"The Future of European Muslims Revisited"

Book Launch of *"Europe 2030"* (Brookings Press 2010)
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I am delighted to be here to represent the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, which has benefitted greatly from its cooperation with the Luso-American Development Foundation. This book would not have seen the light of day without FLAD's support.

Europe 2030 is an unusual volume with a light but detectable Portuguese accent. This is fitting, given the significance of the city of Lisbon – and of Portuguese political leadership – in driving some of the most important institutional advances of the EU in the last decade. This book has something in common with the publications of the Bureau of European Policy Advisors in the Commission Presidency or the scenarios explored by the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends reports. But unlike those two organizations, the collaboration of Brookings and Luso-American gives *Europe 2030* a genuinely transatlantic perspective. It will be of interest to the same target audiences – which is to say, anyone with an interest in the future of European politics, society and EU integration.

My chapter in this book discusses the future of European Muslims. The Muslim presence is currently estimated at 15-17 million or roughly 3.7% of the EU-27 population. By 2030, the number of individuals of Muslim background is expected to grow to roughly 25 million, or around 6 %. Keeping in mind the extraordinary diversity of this population, I speculate on the political evolution of two main policy areas where governments (including the EU) can make a difference: 1) Muslims' political participation, and 2) Islamic religious leadership.

European countries have rich and complicated pasts with the Islamic world, including conquest and colonialism that went both ways, from the late 8th century to the mid-20th century. The last fifty years of Muslim-European history, however, which accounts for the arrival of nearly all of today's Muslim population, is largely the result of *voluntary economic migration* and its aftermath. The Muslim presence is therefore of a decidedly post-colonial – and post-guestworker – nature, and this will only become more pronounced in the next 20 years. Where political violence has and, regrettably, will likely again occur, its immediate trigger is arguably contemporary foreign policy disputes, and not ancient rivalries. Where urban unrest has broken out, it by contrast has had nothing to do with foreign policy and everything to do with elusive socio-economic mobility and the political integration that would normally transmit these interests upwards into national democratic institutions. The reality of radicalism and violence among a tiny minority of European Muslims will not disappear overnight. But governments can diminish the relevance and attractiveness of anti-

system ideologies by improving institutional representation of Muslims and their wide variety of interests. What is the Europe of 2010 doing to minimize conflict in 2030?

In the book chapter, I discuss what Islamic politics might look like twenty years from now, and I try to paint a realistic yet optimistic portrait of majority-minority relations. Much of my optimism is based on the accomplishments of the very recent European past: the last ten years, which we usually think of as the tumultuous decade of the "war on terror." But in key Member States, the groundwork has been laid for the recognition of Islam alongside other faiths, and the normalization of State-Islam relations through the creation of Islamic Councils Today's handful of self-identified Muslim politicians who have entered local and national politics in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, the UK and elsewhere are paving the way for the next generation's political participation on a more massive scale. The dual successes – however modest at this early date – of recruiting reliable and legitimate religious and secular leadership will serve as important precedent for the generation that comes of age twenty years from today.

This is especially critical because 2030 will witness the mobilization of the first generation of native-born Muslim voters born in the last decade. This simple milestone will mark the overcoming of a dangerous democratic deficit of the past four decades: a majority of Muslim adults were Third Country Nationals who had neither local nor national voting rights. Will the coming generation have grievances regarding basic religious freedoms or the openness of political parties to their participation? How else, other than through institutional progress and continued democratization, can Europe hope to diminish the salience of a widening "religious cleavage"?

I also discuss in my chapter what a possible Turkish EU accession would mean for likely migration patterns and for the religious life of Muslims in Europe. The Turkish case is very interesting because of the strong role that the state plays in managing the practice of Islam both at home and for Turks living abroad With its state-sponsored religion, Turkey does provide "a powerful alternative to radical Islam," as President Barroso has said – as, by the way, Morocco and Algeria have done for many years. Just last month, a Ministry for Turks Abroad was created in Ankara, and it invited 1500 members of Turkish civil society from Western Europe to a gala conference in Turkey. The Moroccan government has had such a ministry for *its* citizens abroad for years, and in 2009 it established an Ulama council for Europe. The "Consultative Committee for Moroccans living Abroad" has held a growing number of conferences for European policymakers and European-Moroccan leaders. Algeria has recently reinforced its key religious outposts in France, which enjoy good relations with local authorities. This governmental activity reflects an increase in attention paid, and resources invested, in nurturing ties with European "diaspora" groups.

For the major emigration countries of the Mediterranean basin, such as Algeria, Turkey and Morocco, the percentage of their national émigré population living in Europe is around 75%. The European outreach by non-EU partners is carried out for practical reasons – to ensure a steady flow of tourists, remittances and foreign direct investment. But it also has a security-driven logic – to keep a close watch on dissident Islamist networks active in Europe who may threaten the regime at home. The success of these experiments will depend on the continued engagement of European governments. Right now, the current cross-border activity contrasts favorably with the 1980s and 1990s, when the Islam "of the embassies" demanded a monopoly over representation in European state-Islam relations and refused to sit at the same table as dissident organizations.

Today, the religious programs and personnel of Algeria, Morocco or Turkey, for example, are increasingly being adapted to European contexts. Quasi-"official" representatives now conduct

business in the language of host states, they cooperate with European governments on the training of religion teachers and imams, and in some cases, they have even begun to accept the legitimacy of rival organizations in European Muslim communities. Nonetheless, these same countries' authorities continue to export other personnel and religious content that has not yet been adapted to the European "market."

Both the Moroccan and Turkish governments have established ministries for their *citizens* abroad, but it is not a great leap to surmise that their real constituency includes their *children and grandchildren***;** that is to say, EU citizens. These governments are confident in the universality of their respective messages – whether their legitimacy is rooted in the Moroccan "commander of the faithful" or in the Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs – and these are mostly salutary influences. As the integration of 2nd, 3rd and 4th generations progresses, European governments – and the European Union itself – will need the cooperation, expertise and support of the former sending states. But in their own interest, Europeans will hopefully also continue to maintain a healthy diversity among their religious interlocutors through initiatives like the Deutsche Islam Konferenz, the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board in the UK, and other such national bodies. To fail to do so would be to accept unfiltered foreign interference in domestic affairs and to renounce the full "naturalization" of Muslims and Islam in a European context

As Muslim populations are now made up of a majority of member state citizens, European countries and the EU face a choice: Who will be recognized to speak for Muslims' religious interests? Understandably, the question of representation is still being resolved at this relatively early date, but it will remain urgent. Even though EU competence in the domain of religious representation is limited, in an era of prohibition of headscarves, burkas and minarets, there is a critical role to be played by the Commission, the Court of Justice (and of other supranational bodies like the ECHR) in upholding religious freedom and preserving the natural diversity of religious perspectives among those Muslims who choose to join or create organizations along religious lines.

Since 2005, the Commission under President Barroso's leadership has made important symbolic overtures to religious groups. President Barroso has received annually the leading dignitaries of the major monotheistic religions, including of course Muslims. The Commission also supported the Prague Imams conference, the European Values Summit, the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, and other initiatives. All of these efforts to engage Muslim civil society in its full diversity contribute to the routinization, domestication and normalization of Muslims' political and religious participation in tomorrow's European Union.

The political and religious integration of Muslims are just two of the challenges facing Europe in the next twenty years that are discussed in *Europe 2030*. All of these developments will have an impact on European construction and transatlantic relations. This book demonstrates that US-European cooperation remains critical to addressing the most pressing foreign policy challenges of our day, which alas are likely to resemble the ones we face in 2030.