

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

THE NEW START TREATY: WHY IT MATTERS

A DISCUSSION FEATURING FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY  
ADVISOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Washington, D.C.  
Friday, July 23, 2010

**PARTICIPANTS:**

**Introduction:**

STROBE TALBOTT  
President, The Brookings Institution

**Featured Speaker:**

BRENT SCOWCROFT  
President, The Scowcroft Group

**Panelists:**

DARYL KIMBALL, Moderator  
Executive Director, The Arms Control Association

STEVEN PIFER  
Senior Fellow and Director, Arms Control Initiative  
The Brookings Institution

MORTON H. HALPERIN  
Senior Advisor, Open Society Policy Center

ANGELA STENT  
Director, Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies  
Georgetown School of Foreign Service  
Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. TALBOTT: Good afternoon, everybody. I'm Strobe Talbott of The Brookings Institution, and it's my pleasure to welcome all of you to what promises to be a very timely event. At least we've given you a cool surrounding to come in from one of the dog days of July here. But as I look around the audience, I can see any number of people who have been deeply involved in the subject that we're going to be talking about today, which is, of course, arms control.

Brookings is proud to be co-sponsoring this event with the Arms Control Association, which is represented here very appropriately by Daryl Kimball. The Arms Control Association and Brookings share a commitment to finding as many ways as we possibly can to inform the public, national, and sometimes international debate on issues having to do with arms control and nonproliferation, and here in this building at Brookings that effort is very ably steered by Steve Pifer, who's part of the panel.

We on the Brookings end want to also thank the Ploughshares Fund and the MacArthur Foundation for the generous support that they've given us for work in this area.

I might add it is also very good to have Mort and Angela here with us today. Both have long and very close ties to Brookings, as well as a very deep knowledge of the issues that we're going to be talking about, and principally that means the debate over the ratification of the New

START Treaty.

As I think everybody in this room knows, it's been 18 years since the old START Treaty was ratified. That was during the administration of George Herbert Walker Bush. Nuclear diplomacy was one of several areas where President Bush skillfully managed U.S.-Soviet relations during a tumultuous and, it seemed sometimes, a dangerous period when the USSR was disintegrating. While President Bush often is associated with the conduct of the first Gulf War, he deserves equal praise for an even more consequential achievement, which was the way that he used his extraordinary personal and political relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev to help end the Cold War in a way that not only preserved the nuclear peace but strengthened it and also in a way that laid the ground for a Europe whole and free.

In that accomplishment, as in many others, President Bush had at his side, our keynote speaker. Brent Scowcroft was involved in every strategic arms agreement going back to SALT I in the Nixon Administration. He was with Gerald Ford at Vladivostok in 1974, working with Leonid Brezhnev to keep the SALT process alive after President Nixon's resignation. Brent served both Presidents Ford and Bush 41 as national security advisor.

Aside from his distinguished public career, I believe that he as a private citizen has a kind of lifetime appointment as a national security advisor to the entire nation. For decades, he has been a strong,

clear, and independent as well as sagacious voice on issues of war and peace. And, I might add, he has been a friend, a counselor, a mentor to many of us here today, myself certainly included. We're fortunate and grateful to have him establish the frame for our discussion.

So, General, over to you.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Thank you very much, Strobe, for that great introduction, especially about the SALT -- the arms control process. My job is an unpaid position, I want you to know, that he described.

I'm very happy to be here to talk with you about what is in some ways a very important treaty and in some ways a very insignificant treaty. It's important because it needs to be passed.

Let me go back and review the whole strategy arms control process with the Soviet Union to put this in a kind of perspective that it needs, because much of the debate is not about this treaty and what it's designed to do, but it's about other issues that people have, and some of them seem to me only dimly related to the treaty which is before us.

The philosophy of strategic arms control, while it really began in the latter part of the Johnson Administration, was formulated in the Nixon Administration, and it's been followed generally ever since, and not everybody really recognizes what the process was. But it was designed in three phases.

The first phase, which came to be SALT I, was to stop the

production of nuclear weapons. We had an arms race which was going on, and each one was pushing its favorite weapons to stay ahead or get ahead or whatever, and this was just cease in place. And that's what SALT I did. It just froze the process.

Now, phase 2 was designed to, to use the word "equilibrate," the two forces. The force structures are very different. They emphasized land-based ICBMs, heavy ICBMs; we emphasized MIRVs, sea-based, air-based. They were very different kinds of forces. Now, how do you balance them? How do you make them equal? So then you can say which was to be phase 3, okay, let's reduce, and we reduce in these ways so that we don't disturb that balance. And that was the general philosophy of this process. And SALT I was successful.

Nixon resigned, as Strobe says, and President Ford picked it up -- picked up the process at Vladivostok. And there was some useful progress made, but it came a cropper on two new weapon systems: the Soviet backfire bomber and the U.S. cruise missile, nuclear cruise missile. And we didn't know how to count those, and neither one wanted them to count because they weren't strategic weapons. So, anyway the process sort of collapsed.

President Carter picked it up and pushed to a treaty, SALT II. He sort of combined phases 2 and 3, and probably it was too ambitious for the process. Anyway, SALT II did not pass.

The process was picked up again by President Bush, Sr.,

and ended up in START I, which really was this phase 2. These are what the forces looked like. These are how they are balanced. He went on and tried in START II, which was never ratified, tried to go on to phase 3, which was reductions, some of which took place in Bush 43's administration. But importantly, in START II, which was not ratified, there was an attempt to strengthen the stability of the balance, because there was to be a ban on MIRV'd ICBMs, because in a crisis, a MIRV'd ICBM is an incentive to a first strike to get an advantage.

So, that's the whole process.

Now, what unfortunately happened, there was a long pause after START I, as Strobe has also said, and all of the rules that are embodied in START I -- the counting rules, the verification, the other kinds of measures which went into equilibrating these forces -- were embodied in START I. They ran out December last year. So, we don't have those anymore. And you can't -- the sides really cannot proceed substantively toward either reductions or changing the balance of forces, changing the nature of the forces so that the balance is more stable without those rules, because they give both sides confidence. They were both talking the same game using the same rules. And that's what this treaty is designed to do. It's not designed to be phase 3 fundamentally, to go into either reductions or change the character of forces. It's just designed to take this body of rules, which has been formulated since 1962, and keep them in place so then we can decide what we want to do on arms control. So, the

treaty is essential if we're to move ahead, because if we don't have it, we really cannot proceed. We don't have to proceed anyway, but we cannot proceed, again, because so much of the structure of what we're doing will be ended.

Now, it's true that there are questions raised about some of the treaty language. There are ambiguities. There are omissions and so on. I think most of those are in the esoteric of the negotiations, and my sense is that the treaty negotiators can clear up most of those, but we'll talk about some of those things.

The treaty, of course, makes no provision for the maintenance of our deterrent capability, nor should it. Of course, to me it remains essential that our strategic nuclear capability be safe, reliable, and capable. But that is a unilateral U.S. requirement quite apart from the treaty, and those who say no, it ought to be a part of a precondition, are mixing apples and oranges.

There are a number of criticisms which deal with what the treaty does not do. And, as I said, the treaty was not designed to move the process forward. Yes, it reduces the number of forces on each side by a very modest amount, but what it was designed to do is to preserve the structure within which we have operated, which gives both sides the confidence that we're both talking the same way, and then we can move on to either deeper reductions to changing the character of the forces to improve stability and so on. So, this treaty is not substantively important;

it is vital if we are to continue the process of strategic arms control with Russia.

Thank you.

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you very much, General Scowcroft, for those excellent opening remarks that really set the stage for our discussion about the New START Treaty itself and why it matters for U.S. national security.

My name is Daryl Kimball. I'm the executive director of the Arms Control Association, and we're glad to co-sponsor this event with the Brookings Institution.

We're now going to turn to three expert panelists who are going to look in more detail at some of the issues concerning the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and first we're going to hear from Mort Halperin, who's senior advisor to the Open Society Institute and who was a member of the congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which finished its report in May of 2009. He served in the Nixon, Johnson, and Kennedy administrations, and the Clinton Administration's work on nuclear policy and arms control. Some even say that he was working in the Hoover Administration, but we'll have to confirm that to verify that rumor. And he recently testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the New START Treaty. He's going to address several of the questions that have been raised about the New START Treaty by some and explain why these issues should not delay the



consideration and eventual ratification of the treaty.

And then we'll hear from Steve Pifer, who's a senior fellow here at the Brookings Institution at the Center for the United States and Europe and the Arms Control Initiative of the Brookings Institution, and he's going to delve into the verification issues relating to New START, why it's effectively verifiable, why this verification system is important for U.S. and international security.

And last but not least, we're going to hear from Professor Angela Stent. She's going to address how New START has already helped reset U.S.-Russia relations, how this fits into our broader objectives with Russia on issues of common concern. She's a nonresident senior fellow in foreign policy here at Brookings, and she's also at the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies at Georgetown.

So, with that introduction, I'm going to turn it over to Mort. And then after each of the speakers addresses these issues, we'll take your questions.

Mort?

MR. HALPERIN: Thank you very much. It's always a pleasure to be back at Brookings.

My task is to try to talk about and respond to some of the criticism that's been leveled against the treaty, and that's a little hard to do, because the criticisms change every week. As the lack of merit of

each criticism is revealed, we move on to new ones, and the most recent one has been we have to read the treaty more carefully, because we're sure there's a problem buried in it that we haven't yet found.

The fact is that the negotiation of this treaty followed almost to the T the advice of the Strategic Commission that I had the privilege of serving on and which -- those of you who know about the range of views on this subject, this Commission went from the center to the far right, and it had a group of people in it, none of whom can be called devoted arms control advocates. And yet it agreed on a simple recommendation that the administration should, as its first step, negotiate a modest treaty with Russia, which does, as General Scowcroft suggested, simply continue the procedures and the context and the structure of our arms control relationship with Russia; that it should involve only modest additional limitations on our forces. And that advice was followed and the treaty is, I think, one that makes important strides in the way that's been suggested. So, let me look at some of the criticism briefly.

The first one is that the treaty is acceptable if at all only if we, in fact, modernize our force. And we cannot trust the Congress to agree to the modernization proposals made by the President. Those proposals lead to very substantial -- will lead to very substantial increases over the planned modernization proposed by the Bush Administration. The person in charge of that modernization has said that he would have killed for the budget that we now have from the Obama Administration, and the

Congress is beginning to move to approve it. The first committee votes have been very successful.

And I would argue that far from making sense to hold up the treaty to try to see whether the modernization takes place, that we need to understand that the success of the modernization will depend on the ratification of this treaty and in my view, then, moving ahead with the ratification of the Test Ban Treaty. Because the previous Congresses under Republican presidents and Republican control of the Congress turned down proposals for modernization, because they saw them as an effort to build up our nuclear forces, to find new purposes for nuclear weapons. And the Congress I think clearly will not do that, will not approve an effort to introduce new purposes for new nuclear weapons. But when you present them, what this administration has in the context of the START Treaty and the Nuclear Posture Review, with a proposal to build down our nuclear forces, to exclude nuclear testing, and to exclude the development of new weapons for new military purposes, then the argument that says we ought to have a modern, effective, safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal is a very strong one and will get and continue to get overwhelming support from the Congress and from the American public. So, if you want the modernization of the force, if you want a safe, secure, and reliable arsenal, you should be for prompt ratification of the treaty.

The next set of arguments that's raised has to do with

ballistic missile defense. And this I find, again, deeply disappointing and surprising, because in this area as well the administration followed precisely the recommendations of the Perry-Schlesinger Commission. The treaty itself places no limits on the effective deployment of ballistic missile defense. There is a statement in the preamble that says there's a connection between offense and defense. I was present when we tried very hard to persuade the Soviet Union that there was a connection between offense and defense. It took many years. We finally persuaded them of something which is obvious to anybody that looks at the issue and which is described in the Commission report, namely, if we or the Russians make an effort to take away the offensive capability of the other by building large defenses, the result will be a buildup of offensive forces, no greater security for either country. At the end of the day, each of us will have the same capability to destroy the other as we had before, but the forces will simply be much larger and much more unstable. So, there is that connection, it is one that we need to accept.

Second, there is a ban on placing missile defenses in strategic offensive missile launchers. The head of our Missile Defense Command has testified that while that looked like an attractive option a few years ago, and we actually did deploy a few in missile silos which are grandfathered in by the treaty, that that's no longer considered a sensible option. We now know how to do this by building from scratch. And the military is unanimous in its view that we can build missile launch -- anti-

missile launchers faster and more effectively and more efficiently by building them from scratch rather than trying to put them in missile silos.

So, there is this limit. It makes a clear separation between offense and defense, but it has no real effect on our capability.

And finally, there's the Russian unilateral statement, which says that they reserve the right to withdraw from the treaty if we build up our missile defenses. The United States, while it hasn't said it, also reserves the right to withdraw from the treaty if the Russians build up their defenses. And either of us would withdraw if there was a very large buildup. But if we stick to our current plans to deploy missile defense against Iran and against North Korea, it poses no threat to the Russians and will not lead to withdrawal.

Moreover, the Russians' threat to withdraw will not have any impact on the U.S. program, just as it had no impact on our negotiating position when the Russians suggested that they wanted more limits on ballistic missile defense. The Administration said, properly in my view, then we won't have a treaty. And I think it is clear to the Russians that that line has been drawn.

Finally, at one point we were told, and some people still say, that the treaty doesn't ban rail mobile systems because it doesn't mention them. But, in fact, they are subsumed within the definition of missiles and missile launchers, which are prohibited or limited by the treaty. And if the Russians decided to go to a new rail mobile system it would, I think, in

every reasonable view of the treaty, be covered by the treaty.

Those are the main objections that I'm aware of. If others of you out there have others, I'm happy to try to address them.

Thank you.

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you very much. Now, we'll turn to Steve Pifer. Steve.

MR. PIFER: Well, thank you, Daryl. First of all, you gave me the task of delving into the details of the verification of the New START Treaty. I'm not sure if I'm going to make a lot of progress in five minutes. This is the text of the treaty, the protocol and the associated documents, and probably between 85 and 90 percent of these pages deal with verification issues. So, let me just make maybe three or four basic observations about New START and verification.

The first is that some have criticized New START for having less in the way of verification than was the case with the START I Treaty signed in 1991. And it is true, back in July of last year, when the presidents met in Moscow, they agreed that they would try to streamline and simplify the verification provisions. And there were several reasons for this.

First of all, the militaries on both sides wanted to make verification less costly and less intrusive on day-to-day operational practices.

Second, the sides had 15 years of implementing the regime

of START I. So, they learned what made sense, they learned ways to make it more efficient, and they applied that in the New START negotiation.

Third, some of the threats they were worried about when they negotiated the START I Treaty back in the late 1980s didn't really materialize. A lot of the START I verification regime dealt with a question about mobile ICBMs, when there was a concern that the Soviets would deploy hundreds and hundreds of these. And, in fact, START I had a limit of no more than 1,100 warheads on mobile ICBMs. Well, in fact, now 20 years later, we've seen the Russians have a much more modest program. They've shut down the program for rail-mobile ICBMs, and the number of road-mobile ICBMs they had as of a year ago was about 190. So, the concern on that area has dropped down.

Finally, some START I limits are not replicated in the New START Treaty, so you don't need the associated verification measures. An example here is the question of telemetry, the information that a ballistic missile broadcasts during its test flight that allows the missile to report on its performance. START I had specific limits that required access to telemetry. The New START Treaty does not have those limits.

Now, I think it would have been a good thing if we could have had the full START I access to telemetry in this new treaty, but the Russians refused to go that far. So, instead we have a more limited provision that's really not a verification measure, and Secretary Gates has

said he does not see a need for telemetry to verify the treaty. But this more limited provision actually serves as an additional transparency measure.

So, my second observation would be that whether New START has less in the way of verification compared to START I is not really the right metric to judge the verification provisions of the New START Treaty. The question really should be: does the New START Treaty have monitoring and verification provisions that are appropriate for its limits and that will give us high confidence that we could detect a militarily significant violation in a timely manner? And by “in a timely manner” what I’m referring to is in time for the United States to take steps to respond before its security was jeopardized.

That leads to my third observation, which is when you look at the aggregate of measures in this document the answer to the question is yes, the New START Treaty is effectively verifiable. We can have high confidence that we would detect any militarily significant violation.

And just to go through some of the verification measures. First of all, as with every arms control treaty going back to the 1960s, the basis for verification is National Technical Means of Verification, things like imaging satellites. And by all accounts U.S. National Technical Means are very, very good, but this document has other provisions, many of which are designed to help augment National Technical Means. For example, it provides for a data exchange, which requires a huge exchange of data



between the sides. In this document the format -- just the format -- for the data that the Russians have to provide after the treaty enters into force runs 34 pages. They have to give us not only aggregate numbers, but the location of every deployed ICBM, every deployed SLBM, and the number of warheads on each one of those missiles. We are going to know a lot Russian strategic forces with this agreement in place that we won't know without it. Likewise, every intercontinental ballistic missile, every submarine launched ballistic missile, every heavy bomber is going to -- for the first time -- going to have a unique identifier, which will allow us to track systems from production to deployment to elimination.

In here are about 43 notification formats. More than 15 of those are related to notifications that the sides have to make about changes to their strategic forces: when an ICBM is produced at a production facility, when it goes to a test range, when it's eliminated. All of this information allows us to queue our National Technical Means and use them much more effectively.

Moreover, there's an inspection regime here which is simpler than the inspection regime in START I. START I had between 10 and 12 different kinds of inspection, New START has 2. But those inspections actually are going to give us more insights into what the Russians are doing, in part because we're going to have to inspect a smaller number of sites in Russia.

My final observation will be that with the verification

measures in the New START Treaty we're going to have much more transparency about Russian strategic forces. We're going to have a much better understanding about how they operate, maintain, and arm those forces. That's going to be good for confidence-building, it's going to be good for stability, and it's going to allow for better informed choices on the U.S. side about how we equip, operate, and structure our own strategic forces. And that seems to me to be a very significant reason to ratify.

And here I would pick up on General Scowcroft's point is the verification regime in the START I Treaty expired in December when the START I Treaty expired. We're now in a gap where we're dependent simply on National Technical Means of Verification. And closing that gap and beginning to get access to the kind of information that this Treaty provides would seem to be a reason for ratification sooner rather than later.

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you, Steve. I think you shouldn't doubt yourself so much, because you did an excellent job summarizing the details of the verification system.

Next, we're going to hear from Angela Stent, who's going to talk about the U.S.-Russian relationship and New START.

MS. STENT: Thank you very much, Daryl. I was asked to talk about the meaning of START for broader U.S.-Russian relations, and I, too, am going to make three points. And the first one, I think we all need to remember how important the relationship with Russia is for the United

States, because sometimes we don't remember it enough. It's of critical -- Russia is critically important for a number of our global interests. We're both the world's two largest nuclear powers, we hold a key to the future of the nonproliferation regime, and this is a regime that both Republican and Democratic Administrations have supported.

But beyond that, Russia plays a crucial role and can play a major role in enabling us to achieve the objectives that we're pursuing in Afghanistan, in Iran, and in combating terrorism. And conversely, Russia can also make it much more difficult for us to achieve those aims. So, that's another reason for the importance of Russia.

The improvement of U.S.-Russian relations over the past year has not only led to the START Agreement, but to an agreement on military transportation for Afghanistan over Russian territory -- something that -- that agreement is being implemented, the conditions are improving -- and to Russia joining us for a vote on more robust sanctions against Iran in the United Nations Security Council. Again, we can argue about that resolution, but Russia has now joined us in that.

So, how does START fit into this picture? And what impact could it have on other issues? The U.S. commitment to negotiate START, I would argue, was the prerequisite for the reset. The reset would have been very difficult without it. You've heard from my colleagues about the substance of the treaty. I'm not going to talk about the substance, but I'm going to say that the process of negotiating START was very important for

improving our relationship with Russia across a variety of fields.

For many years the Russians have complained that we did not take their interests into account, that we didn't afford them the international role that they deserve. Again, we can talk about that -- those concerns, but remember Vladimir Putin's speech in 2007 to the Munich Security Conference, and the tone of that speech, because I'm going to come back to a Medvedev speech in a minute. So, we know what these Russian concerns and complaints were, and they did affect the way that Russia dealt with the United States over the past decade.

Now, the Obama Administration's reset policy has been predicated on acknowledging those Russian concerns and on changing the rhetoric and the reality of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Now, of course, it remains a selective partnership. Just juxtapose the "Cheeseburger Summit" between our two presidents last month followed very shortly by the exchange on the tarmac in Vienna of the spies. So, yes, it's a complicated relationship.

But in negotiating START, we have signaled to the Russians that we treat them as an equal partner on this issue, and we have a framework, an established framework, that General Scowcroft and my other colleagues have talked about. And this may be the last arms control treaty of its kind, but it's been very important for reestablishing this relationship with Russia, and it is the major accomplishment so far of the reset.

Now, last week, President Medvedev gave a speech to the Russian diplomatic corps. I've been following these speeches by Russian and Soviet leaders for more years than I would like to recall, but I have never seen a speech in which the threat from NATO has been so downplayed. Medvedev talked about the United States as one of Russia's key international partners, ahead of China and the CIS and everything else. He talked about a paradigm shift in relations between the United States and Russia.

So, if you read that speech, if you go to the Brookings website and see the speech that President Medvedev gave here at Brookings in April, you see a very different tone and a very different discussion of substance than the day after President Obama was elected. I don't know whether any of you remember that, on November 5th, I believe, in 2008, when Medvedev made a speech saying -- threatening to deploy missiles in Kaliningrad if the United States went ahead with its own missile defense deployment. So, there really has been a change there in the rhetoric.

And I think the other reason for this is that Russia has recognized that it cannot modernize its economy without a substantial input from advanced market economies -- the United States, the West -- and it needs some more cooperative political relationship with the West in order to achieve that.

And my third point has to do with our relationship with our

NATO allies and their view of Russia and their view of START. I would say the negotiation of START and its signing has been an important element in narrowing the transatlantic gap over how we should deal with Russia. Our policy is now more aligned with that of our allies than it was previously; I think that's very obvious.

Now, some of you may say, yes, but that applies to Western Europe. But what about Central Europe and the Baltic states? And I would argue now that, as a result of a reevaluation both by Central Europe and by Russia, in fact, there's -- this difference between old and new Europe on how to deal with Russia has really narrowed, and we have much greater alignment now in the transatlantic community on how to deal with Russia, and I think that's beneficial for us.

So, today we face common strategic challenges: combating Islamic extremism and the terrorism that it engenders; stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The START Treaty, as I said, represents the most concrete accomplishment of an American attempt to ensure that Russia is part of the solution to these problems; very important. If START is ratified, I think the next challenge will be the next phase of the reset policy, which I believe is going to be more difficult and challenging than the first phase. If it is not ratified, however, I think that will adversely affect the whole spectrum of the U.S.-Russian relationship, and it will impact negatively on a far broader set of critical American interests worldwide.

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you very much all three of you. And we've heard each of the speakers talk about different aspects of the New START Treaty. We heard from General Scowcroft about how this is part of a continuum of U.S.-Russian efforts to reduce strategic nuclear weapons, and that this puts us back on track to do that. We've heard about why the verification system is of value to the United States, about how this treaty will permit the United States to maintain a robust nuclear deterrent, and how it's going to contribute to a more positive U.S.-Russian relationship.

Now, we're going to begin with some -- go into some questions from the audience. And I will ask those of you who want to ask a questions to raise your hand. A microphone will come to you. Please make your question a question and not a statement.

And as you get warmed up with your questions, I just want to start us off with a question for General Scowcroft, following on what you said at a hearing on the New START Treaty back in June before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And you said, and I quote, "the principal result of non-ratification would be to throw the whole nuclear negotiation situation into a state of chaos. And the reason this treaty is important is, over the decades, we have built up all of these counting rules, all these verification procedures, and so on. And if -- so that each side feels that, yes, we can take these steps."

So, could you just elaborate on that thought a little bit further,

about why you believe U.S. national security would be affected if this treaty were to be rejected or indefinitely delayed?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I think there are a couple of reasons. One is as I described and is graphically presented here. This body of documentation represents countless hours of discussion, negotiations, and so on. This is what gives the two sides the confidence to move ahead and say, okay, we can make cuts here if we eliminate this kind of weapon and so on; we improve stability, the balance, we reduce the chances of a crisis turning into a conflict. And if this is dropped, how do you go on to a next step? You can't, so you have to start all over again, and go back and reconstruct this. So, that's the first part.

The other is the whole issue of let me say proliferation. The U.S. and the Russians are still the custodians of the nuclear age. We own 95 percent of all the nuclear weapons. If we are unable between the two of us to make any progress, what would this do to our urging others not to proliferate, not to go to nuclear weapons because they're a danger to the world, while we sit there and fiddle while Rome burns.

And it seems to me that is -- I'm not saying countries proliferate because of our position. They do it for a variety of reasons. But if we're to try to get a handle on what I think is a growing threat of nuclear proliferation, we've got to show that we're determined ourselves to help the process, not just that we insist others do it.

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you. Do we have any questions from



the audience for the panelists?

Yes, sir. I'm sorry, please tell us who you are and your question.

MR. COLEMAN: I'm Bill Cohen. And I think long ago when Adrian (inaudible) had (inaudible) this problem, I think I was on a committee with him. The questions I want to ask you --

MR. KIMBALL: Check the mic.

MR. COLEMAN: The question -- I won't ask you to show my ignorance, but it also may be something you don't want to answer, My understanding is that the United States was the one that developed the weapon. Now I'd like to know how the Russians got it, how the North Koreans got it, how I think they say the Indians have it and have -- and another country out there. There's a lot of stuff about the Israel has it or could get it. And I know that we told the French and the British what we want to do. So that's one of my with it.

The second problem is that you say you're drawing treaties, and a person says I have X-number of weapons, and you got to spot where he stores each one of them. Now, if he wants to cheat and have another 10 and put it someplace else, how do you know he's done that?

MR. KIMBALL: Okay. So I think we've got a question about the process of proliferation and how this relates to that. And also how do we take into account the possibility of cheating on this treaty?

Perhaps, Steve, you can talk about that, that second

question and the relevance of potential cheating under this New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

MR. PIFER: I'll make a couple points in response on the possibility of cheating. The first point would be that I think it's probably too much to expect that we could detect every little bit of cheating, But I think the focus, therefore, is you focus on detecting cheating that's militarily significant, that's going to cause you significant harm, that would damage the balance.

And I think with this Agreement and our National Technical Means, we have very good ways to prevent that. The Russians might be able to produce, you know, one undeclared missile. That wouldn't really have a big impact on the balance when each side's allowed 1,550 strategic warheads. It would be hard, though, I think, for the Russians to produce a significant number of missiles without declaring them and without subjecting them to the treaty simply because we have our National Technical Means, and we also have a lot of data here that would then show, wait, there's one extra missile here that doesn't jive with the data. So I think this gives us a good handle on that.

Likewise, I think another good question would be how might they -- could they put extra warheads on missiles? This treaty allows us 10 times a year to go to a either a missile submarine base or an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile base and say, okay, we choose that submarine. Open up Missile Tube No. 6. You say there's four warheads

on there, we want to see four warheads.

So we have, I think, mechanisms that are going to create much more confidence and create disincentives to cheating.

I make one last point, is that, you know, when a country thinks about cheating, they think about gains and costs. And it seems to me that under the terms of the New START Treaty there's going to be a huge disincentive to the Russians to cheat, and that is because the United States will have a response. Under the terms of the treaty -- and the Pentagon has already talked about how it plans to structure its forces under the treaty -- the United States will eliminate a relatively small number of missiles and bombers. But most of our reductions to get down below the ceiling of 1,550 warheads will be done by taking warheads off of missiles, but we'll keep the missiles.

So, for example, we have now 450 Minuteman ICBMs in the force. The plan under the treaty is to go down to maybe between 400 or 420 of those ICBMs, each of which will carry a single warhead. Well, each of those missiles actually can carry three warheads, so one of the things the Russians have to ask themselves is, if they cheat, does that provoke the United States to go back and take those single-warhead missiles and put the other warheads back on? So our 400 missiles, instead of carrying 400 warheads, could carry 1,200 warheads.

And you have a similar situation with the ballistic missile submarines. So again, I think if the Russians are ever going to think about

serious cheating, they also have to ask themselves: do they want to see the United States then go and redeploy a full set of warheads, and the United States could in a matter of months add about 1,600 to 1,700 warheads to its arsenal.

So my sense is you have to be concerned about cheating, but it seems to me that with the treaty, we have pretty high confidence that we can detect cheating that would be significant, and we also have a structure that gives the Russians a very strong disincentive to cheat.

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you. Are there other questions? Yes, sir, right here in the blue. And let's make sure that microphone is working.

MR. SURITA: My name's Masata Surita from NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation. I have a question in regards to the timing of the ratification. So in relationship to the November election, when do you think is a likely timing of the attempt to ratify this New START Treaty?

Thank you.

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Steve, do you want to take a shot? And I can address that also, if you'd like.

MR. PIFER: Well, I think the administration's hope is that before the Senate goes out on recess in August that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which is the committee that has primary jurisdiction, will be able to vote it out of committee. And I believe the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has either concluded that they only have maybe one

or two more hearings, so they should be on track for that.

I think in the more optimistic scenario, the administration would even like before the Senate goes out on recess to have the opportunity to have a full floor vote, although most people I talk to think that's pretty optimistic. So that, then, puts the full floor vote back to sometime in the fall after the Senate returns in September.

MR. KIMBALL: Mort, do you want to address this?

MR. HALPERIN: I just -- in the absence of Senator Kerry — would note that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has sole jurisdiction over this and every other treaty. The Armed Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee will hold hearings, but those hearings have to inform senators; they are not part of the formal process.

And, of course, the Senate only consents to ratification. The President will then make a determination to ratify and exchange instruments of ratification with Russia.

I think most people think it will happen before this Congress adjourns and probably will happen before the election. But if it doesn't happen before the election, the Congress will be back in after the election. And I think, unless the careful readers of the treaty find a new provision that none of us have found yet, that the treaty will be ratified before the end of the year.

MR. KIMBALL: Now, let me just add that I would agree with my colleagues about the -- the outlook for the votes in the Committee and

on the floor. The Senate Armed Services Committee is holding two more hearings next week, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has already held its single hearing. There have been a total of almost 20 hearings in the Senate since the treaty was signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev on April the 8<sup>th</sup>; also, the reports that the Congress is due on this issue have been delivered.

The Senate has the information it needs to make a decision. And while it is important in my view for the Senate to look carefully at the treaty and all the details, it's also important to move expeditiously because, as Steve Pifer noted, we are living in a world without any system of regulation of the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. We no longer have a verification and monitoring system to give us a look into Russia's strategic forces, and the longer that we go without that system, the less information we have, the less detail, the less confidence about one another's arsenals. And in my view, that's not a safe condition to be in for an indefinite period of time.

So I would hope that the Senate is going to work expeditiously with the information that it has.

So do we have some other questions? I think there was a question in the middle. Yes, sir?

MR. MARTIN: Paul Kavica Martin, Peace Action, formerly Sane Freeze. Thanks ACA, Brookings, and the panelists for a good briefing.

Can you talk more about the Senate politics behind this? It seems like this treaty is a slam-dunk, and treaties in the past have gotten some 90 to almost all senators voting for it. But it seems like there are some Republicans who are playing politics with this treaty. Can you talk a little bit about that, please?

MR. KIMBALL: The politics. Who would like to wade into the politics? Mr. Halperin? Steve? General Scowcroft?

All right, I think you brought the moderator for the tough questions. All right, that's the way to go.

Well, I think that, as I said, it just -- in answer to the previous question, this is a complex issue. The Senate needs to look very carefully at this, and it's clear that some senators, particularly the Minority Whip Jon Kyl, are looking to get some commitments from the Obama Administration for issues that he cares about before he's willing to allow the treaty to move forward.

And as Mort said in his opening, and as General Scowcroft suggested, it is important for the United States to make sure that there are the necessary resources to maintain the U.S. nuclear arsenal into the future. But what Senator Kyl is saying right now is that he needs some assurances about what will happen in years ahead, beyond the next fiscal year budget, 5, 10 years from now, to make sure the Congress appropriates and authorizes the resources that the Obama Administration has pledged to put forward -- \$80 billion. That is an ask that is next to

impossible for any administration to deliver on.

So I think that Senator Kyl and the Republicans who are concerned about this issue have to be realistic about what the administration can deliver on and whether or not they are holding this treaty up, the consideration, on the basis of substance or whether there are other reasons why they're holding this up.

The administration has put forward a very robust modernization budget, as Mort outlined. It is higher in dollar amounts than the Bush Administration put forward. It's more than enough in the view of the lab directors, the experts looking at this, to maintain the stockpile into the indefinite future.

And so I think it's possible on substantive grounds to move forward with the consideration of the treaty having that in mind. That is one of the key issues that the Republicans are raising as something that they want to see guarantees on before they allow the treaty to move forward.

And, Steve, yes?

MR. PIFER: I think the arguments for ratification of the treaty are overwhelmingly compelling, and I guess I would just add one observation. In 2003, the Senate voted, I think by a vote of 92 to 0, to consent to ratification of the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty that was signed by Presidents Bush and Putin in 2002. That treaty is a little bit shorter than this document. It was two pages.



It limited each side to 1,700 to 2,200 warheads, about the same level as this treaty. It has no limits on missiles or bombers. It had no counting rules, it had no provisions at all for verification. And I guess there would be an interesting question, you know, senators who voted for that treaty, to ratify that treaty in 2003, one would wonder why they would have difficulty with this treaty.

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Yes, sir, over here? If you'd raise your hand again, please? Thank you.

MR. PRICE: Hi. I'm Jeff Price of Steptoe & Johnson, and one time at the Defense Department.

I think Mort's done a great job of addressing many of the concerns that have been raised about the treaty, but just in the interest of completeness, one concern that's also sometime mentioned is the effect of the treaty on prompt global strike, on the ability of using conventional warheads on strategic delivery systems. And I wonder if the panel could address that one.

MR. HALPERIN: What the treaty does is to permit conventional prompt global strike missiles to be placed in existing silos, but it counts against the limit. And the administration has indicated that it was prepared to accept that because its current plan -- first of all, there are no plans to actually deploy any prompt strategic strike -- but its planning shows that if it decided to do this, it would be what the Pentagon charmingly calls a "niche capability." Because the kinds of things you

would want to use them for, that you suddenly know that all the terrorists in the world have to accommodate us, come together in one place and stay there long enough for us to attack them, or you see a North Korean missile being put on a silo ready to be launched, that the number of targets that you can conceive of for doing this are very small, and therefore, a dozen of these would be enough, and that a dozen would easily -- we could accommodate that within the limits that we now have. And there is no realistic possibility to have any marginal number of these before the expiration date of this treaty, because we're not even in the beginning research and development stage.

If you look towards a larger capability, if you suddenly decide that you want 70 or 80 of these, then I think prudence suggests, and certainly the attitude of the Congress suggests, that you ought to put them somewhere in a ballistic -- other than in a ballistic missile field. Because the last thing you want to do in a tense crisis is to fire 50 objects up from the missile field in a way that the Russians would have to feel was coming at them and might lead them to fire in retaliation. Indeed if you did that, there would then be enormous pressure on you not to use the capability in a crisis for fear that it would provoke a nuclear war.

So if you're going to go to a large prompt capability, you want to deploy it in ways that would not be coming out of the ballistic missile field. And the treaty permits that, and the administration is beginning to look at options of that kind. And I think it's clear that if they

move in that direction, which I doubt that they will, that they'll do so by designing a system which is not covered by the treaty at all.

MR. KIMBALL: General Scowcroft, do you want to take --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Just a word, yeah. This is a sensitive issue, and some of the proponents say, well, prompt global strike, this is a conventional weapon. Why do we have to count it in START?

Well, look at -- suppose that this were a Russian proposal, and, say, they want to use some of their ICBM launchers for conventional weapons, we would react in horror at the notion. How do you tell the difference? And I think Mort's got it exactly right. These are the fundamentals, the counting rule. And do you really want to risk a nuclear holocaust by seeing something going up, and it's a nuclear carrier?

But we say, oh, no, you know, it only has a conventional warhead on it. That's a very sensitive issue, and I think we're working our way through it in a satisfactory way.

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Other questions? Yes, sir, right here?

MR. KLEEN: Tom Kleen, Arms Control Association. Thank you.

One of the issues that had been raised by certain senators is demand for access to the negotiating record of the treaty of New START. I'm wondering if you could talk about the historical precedent for that, and

whether you think it's a good idea going forward to share New START's negotiating record.

Thanks.

MR. KIMBALL: Steve, do you want to try to tackle that one? Or I can.

MR. PIFER: I think in the arms control world it's been done twice. I think it was done with regards to the Antiballistic Missile Treaty signed in 1972, and then the record was provided for the treaty banning intermediate range nuclear forces that was signed in 1987.

But my recollection is that when the Senate received the record to the INF negotiations, they also said -- and I think this was a Republican Senate -- that this should be not the standard; that this should be a very rare event.

Now, the negotiating record, when you're talking about that - - and I served on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces negotiations back in the early 1980s. This is literally hundreds and hundreds of cables. I mean, literally every conversation that is had gets reported back to Washington, and having to make sense of this. And also, I think sometimes because you see things that get taken out of context, I think it's very difficult to see how that's going to add much more to the understanding as opposed to the administration saying: This is the Agreement and this is what it means.

MR. KIMBALL: Yeah. Mort?

MR. HALPERIN: I think it ought to provide the record. I think that the Senate has a constitutional role that's equal to the President in deciding whether the United States ratifies treaties. I think that, yes, it will provide opportunities for people to find one sentence and complain about it, but I think it's a political matter. It's worse not to give it, and I think as a Constitutional matter, we ought to set a precedent, and we ought to provide it.

MR. KIMBALL: I would amend the comments just made to say that one of the things I think will be important is for those Republican senators who want to see the record is to explain what particular issues they are concerned about. In the case of the INF Treaty, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, portions of the record were made available, in a word, to clarify certain issues that were considered to be unclear in the treaty itself.

This treaty is extraordinarily clear. It is a very simple treaty. The terms are very clear. To my best determination, one of the motivating reasons why some Republican senators have said they want to see the record is because there is the suspicion that there is some sort of secret understanding between the Obama Administration and President Medvedev and the Russians regarding missile defense.

As Mort said in his opening, the treaty is very clear about how this -- how missile defenses are affected. They are not affected in any meaningful way, and I think if the record were to be provided, or

portions of the record were to be provided, it would probably make it clear that the Russians asked for many things that they did not get in this negotiation.

So I think it's very important for there to be some clarification about what the particular issues of concern are in the record. A negotiating record is theoretically or potentially quite a lot of documents to go through, and that alone could slow up the process, I think unhelpfully.

I think we had one other question over here and over here, so if we could start in the middle, please. Yeah.

SPEAKER: Hello. Louis. I just wanted you to comment about the objection according to which this treaty lead to U.S. missions limitation. If you can comment on it.

Thank you.

MR. KIMBALL: Sir, missions, limitations, if you could just --

SPEAKER: The START lead to the U.S. missiles limitation. That's an objection of critics. Can you comment about it?

MR. KIMBALL: Okay, I'm not sure I understand your question. Missile limitations. Limitations on the --

SPEAKER: Yeah. I heard an argument saying that this START leads to the missiles -- American missiles -- limitation. If -- can you comment about it?

MR. PIFER: Well, again, I think, as Mort said, there are no limits in this treaty that are meaningful regards to missile defense. Missile

defense is mentioned at two points in the treaty. In the preamble it notes that there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms. And I don't think anybody at this panel knows better than General Scowcroft, I mean, that's just a strategic reality. It's been acknowledged for 40 years. That, moreover, is preambular language that doesn't have any impact. It doesn't actually limit anything.

The one restriction in the treaty that would affect missile defense is in Article V, paragraph 3, and that says that the sides are prohibited from placing a missile defense interceptor into either a converted intercontinental ballistic missile silo or into a missile tube on a ballistic missile submarine. Nobody that I've read about has ever suggested there's any kind of rationale to putting missile defense interceptors on submarines. There was a brief debate or there has been a debate that a limitation on putting a missile defense interceptor into an ICBM silo would somehow constrain us. The question came up about a month and a half ago when the head of the Missile Defense Agency testified before Congress, and he said in five cases there are five missile defense interceptors in old ICBM silos out at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Those are all grandfathered. Those are not prohibited by the treaty.

But he then went on to say that, you know, if I want to deploy new missile defense interceptors in silos, it's actually much cheaper for me to build a new silo than to convert an old ICBM silo. And he said that

the price difference was about \$20 million per silo. I think Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Jim Miller made the same point in his testimony earlier this week before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

So I guess from my perspective that does mean that is a limit on missile defense. But a limit that keeps us from doing something that we would never do, in any case, is the kind of limit that we ought to be able to live with.

MR. KIMBALL: Okay. We have a question over here, please.

SPEAKER: James Godwin, formerly of the Department of Defense.

I think I read in the paper that the State Department had to provide a compliance report. And I was wondering if there was any ammunition that you, the panel, is aware of for opponents of the treaty, you know, as to how the Russians behaved under previous treaties, START I?

And if I may ask another: Just sort of an outlook is what impact would this treaty have on NATO nuclear weapons in your opinion?

MR. KIMBALL: Anyone for the first question?

MR. PIFER: Well, I think the administration has provided -- there was a requirement for annual compliance reports. For reasons that I'm not sure of, the Bush Administration in 2006, 2007, 2008 did not provide that report. What I am told is that the administration, the State



Department, has provided the compliance reports for 2006 to 2008. And they've also provided a portion that looks at strategic arms from 2008 up to the present with a view to affecting the -- or informing -- the debate on the ratification of the new START Treaty. At least as I understand it, those are so far classified reports. I think at some point there will be unclassified versions released, but at least as of two days ago when I checked the State Department Web site, they have not yet come out.

MR. KIMBALL: And how will this affect NATO weapons? Perhaps I can expand upon this question and direct this to General Scowcroft. I mean, one of the questions that has come up in these hearings is why the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty does not establish any limits on tactical nuclear weapons. The simple answer to that is that this is a strategic arms reduction treaty, not a tactical nuclear arms reduction treaty.

But one of the things you left out from your historical overview at the beginning is that there has never been an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons except for the presidential nuclear initiatives that President Bush, Sr., pursued when you were there as the Soviet Union was falling apart. Perhaps you could tell us what you see as the prospects for progress in the future regarding limitations accounting for tactical nuclear weapons with this treaty being ratified versus without this treaty being ratified.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think the issue, both of missile

defense and of non-strategic weapons, partly hasn't been included because we thought the issue was complicated enough without adding it. And one of the reasons for the ABM Treaty, going along with SALT I, was the simplest thing to do was to ban defenses because obviously there's an interaction between the two.

On non-strategic nuclear weapons, President Bush, Sr., did attempt to, by unilateral action, to reduce those. The Soviets or Russians did not respond, and they, my guess is, are increasingly dependent in their own sense for their defense on those kinds of weapons. But I think as we go forward, we will need to open it to non-strategic weapons because they're becoming -- the disparity is becoming increasingly large, and it does affect our extended deterrence and our relations with our allies, so they will have to be considered. But if there's no agreement on this treaty, the chances of moving forward to discuss non-nuclear -- or non-strategic nuclear -- weapons is close to zero.

MR. HALPERIN: Well, here again, the administration took the advice of the Strategic Commission. We explicitly recommended that we not try to deal with tactical nuclear weapons in this first treaty, among other reasons because it's exceedingly difficult to do so. But to say that we don't want this treaty because it gives the Russians a large advantage in tactical nuclear weapons is a non sequitur because the Russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons will exist whether or not we ratify this treaty. It exists, as General Scowcroft suggests, because three or

four successive American administrations have made, in my view, the correct judgment that these tactical nuclear weapons were not particularly useful, and we have reduced by substantial amounts our arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. The Russians, unfortunately, have not followed suit. We have decided that that is irrelevant to any strategic interest of the United States. We have been free and will be free, even if this treaty is ratified, to build as many tactical nuclear weapons as we want to. We have no plans to do so. We will not do so. So the treaty is irrelevant to it.

It's also worth noting that the treaty also does not limit non-deployed strategic weapons, an area in which we have a substantial advantage over the Russians. And the Russians have been very concerned about whether we would up with those weapons onto silos. They wanted that issue dealt with in this treaty; we refused to do so.

The treaty also does not deal with weapons waiting destruction, and we have a very large number of weapons waiting destruction in addition to non-deployed weapons. And as far as I can tell, it's only a slight exaggeration to say that the only difference between those two is the sign on the field where the weapons are. Some fields say "non-deployed strategic weapons" and others say "tactical weapons" and others say "weapons waiting destruction." But if one was to drop on you, you would not be able to tell the difference between any one of those three fields.

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Any other questions, please? Yes,

sir? Right here in the front row.

SPEAKER: John Thornton, Brookings Trustee. This is either for General Scowcroft or for Mort.

If we assume this treaty gets ratified, what is the administration likely to do next in relation to the Russians? And whatever that is likely to be, what's the impact of that on others in the world?

MR. KIMBALL: All right, so the next steps beyond new START, General Scowcroft.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I would assume that the next step would be to start to formulate negotiations on further reductions in numbers or selective reductions or elimination of things like, for example, the highly MIRV'd ICBMs. In other words, to try to make the balance such that a first strike is no longer an attractive option regardless of the severity of a crisis. Those are the kinds of things that are obviously the next steps.

MR. KIMBALL: Mort?

MR. HALPERIN: Well, I think the next focus of the administration in the nuclear field will be the attempt to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The President is committed to doing that. I think it is important that we do that. We have not tested for many years now through two Republican and now two Democratic Administrations. President Obama in the Nuclear Posture Review said, "We will not test." Period, full stop. For the first time there was no --

unless we -- and I think he has reached a judgment, which I think most of the people working in this field agree to, which is there is no conceivable reason why we would have the test.

We, in any case, are not going to test and, therefore, I think it is clearly in our interest to get the test ban. That will require, I think, most of the resources that the administration will have to deal with these issues for the rest of the first term of the Obama Administration. I think it will begin the process of thinking about the next strategic treaty with the Russians, but that will be extraordinarily difficult.

And, again, in the Commission Report we laid out all the reasons why. Nobody knows how to verify. The question that was asked, "How do you know whether somebody's got 10 hidden in a closet?" Well, for this treaty it doesn't matter because those aren't covered. It's only the ones that are deployed that are covered. But if you try to cover the non-deployed weapons, then the question of "How many did you start with and where did you put them," is very hard to deal with.

The tactical weapons, we don't know how many the Russians have. It's not clear they know how many they have. But nobody knows how to count where they start from, and nobody knows how to decide whether they've been destroyed.

Moreover, as I say, once you mark weapons for destruction, you know, you can take out one little piece of them, but that can be put back very quickly. So how you verify that weapons are actually being

destroyed, it takes a very long time and is very expensive to actually destroy them.

And then there's the question of, "Does parity in numbers matter and how does that affect our assurances to our allies?" A question we haven't talked about which will become much more important if you go to much larger numbers. So my guess is that the administration will take the remainder of this -- of the President's term implementing the START I Agreement, the new START Agreement, because it's got to figure out how to go down to the numbers in it -- and it's pretty close, but it's still got some hard choices to make -- getting the test ban ratified and developing a negotiating position for the next treaty with the Russians. And I think if we're lucky at the start of whatever, whoever is the next president, we will be ready to begin the new negotiation with the Russians.

MR. KIMBALL: All right, thank you. Strobe?

MR. TALBOTT: Just to follow up on John Thornton's question. He concluded his question by asking about the implications for the future with respect to others, and I assume he would include among the others, of the three other entities, authorized as it were, nuclear weapons states which include, of course, two of our allies, France and Britain, and also China. What does the panel think about the desirability and the plausibility -- and those may be quite different -- with regard to bringing in other nuclear powers, multilateralizing rather than just having a bilateral negotiation in the next round? And if you can say anything

specific about China, that would be interesting because sidebar conversations with the Russians as well as some informal conversations that Steve and others have had in Moscow suggest that the Russians are concerned not just about deterring the United States, but deterring the People's Republic of China as well.

MR. KIMBALL: General Scowcroft on that?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I think at some time -- at some point we need to multilateralize the process. I think it's premature now because the U.S. and the Russian forces are so disproportionate to those of any other country that we need to resolve the problems between us before we're ready to reach out and include others.

With respect to China, I think the first thing we need to try to do with the Chinese is to start talking about the issue. You know, we started talking with the Russians in the late '60s about our arsenals and so on. We have no such discussion with the Chinese now, and it's not easy to start. They're very reluctant to get into those things, but it seems to me that's the next step. And if we can have a substantive step with the Russians that follows this one -- and I don't know whether it can happen in this administration -- but I sort of agree with Mort that it's going to be a long ways because we've got a lot of homework to do before we start that. But I think we need to do that, and then we can start to reach out and figure out how to multilateralize it without it becoming chaotic.

MR. KIMBALL: Mort, on this?

MR. HALPERIN: Yeah, well, first on the -- I think the most important form of multilateralism is the Test Ban Treaty. That is really a treaty primarily among the five nuclear powers, then obviously you have to bring in the others. But I would like to see us engage the five nuclear powers under the Test Ban Treaty -- under the NPT -- in the process of bringing the Test Ban Treaty into effect because after the U.S. ratifies, there's a lot of work to be done, and I think it can only be done if the five nuclear powers cooperate and see that as an obligation that they have under the NPT.

I think after the next treaty with the Russians -- if we are able to negotiate it and ratify -- we will then have to try to bring in other countries. In the meantime, I agree with General Scowcroft. We should be starting to talk to the Russians. The Nuclear Posture Review tantalizingly says we seek strategic stability with China as well as Russia. If you ask people in the administration what that means, they assure you that it doesn't mean anything, that it was a phrase that they all managed to agree on but every member of the administration has a different view of what that means. I think the administration needs to think it through. We need to find a way to persuade the Chinese that it's okay to start talking to us. We then need to talk to the Japanese before we talk to the Chinese, otherwise we may have another nuclear power on our hands. And then we need to try to engage the Chinese.

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Thank you very much. We are



closing in on the end of this session and our host, Strobe Talbott, has a few closing comments to make. Strobe?

MR. TALBOTT: Co-host with you, Daryl. I just wanted to thank all of you again for participating in this discussion this afternoon. And I also wanted to return to something that I said at the outset. When I looked around the room, I was struck by how many people in this room -- there are probably a thousand years of experience represented here, working in this particular vineyard.

But I want to single out two people in particular. You remember the old Dean Acheson phrase about being present at the creation. There are a couple of people here who were present at the creation of this very important enterprise, which is strategic arms control and arms control in general, and they're both associated with the two co-hosting institutions.

Hel Sonnenfeldt, who is a cherished colleague of all of ours here at Brookings and who is a regular at events of this kind and has been a guide and counselor to many of us, certainly those of us who have been in government, and a terrific part of this community here.

And Stan Resor, who guided me and Daryl and others and I think probably Mort and some of those who have attempted to explain these issues to the public over the years. And Stan, of course, has also been a stalwart supporter of the Arms Control Association. So it's particularly appropriate that the two of you would be with us, Al and Stan.

But thanks to all of you for being here. And now go brave  
the heat outdoors.

\* \* \* \* \*

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