THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

LESSONS FROM HAITI:

INNOVATIONS IN TRACKING AND HOUSING INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FERRIS: Welcome to Brookings and we're delighted that you're here for this event that we're co-organizing with the International Organization for Migration. My name is Beth Ferris. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings LSE Project on Internal Displacement.

We're particularly concerned with the situation of internally displaced persons, or IDPs, as they're called, in many different situations.

Haiti, of course, was an example of massive displacement of people, and this afternoon we're going to look at two innovations that were used, one looking at the tracking, mapping, counting aspect of understanding both the scale and the process of displacement, followed by a discussion of some of the housing innovations that took place after that devastating earthquake almost three years ago.

We have a great panel for you and because we're going to be having PowerPoint, I've asked the panelists to remain seated until they make their presentations.

We'll begin with IOM, and you've got the biographies in your packets, but we'll start with Vlatko Avramovski, who is data management and registration program coordinator with IOM in Haiti. He's worked in this field for almost 20 years in lots of different countries including Macedonia, Kosovo, Sudan, Uganda, Iraq, and Haiti. And he'll begin and be followed by Lorenza Rossi, who is from Italy, and also has a long experience working with various aspects around statistics, health issues in a variety of countries. She's been in Haiti since December 2010.

Then we'll turn to Chuck Setchell, who was the senior shelter, settlements, and hazard mitigation advisor for USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and has done a lot of work not only in Haiti, but in most of the major emergencies that have taken place over the last quarter century, so you can put this in

some kind of historical perspective.

So, after we hear about the displacement tracking matrix from IOM and then housing from Chuck, who will be using PowerPoints, then we'll all come here on the stage and have a conversation beginning with Vincent Cochetel, who is the regional representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees here in Washington.

Vincent also has worked with refugees and displacement in many complicated situations, both in the field and in Geneva, and has always had a particular passion for Haiti, has traveled there often, and concerned about the protection issues around Haiti.

So, he'll step back from some of the technical innovations and talk, perhaps, about some of the broader concerns that we all have about the situation in Haiti.

Okay, so we're going to begin with IOM. I invite Vlatko to come up here and let's hope for a seamless transition to the technology.

MR. AVRAMOVSKI: I would like to thank Brookings for giving us this opportunity. I am going to talk about one operation that we set in order to track and count and identify locations of the displaced.

After the earthquake in Port-au-Prince in January 2010, and also two more areas in the south, Leogane and Jacmel, including the Grande-Goave and Petiti-Goave, one of the problems, it's not everything -- all the problems of the earthquake, one of the problems that we were asked as IOM to address is IDPs in the camps. How many? Where? And who is in the camp?

In order to answer to this, we set up mechanism to assess the -- every camp or to assess the location with -- sorry -- camp-based assessments where we visited every camp and get the first assessment and identify the location, and in the same time,

parallel, we started systematically registering individuals in every camp in order to answer to the question, who is in the camp?

This processes we are systematically doing it since 2010. As -- starting with first phase of registration, that we call it emergency registration, where we managed to reach almost everybody that was in the camp by September, and after that, end of 2010 and within 2011, we continued visiting the camp and follow the changes and updating the register, which led us into next phase that we are doing now, updating the remaining register and doing referrals for different programming, whenever whoever needs the beneficiary leaves from camps for different type of assistance get it from this register, and we are tracking once the person is out of the camp based on any program assistance. We are in the registration phase, basically, is not any more in the IDP register.

But, individual registrations and censuses are slow processes in the same time, in order monthly to track, we are continuing the camp-based assessments. We are using different methods to identify the number of families and people in the camp.

I will go back on the methods a little bit towards the end, but basically this is the set up that we made in order to come to the displacement -- to what we call displacement tracking matrix in order to understand who is in the -- where are the camps, who is in the camps, and who is in the camps, and of course, how many.

So, based on these two processes and assessments, we come up with different results that we are presenting individually, by camp, or we are presenting it on aggregated level and in regular monthly reports.

I will leave a little bit now -- I will stop here and leave the floor to my colleague, Lorenza Rossi. She will talk more about the profile of the displaced, everything that we get out of the displacement data that we collect so far.

MS. ROSSI: Hi. Good afternoon. Yes, so I will talk a little bit about the results and as Vlatko said, the two sets of data that we collect regularly. So, basically the first question, the immediate question was, how many IDPs and where are they?

So, we, IOM, had to map all the camps and this process gave the first number, the first estimate of the number of IDPs, and that was by July 2010, IOM was able to say that 1.5 million of people were displaced in Port-au-Prince areas and the two areas in the south and the northeast of the country.

So, this was the first number, 1.5 million displaced people in 1,555 sites or camps, and basically, the database has the GPS coordinates and we were able to map the camps in these areas.

Now, this picture, this graph shows the trend, because the camp base assessment is done regularly every two months, this is the trend in the past, almost three years, of how IDPs in camps decreased or increased, so basically, you have the graph on the top, that is the population, and you see we started with 1.5 million in July 2010 and we reach now, November 2012, so the latest DTM report that was published that you have in your folder says that there are 359,000 IDPs left in the country, in camps.

These are displacement in camps. And then the graph that -- with the triangle, shows the number of camps. So, you can see -- so, we started with, yes, 1,500 camps, and we have now 398 camps. And if you see from the beginning of the -- from the event, up to approximately a year ago, September last year, it's the phase of what is called spontaneous returns, so you see that the number of IDPs is decreasing and the number of camps stay the same, which is interpreted as a sign that people who could leave, left.

In the first year or year and a half after the earthquake, all those who had a house, a house to repair, land, or everything, all those who were able to return to their

place of origin spontaneously, they left.

But that didn't have an impact on the number of camps as it had in the second phase, actually, where we talk about organized return. So, these are programs, projects, that are aimed at closing the camps, basically, relocating people, IDPs from the camps, to the neighborhoods and close the camps.

So, in this case, the two numbers go parallel somehow.

Okay, so these are the numbers that we get from the camp base assessment that is done regularly every two months, and the report is published every two months, and you can find it on the website, and this one is what then we called phase one registration and phase two registration that has a different objective, so to answer more to the question, who are these IDPs? What's the profile of these IDPs? So, there's much more detailed information on the individuals and on the households. Household is a tent, basically.

So, in phase one, if you remember the graph with the phases, the picture with the phases, so phase one was completed in 2010 and it gave the actual final number of IDPs, which was 1.3 million -- 1.360 million, and in 321,000 households, and we register 1,273 sites in the 13 communes effected, so it's 7 communes in Port-au-Prince, and 6 communes -- no, 8 communes in Port-au-Prince and 5 communes outside Port-au-Prince.

And in phase two, which started in the end of 2010, there was a second registration. Now, this is a sample of the initial population. We didn't re-register all the camps, but it was an opportunistic sampling, let's say, because we only selected camps that were other -- that had the return/relocation program, so the IDPs were targeted for being relocated into the neighborhood, or we targeted large sites, for example, in the center areas of Port-au-Prince, for camp closure.

So, in the second phase that we registered the 167,000 people up to September this year, and this corresponds to 44,000 households and 258 sites, and this was done only in Port-au-Prince area. And one in Jacmel? One in Jacmel, one in the south.

So, basically, what we can see from the first -- the initial registration, is that a majority of people came from Port-au-Prince, 83 percent came from Port-au-Prince, and the other people were displaced outside Port-au-Prince. Interesting to see that people moved the closest possible to where they were when the earthquake happened, so 85 percent of people were displaced in the same commune of residents, and the rest in different. And 73 in the same section or (inaudible), which is the smallest administrative division of the country, and in phase two, in 2012, the sample of 2012, there is a fewer percentage left who came from the same commune of residence, which probably indicates, again, what Vlatko said -- or what we said before, that initially there were the spontaneous returns, so all those who could leave and go back to their place of origin next to where they were displaced, they did, and the rest now come more from different areas.

Okay, these are three age pyramids. So, basically the bars are five years age groups and this is the percentage of the population, female and males, in the different age groups. So, if you look at the first one, it's the census of 2003, Haitian census 2003 for the same 13 communes. So, the structure of the population is quite similar and, as you see before, it's 47 percent of the people were affected by the earthquake, so it's half of the population of those communes were actually affected by the earthquake and living in camps.

And the age and sex ratio is very similar with the exception of some central age groups, 20, 30-something, 35, 39. The second one is the registration phase

one and phase two, and the third one is the last registration, so 2012 only, and the

census only in Port-au-Prince because this was only Port-au-Prince.

So, basically what do we see in terms of age and sex structure of the

population? Initially it was very similar to the population of the country. There were a bit

more adults in the central age groups and fewer elderly and fewer children zero to five.

As we move towards these people left in camps in 2012, we see that

there is an increase in the central ages, so already there were more when they moved,

when they were displaced, but now there is a growing population or there is left a bigger

population of the central age groups.

So, the average age is 22, 24 for the three years. The head of the

household, they're older, they're between 38, it's likely decreasing 2012 to 36. The sex

ratio, what also we observed in 2012 and compared to 2010 is that there is progressively

more males in the population, especially in this active age groups. In fact, the

percentage of the people in the active age groups is larger than the one we find in the

census, so compared to the normal population, there is more people in the active age

groups, both males and females, and also the sex ratio of the population, it's more

skewed towards men compared to the census, compared to the normal population in the

country.

And there is a dependency ratio decreasing, so, again, if there are more

active people who are in the camps, of course the dependency ratio is lower.

Now, then we analyze also the household, so the household is the tent,

and we see that from 2010 to 2012 there is an increase in -- we divided the -- who heads

the household in couples, single-headed males and single-headed female households,

and there is an increase in households who are headed by single males.

And these households have also fewer kids per household, and they

have -- and they're shrinking in size. The D households are decreasing in size. So, from 2010 to 2012, there has been a decrease from 4.2 members of a household to 3.4.

And the number of kids also is decreasing, kids -- children below the age of 15, decreasing from 1.3 to 1, but especially if you look at the -- these are the households headed by males, they had 0.8 children in 2010, now they have 0.4. So, we see a prevalence of households headed by single male with fewer kids.

So, the idea is basically that the population in the camps changed, older people left the camps, couples left the camps, probably with kids, and now there are more single-headed households with fewer kids.

Okay, then we have an information on education. So, basically 56 percent of male and 53 percent of females are in school and you have a level of dropout in schools that is around 10 percent for both male and female.

Now, what is interesting to notice is to notice that the demographic (inaudible) results, the draft results were published a month ago and this is a statistically representative sample of camps as well, so they included camps in their survey this year. When we compared the school enrollment in primary school in the camps and in the neighborhood, it's very similar, both from our data and from the HS data, which is a good results because it means that people, at least primary school kids in camps had the same opportunity or went to school in these three years as much as children in the neighborhood who were not displaced.

As for occupation, of course there's a very high unemployment rate in camps, up to 66 percent, which, given the dependency ratio, implies that every adult is supporting, on average, 2.3 known active members of the IDP population.

Of course, as can be expected, more than 50 percent is unskilled workforce that was an informal occupation like (inaudible) and -- informal occupation, and

only 23, 28 percent is skilled workforce, meaning mainly manual workers with some skills.

And then there's a few percentages of other drivers, technicians are around 4 percent,

but the main group is unskilled.

Another information that we get from the individual registration is the

ownership status, so we ask people if before the earthquake they used to own a house

that they can repair, that they used to own a house that they cannot repair, or if they were

tenants, and this graph shows the blue is the percentage of -- the dots are the camps, so,

the percentage of tenants in 2010, represented by the blue dots, it's quite spread out. It's

from 20 to 80 percent, but if you see the orange dots, in 2012, there's a much higher

proportion of tenants.

So, it means, again, that those who could leave, who had the chance to

repair their house or to go back to their places, they did already, and those who are left in

camps are tenants, were tenants and now don't have the means to rent a new place due

to the lack of places and to the lack of means.

So, yes, the owners who could repair their house decreased from 20

percent to 6 percent in 2012, so there is very few left.

So, the summary findings is basically in terms of age and sex, that, as I

said before, there's fewer elder, fewer kids, fewer couples, and so probably either

families are splitting or younger adults are staying in the camps. Ratio of female is

decreasing. The size of the household is also decreasing, so you have probably the

same number of tents, but fewer people inside. And that services, in terms of schooling,

probably were good services in the camps because they allow children to go to primary

school as much as their peers in the neighborhood.   And unskilled labor is predominant

incomes.

Okay, so this was phase one and phase two, the profiling of the IDPs.

Now, this is phase three, the results of phase three, the return or relocation programs, in 2011 and 2012. Okay, this is IOM only, so IOM targeted 12,000 families, almost, and they already relocated 99.5 percent of them, so there are only 61 families out of these initially targeted families that are still to be relocated, but it's in the process.

And then a survey of follow up at six weeks shows that 89.5 percent of those who were relocated to a rented house are still in the house. So, and these are the bad news. This is not just IOM, but this is IOM with partners, so there is a -- the NGOs, JPHRO, the Federation of the Red Cross, Concern, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision International, Acted Care, Goal, Helpage and (inaudible), they also were part of this return and relocation program, and we have still 70,000 families still in need for which we don't have funds to relocate.

So, that's it in terms of results.

MR. AVRAMOVSKI: Meaning that of 90,000, 20,000 are sort of planned for programs next year, but 70,000 neither are planned, neither have funding for programs.

So, I'll go back to methods that we are using, some technology I cannot explain everything, we don't have time, but I will try to get to the main points.

Of course, standard instruments, registration form or as a site assessment, one very interesting and simple thing that we applied is a unique serial number that is very difficult, I mean, we don't go with computers to generate serial number and everything, we just pre-print the cards and with the numbers, so when we go and register, it's very easy to have the number and then also we keep it in the system.

And for the future tracking it's very useful, and usually people keep these cards -- it's not beneficiary card, it's simply tracking card and you can easily refer.

Of course, mapping is very -- was very important for us and starting from

camps, say points and (inaudible) of the camps, basically we identify completely the side

we are able to measure to count the tents, of course, also to measure square meters,

people per square meter. Street network with a lot -- jointly with open street map, with

National Center for Geospatial Information, we improved the mapping of the street

network of Haiti.

Those who are using Street Network's Open Street Map, if they go in

2010, there were only 2000 streets mapped. Now, there are 10,000 streets mapped in

Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and it's quite good, and now even under Google Map

and everything, all this street network is available.

And also, recently in mapping and elimination of the neighborhoods of

Port-au-Prince, which all this helps us to make a better quality data set, basically, we

know in which neighborhood, we know from which street. The numbers that you see just

extra toward the map saying that from (inaudible), that's a camp that also you can see

that on the image for those who have been -- that's next to the airport. Now that camp

doesn't exist. (Inaudible) completed the program, but after the registration we were able

to map from which streets in which neighborhoods these people used to live. So, they

focused the program that way.

So, in the beginning was a lot of use of satellite imagery and everything,

comparison pre and post to identify, so basically those were the steps to map the camps.

Recently what we are using is more aerial photography, which we do it

our self, we have our small drone, we fly it over and then (inaudible) has the image. This

is one of the biggest camps at (inaudible) Jean-Marie Vincent, or old military airports, it's

all a big public area around 8,500 families, and we were able to count and map and

prepare for registration using the aerial photography basically we are able to -- we were

able even before we started registration to count and to map every ten divide in blocks.

Why? Because further, when we work with a register, it's very easy, we know people are coming from which block and we planned the program very easily block by block to clean up the camp.

That's another example, famous Petionville Golf Club, that those who are associating with JPHRO and activity or something and his support for Haiti, so, for this camp, also, we are doing detailed registrations and aerial photo and everything, it is numbered and every family is known. So, this just shows after the registrations and following the return programs, so if you see the numbers and you don't see the tents, it means that those people were relocated. And we will continue every six months to follow.

Our latest, what we are doing, is with return program and once using the registration database, initial data is loaded, so when the staff is doing the return program, they are able in one day to complete everything, to take the family to the house where they are renting, get the data, get their conformation, get additional data like photo of the beneficiary, photo of (inaudible) and in the same time, Blackberry service that we are using in Haiti allows also to get the GPS point and everything so everything goes straight in the database without needing to spend too much paper and too much visits or different -- and to waste time on data collection.

So, that's our most recent that we are trying to use it, once we have more return programs and individual work with beneficiaries and locations.

Our choice on the Blackberry was because it's very simple, it's cost effective for us, and as organization we have corporate account for use of the Blackberry, so we didn't need to buy new tablets or new machines or whatever, just we needed to write the software and we just wrote it ourselves within our own capacity, which also developed as we have.

So, I'll stop here on VTM and techniques and technologies. I'll leave the floor.

MR. SETCHELL: Hello again. Chuck Setchell. Thank you, Beth, and thank you, Brookings, for hosting this event. As you can see from the previous presentations, the issues remain and the needs are great.

I want to talk to you for a few minutes about some of the innovations in sheltering based, in part, on some of the data assessment and analysis that you just saw. Shelter is the humanitarian counterpart to housing and it doesn't exist in a vacuum. It really resides in settlements, and they can be anything from a very temporary transit center to a very large metropolitan region.

The location, condition, and management of settlements will largely determine whether they become the sites of future disasters, possible humanitarian community responses.

By now you've seen this movie. It amply demonstrates the conditions experienced by one in six people on the planet at the current time. By 2030, not too far from now, nearly one in every four are projected to be living in conditions depicted in the film. I mention that because 98 percent -- the equivalent of 98 percent of all population growth on the planet in the next two decades will be located in a city in a developing country. There will also be a concentration of poverty as well.

All to say, this is my math here, shelter is far more than four walls and a roof. With that in mind, this happened a couple years ago. One of the very basic questions early on was, who owns the debris? It was never really truly resolved, what cluster, what agency, who would drive this process? How much debris? There were some estimates as substantial as 60 million cubic meters, 78 million cubic yards, quite a substantial rubble pile, probably not that large, maybe a sixth of that, but still covering the

mall 120-feet high. Pretty substantial, and where to put it, how to dispose of it.

Big question here was clearing land to provide shelter and services. If we don't do that, we can't move people out of camps. Very, very basic.

A critical initial challenge was exchanging bed sheets for plastic sheets, not very dramatic, but very useful. Some of the outputs that we provided, the largest shelter and settlements program, S&S program that we've ever had, providing the sheeting early on and the sheeting distributions were at a faster rate and coverage levels were higher than any previous large-scale disaster going back a few years, and then the transitional phase, which we completed our portion of in November of last year, about 63,000, 62,600 households were assisted in three primary ways. I'll go into them.

One of those primary ways was driven by a lot of the data tracking that had been established by the international community, primarily the shelter cluster. Trying to get clues. We ground truth some of this at the same time and came up with a hosting support program for over 26,000 families. Very substantial, very innovative form of sheltering, we've been doing it for some time but we refer to it as stealth shelter because it's not commonly understood and not widely adopted.

We think it's a very effective means of providing shelter in the short-term, and then as you see at the bottom, it often transitions into permanent shelter. Aunt Martha coming on your doorstep after the disaster and staying and perhaps insinuating into the household, and that works.

Seventy percent of our hosting support arrangements have evolved into permanent housing, 18,500 families don't need a permanent home or a transitional shelter or a place in a camp.

A lot of the data analysis and tracking was related to damage assessments and that informed repair programs that we supported and other donors

supported and undertook, mindful of the fact that 54 percent, 55 percent of all the

structures assessed in the affected area were not damaged by the earthquake. That's a

not widely known fact.

And transitional shelter, or TS, widely used, widely adopted, 140,000

units provided to families by the international community, and they're not new. They're

rooted in something that happened in the last century, in the early 20th century in my

hometown, and about 20 of those still exist. Transitional shelter does have an impact.

This is, what we're considering now as a very innovative practice. It's actually, in this

case two, and they were raised and they're being upgraded again. And this is 2003. I'm

going home next week, I'll take some more pictures. This particular home was sold for

about $600,000 a few years ago, so maybe transitional shelter has some application in

the urban fabric.

The utility of shelter assistance in general to response from recovery,

even modest forms of shelter and transitional shelter even more so, really jump start and

reengage affected populations in this incremental, longer-term housing development

process that exists in nearly every country that we work in. So, jumpstarting and re-

immersing people back into the local economy and the local housing markets is very

critical.

And unlike other sectors, there's no easy hand off to development. The

international community has not done a very good job in prior years, particularly in Haiti,

in providing large volumes of housing, permanent housing, for families affected by the

disaster. So, all the more reason to focus on transition and context.

And at the settlements level, at that contextual level, we provided support

to the government of Haiti and UN and NGO agencies to engage in something we might

call emergency urban planning based on a lot of the information that you just saw IOM

developing.

At the micro level we supported neighborhood-based projects that

yielded significant benefits to affected populations, neighborhoods being that socially

defined space, physical space, that really is the foothold that people have in the urban

context, in the larger urban arena.

And we really made this happen in a few places by providing multiple

shelter solutions in context. Again, you'll see various permutations of new development -

- I don't know if we have a pointer here -- new development here, transitional shelter

here, repair programs here, and something up here that I'll show you in a second. It's the

first ever two-story transitional shelter produced by the humanitarian assistance

community reflecting context. There was no room. We had to go up. We had to better

reflect context.

The humanitarian community has a history of rural-based orientations,

institutional memories, practices. We needed to change that.   Some of this is very

innovative in context with regard to humanitarian activity.

And beyond this two-story T-shelter and the hoopla of this neighborhood

approach, which is now being widely embraced, is that 20 percent of that 18 acre

neighborhood has been reconfigured through a community-based settlements planning

process. It's permitted new access ways, evacuation routes, improved drainage,

retaining walls, et cetera, for safer shelters and a safer settlement. This is ultimately what

we want to do.

More importantly, it's also increased the area to be used for shelter and

also changed the market for land and housing in the neighborhood, making pre-event

vacant and underutilized land all the more valuable. It's capitalized the value of

humanitarian assistance.

So, we're facilitating, and I think in a very innovative way, the upgrading of lots, lands and lots, to permanent housing. We will not be funding that permanent housing, but it will be built, and it's much needed, particularly with regard to rental housing.

Also beyond the hoopla, upgrading side-by-side. The Irish NGO GOAL provided these shelters, two shelters in 2010. One has been completely transformed into a permanent home, on the left, on the right is pretty much the pristine situation that we provided in 2010 -- side-by-side, we are seeing the evolution of a very rapid process to permanence.

Also, upgrading to permanence, we provided some pilot funding to better inform ourselves in the humanitarian community on how best to guide and manage the transformation to permanence. This, I think, is the new mother lode. We need to develop some good techniques in order to do this a bit better.

So, getting from this to this is not the responsibility of the humanitarian community, but re-conceiving this road to recovery requires a re-conception of the core process of sheltering. Our standard approach is, emergency shelter plus transitional shelter plus, provided by the donor -- the international development community, permanent housing. Some are now promoting this notion of emergency shelter, essentially a camp-based shelter, to permanent housing, bypassing completely this notion of transformation.

And our alternative is this -- I'm sorry for the math, I have a 12-year-old who's been helping me with these slides. Emergency shelter plus transitional shelter intentionally supported to transform to permanent housing, providing the guidance and funding to do so, and if needed, in very small font, permanent housing, for example, for very particular special needs populations.

Recognizing the RRR again, re-conceiving the road to recovery, recognizing the centrality of settlements, the spatial framework provided by the focus on settlements provides this catchall context for shelter interventions. We can identify resources and opportunities, constraints, impacts, et cetera.

These databases that are being produced by IOM and others will inform this process. This area-based approach changes the focus, the near obsessive focus, of the humanitarian community from households to neighborhoods and large communities, and this change in unit of analysis is obviously very useful in urban areas.

And, again, focusing on the settlement side of the sector, shelter is, relatively speaking, the easy part. The much tougher issue is land. Land -- if land was so impossible, nothing would happen, so something's afoot.

Again, 140,000 transitional shelters were provided by the humanitarian community, so we need to do a better job of understanding and figuring out the land process a little bit sooner and a little bit better. It's a socially defined process, not necessarily a legalistically defined process.

In Port-au-Prince alone, the effected area lost an estimated 30 percent of land that was essentially taken off the market by rubble, by the destruction, which constrained sheltering of affected populations even more, and hence, some people in camps.

And a surgical neighborhood-based focus is really preferred over the clear cut notion of just rapid disposal, destruction and disposal of structures, requires more creative work -- settlements planning, land readjustment, and what have you. You can imagine, in setting the retaining walls and walkways, the evacuation routes in a couple of the neighborhoods that we've worked in, you really had to sit down with maps and information to understand where you're going to take a half a meter and give a half a

meter, and those are negotiations that are done at a very micro level, and very important.

Humanitarian actors can help frame the future. We, heretofore, have not

been very good, we need to be very innovative in how to do this. We need to lean over

that line between humanitarian assistance and development assistance, and help frame

the reconstruction that follows through emergency master planning, because most official

plans are aspirational and perhaps even inspirational, but not at all operational.

For example, at the time of the earthquake, the government planned for

Port-au-Prince to assume the removal of 1.2 million people from the metro area based on

the view that the city was too large, too big. Only one city in the last 30, 40 years has

been able to remove a million people in short order and that was Phnom Penh. Don't

want to use that as a model.

The urgent need to plan the reconfiguration of space and new space,

and the reconfiguration of risk-prone settlements in this age of climate change and sea

level rise and massive risk, expansion of settlements into risk-prone areas, very, very,

very critical.

And challenges remain in Haiti. Exchanging plastic sheets for longer-

term shelter is one of the issues that we really need to be looking at. And the

transformation of pledged funds to completed projects. We're at about 53 percent now of

disbursements, only up from 45 percent in April. That's not very much movement in five

months. We need to do a better job of identifying projects, planning them, implementing

them.

Some final takeaways. Context, context, context. This is the

humanitarian community's equivalent mantra to the real estate industry's location,

location, location. We need to adopt the big picture to understand, develop a market

approach. It's critical to understand that context. That's best informed by the kind of data

that IOM generates through these DTMs and these other forms of -- all of that information is useful in terms of recovery and response.

So, shelter and settlements activities can really frame response and recovery and other sectors. It's really, pardon the pun, very foundational. And re-conceiving the road to recovery features a focus on this transformation of transitional structure to permanent housing. Again, this is the new mother lode. We need to develop some new mechanisms to make this happen.

And shelter, again, is the easy part. The tough issues are on the settlement side of the sector. We're seeing this again post-Hurricane Sandy. In the mountains of Haiti, we are seeing massive, massive flood inundation and flash flood, massive destruction on a fairly severe scale in the rural areas, something that had not been a part of the initial earthquake affected area. New issues are emerging.

And urban disasters pose a particular and major challenge to humanitarian community and development community actors. It needs to be informed, again, by the kind of information that's generated through the likes of IOM and the data tracking matrix and other mechanisms.

So, thanks for your time and attention.

(Applause)

MS. FERRIS: Well, thank you very much for your presentations, presenting a lot of interesting information about new approaches that we've learned in Haiti.

Let's turn now to Vincent Cochetel for some reactions or comments, either on the presentations or the larger political, social, humanitarian context.

MR. COCHETEL: Thank you very much. Thank you for your presentation. Thank you to Brookings and IOM for the invitation to share with you some

comments.

If I may sound critical on some of the comments, not any criticism of any organization in particular or project or programs. The challenges in Haiti were unheard of, I mean, in many respects, intervening in on urban contexts is, as Charles mentioned, was very, very difficult.

You see those sites, I mean, none of these sites were planned sites. People move close to the neighborhood, but then it was very difficult to move people even within the sites. So, in a classic -- in another type of displacement situation, there would be more margin of maneuver to try to move people, for instance, around vulnerability criteria and use the registration to develop some protection-sensitive site.

This was not possible. We did not have the space and everybody was overwhelmed with the camp management challenges that colleagues were facing.

I'm not sure that we have learned sufficient lessons in terms of IDP population figures through the experience in Haiti. It's still a challenge, it's a challenge in terms of standards, it's a challenge in terms of methodology.

If you go back to the guiding principle, you will see the guiding principle, there are some hesitation about registration because registration is often linked to documentation and it's often linked to status and we don't want to go down that way because then with status you have the issue of de-registration coming in and what sort of standards you are going to apply for de-registration.

So, I think we have avoided some of the pitfall with the DTM, which was good, but at the same time, it depends also what you want to register people for. For what sort of intervention? How you share that? How are you going to use the data to plan assistance activity and to plan individualized or household solutions?

And I'm not so sure that we, through the (inaudible) profiling self-

registration of the people, we have reached the most efficient tool at this stage. But, again, you know, registration should not lead to dependency, and that's a concern. But something that's falling short of registration, sometime, is not sufficiently useful for humanitarian operators.

I know the majority of humanitarian operators believe that we don't want a registration necessarily in an IDP situation. Some governments have taken the opposite view in conflict or even situation. There are pros, there are cons, and I think we have to adapt to the context. In the context of Haiti, I think the DTM approach was useful.

But we have to see that, I mean, we were challenged by the composition of the IDP population, or the population in the camp. We had a mix of people who were former tenants, other former owners, some of them had their house partially destroyed, others had their house fully destroyed, other had their house not destroyed at all, but they were fearing to stay in their habitat or wanting to stay in the camps for a couple of months. Others moved from poor neighborhood to the camps with the hope that they would get some assistance that they needed in their neighborhood and that was not coming to their neighborhood.

You know, sometime donors, even some humanitarian operators, qualify those people as people abusing of the assistance. I'm not so sure we can read it that way two years after some of those people are still around.

So, but there were a lot of challenges. So, some of the limitation I see with the DTM, I think the DTM became for the donors, the Bible, or the holy Koran, whatever you want to take it, and it became the official figure on displacement.

Well, there were other forms of displacement that the DTM could not track, and I think we have to remember that. You (inaudible) urban displacement, outside

of the camps, people sheltering others in their habitat. Those people were not

considered to be IDPs on way out of reach for many, but humanitarian operator.

You had urban to rural displacement. I mean, as far as places close to

the border with the Dominican Republic, you see (inaudible), you had camps there, so,

you had people moving really far away from Port-au-Prince to camps.

So, those population in the camps where tracked by the DTM, but those

living in the village nearby, in (inaudible), were not tracked. So, a difference in terms of

who makes it to the statistics or who doesn't make it to the statistics.

Another limitation is up to a point IOM very usefully tracked figures about

eviction, forced eviction, not assisted return, forced eviction from the camp. I saw in the

latest report you are not talking anymore about eviction and that's something I'd like to

ask you, maybe --

MR. AVRAMOVSKI: There were no new cases in the period.

MR. COCHETEL: Okay, Oxfam (inaudible) report two days ago on

eviction from the camps, you know, it's not -- I mean, for me it's not a detail, the situation

like in August we had 61,000 people affected by eviction. Sixty-one thousand people

affected by eviction, where do they end up in statistical term, those people?

So, I know that the donors would like to push the number down. I know

the Haitian government would like to push the number down, but those people, as far as

I'm concerned, they remain displaced. They are no longer tracked, but they are

displaced.

There were a lot of talks and rumors about who are those people also in

some of the spontaneous settlements that mushroom around some relocation sites, like

Canaan, Geosalem and all those sites near Coral.

At the beginning they track, then track how those people are displaced --

has displacement ended for those people? And what does that mean in terms of solutions? I'm not so sure we have gotten to any answer there because politically it's also very sensitive.

And, you know, the DTM is a useful -- extremely useful tool in tracking trends for such a large scale displacement, but it does not replace, in my view, a case management tool and it was not designed to be a case management tool, but that's something we will have to discuss about it and I think we need more reflection in the camp management cluster at the global level on that issue because I think (inaudible) also has to learn from that, the way we use registration, what do we share in terms of that, what we don't share with partners, and I think at this time, 21st century, we should be sharing more data with partners.

I think the one who owns the database tends to be very protective of its data, sometimes for good reason, but I think in the natural displacement situation, I think we need to be able to share that (inaudible) data, correct data, among the partners and that's something that can evolve in the future.

On the shelter side, thank you, Charles, your presentation was very good and I'll leave this room today with a bit of hope in the back of my mind. I still think that in the shelter response we've seen the worst and we've seen the best in Haiti. We've seen the worst partly also because many operators, humanitarian operators, did not want to be coordinated or coordinate anything and operated totally on their own, so no more adherence to existing standards and on some practices that were really harmful to the people.

Access to temporary shelter or T-shelter, I mean, in some parts of Haiti, it was based on a religious affiliation. There are some sites that you could get access to in terms of T-shelter only if you followed a certain church. And this is totally

unacceptable. Okay, it was private funding, nobody had leverage on the organization

doing that, maybe, but this is totally unacceptable.

So, no consideration of vulnerability on all that in that decision-making

process.

There was, I think, a bit of ambiguity on the T in T-shelter. Was it

transitional? Was it temporary? Was it petit, in Creole? What was it exactly? And what

communication was orchestrated around the T-shelter concept? I mean, talk to the

beneficiaries. Not sure what they got out of it, especially when you look at their tenancy

rights. I mean, I've been reading some of those papers they have signed, different signs

on what they have signed about their ownership of the walls but not the land, about the

uncertainty, about how long they'll be able to stay on that land, but don't worry, you can

move with your T-shelter.

We're not at the end of the (inaudible) on that and some of the

movement to some sites, in my view, were a bit rushed. We are not sure about the

ownership of the place and we are not protected against some bad surprise in the coming

months or years with the people that were moved to some places.

At the level of the standards used in construction of T-shelter, I think,

again, we've seen the best, we've seen some good example of coordination within the

cluster, within the shelter cluster, but we've seen also insane competition sometimes on

(inaudible) between some organizations. And I think we should avoid that. And at the

level of the donors, they have to exercise more serious control on what they found and

around which standards we develop -- we use in the rehabilitation process, in the

reconstruction process. I think that's important to keep that in mind.

An example around that was, for instance, you had some sites where I

could not see -- I've been talking to all of them in two, three sites -- I could not see any of

the workers working on the shelter being an Haitian. They were all from Dominican

Republic. All the workforce was from the Dominican Republic. Well, fine, I mean, I have

no problem that Dominican Republic builders get involved in the reconstruction effort in

Haiti, but I mean, you have so many unemployed people in the camps. They should be

the -- it should be a very strict condition of workforce participation of affected population.

It has to be an absolute criteria, and it was not in place on many sites.

So, better community engagement around the emergency shelter,

around the T-shelter, around the transition to another type of shelter.

Last remark on the shelter side, also some of the site planning and some

of the relocation site, I mean, needs to take into consideration the specific risk in terms of

the urban violence that we had back in some of the neighborhoods, and you need more

space between the shelter. I know land is a problem, but you need more space,

otherwise you're going to reproduce the same sort of urban violence and risk for certain

populations that we've seen in some neighborhoods before the earthquake or that we

see today in some of those neighborhoods.

But otherwise, are a very good innovation, I agree with you, and we hope

that those innovations will make it to some standards and that's why it's really important

to document the process, the success, the failure, the hesitation, but we need to keep a

very, very close eye on what's going to happen with tenancy, tenancy rights, what's

happening to the people that get assistance for one month to rent where to date 89

percent are still there six weeks after they've got assistance -- well, that's good news for

the 89 percent, I'm wondering where the 11 other percents are going, but maybe mobility

is a good thing, they move on with their life and we should not look at them as IDPs

forever. We're not in Colombia, we need to move on, but there are challenges around

that and of course the DTM cannot track all those challenges, it's not the responsibility of

the humanitarian community to do so.

MS. FERRIS: Well, thank you very much. Lots of issues you've raised, from registration to evictions to T-shelter to solutions to violence, urban phenomena.

I'm going to suggest that we take a few questions from the audience and then you may also want to respond to some of Vincent's comments.

We have microphones here if you would like to raise your hand. Why don't we start over here? Yes, and if you could please identify yourself, Sarah.

MS. WILLIAMSON: Hi, I'm Sarah Williamson, I'm a humanitarian consultant and I work with a number of clients on Haiti, including the Center for Global Development, and I was recently in Haiti and I just noticed two trends on these issues that maybe you can address. One is, a number of people felt like the situation had moved on to now it's a financing problem.

When you talk about housing, a lot of people are paying very high money for rent where in a normal system, they should be able to finance loans to construct or build or own their own property, and I know this isn't exactly what you do, Chuck, but I wonder if you could speak to some of the housing financing issues that USAID is working on.

And then the other trend that I saw is that now you do have government officials in place who are trying to take a greater responsibility for the issues, so to IOM, at what level are you sharing information or partnering with the government of Haiti so that municipalities, for example, can begin to track those who remain displaced in their area?

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Another question. Jim Purcell.

MR. PURCELL: My name is Jim Purcell. I'm the former head of the State Department Refugee Program and former Director General of IOM. I had the

occasion to visit Haiti this past March and I want to comment on the significant success

that we have had in Haiti.

I've been traveling in and out of that country since 1980 when the first

Haitians came up with the Marielitos. It's a difficult country, ravaged by an earthquake,

and in a little over two years we were able to take, of a million and a half people, 1.2

million people and move from temporary to transitional to permanent shelter. In a country

like Haiti, that's a major accomplishment.

On the other hand, there are 300,000 people still left there, you report

this now 359,000. I toured those camps, many of them with the same plastic sheeting

they started with. Gender-based violence I saw is as bad there as any place I've ever

seen around the world.

I know IOM's objective was to move -- to close those camps as quickly

as possible and move people out, but we've heard here today a lot of the impediments to

that.

I'd like to know a little bit more, what do we see -- what's in the offing for

these 350,000 people left there? I'm discouraged when I hear that the international

community financing of this program is drying up almost to nothing. As I heard today, the

two -- there are only a couple of major contributors left. I've made a comment when I

was there and I've made it here recently, in my view, Haiti is a situation where we start

and stop too much. I've seen start and stop and I'm afraid that we're at the point now of

stopping again, and I just want to raise attention to the fact that the international

community has a responsibility, and I think we're slacking off again.

But I'm really concerned about this 360,000. What ideas do we have

and how long is it going to take to get those people out of those miserable camps?

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. Maybe one more and then we'll

turn to our panelists. Here at the back.

MR. COHEN: Thank you. Marc Cohen from Oxfam. Monsieur Cochetel, thank you for mentioning our forced evictions report. Mr. Setchell, your slide on the hosting support, if you could elaborate on that a bit. If I understood correctly, that program was aimed at the non-camp displaced people. Is that correct? Could you just elaborate a bit on what was done there? Thanks.

MS. FERRIS: Okay, we'll turn to our panelists. Vlatko, would you like to start? I know that there are questions about financing of housing, sharing information with the government, what's going to happen with the 360,000 and the hosting support. Some of those are for Chuck and some for you.

MR. AVRAMOVSKI: The question from Sarah, how do we work with the government in terms of tracking and displacement? Since the beginning, together, when first camp assessments and registrations were done with DPC, that's the Department of Civil Protection, and also formally there is a memorandum of understanding that we signed with the Minister of Interior to start the registrations in the camps because they were demanding in order to look for further solutions.

That's one point in the start, but now also and during all the process, DPC is involved with providing staff, volunteers, and everything, and using, at any time, any results they need. Basically, our office is their office, they can come and take any results, it's more their data than is our data.

Secondly, with the municipalities, and recent developments that you've seen now with the government in Haiti, there is this new body UCLPB, unit for reconstruction and everything that has one pillar of camp closure. Basically, we serve as their technical support. So, on their demand, and the plans of the government, we planned the phase two registrations.

When the famous 616 program, even before it started, first they approach us and say, okay, we are thinking about these camps, and then we move to those camps and update the register and give -- they were the first recipient of the data list.

Last point. When we are doing the return program, when the final beneficiaries list is established, this is done with representatives from (inaudible) office, so -- office of the (inaudible) mayor, so their presence on the registration, and then they are approving the final beneficiary list.

So, the answer is yes, the government is fully involved and we are encouraging also for more funding or co-funding to transfer the capacities we have. In our unit, there are no experts, there is a lot of Haitians, there are 300 -- it's myself and two more and now we have further (inaudible) all the rest are Haitians, but are they going to remain? How this is going to work and how the government will take care of such a data management processes, we really don't know. We encourage and we are ready to support and to train, but we'll see.

MS. FERRIS: Would you like to comment on the question of evictions and how IOM is dealing with evictions?

MR. AVRAMOVSKI: We just track the evictions in terms of displacement tracking. I'm talking only from the point of the displacement tracking. And then, of course, from the camp management point, we are trying as much as possible to negotiate, to mediate, whenever usually this is coming with the private owners and everything, so, so far we have success in delaying the process until solution is found whenever our camp management operations officers are involved, but of course, we cannot achieve for all the cases that was in the past.

But recently, there are no more -- there is not such a big trend of

evictions. Also, the government and the mayors got the point because some of the

mayors started the evictions but then now with establishing better of the new

government, and establishing with UCLPB and return location camp, this trend is much

lower than it was in '11.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Chuck?

MR. SETCHELL: Thank you. I think, let's start with the loan issue. I

think only recently did the U.S. government, through the Overseas Private Investment

Corporation, develop a substantive micro loan program for housing and small

businesses. This was, I think, announced in September, a $26 million program, of which

$6 million is funding from USAID, from our development side of the agency.

This will probably benefit up to 4,000 families, repair program, retrofitting,

new development, new homes, essentially mortgage finance. It's a very, very small

project, frankly. It's not being replicated at scale by others. We do not see a lot of this

type of funding out there that people can access. This is an issue that I think will remain

very significant in light of the fact that 180,000 structures, not living units, but structures,

of which there were several thousand more actual living units that were either damaged

or destroyed.

Many houses, for example, were tagged as a part of the assessment, the

damage assessment process, were tagged as red, uninhabitable, unsafe. Almost all of

those that are still standing remain occupied and were occupied early on.

A retrofitting program, repair program and retrofitting program, rather

than a new construction program, is absolutely imperative, I think. That can be done

through, perhaps, at the higher end with loan program, at the lower end with grant

program. This needs to be linked, I believe, with a significant increase in the supply of

rental housing.

One of the major constraints now, one of the major impediments that we see in thinking about 360,000 people still in camps is the ability to access safe and affordable rental shelter. It's not being done. There are a lot of innovative ways to do that. We've seen a lot of rooftop second units, if you will, very modest shelters, but frankly quite safe relative to the pre-event housing that existed on the ground.

Those are very modest cost operations and I think they can be done fairly rapidly and can increase the supply of available shelter quite sufficiently to identify and target the 360,000.

I think the -- this issue of protection that came up that I think Vincent and that you also, sir, mentioned, you know, we -- at some point, and I have a discussion with my protection colleagues all the time -- at some point, we need to move away from child-friendly spaces to people-friendly settlements. We can do that through design. We can do that through programming and careful planning, and I think that's the kind of activity we want to do now.

When we talk about safer settlements, it's not just safer from the sense of protection from a flood, a flash flood or an earthquake or a cyclone. It really is how you design. Even camps can be designed to be safer, not 100 percent safe, by any means, but safer. And I think, too, once we get to a point where we identify and recognize that $2.4 billion or so dollars have really yet to be used and implemented in any kind of way and that still, the 2.8 of that total that's been dispersed has not been fully implemented.

There are still significant opportunities to overcome some of the impediments that you've identified. I think one of them is seeking opportunities to increase the supply of rental shelter.

MS. FERRIS: I wonder if I could ask you, Chuck, you've worked in so many natural disasters, how unusual is it that there are 360,000 people still displaced

three years after the earthquake? Is this something we just don't see in other situations?

Or are there particular characteristics of the Haitian earthquake and Haiti that's led to

this?

MR. SETCHELL: All of the above. I do think -- and I say that somewhat

facetiously because I think for the first time in a long time, the international community

has actually spent the time and the effort to track displacement over time. We didn't do

that in the tsunami, we didn't do that in any of the large events that we've seen -- the

Pakistan earthquake of 2005, the massive 2010, '11, and '12 floods in Pakistan.

We had an instance in 2009 before the earthquake in Haiti working in

Indonesia with a big earthquake in Sumatra where there was a data tracking effort in

information at the cluster level, and then the cluster wanted to leave after two months,

once the strategy was developed, and we were very adamant and provided the funding to

keep their toes to the fire, so to speak, and have them stay so that we could develop the

information and the data to be able to track displacement and see how people are

moving into programs and whether or not programs are being effective.

Without that, we can't do it, and I think that's one of the legacies, I think,

of Haiti, will be this -- as perhaps imperfect as it may be -- the information effort by

several different organizations to identify and track displacement. And I think that's

something -- when I see that -- my previous hat, years ago, before FDA, was as an urban

planner and when I see that information presented, that is what I need to be able to plan

communities and plan safe communities.

MS. FERRIS: And for IOM, do you think the displacement tracking

matrix can be used in other situations? Are you working on that?

MR. AVRAMOVSKI: Yes, we are using the concept and even in different

situations and adjust it, because this is not new for us. I am involved with different IDP

crises starting, for example, I can just name things that I was working on or participating

or even the other that I can recall that is in the organization starting from Sudan, South

Sudan movements, tracking of the returns from North to South even before the peace

agreement and then further and even now continuing, targeted registrations in Darfur and

everything. But those times it was, okay, we do one time, one thing, and then return

tracking, as a return tracking is the numbers, okay, so many people in the (inaudible) so

many people are out in Juba.

Darfur registration targeted for full distribution on request of WAP, and

this technical capacity is developed. First, (inaudible) in Haiti we are joining the thing,

like, okay, use it programmatically targeted to the registration, but also keep going and

tracking the numbers and changing the focus. We have another program request also

now in Haiti that we are doing registering people in the neighborhoods and mapping the

houses and updating the house condition. And then we can also link who was in the

camp or was not in the camp.

In Mali we recently started, since June, attempts to get the estimate and

then we went after the first estimate into first registration of IDPS by (inaudible) level in

(inaudible), and that was completed in November and now was published.

So, besides assessment and getting the overall situation still, making

registers in order for people to use, and now it's already lists are given to NGOs in Mali

that are supplying some non-food items to families that were registered and identified by

address in different host community and in Cartias of Mali.

So, at the same time, a little bit to comment on Vincent. Yes, we are

aware, this is not a perfect system, it's not a perfect thing, especially when you are

registering people, but we see the usefulness and we will try to stay on the usefulness

and trying to improve it.

MS. FERRIS: Okay, other questions, comments? Let's go one, two, three.

MR. WILLIAMS: Roger Williams. I'm a consultant in community development. I have a two-part question. I know in Haiti folks have been paid to move out of the camps. Has anybody really tracked where they're going and seeing whether they have, in fact, moved to good housing, or is it just the question of getting the money?

And the second part, of the people that have been displaced, have they just been moved to other unsuitable slums or has any attempt been made to make sure that they're moving to a habitable place? When Chuck commented just now you talked about safe and protection, but not habitable.

MS. FERRIS: Okay, let's take a couple more questions, at the back and then at the front.

SPEAKER: My question is for Vincent. You pointed out a number of issues related to protection in terms of, you know, and then the other issues related to camp displacement, eviction, other things, land issues, and shelter. I just wanted to -- I'm sure everybody knows -- but on the global level, UNHCR is the coordinator for shelter, or co-coordinators in the shelter, also the protection cluster, CCM cluster, and sub -- HLP, house, land and property clusters.

Now, in Haiti, with this responsibility at the global level, what was UNHCR's achievement and contribution in Haiti in the last three years?

MS. FERRIS: Thank you, and this woman here in the front, and if you could please identify yourself.

MS. CHO: Shirley Cho. My question, in some ways, piggybacks on the question this man asked before, it's about this debate about moving from emergency to temporary shelters and permanent shelters. The government has received a lot of

negative press and most of the reactions to the discussions about reducing the number of

people in the camps from 1.5 or 1.2 million down to 400,000, the focus has been on, well,

you've wasted money on temporary shelter, why are there still 400,000 people left. So,

it's more to understand this debate based on your experience elsewhere in the context in

Haiti, what would you have advised, in a sense, and was there really an alternative to

having temporary shelters while funding is being found for permanent shelter.

               MS. FERRIS: Okay, a set of very interesting questions. Do you want to

start, Vlatko? Particularly about people -- you know, what happens to people after they

leave the camps? Do we know if they're moving to safe housing?

               MR. AVRAMOVSKI: Maybe we didn't put more emphasis, we didn't

have time in the presentation. Yes, we track each single that are part of the program. I

assume that you said they are paid, yes, they are paid certain amount, but there is a

whole program. There is guidance, there is a caseworker with the family, they need to

identify the house, then we need to verify the standard that has a minimum standard that

is a separate room for that family, that there is a minimum services like water, sanitation,

minimum services that are accessible to them, and after that, we approve the program,

and we are not paying them directly, we are supplementing -- we are paying the landlord

or -- and then they get the follow up after three months, the first follow up, if they are

there, they get the last installment.

               So, yes, in those terms, yes. If you are referring to some private

initiatives, yes, they were, but very minimal. I can recall maybe $200, $500 that some

private owners of the land took from their pocket $200 or 300 and then people moved

from the camp, but mostly what we mentioned here, this 20,000 that were in process

during last year, they are all in additional program, in minimum conditions and standards

are set. I can show you later on the book and the standards.

MS. FERRIS: Okay, Vincent, the questions about protection.

MR. COCHETEL: Well, again, on this issue of eviction, I think, yes, that's good news there were no eviction over the last two months or so, but, I mean, there's still a lot of people at threat of evictions because even the owners don't see any movement if the program (inaudible) because lack of funding, the eviction will resume in the spring. I mean, we've seen that last year, we've seen that --

MR. AVRAMOVSKI: Yes, yes. Sure.

MR. COCHETEL: So, it's going to -- we have to anticipate those moves. More eviction will lead to more instability, discontent, political instability. I mean, all that is linked at some point, so we need to anticipate that and prevent that.

There were two proposals made at some stage by the humanitarian community. We were not able to convince the donor when they were negotiating with the Haitian government national reconstruction plan two of the things that link to the rental market. One idea was we need to go back to the rental price of before the earthquake. So, have a moratorium for three, four years, no increase on rent.

So, maybe disrupt the market, but at least make this option of affordable housing under the emergency legislation that is possible under the Haitian constitution and all that.

President Preval did not want to do that. The new president has not been yet convinced to do that because he doesn't want to upset some of the families that are controlling the housing market in Haiti, I think we have to be clear on that.

Second issue, which is also linked to that, the president has the possibility under the constitution to declare some land of -- in the public domain or in the eminent domain. When the international community asked President Preval to do that, he refused to do that with little exception, Corel and a few others. We need land, and

space is limited where you can build in Port-au-Prince. Even in the greater Port-au-Prince, many of the land is not suitable for construction.

So, at some stage, you need land. You need to address that and you need political courage to take the decision that you're going to have to nationalize land or rent it for 50 years or do something with it, but provide a space for that. Otherwise those people are going to be stuck in camps forever.

As to what UN should do or has done in Haiti, we have a very, very modest presence. In a sense, it's a national disaster situation; it's not a conflict-driven displacement, so we were asked to support the protection cluster lead, the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. We are assisting them. Today, as we speak, we have only small project, one is for response to victim of sexual gender-based violence, a network of safe house in the country with (inaudible) on some resettlement for some of those women, so -- on their kids. So, we have a small protection program there.

On the rest, we tried to support the Haitian government in trying to address some of the gaps in their civil registration, which is impacting badly the people who were never registered in Haiti at birth or people who have lost documentation during the earthquake, but it's also affecting hundreds of thousands of Haitians or people of Haitian origin living further afield in the Caribbean countries, in Latin American, Central America, even in North America.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. We turn to Chuck for the last word and the question of was there an alternative to temporary shelter, T-shelter.

MR. SETCHELL: Well, a couple of things. I wanted to get back to Marc Cohen's question about hosting support. I do think that this is a coping mechanism that we see everywhere. It's been happening for centuries. Most cultures and societies that we work in sense an obligation to host family and friends, primarily, or village mates or

kin or something from the same province, what have you, so it's a socially defined

process. It usually happens before we, the humanitarian community, gets on the scene.

It frays rather quickly because people are burdened and they lack

privacy and their food is being consumed and their water is being consumed. That needs

to be supported and that's what we do, and we've been doing that for some time. This is

only now becoming, I think, more and more widespread in terms of support within the

humanitarian community. Very, very modest inputs can go a very, very long ways.

Again, there are basic two forms, social, kinship, and then maybe rental

and a more market-based. We tend to shy away from the market-based because we find

that hosting works very well when it's family and friends, or works better.

As for housing, I think we saw in Haiti a couple of things. The

humanitarian community has traditionally had a rural focus with institutional memories

and practices, the Sphere Project guidance, all rooted in African refugee camps. That's

been the focus of the humanitarian community for 40 years.

Haiti, Port-au-Prince was not a rural, African setting, and yet the

responses were such, very ill conceived, frankly.

I also think that the development side has certainly lost the ability to

engage in urban development and reconstruction. USAID provided funding for

permanent housing as a part of a supplemental that we received from Congress. It was

the first such funding that I saw in my nearly 15 years at OFDA. Think of all the disasters

that have happened in the last 15 years. We haven't seen a whole lot of money for

permanent housing. Permanent housing isn't a part of my office's work, but I'd like to

think that we can collaborate with colleagues and make that happen. It's been very, very

difficult.

And I think other donors, the same thing. I don't have counterparts, for

example, in other donors, so developing shelter guidance and practices is very difficult

and having common ground, and large disasters tend to attract a lot of organizations that

are not typically a part of the humanitarian community.

So, they are well intentioned, don't often know the institutional landscape

of the cluster approach and who the cluster lead agencies are or what the Sphere Project

guidelines are or what donors are looking for in terms of funding support. So, it's very

difficult, and what you get, at the end of the day, are very divergent outputs.

Some organizations want to go to Haiti and build ten houses. I've seen

this over and over and over again all over the world. Those ten houses might be the best

darn houses you're ever going to see, but they're the Mercedes Benz of shelter when

everybody else is trying to provide basic coverage, and that creates acrimony and

significant disparities in output and intent.

And so, that creates problems, and I think not having -- not tying into the

cluster and not having a strong linkage to the government as a co-host of the cluster,

creates real problems with regard to the design of basic principles, concepts, guidance,

and therefore, outputs. And so, we've struggled with that, I think, mightily in Haiti and

elsewhere, and probably Haiti more so than just about anywhere that I can think of in

recent times.

MS. FERRIS: Vlatko, did you want to add something?

MR. AVRAMOVSKI: Very short on the rental market and the program

and how to control the rental price.

I just want to give one example with the return program, the only possible

control mechanism that we have is to let the family negotiate because they are

encouraged to negotiate less price because the remaining amount, they will receive it for

their own needs for household goods and anything that they may need in the follow up

visit. So, that's how we are trying to control because if we go ask organizations to rent

houses, it will be impossible, prices will go very high.

        So, that's one of the only mechanisms that we have.

        MS. FERRIS: Obviously, many complicated issues remain about Haiti.

And I'm sure we'll probably be organizing other events talking about different dimensions

about the humanitarian and the long-term response.

        Thank you all very much for coming and please join me in thanking our

panel.

        (Applause)

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