urban communities is a whole different ballgame than having food distributions in camps.

And the security issues are different as well. When people are dispersed in the general population, to know what's going on, to be aware, I mean it's a whole different ballgame that I don't think anybody is really prepared to deal with.

And just one other comment on gender, there's a lot of interest and focus as there should be on the situation of women, particularly women-headed households, living as refugees. But there's much less attention on the particular vulnerabilities of young Syrian men, and yet inside Syria when you're trying to escape conscription or detention or often there are barriers to entry in these countries. Families can get in usually easier than single young men who are viewed with suspicion, sometimes with reason, but often without reason. So I think the Syria case challenges all of us to look a little differently at some of our stereotypes or regular ways of looking.

Let's take some more questions on this side, maybe back in the back by you, Alexa, and then one, two, three.

QUESTIONER: Hello, I'm Matt with Syria Relief and Development. With

ISIS obstructing aid and governance and the World Food Programme reporting that in July and August none of its food reached Raqqa, the effective capital of the Islamic State, is it possible for the pending military action to take into account these humanitarian considerations in the formulation of its strategic objectives?

MS. FERRIS: Okay, we'll have the woman here, yes?

QUESTIONER: Hello, thank you for sharing your experiences in Lebanon and Turkey. My name is (inaudible). I'm a Syrian Armenian. I'm from the U.K., not Wales, unfortunately. I'm currently working with the Armenian National Committee of America. Last year I worked at the Syrian Armenian Relief Fund in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, helping the Syrians who were coming in integrate and fund them financially. Armenia is a very tiny country. However, economically it's not doing the best it can, however, proportionately it is receiving as many Syrian refugees. So I wanted to kind of ask how organizations such as UNHCR are distributing their assistance to support as many Syrians as they can. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: And then the man right in front, yes?

QUESTIONER: Ed, Voice of America. You've talked about the immense stress refugees have put on neighboring countries. Is specifically the U.S. doing enough to deal with this, not only in terms of donations, but bringing refugees to the U.S.? Are they doing enough?

MS. FERRIS: The gentleman in the back, yes?

QUESTIONER: Hi, my name's Michael, and I'm with Refugee Affairs in Immigration Services. I thought that there was an interesting discussion about camps. So if I heard correctly, I'm forgetting now, but almost four times as many of the Syrians that are in Turkey are outside of camps as opposed to in, or maybe I'm -- it's sort of hard to hear in the back. But I'm curious because I think that especially in the American media

culture, we love to talk about refugees in camps and I'm curious whether you think that that's an okay thing. I'm curious for my own information in how much of UNHCR's budget in terms of humanitarian assistance is actually put into camps, and I'm curious whether -- I mean this is something we should try to change. And I'll just add that the situation isn't unprecedented and that I think Iraqis are almost entirely not in camps at all anywhere. So it seems like this is a trend that the media is sort of not quite catching up to here.

MS. FERRIS: Great, some interesting questions here. Would you like to jump in first, Andrew? I know you like to go last, but maybe just to shake things up a little bit.

MR. TABLER: In terms of the media's coverage, I mean first of all I think a lot of times journalists are constrained by the fact they have to go to find refugees and oftentimes you can go to a refugee camp. Also host governments prefer that you go and talk to refugees who are in camps. It's the official system, and we have to be aware of that because talking to refugees outside of the camps gets you into a whole host of other concerns, to put it mildly, that come out of that situation. And you might -- and we do need to recognize that.

That being said, I think there are a plethora of stories of those who are outside of those settled camps and some journalists have lost their lives trying to report that story, both outside of Syria in neighboring countries as well as inside of Syria tragically. So it's something that I think that obviously we need to work on.

I think it is also, though, something to be fair also to the journalists maybe because I used to be one, but there is something special about the Syria crisis and it's not in a good way. It is unusual, the Syria crisis specifically is unusual in terms of volumes and where people end up going. It doesn't mean that this is the first time that

certainly refugees have gone to family on the other side of the border, but the scale and the sectarian nature of this I think is important to point out. So the fight inside of Syria has become increasingly sectarian. It's not only sectarian, but it's increasingly sectarian. The sectarian figures, some of which are public -- I think in Lebanon, for example, 96 percent of -- at least I think that was a UNHCR figure or perhaps not -- of refugees are Sunni. And for all of them to go into Lebanon and represent roughly a quarter of the population there, for someone again who's been dealing with the region for a long time, that's unprecedented.

And I think in getting to your very good question about did we do enough, the answer is no. I think it's not for lack of caring, and the U.S. has responded in generous ways in many different avenues. But I think particularly the concern was just the lack of interest by the White House in particular and the criticism that has come as a result of that to helping to solve the problem and instead dealing with its effects or the symptoms has led us to the current situation. It has played a role in it. It doesn't mean that it's generated it, but it's played a role in it. And I think after everything that's happened, I think that's a fair criticism.

MS. BATCHELOR: Thank you very much, very interesting and challenging questions. You know, if you look back three and a half years ago at when this initially unfolded, of course, it was on a tail end now we could say of the so-called Arab Spring. And people looked at the situations changing rapidly, not necessarily settling down we can say in hindsight, but changed rapidly in a number of countries. And certainly in Turkey the perspective of the Turkish state and of many engaging with the Turkish state was a short-term planning.

So the question of doing or not doing enough has to be measured against what people thought needed to be done. Nobody was able or willing to discuss

three and a half years ago where we're sitting today. Although given that it was Syria and these divides go all the way to the Security Council, perhaps it should have been more predictable. But it was very difficult to talk about anything beyond a few months, never mind years, and now we see no end in sight.

So on the question of doing or not doing enough, in the Turkey context, the United States has been the number one partner -- donor, resettlement, advocate, technical support with the legislation, and so on -- and this has been enormously helpful to help develop and guide a humanitarian sense and spirit that was already there, but not in a kind of structured way and not in a legal context. So that has been extremely helpful.

But is what everyone has done enough? No. As I mentioned, the RRP for the best funding rate at the close of last year was 70 percent funded at the highest level for some of the states. In the case of Turkey, 37 percent funded. This year 21 percent funded. And as I mentioned earlier, this is sending a little bit the signal to the states that we're on our own.

So that goes to one of the questions that was asked earlier, will it change their policy? Will the developments with ISIS -- will the security -- of course, it will. They're accountable to their own citizens if nothing else or at least that is a discussion that they must have with their own population. What are you doing in the case of Turkey? The country has fundamentally changed in ten, 15 years. The 17th largest economy in the world; the Turks don't want to lose these gains and very much they are seen. But if so many people keep coming, if we have security problems, if we go back to kind of terrorist incidents, our economy drops, the Turkish lira is losing its value, then all of us what we've gained we stand to lose.

So it's important that everything -- I think our High Commissioner said at one point, even if everyone put in everything they were capable of giving, it still wouldn't

be enough because of the magnitude of this crisis, which is now beyond the Syria emergency. So has a lot been done? Yes, the United States is the number one partner and donor for us in the Turkey context, I think also the region. But is more needed? Unquestionably, a great deal more is needed.

Just on the camps I would say this is something that people can relate to. You see a logo. You see the convoy. Maybe on the Security Council Resolution. Typically when we are doing cross-border assistance, you'll see an interagency 20-truck, 30-truck, 40-truck convoy shipping the goods in, the media following to the point of offloading and distribution and so on. In this case, the trucks come from Syria. They are loaded, secured, taken to the border, and at the border we go in one- to two-truck deliveries maximum. So you lose your visibility because of security and you're not sure what will happen. You have to get quickly to a destination. The U.N. isn't on the other side. We're using NGOs and implementing partners who've been active there for a number of years.

So the visibility is a challenge and, again, this is why it's so useful to have these interactions to be able to describe what is happening. But the camps are something that people understand. They relate to the types of images that come through the media and they're in numbers. If you go to the urban setting, there's one family or maybe typically in this case three or four families. But it's a group of people. So if you're sitting on the other side of the world, you don't know. Do I multiply that group of people by ten, by 100, by 1,000, whereas in the camps it's large numbers. And so I think it's important to portray both because the message needs to come through just how staggering, staggering, these needs are. But indeed the vast majority -- you're absolutely right -- in the Turkey context, 1.35 million of which only 230,000 are in camps. All of the rest are fending for themselves in the urban context.

MR. HANSFORD: Basically just to reiterate and certainly what Carol has said as well, in Lebanon we've registered 1.2 million Syrian refugees in over 1,700 locations. And, yes, as a former journalist and as Andrew sort of mentioned as well, camps have the visibility. You can see the Zaatari camp in Jordan, the new camp as well, the Azraq camp; whereas in over 1,700 locations throughout the country, Syrians living amongst the poorest of the poor Lebanese in many circumstances, in many examples. It's very difficult for journalists and the more difficult story to tell, but an even more essential story to tell that they're living amongst the communities.

In terms of are we doing enough, certainly and again as Carol has mentioned, the U.S. has been the largest donor for us. Well, it's the largest supporter of UNHCR, the U.N. refugee agency, and in Lebanon one of our very top humanitarian donors as well. Has much been done? Absolutely. Is there much more to do? Absolutely.

MS. BATCHELOR: For the lady who asked the question about how do we ensure that assistance goes to everyone; I think this is extremely important. UNHCR's policy is not based on somebody's ethnicity or religion or economic position, whatever it is. It's based on their well-founded fear of persecution number one. Are they a refugee, a person of concern to you in HCR? And so there immediately protection must start.

And then do they have certain vulnerabilities? There are some in this case who sometimes stay at various locations in Turkey and you'll see many Syrians in hotels who are coming to the end of their resources, but they have had their own resources. It's not that every single person of the nationality has the same need. There are others who are utterly destitute. They don't have any place to be.

And so after identifying who is a refugee or of concern, we look at

extreme vulnerabilities and particular needs. In the Turkey context, we have every ethnic and religious group that is represented in Syria is now in Turkey. And our objective -- and this is what we help the government with -- is to identify their needs regardless of what their profile is.

MS. FERRIS: I think we have time for maybe two or three more questions. How about one, two, and three?

QUESTIONER: Well, thank you for being here today. I'm Jenna Froats. I work with a joint IDP profiling service, JIPS, based in Geneva. And we've talked a lot about Syrian displacement, but largely about refugees. And I was wondering more about what's being done to address the needs of internally displaced Syrians, which there's been some statistics that there's almost 6 million, so twice the amount of refugees are actually internally displaced. You mentioned there's a need for long-term strategies and policies for refugees, so I was wondering for IDPs what that looks like.

QUESTIONER: Hi, I'm Rob Sachs. I'm with Public Radio International. And I had a question concerning something you were touching on earlier about the status of children and specifically girl refugees who are caught up in this. You mentioned you go from a place where you're trying just to survive to having a long-term plan. How does education factor into that, especially when you were talking earlier that sometimes these girls are being married off or there's other plans for them apart from an education? How do you factor in the cultural norms of where they're coming from versus what may be best for them in the long term?

MS. FERRIS: Okay, and last question?

QUESTIONER: Hi, my name's Nicole. I'm here from UNRA. I'm curious actually about the situation of Palestine refugees from Syria in Turkey because obviously UNRA takes care of or attempts to take care of Palestine refugees that go to Lebanon

and Jordan. We know that Jordan has obviously recently closed their border to Palestine refugees from Syria. Lebanon's not really known for being particularly welcoming to the Palestine refugees, and various laws and institutions unfortunately make life very difficult for Palestine refugees in Lebanon. So I'm wondering what's the situation been in Turkey because that's definitely out of our purview and that would fall under the UNHCR purview in terms of institutions, laws, or just the general social situation?

MS. FERRIS: Okay, three interesting questions, one on numbers of IDPs, one on education and girl refugees, and one on Palestinian refugees in Turkey. You want to start, Carol, with the last one?

MS. BATCHELOR: Sure. For the Palestinian refugees, if the person concerned was habitually resident in Syria, they are treated as Syrians. So they are under the temporary protection directive, they'll be under the temporary protection regulation in principle unless there's some fundamental change. So Palestinians, actually some of them live in the camps. They're treated as Syrians if they were habitually resident in Syria. For all other Palestinians, they apply for review by the office under RSD. So that's the situation for Palestinians.

What's being done for IDPs? We had a meeting with our colleagues from Damascus three or four weeks ago in Istanbul and we were looking, of course, to compare notes so that what they are doing cross-line and what we do cross-border from Turkey complements one another. We don't want everything going to one place and nothing going to another place. It's UNHCR and other operational U.N. agencies with some of the implementing partners like the Syrian Arab Red Crescent in Syria who are going to great lengths to bring assistance throughout the whole of Syria. And some 50 plus percent of the aid that they have distributed in Syria actually goes to hard-to-reach areas, some of the places we also target from Turkey.

And now in addition -- this is quite important to know about inside Syria -- in addition to the 6 million plus displaced internally, there are refugees from Iraq, including Yazidi. So I had actually hoped to come with my colleague from Damascus, but he's very busy on the Syria-Iraqi border setting up camps for refugees from Iraq if you can imagine. That's how dire the situation is in Syria.

But as much as possible is being done. This is a big push for the U.N. There is another legal donation framework called the SHARP, the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan, to which donations can be made, support can be given, and it's for this purpose.

And then just to follow-on on the question about girls and ensuring that they have access to an education, as I mentioned we work with the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, to ensure -- this isn't just international law, this is the law of Turkey. Every child, girl or boy, is obliged to go to school till a certain age, and we don't want to see disparities there. This goes to not only the protections of the girl, not only the future for her, but also the future for Syria. This is half of the refugee child population of Syria. So if they get an education, if they feel they're building towards a future, if there are choices they can make in their life, this will have a direct bearing on the reconstruction of Syria, the repatriation of people to Syria, and what the future will hold for Syria. And, of course, as we see increasing real security problems, we want to ensure that both girls -- I think Beth has made an extremely important point. There are extreme vulnerabilities for boys. Now there is heavy, heavy, recruitment. You either convert or you are killed in some instances and children are in this position as well.

So it's really important that advocacy is done to uphold the national laws, the international laws, and we're working with the state institutions to help them. They say they are committed to this, but it is a big challenge to help them manage the cultural

norms according to the rights and entitlements for all children.

MS. FERRIS: I want to thank all the panelists and you; you've given us a lot to think about. These are complex issues. I might mention that my colleague, Kemal Kirişci, and I are writing a book on Syrian displacement and we now have ten other things to include in that book. So thank you very much.

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

)Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2016