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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AT A TIME OF
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL TRANSFORMATION:
VISION AND CHALLENGES

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. HILL: (in progress) -- your very busy schedule, and to welcome him here on behalf of the Brookings Institution. I'm Fiona Hill, the director of the Center for the U.S. and Europe, and it's a distinct pleasure to be able to host him again and my colleagues from the foreign policy program as well as the President, Strobe Talbott, are very excited to know that he's here. Unfortunately, they're all in Seattle today for the Brookings board meeting, so they apologize that they couldn't be here to see you. And also, I want to thank Ambassador Namik Tan and all of his colleagues at the Turkish Embassy for making this possible this morning, and everyone else who was able to help us with the scheduling.

The Foreign Minister is going to have a few opening remarks and then our colleague, the TUSIAD senior fellow, Kemal Kirişci is going to moderate a discussion with you from the audience. I know you have lots of questions and hopefully we'll be able to accommodate as much of them as possible. But Foreign Minister, thank you so much for joining us this morning. Thank you.

(Applause)

FOREIGN MINISTER DAVUTOĞLU: Thank you very much for this nice introduction and first I want to apologize because of being late, but the rumor that I was being kidnapped by Secretary Hagel was not correct, I am sure you know it. But for this delay, I will extend my stay here. Don't worry, I will not leave this room until I answer all of your questions. It isn't important how long it will take.

The title on Global and Regional Transformation: Vision and Challenges, I have been at Brookings Institute several times before and I had chance to share my views regarding the analysis of change in international system after the Cold War. Really, now, almost quarter century has passed and still there is a huge challenge in front of us to manage the transformation of international -- or global political economy and cultural transformation. There is a huge change and fast flow of the history.

There was a claim that history has ended, but as you know, and at that time that (inaudible) was declared by (inaudible), I wrote a contra analysis and I said, "History will flow faster", but today I am -- myself, I am a slave of this fast flow of history. History is flowing very fast, and therefore, the analysis you made had to be revised even in months after changes around the -- in the international system.

What is the main trend in this global transformation? First of all, on political scene, the Cold War has ended. Bipolar world, the balance of power according to bipolar system has ended, but still we are looking for new access and new balances and need to be adjusted, especially in UN system. The recent experience in Syria, for example, showed it very clearly that international system, unfortunately, in charge of -- UN especially, in charge of keeping peace and stability and international order, is not providing quick answers to the questions and crisis, which are the threats to international system.

In last two and a half years, 130,000 people being killed in Syria, around seven million people are displaced, two million people are refugees,

700,000 of them are in Turkey. Chemical weapons have been used and millions are facing, at this moment, serious challenges on the ground in the cities, urban areas, villages, facing diseases and other serious problems of humanitarian crisis.

But what was the response of the international system? Until now, unfortunately, there was no single UN Security Council resolution regarding humanitarian situation in Syria. Forget political differences. Forget all the different attitudes or approaches regarding the future of Syria. But at least there should have been a common ground to agree on humanitarian issues.

As a neighboring country, for the last two and a half years we have been begging, we have been calling, we have been sending all the messages to P5 and all the actors, inside and outside Syria, that there is a need of urgent action on humanitarian situation in Syria. Until now, only neighboring countries are facing new and more and more alarming challenges and we are trying to respond to this.

Turkey spent \$2 billion, but money is less important in this discussion.

When there was UN Security Council resolution regarding chemical weapons in September, we have spoken with all the colleagues and we tried to convince them to put one paragraph -- one paragraph -- only one paragraph for humanitarian situation in Syria, but unfortunately that paragraph was not added, only a (inaudible) statement later was added.

This is just an example, unfortunately, how the international

political system today is not responsive enough to the security challenges around us.

I don't know how we will be remembered in next 20, 30 years in the history of the United Nations about our inability, therefore several times I said, and I strongly believe, like what Secretary General, although he was not responsible, he went to (inaudible) last year and apologized in the name of United Nations because of not being able to prevent (inaudible). I am sure maybe after one decade another UN Secretary General will go to Hamas or to East (inaudible) in Damascus and will have to apologize because of not preventing chemical attacks or massacres.

But I don't -- we don't know how many more thousands of people will be killed. This is a big challenge in front of us. I don't mean only Syria. We can discuss Palestinian issue or others. UN system should be much more responsive as the ultimate institution of international and global order.

Economic area, there is a need of a restructuring of economic order in the world. The gap between G-8 and LDC, least developed countries, is growing every year. G-20 was, as an intermediary institution -- not institution, but a forum, is closing this gap, but still, the economic injustice is growing and there is a huge shift of economic access in the world.

The share of Asia was around 10, 15 percent three, four decades ago, now it is 30 percent. In the middle of this century, it will be 50 -- more than 50 percent, so there is a change of shift of economic access.

The cultural issues in international arena, technological change,

and the identity today -- identity issues -- maybe the ideological differences in Cold War has ended, but new identities emerge. The east-west conflict, it doesn't mean now capitalist-socialist confrontation, but more cultural confrontation.

South-north polarization in economic scene, east-west polarization in cultural scene is bringing new challenges in global transformation. There is a need of a new global conscience, global wisdom in cultural sense where authentic cultures and civilizations will be having a synthesis with the modernity as a new phase of global culture.

These are global challenges.

Parallel to this, of course, there are regional reflections of these challenges. The identity issues in the Middle East or Balkans or Caucasia, more ethnic and sectarian confrontations, as well as economic problems in Africa and in other parts are becoming the root cause of rising terrorist activities in Africa or in (inaudible) or other parts. So, all of these issues are interlinked and there are several regional reflections of this transformation in international system.

How should we approach these issues? There are two methods, one is we have to develop a visionary approach, a new vision for the international order, and new vision -- sub-visions, let me say, in regional sense consistent with this international vision. And dealing with the challenges, so the basis is vision, then you have to deal with the challenges.

The second method is more crisis containment method, dealing with the challenges is the main issue and visions will be adapted to this

containment of the crisis method.

As Turkey, we preferred always the first one and dealing with the challenges and trying to adapt the vision according to this crisis management will postpone the crisis to the future. Therefore, we prefer always a visionary approach based on principles, then trying to deal with the crisis and challenges based on this visionary approach.

Now there are two new elements in front of us in last three years especially, one is international economic crisis, especially European crisis, and second one is Arab Spring. There are already many challenges in surrounding regions and in international system until 2008, 2009 when global economic crisis did emerge and European crisis, and Arab Spring started in 2010. And Turkey is right at the center of all these challenges.

European economy crisis has great potential to affect us, not only regarding our economic growth, but also rising xenophobia, rising Islamophobia, rising racist tendencies in Europe, especially anti-Turkish sentiments in some places. As you know, some Turks were being killed because of these crimes by racist organizations in Germany a few years ago.

So, the cultural -- economic crisis leads to cultural tensions and we are very worried about the rise of riotous moments everywhere in Europe today -- in France, in Germany, in Greece, in Bulgaria and neighboring countries, this is a big challenge to us.

So, economic crisis does not mean only economic crisis.
Economic crisis is easily being transformed to social-cultural crisis and political

crisis.

And when we are trying to have a new strategy to deal with these new challenges in Europe, a big challenge in Middle East did start after Arab Spring, and here Turkish approach was that we have to see the potentials, the positive side of these transformations, rather than just the risks and challenges, especially regarding Arab Spring. I will come to this point in a much detailed manner.

And in Turkey, in last ten years, has been transformed in a very comprehensive manner. The key term of this transformation, I always referred, is restoration -- restoration of Turkish economy, politics, and foreign policy through self-confidence and new creative ideas.

When we say restoration, I am sure all of you follow very closely what is going on in Turkey and around Turkey. I can say three backbones of restorations -- one is democratization and strengthening democratic institutions, strengthening the concept of citizenship rather than sectarian or religious or ethnic identities, to strengthen this notion of citizenship in the country as (inaudible) through democracy, because the best way of long-term stability in a country is democracy. And here we declare the balance between security and freedom and I always personally believe that freedom is better choice for a future vision in a country and to guaranty the security in the future.

Economic development, yes, Turkish economy, has been grown four times in the last ten years. This was like an unimaginable miracle for those people living in Turkey in 2002 before we came to power. Our per capita income

has increased from \$3,000 to \$11,000 almost -- almost four times. Our economic capacity has increased and there is an economic restoration. So, our foreign policy should be linked to democratic restoration and economic restoration, strengthen Turkish economic and political structure in order to create a new vision for surrounding visions around Turkey and also for Turkish position in international system.

In 2003 -- 2002 when we came to power, our choice was -- here, especially regarding foreign policy and domestic policy issues -- was full integration with EU as early as possible and to develop our vision -- new vision -- inside EU, in EU, together with EU. And there we had three aspects of foreign policy, strengthening our ties in transatlantic relations, EU and U.S., strengthening our links and interdependency with our surrounding regions, neighborhood, close neighbors -- we think there are zero problems with neighbors, I am sure there will be questions on this because some people are trying to prove that this was not a correct (inaudible) and those who were criticizing our zero problem with neighbors in the past, now they are praising that principle in order to criticize us again based on our principle.

Anyway, but we can -- I can discuss this during question and answer session. But second was strengthening our ties with neighboring countries and neighboring regions.

And third, opening Turkey to new areas like Africa, Latin America, East Asia, to respond especially to this economic shift in international global order.

And these three, let me say, backbone, if assumed that there was a scenario, that Turkey became member -- had become member of EU in 2006 or 2007 or at least we were -- we had such a vision, I am sure today we would have a new Europe, a much more creative, dynamic Europe, even responding to economic crisis in a much better way.

But that did not happen and nobody can blame Turkey because of this, because, you know, remember how we had a very active diplomacy regarding integration with EU, also regarding Cyprus issue in 2004. That was our vision.

Either we would have been in Europe with Europe to develop this new regional policies and perspective visions, together with the new role in international right now, or we would develop our own foreign policy without contradicting with EU integration process.

If it was our decision, it was -- if it was in our hand, we would prefer the first option, but unfortunately, Europeans did not look to this from a strategic perspective, therefore we tried to keep EU as our strategic perspective, as the main strategic objective, but meanwhile when history is flowing, you cannot wait for someone to come from Germany or France supporting Turkey. History is flowing and we have to do everything possible to have our own vision to be implemented.

Then you look at today, still these three are there, our EU perspective is continuing and especially recent developments -- post-developments are there, a new chapter has been opened, chapter 22, (inaudible)

the dialogue is going better, strategic dialogue with EU, especially with Katy Ashton and myself and our Minister of Foreign Affairs and external service in UN is going very well, and we will be having, in December, most probably, this strategic dialogue -- Turk strategic dialogue meeting.

But we hope that this relation will be leading to full integration as early as possible.

And strengthening our ties with U.S. has been always our backbone of our foreign policy and from 2003 until today in several challenges in Afghanistan, in Middle East, in Balkans, in Caucasia, we work together and as it has been described by President Obama in 2009, it is a model partnership.

So, this morning I spoke with Secretary Hagel and I will be meeting with Secretary Kerry, Madam Rice, and all other colleagues in Washington. From time to time, of course, we need to talk, consult, and adjust and synchronize and coordinate our foreign policy positions and in order to respond to these new regional challenges around us, but no one in Ankara or in Washington has any doubt that Turkey and U.S. together, and Turkish-American strategic approach is one of the main alliance and joint effort which might be helpful as a leading factor in regional issues in next year's indicates. This will continue.

This is the traditional alliance of Turkey, transatlantic, and therefore we want to be part of a transatlantic trade and investment partnership in order to respond to economic shift of access. Therefore we want to be -- to have very close cooperation in all defense and security industry as well as

policies in order to respond to the new security challenges around us. This model partnership will continue.

The second is neighboring -- close neighborhood and neighboring policies and regional policies. Turkey has developed new mechanisms in order to strengthen these ties with neighborhood. One was this principle of zero problems, but we didn't stop there. We established a new mechanism, high-level strategic cooperation mechanisms. In 2009, we started with Iraq. We established with 15 countries until now joint cabinet meetings, all significant ministers are sitting around the table, and until now we signed 358 agreements in four years with 14 countries.

I can give you a good example. With Greece, in 87 years we signed only 35 agreements, in at least two high-level strategic cooperation consult in 2010 and 2012 we signed 50 new agreements. With Russia, through high-level strategic cooperation consult mechanism, we lifted with us and Russia became the first trade partner of Turkey.

They are competing with Germany every year, on tourism and trade, the Russians are first and Germans second (inaudible). And nobody would imagine that Turkey would have such a close trace and cultural relations with Russia during Cold War years.

I am giving these examples in order to those who are skeptics of our neighborhood policy.

If you see my schedule in the last one-month, we had high-level strategic cooperation consult meetings in one month with Ukraine, Russia, and

Azerbaijan. Iran and Iraqi ministers of foreign affairs came to Turkey and I went to Iraq and I will be visiting Iran. Bulgarian minister was in Ankara three weeks ago. Romanian prime minister was in Turkey during (inaudible).

We will be, after this visit to Washington, I will be back, I will be meeting with William (inaudible) on Wednesday and Thursday we will be in Moscow with Prime Minister Erdoğan, and Saturday I will be in Qatar, Sunday, Bahrain, Monday, Iran.

You can imagine, this is one month's schedule almost with all neighbors, and we will be organizing -- and not only these bilateral relations -- but we will be organizing -- several we have organized -- trilateral and quadrilateral meetings -- Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia -- ministerial meetings, economic projects, like (inaudible).

Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, after two weeks we will be having eight summits. Turkey, Bosnia, Serbia -- Turkey, Bosnia, Croatia -- Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan. All these mechanisms are the mechanisms which we are trying to strengthen, to which we are trying to strengthen our ties with neighborhood and to create a common mission.

This vision, based on the principles of high-level political dialogue, economic interdependency, multicultural coexistence, and a common security agenda. Unfortunately, Arab Spring created, of course, many challenges and many new opportunities. When Arab Spring started, our approach was clear that Turkey will be supportive of the aspirations of Arab people, because we had a visionary approach meeting that long-term stability of Middle East, or of any

region, will be granted only to democratic processes.

Either you will approach to these challenges from the perspective of long-term vision, and deal with the crisis with that mentality, or if you start to deal with the crisis just for short-term stability. Okay, let's have an autocratic regime at this moment, let's (inaudible) with Bashir for some time in order to make sure that there will be no new security challenges. This will save the day, but you will risk years, decades, even centuries. Important is what is necessary for long-term stability.

We, as Turkey, we believe that long-term stability will be granted only if there is a new consensual relation between leaders, state and citizens. The old world is over. Therefore we have been against autocratic regimes in the last three years, we tried to do everything possible to support democratic processes in these countries, but if you ask me, my honest analysis, 2011 there were waves of revolutions in Tahrir Square against Mubarak, in Tunisia, in Libya, in Yemen, 2012 was the year of high optimism because there were several elections in Tunisia, in Egypt, in Libya, and there was a hope of change in Syria.

But unfortunately 2013 was a year of disappointment because several of these positive transformations being changed in negative way -- military intervention, coup in Egypt -- because of that ambiguity, the instability in Libya in recent days is increasing. Bashir al-Assad, despite all his crimes, is still thinking that he can run a country where he used chemical weapons against the people of that country.

So, all those autocratic leaders now they have a hope that they

can -- the old (inaudible) come back, but three years in this huge transformation is not enough to see the future. I will give you -- I will try to imagine, in 1992, how was the situation in Eastern Europe, in Balkans? 1989 transformation in Balkans and Central Europe and Eastern Europe started 1989 with the fall of Berlin Wall. In 1992 and 3 -- after (inaudible) there was war in Bosnia and (inaudible) was surrounded and attacked -- Sarajevo was surrounded and attacked, Bosnians were massacred, like Syrian people today, there was no stability in all Eastern Europe.

There were positive transformations, but two things were different in Eastern Europe at that time. One is, Europeans economic support and umbrella of an economic development that they will be member of European Union. In Middle East today there is not such an incentive, such an economic -- financing democracy through the economic means, like marshal aid in 1950s or European Union assistance in 1990s to Eastern Europe. Today there is not such a -- there was not such a mechanism supporting democracies in the Middle East.

Secondly, NATO umbrella in Eastern Europe through Bosnia or Kosovo. In Libya we had a similar case, but still, the issue of which international organization or mechanism will be guarantying public order in these countries and common security in the region. These are the challenges, but still, three years are not enough to judge what would be happening in the future like in 1993 in Balkans. Today, we are facing many challenges. Important is, what is our vision for the future, for the people in the Middle East and North Africa.

As Turkey we say, despite all the difficulties, the future of Middle

East and North Africa should be in the direction of democracy and a new consensual relation between people and state.

If we think short-term, like in 1990s in Tunisia, some European allies, they supported the old (inaudible) at that time against the new emerging opposition. If we do the same mistake, hoping that some autocratic leaders will bring security and stability in the Middle East, it will be a big, big mistake. After all these changes in technological communication, nobody can guaranty stability and security in a region except the people of that region themselves, and this could be only through a new consensual relation and through democratic choices of these people. Turkey will support whatever happens, we support democracy, democratic transformations in Middle East.

We have many challenges in Syria, many challenges in North Africa, we know, and next one year is a real challenge from elections in Afghanistan, elections in Iraq, Geneva 2 process in Syria, whether it will happen or what will be the consequences, in Egypt, whether there will be an election or more and more -- an inclusive election or a guided election led by military and elections in Tunisia and Libya. These are all challenges in front of us.

What we hope, Turkey, United States, EU, all transatlantic alliance, we support the democratic aspirations and moves, and democratic forces in our surrounding regions.

Lastly, restoration in politics through democracy, restoration in economics through economic development and new economic areas of cooperation, and restoration of foreign policy based on strengthening our ties

with EU and transatlantic relations, especially U.S., strengthening our ties with the neighborhood, with the new vision, and of course, lastly, opening new areas in international scene.

Today Turkey is much more active in Africa, in Latin America, in East Asia. Only in Africa in last four years we opened 23 new embassies. In 2009, we had only 12 embassies in all Africa, including North Africa. Today we have 35 new embassies.

In Latin America, we opened six new embassies; in East Asia we opened four new embassies. In last ten years our number of our embassies has increased from 93 to 129 -- 36 new embassies. And our foreign representation has risen from 162 to 221. With 221 foreign missions outside Turkey, Turkey is the seventh largest biggest country in the world after P-5 and Italy, Turkey is the seventh most represented country in the world. Why? Because we are observing very -- in a futuristic manner, about the shift of economic access, about the new emerging democracies, big democracies and big regional pivotal countries, like Brazil, like South Africa, like India or South Korea. And therefore, our relations with these countries are developing.

I will give you one striking example. Our relation with Brazil is a strategic alliance now. Nobody would imagine five years ago or six years ago when such geographically distant countries would be cooperating in all fields everywhere. Our relation with Ethiopia, for example, in 2006-7, there was only one Turkish company in Ethiopia and total Turkish investment was \$50 million U.S. Last year I went, there were 341 Turkish companies in Ethiopia only, not in

all Africa, and the total Turkish investment was \$3.5 billion U.S.

I was in Myanmar a few days ago. Our relation with Myanmar is increasing and East Asia as well -- Latin America and East Asia. We will continue these openings because we want Turkey to be not only a regional power influential in surrounding regions, but a global player everywhere in the world.

Our policy, I am sure you followed, in Somalia, how that policy was effective to change the destiny of Somalia and to make Turkey as one of the leading nations in Africa.

Another striking example, Turkish Airlines, four years ago, had a few lines fly to South Africa, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. Today, Turkish Airlines is the biggest airline in Africa in the sense of flights outside Africa. And today Turkish Airlines is the biggest in the sense of the number of destination in the world with, I think, 205 destinations or something like that. Why? Because we are coordinating these policies -- foreign policy, transportation policy, energy policy, and all these policies are aiming to the same direction, to make Turkey a real global player and to make Turkey one of the supporters of stability, democracy, and a new vision for global and regional order.

Therefore, we will be everywhere, whenever we are needed. We will be active everywhere. Some people may think -- they may try to imagine or force us to be busy only with Syria, but in the morning we wake up with Syria, before noon our mind is in Balkans, in the afternoon, in Africa, in the evening in UN or in Latin America. Nobody will or can limit our vision.

If you look at the summits in coming years, which we organized in Turkey, you can imagine, 2014 we hope that we will be member of UN Security Council again, 2015, Turkey will be hosting G-20 and LDC, least developed countries, the poorest and the richest countries will be met in Turkey on different summits. 2016, OIC, Organization of Islamic Conference summit, as well as the first ever humanitarian summit of UN will be held in Turkey. 2017 Oil Summit will be held in Turkey.

And we want our geography to be a bride of peace, from Beijing to London to (inaudible) now on the -- through (inaudible), we want our country to be a bridge of peace through energy lines from Caspian to Europe, and we want our diplomacy to be a bridge of peace diplomacy everywhere in the world. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MR. KIRIŞCI: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Minister. As always, it's been great listening to you and what I am really impressed with is the pace you have discovered is a pace that I could not keep up with -- the travel, the politics, the diplomacy, I'm not sure whether Mrs. Davutoglu appreciates this. I think my wife wouldn't allow me to keep up with such a --

FOREIGN MINISTER: Busy in hospitals to deliver babies.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes, I know. She's very busy too.

But how do you manage to engage in such a pace to find the time and to think about these visions, think about the broader picture out there? That is also something that impresses me very much and this morning I enjoyed

reading your article in the Foreign Policy. I would recommend it to you all. It's a good, concise summary of your presentation today.

What I really like the most in the article was your reference to the transatlantic trade and investment partnership that we are very much supporting here and anchoring Turkey in it.

I know time is very limited and there's a great enthusiastic crowd here, and I know they have lots of questions to direct towards you, so I'm keeping my questions to myself and opening the ground to questions.

FOREIGN MINISTER DAVUTOĞLU: I will fulfill my promise. I will stay here until I answer the questions, all of them.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes. I think there might be some people who may have to leave because of their programs and schedules. What I'm going to do is take three questions very quickly and then turn it to you.

(Inaudible) there, Michael Wertz and maybe someone from this side, please, and then please present yourself very briefly. Keep the questions as brief as possible in line with Brookings policy.

QUESTIONER: Mr. Minister, thank you for this speech. I have one quick question. One region that you didn't mention in your speech was Central Asia. What is Turkey's policy with regard to Central Asia with regard to increasing competition in sharing the energy resources, increasing influence of China? So, is there any way or some part in your vision to incorporate the region? And, of course, with the (inaudible) Caucuses and Turkey?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Michael?

QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. Michael Wertz at the Center for American Progress. Foreign Minister, thank you for an interesting presentation. You have said that there is a need or that you would support a democratic consensus that needs to be reestablished between states and populations to mitigate the risk of autocratic tendencies.

You've spoken about the region. Give us a little bit of a feeling of how this question plays out in your own country. Thank you.

QUESTIONER: Good morning. We've seen, over the last decade, the consolidation of civilian control over the Turkish military and I think that plays into the notion of restoration of democracy over -- within democratic institutions that are supposed to be democratic. Does that impact how Turkey calculates its soft power politics throughout the world? In the sense does having a Turkish military that is more under -- that is not under the control of the civilian government -- does that allow for Turkish soft power politics to be underpinned by perhaps, in the long-term future, a more assertive hard power stance to reinforce Turkey's own diplomacy around the world?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you. Mr. Minister.

FOREIGN MINISTER DAVUTOĞLU: Thank you. Professor Kirişci is my very old colleague, so he understands the difficulties facing -- but we are (inaudible) to survive.

MR. KIRIŞCI: You're doing a great job, Minister.

FOREIGN MINISTER DAVUTOĞLU: Thank you. First about -- thank you, (inaudible) for your question on Central Asia. When I was mentioning

about neighborhood, I had to intensify on the main issues in the Middle East, otherwise, of course, Central Asia is not less important for us. In fact, there has been a pragmatic shift of our policy in Central Asia and Caucasia. I am sure you follow it. After 20 years, first time ever, Turkey council has been established in 2010. Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kurdistan, and Turkmenistan from time to time comes as guest of host country or observer.

This cooperation is important for us and our bilateral relations -- when I mentioned high-level strategic cooperation council, one of the most productive one was with Azerbaijan because of our historic ties as well as because of the energy policies. I am sure, one of the most important, significant news in the last years regarding the energy parameters in Euro-Asia was the signature of Tanap between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

With this cooperation with Azerbaijan, a trans (inaudible) pipeline, together with top trans-Adriatic pipeline, the energy parameter -- balances are being changed positively in the sense of diversification of energy resources and Tuesday we had high-level strategic cooperation council meeting with Azerbaijan and we decided to strengthen these ties in all means -- of course, transportation is another (inaudible) again, but (inaudible) which is connected to land through (inaudible), this is also (inaudible) and also Central Asian projection because through Kazakhstan, this is linked to Beijing.

Same, oil of Kazakhstan and natural gas of Turkmenistan, might be connected through trans-Caspian project. At this moment, Kazakhstan is already sending oil to (inaudible) pipeline.

So, this energy and transportation corridors, middle corridors, let me say, in Euro Asia, is directly related to Turkish region and approach to Central Asia. Our relation with Kazakhstan is special and developing very fast, and another high level strategic cooperation council partners, and I'm sure you know very well how we were influential in overcoming the crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 through nation reconciliation.

I was the first foreign minister landing in Bishkek in 2010 June crisis and with Roza Otunbayeva, at that time president of Kyrgyzstan, again, I am proud of being her partner as co-chair when we brought all the conflicting groups of Kyrgyzstan in Usika on first week of October 2010 to guaranty a free and fair election in Kyrgyzstan.

So, with all these countries we have bilateral, multilateral, and as well as regional Turkey Council Cooperation mechanisms and our Central Asia Asian policy in Central Asia is not an alternative to any country, Turkey is not a competitor, but Turkey will support all the initiatives in Caucasia and Central Asia for regional peace and stability.

In Caucasia, again, when we sign protocols with Armenia, we are -- our strategic vision was to promote regional peace, as well as bilateral relations with Armenia, and in Russia and Georgia in war in 2008, Turkey has proposed Caucasian peace and stability platform. Still, we are committed to these processes and we hope one day especially through creative ideas and successful conflict resolution mechanisms between Azerbaijan and Armenia, one day Caucasia will be a zone of peace and stability.

And at this moment today, there is a summit between Armenian and Azeri presidents, so we will be supporting all these efforts and through several means we will promote regional peace in Central Asia and Caucasia.

About -- question about, yes, when -- in our policy, one of the main principles is to have one consistent approach. Whatever we promise to our people, or our domestic politics, we are respecting the same demands of other peoples. Therefore, in Arab Spring, when the rightful demands being raised in Arab squares, we support it. What were they requesting? They were requesting free and fair election, free media, freedom of thought, rule of law, constitutional order based on human rights. Now, if these are the basic principles, the same principles were the principles of our party in domestic politics, therefore we supported these demands.

If these are the demands, I am sure you will accept that all these demands are being fulfilled in Turkey. There is no question that there is freedom of -- free and fair elections, nobody can compare Turkish freedom of thought with any other country in surrounding regions, even compared to Europe, freedom of association, freedom of demonstration, but in no politics you can claim that you are perfect.

Nowhere in the world politicians can say, we are perfect. If somebody claims that he, personally, is perfect, this is the end of progress. Of course, in Turkish democracy there are many challenges still we have to deal with, but one thing we totally changed, we eliminated the concept of domestic threat. Nobody would imagine in Turkey that on Saturday in Diyarbakir Mr.

Barzani and Prime Minister Erdoğan and tens of thousands of people celebrated a peace. It was not only wedding ceremony, it was a declaration of the end of Kurdish issue as a domestic threat.

Ten years ago, in Turkey, everybody was a threat, for different reasons and all the surrounding countries were threats for different reasons, but today in Turkey we don't see -- we don't accept any such domestic threat. But if you refer to the demonstrations in Turkey, everybody has right to demonstrate like European countries. And you can compare the issues -- the right of demonstration in Turkey and the events in Gezi Park, for example, only with European countries, not with Middle Eastern countries or other conditions like in Athens, in London, in Frankfurt or in other places there were demonstrations for different reasons during economic crisis. There were demonstrations in Turkey for different reasons with full respect, like European police or other security measures there, similar methods being used.

If there are mistakes, yes, whenever there are mistakes, of course, Turkey's rule of law and all those mistakes will be taken to the court -- crime -- or any crime or mistake will be taken care. Nobody can compare Turkey with those countries where there is no freedom of press or freedom of thought, freedom of association, free and fair election.

We are proud that in Turkey, these demonstrations are similar to demonstrations in Europe. There will be in the future similar challenges. We will be dealing with that. One day we hope we will be close to perfect, but no country, including U.S. or European Union countries can claim that their

democracy is perfect.

We are way off perfect ability, but there are many things to be done, as I said, in this direction, in order to be more confident in this sense like other European democracies.

About civilian control over military and balance of soft power and hard power, yes, that's also a good example, which could be taken as an answer to the second question as well, yes, there is more civilian control over military now and therefore in the Middle East we don't want to see military intervention and coup because only accountable governments can be successful and that could be only through elections.

In Turkey before, to be frank -- therefore, there are some discussions, and you can imagine, in 1950s, '60s, '70s, even 1990s, there was such an impression that elected governments can think and work on economy, infrastructure, certain subjects, but there are certain issues, which are beyond the role of elected leaders or governments -- security, foreign policy, and intelligence.

These were thought always that it is the business of an elite, but in last ten years, in all these aspects, elected civilian authority is responsible and taking decisions. This is normalization of political system.

We are responsible for foreign policy. As a minister of foreign affairs I cannot say that I am not able to do because of military suggestions or giving an impression of as if there is another authority taking decisions. No, we are taking decisions. We are accountable to the people. This is civilian control

over everything, and there has been huge progress in this sense in Turkey.

But in 1980s if you ask what would be Turkish policy on Cyprus, and as an academician I was always surprised when certain leaders, when they come they meet with more military leaders rather than democratically elected people in Turkey because they were thinking that these decisions are being taken by military.

Today, there is a normalization of political process, all decisions being taken by a minister of -- by our cabinet, council of ministers, which meet on Mondays right at this moment -- or it is because of time difference, maybe (inaudible). All the decisions are being taken by civilian authority.

And military, of course we need a hard power. We are living in such a fragile neighborhood, Turkey must have a strong hard power. We cannot sacrifice from that.

But when I became chief advisor -- I will finish this answer with this anecdote -- I was asked a question about this. How do you see Turkey? I said, Turkey is like a human being, in 2002, with strong muscle, army, with an empty stomach, a weak economy, and in order to support these muscles, you have to get always foreign aid, because your economy is not strong enough to support it, a small brain, which is not producing new policies, creative ideas, and a very shaky heard, absence of self-confidence that everybody is a threat to Turkey -- inside domestic threat, outside threat.

After ten years I can tell you now, yes, we need strong muscle and we will keep it, but that muscle is being supported by our economy. We are not

asking for foreign assistance to support this muscle. And our brain is our strategic vision, which I mentioned a few minutes ago.

We are developing new ideas and the main force behind all this success is our self-confidence. We are self-confident.

Once I was asked a question in a parliamentary assembly of Council of Europe about the relations with a neighboring country, and that parliamentarian was -- she was an Armenian parliament asking about Turkish-Armenian relation. I answered. I said, why are you -- do you have hostile relations? I said, no. There are two categories of state in our policy. Everybody was thinking that I would say countries with which we have good relations, bad relations. I said, no, friends and potential friends. We don't see any hostile country. There are friends and potential friends, maybe we will have some disagreements today, but in the future we will be friends with them.

This self-confidence is important as a soft power. Soft power could be implemented but only if you are confident of your position, of your politics, of your vision. The rest will come, therefore we will definitely have a strong hard power having defense industry as well, but that hard power will be led by creative soft power, smart power, in short.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks, Minister. I'll take one more round of questions and -- yes, sir, in the back there, and maybe one more question here, and one in the back. Yes, sir.

Cathy, the gentleman there with the --

MR. EVANS: John Evans, I'm a former U.S. Ambassador to

Armenia. Mr. Minister, I wonder -- you've mentioned the protocols that were signed in Zurich in 2009. I wonder if at this point, with the protocols not having been ratified, Turkey might consider simply beginning diplomatic relations with Armenia, taking that piece of the protocols out of the big package.

It seems to me that this would be something that the executive could do without resort to the parliament. And might that be something that would improve the situation in the region? Thank you.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Cathy, this way. We're running short on time, so please keep it short.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. (Inaudible), Voice of America, the Kurdish Service. Not long ago, (inaudible) organized a conference here in D.C. and the peace process with the Kurds -- Turkish peace process with the Kurds was one of the topics, and I would say most of the experts agreed on one point -- a third party is needed in this process to be successful.

So, my question is, will your government accept a third party? If so, who do you think the party who will play a positive role? Thank you.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Cathy, in the back, please, very quickly. I think with this one we will close the questions part.

MR. BONITAS: George Bonitas with the Atlantic Council. A few weeks ago NATO decided to send a small team of advisors to help Libya reform its security sector. Unfortunately, since then, the situation has deteriorated with more violence against government officials and then the recent violence this weekend against civilian protestors.

Last week there was an article in *Foreign Affairs* saying that Turkey and some other countries including Britain and Italy are providing trading for Libyan army outside of Libya. Could you please give us a brief discussion of what Turkey is doing to help the security situation in Libya and what do you think NATO's role should be? Thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER DAVUTOĞLU: Thank you very much. About Turkish-Armenian relation, of course when we signed the protocols, we signed it with good intention about Armenia and Turkey and we were hoping that these protocols would create a new atmosphere. Still we hope and still protocols are in Turkish parliament. We didn't stop the process.

But there are, of course, implementation, when we look at this process from 2005, it started in a very discreet diplomacy and it was a successful diplomacy and we are grateful to Switzerland for this and all the co-chairs of (inaudible) as well.

There are three columns of this normalization, one is Turkish-Armenia as two nation states, neighboring nation state, which have full respect for each other. Like with other nation states around us, we want to have excellent relations with Armenia. Second is Turkish-Armenian reconciliation everywhere in the world regarding historical interpretations or other issues -- in United States, in California, as well as in Paris and everywhere.

And third, we have always supported any dialogue between Turkish and Armenian communities, outside Turkey as well as any dialogue between Turkey and Armenian diaspora. When my friend -- I am seeing my

friend -- (inaudible) was killed, we invited the leaders of the Armenian diaspora. I was chief advisor, and in order to have this dialogue, and it was a very successful attempt to bring these Armenian diaspora to Turkey.

And last year in Turkish -- in the annual conference of our ambassadors, I made a statement, and I said that diaspora for us means all those who left Turkey for any reason, therefore we don't see any enemy or hostile diaspora. All diaspora who migrated from Turkey are our diaspora -- Armenians, Greeks, Turks, Balkans diaspora, they are our diaspora.

So, this reconciliation is as important as good relations between Turkey and Armenia because those good relations might be spoiled by these external factors, which is not directly related to state-to-state relation.

Third column is Azerbaijan, Azeri-Armenian peace. That's also important because we are all neighbors. Turkey is neighbor to Armenia and Azerbaijan at the same time, and 20 percent of Azeri territories are under occupation, and it is a frozen conflict. Frozen conflicts are like mines waiting to be blown up. Therefore, if these three tracks go hand in hand, that will be a successful process of full reconciliation, not only between two nation states, but between two nations, Turkey and Armenia, as well as regional process.

And we are still working on a very creative -- on some creative ideas taught through several channels, how to implement these protocols and how to -- these three tracks going hand in hand -- Turkey still have a strong political will to achieve this goal, and we are very active in this sense and I hope this toll between President Aliyev and President Sargsyan will be very successful

and I hope minister co-chairs will be more effective and I hope this new spirit of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation will be accelerated and definitely Turkish-Armenian relation as two nation states will be one of the best in the region if all these tracks go hand in hand.

About Kurdish service. My personal view, as well as our political approach, is, in this type of cases I always prefer direct talks. Before we tried, you know, Oslo process or others, with full respect to all those who contributed to these processes, as a state we want to talk with our citizens without an intermediary or mediator. They are our citizens and if we have any difficulty with our citizens, the best way is to talk directly.

Why now I am more hopeful than the previous processes, because we are talking directly. We are talking directly to all the factors, let me say, of this issue. It doesn't mean that we don't trust any third party, but whoever is living in our country or outside our country, our citizen, or our former citizen, we have to resolve our issue.

Saturday, it was a very emotional event in Diyarbakir, and on the way I was sitting next to Sivan in the bus. We knew each other, and as a minister -- not only as a minister, but as an intellectual, as an equal citizen of Turkey, I understand, I made empathy and I apologize because of all the wrong policies, which kept him away from his country. He is son of this land. It was wrong policies in the past, which kept him away, and now Prime Minister of this country is welcoming him personally and addressing him in his speech, not only to him, but to Ahmet Kaya and others who died outside Turkey. Those days are

over. Whatever we think, we will speak with our citizens -- he is our citizen, he lost his citizen ship, his cassettes were burned, banned, I told him, whenever you want Turkish citizenship, you can any time implement and you are -- you have the same right like me in this country, not more, not less. Like me. I am minister and you are an artist who had to leave this country and who lost citizenship, but you have the same right like me because you are a son of this country.

With this mentality, only we can solve our problems. It is not a diplomatic process where you need a third party, not like Turkish-Armenian issue we need Switzerland. We don't need any third party. The process is going well, not as fast as we want, but it is becoming an irreversible process, irreversible, and we hope that at the end of this process there will be full reconciliation and there will be no need for any other help from any third party.

About Libya, yes, we are very worried about the security situation in Libya. Immediately after the elections and the elected government being formed, we made some agreements and we worked very closely with Libya and we attended all the meetings. Recently there was another meeting in Morocco on the security situation in Libya and our Minister of Defense has participated. Last year I participated in policy meeting. We have historical relations with Libya, but also we think that Libya could be one of the best examples of this democratic transformation because of huge economic resources.

Once there is political stability in Libya and security is being improved, Libya doesn't need any financing of this democracy like other countries. Therefore, Libya is the most optimum -- has the most optimum

conditions to develop a democracy with huge vast resources and comparatively small population, but what Libya needs is security and good governance.

Yes, Turkey has helped. Last year when Prime Minister Zeidan came to Turkey, he attended the graduation ceremony of around 1,000 police -- Libyan police who were trained in Turkey, hundreds of Libyan officers being trained in Turkey, I mean, army officers, in order to strengthen Libyan army, and we will continue to help Libya in all sense, because the stability of Libya will bring stability to Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and also to sub-Saharan Africa to chart Mali and other countries, but any instability in Libya will affect everybody in a negative way, therefore it is the right time today that all those who are concerned -- who can do anything to support Libya and the security forces in Libya should do it without any hesitation and Turkey, we will do everything possible. Thank you.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks, Mr. Minister.

(Applause)

MR. KIRIŞCI: Before I extend my wholehearted thanks, I would like to seek your permission for a little bit of Brookings propaganda on a topic that I know is very close to your heart. With another colleague within Brookings and the Brookings office in Doha, we are working on a Syrian displacement crisis project. We published one report in September and two weeks ago we were in Ankara, (inaudible) and Haiti and just published the report about it last week, and I would like to have the honor to extend those reports to your colleagues in the delegation in the hope that we might have something to contribute to addressing this tough question that will be with us for some time.

FOREIGN MINISTER DAVUTOĞLU: Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Professor Kirişci.

MR. KIRIŞCI: And we look forward to your next visit to Brookings and to D.C. Thank you very much once more.

FOREIGN MINISTER DAVUTOĞLU: Thank you.

(Applause)

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