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CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN POLICY STUDIES

**THE HIDDEN PEOPLE OF NORTH
KOREA: EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE
HERMIT KINGDOM**

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PROCEEDINGS

RICHARD BUSH: My name is Richard Bush and I'm the Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and it's great privilege to convene today's session on a new and important book by our friends Ralph Hassig and Katy Oh called *The Hidden People of North Korea*.

I'd like to start with a methodological point. There have been a number of humanitarian catastrophes in the 20th century: the Ukrainian famine, the Holocaust in Central and Eastern Europe, autogenocide in Cambodia, and North Korea in general come to mind. The interesting thing about many of these catastrophes is that the world actually had information about them in fairly real time, whether it was farmers from Ukraine or Jewish refugees from Germany and other places, Cambodian refugees on the Thai border, and there was a tendency sometimes to not believe what these people were saying because they appeared to have self-interested reasons for doing so. Maybe people didn't want to believe that such horrors could occur. But we learned over that experience that refugees and defectors are very good sources of information and that you should trust what they say. Whether you can act on that information is another question, but you shouldn't deny what they say.

This book, "The Hidden People of North Korea," takes refugee and defector accounts very seriously and it constructs a picture of life in North Korea from them and we need to take it very seriously and adjust our view of North Korea based on that.

With that I would like to call on my friend and colleague Roberta Cohen to say a few words of introduction, and then we'll move to our authors. Thank you. Roberta?

ROBERTA COHEN: Good morning, everyone. It gives me great pleasure to participate in this launch of a new book by Ralph Hassig and Katy Oh. I have admired their work for many years and feel they contribute a great deal to scholarship on North Korea. Because Katy's family comes from North Korea, she has an edge on understanding the mentality and culture of the North in addition to being a noted analyst of political and economic developments of both Koreas. Ralph brings expertise in social psychology, consumer psychology and organizational behavior to the study of North Korea. Not being Korean, he also brings the distance needed for effective analysis.

Their new study, *The Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the Hermit Kingdom*, is a direct challenge to Kim Jong-Il and his regime. In the opening to the book, Kim is quoted as saying, "We must envelop our environment in a dense fog to prevent our enemies from learning anything about us." Hassig and Oh slowly but surely lift that mountain of fog and misinformation surrounding North Korea. The authors may have been refused entry to the country, but they do a painstaking and extraordinary job of ferreting

out in 253 pages the most detailed information about life in North Korea and who its leaders are. They rely on defectors in the South who now number more than 16,000, on other North Koreans, Asian specialists of North Korea, and a broad range of Korean and English language sources. The result is an almost encyclopedic picture of what life is like in North Korea and how the people cope with the policies and practices of this hermitically sealed regime.

What I found new and interesting in the book is the description of how this regimented and controlled system is eroding. It documents the cracks that are developing in the ideological, economic and political foundations of the regime. It also shows that this erosion is becoming apparent to more and more people in the government, in the elite class and among others as well. The consequences of that erosion however are not so clear, making for intense debate internationally. There are a number of observers for example who believe that even with this erosion and with the death of Kim Jong-Il, the system, the party, the military, the government bureaucracy, the state security, will remain largely intact. Yet at a meeting at Brookings two weeks ago, North Korean defector Kim Kwangjin, a former member of the elite class, expressed the view that a successor regime would not be able to maintain the failed policies of Kim Jong-Il. It would not have the same authority and therefore might have to become more accountable to the population. In his view, there would be a process of reform, the opening up of North Korea, and the dissolution of socialism. Still others anticipate the collapse of the regime, even anarchy, necessitating international involvement.

Hassig and Oh can comment on where they stand in this debate. I would put them somewhere in the middle. On the one hand, their book points out that given the many cracks in the system, North Korea in some respects has already collapsed, but the collapse has gone unnoticed because it happened gradually and out of the view of foreigners. They describe a slow transition from socialism to capitalism and show how the government's information monopoly is eroding. In recent years, North Koreans, especially privileged North Koreans, have been secretly able to listen to foreign radio and television broadcasts and watch smuggled videos and DVDs of affluent life in South Korea. Cell phones and computers are making their way into the country as well, although internet access is severely restricted. Nonetheless, technology is trumping North Korea's seclusion.

But on the other hand, Hassig and Oh point to great deal of stability and organization in North Korea. They underscore how much social cohesion there is and how North Koreans generally hide any thoughts of disaffection. Indeed, most do not even think about politics at all the book says, focusing instead on economic survival. Part of the co-authors' confidence in the strength and stability of the system comes from their own and others' mistaken earlier prediction at the time Kim Il-sung died that Kim Jong-Il's rule would be short. But the situation may really be different now. Perhaps too much erosion has taken place for maintenance of the same failed policies. Perhaps North Koreans are more clear eyed than we give them credit for. Hassig and Oh seem

quite persuaded that just as Kim Jong-Il long benefited from the international community's support and largesse, a successor regime with policies not that different from Kim Jong-Il will also receive international support given the nuclear card it holds. In their view for a variety of political, strategic and economic reasons, outside powers will not allow anarchy to overtake North Korea. What the United States should do the two authors recommend is to bypass the government and target the North Korean people with information about their society and the outside world so that they can decide on the changes to make in their own future. I would probably give more weight than the two authors do to the potential impact on the North Korean authorities of international human rights, diplomacy and advocacy were such initiatives ever to be taken. Because the tool is effective in peeling away layers of official obfuscation, the North Korean government will probably consider it one more sling and arrow of hostile propaganda. Recently the North Korean government submitted a report to the United Nations on its human rights record. As you may know, the U.N. will be conducting a review of the North Korean record on December 7 in Geneva. The North Korean government in its report to the U.N. presents its country as having a vibrant civil society, the rule of law, free expression, political parties, 480 newspapers and hundreds of magazines and a near perfect human rights record. It blames the United States for any internal dissatisfaction. Indeed, it charges the United States with inciting North Korea's citizens to overthrow their government by radio broadcasts and other means.

This hypersensitivity to outside information that differs from its own version of events makes it important that the United States, other governments and NGOs respond at the U.N. review with information that counters the report. I would strongly recommend that the Hassig-Oh book be translated into Korean immediately and distributed at the U.N. and to as many North Koreans as possible. Radio Free Asia, the Voice of America and other broadcasters should publicize the book because it contains so much information the population would hear about. Let them be the judge. North Koreans have a right to know what they are currently told and we have a responsibility to make sure that they hear it. Katy and Ralph, bravo on your book.

DR. BUSH: Thank you, Roberta. Why don't we now get to the main event and invite Ralph to make a few remarks?

RALPH HASSIG: I want to thank Richard and Roberta for their kind introduction, also thank the Brookings' staff for hosting this meeting today and thank you for showing up and showing your interest in North Korea because the North Korean people can use all the help they can get I think.

My task is going to be to give you an additional brief overview of the book, tell you what the chapters are and the main points in each chapter, and then Katy will follow with remarks whose content I don't even know at this point. Then we'll be available for any questions you may have.

We've got the "Hidden People of North Korea," and by hidden people we're referring to almost all of the North Korean people, not just a little segment. They're hidden by their regime, Kim Jong-Il and before that Kim Il-Sung, for two purposes, one, to keep the administration people from finding out what's going on in the outside world and comparing their lot with the lot of others, second, they're trying to keep the outside world from finding out what's going on in North Korea so that even the North Korean telephone book is considered a classified document, although like many classified documents, nowadays with all the corruption in North Korea, it's been leaked out so we know what's in the book, and it's not very interesting anyway.

I think there are at least three main points about the whole book before talking about each individual chapter. The first is that in our opinion, North Korea is Kim Jong-Il's kingdom. It's his property. That's what the country is for. And North Korea over the last 60 years has been both intelligently designed and it has evolved to support the Kim family. That's what it's there for. The third point is that North Korea like any country is a system. The different parts relate fairly well to each other, economy, politics, human rights policies, military policies, so I would not expect that one part of North Korea would change without affecting all the other parts, and the fact that there are interlocking parts of North Korea and the fact that it's a system means that it's relatively resistant to change. I would not expect big changes in North Korea's human rights policies until there are changes in its politics at the highest level. I would not expect a change in their nuclear weapons policy until there are changes at the highest level because it all in my opinion fits together.

The first chapter is just an introduction. We call it "The Illusion of Unity." In any country you'd like to have unity especially when you're under threat and the North Koreans always feel that they're under threat from the outside world. In North Korea's case it's not nationalism as the unifying principle, it's loyalty to the Kim family, specially now Kim Jong-Il, so it's a little different kind of unity than we usually think of. Kim is identified with the country. I have a little quote here. Sometimes the North Korean propagandists express themselves in poetry. This is from No Dong Sheen, the party newspaper a few years ago. He says, "You fought off the raging storm and gave us faith, Comrade Kim Jong-Il. But of you we wouldn't be here. But for you the fatherland wouldn't be here either," so identifying the whole country with one person. Of course, the first duty of every North Korean is to protect the leader. Somewhere down the line is the duty to protect the country, but first protect the leader. So you will see in the book that we spend a lot of time talking about Kim and the Kim regime because I think that's the center of North Korea today.

Unfortunately, in North Korea the unity that they seek is an illusion because it's supposed to be unity around Kim Jong-Il, but just when he took over from his father in 1994 was when the economy was taking a decided downturn. It had been in trouble before, but it really took a hit in the mid-1990s. The North Korean people associate Kim Jong-Il with bad economic times and it's very hard to unite around failure. So for the most part I think the people ignore

Kim as much as you can ignore any dictator, but they don't exhibit this unity that the propagandists keep boasting about.

The next chapter, the first substantial chapter in the book, is devoted to the life of the leader, Kim Jong-Il. It's Kim's country. He has a very bad reputation as I said among many North Koreans because of the economic hardships. It's an irony really because he's just following in his father's footsteps. All the policies were set by Kim Il-sung and he's just doing what his father taught him to do, yet people are blaming him, different circumstances have led to different results, and now he has to find some way out of this situation and there is nothing. North Korea is in such bad shape that I don't see how it's going to fix itself.

Kim himself, the important person, lives like a king. He travels from mansion to mansion around the country. He's probably got probably hundreds of millions of dollars. Actually, the whole country's income is his if he wants it I suppose. So we shouldn't expect that Kim Jong-Il needs foreign aid. His people badly need it, but they'll only get as much as he allows them to have. But if we come to him and say we'll give you this much economic aid if you give up your nuclear weapons, he probably says to himself I don't need any more money. In fact, a lot of economic foreign aid can mean people coming, the country opening up and that's exactly what he doesn't want I think. He wants to keep the people hidden.

He's a very intelligent man. The press often says he's crazy. No. You can't stay in power this long and be crazy. He's very smart, he knows what he's doing, and he's a great success at what he does which is staying in power. He's not in good health apparently. He apparently had that stroke in August of last year and it's taking him some time to recover. He may have other ailments. As you probably know, there has been a succession campaign going on last year and especially the first half of this year. A successor really has to come from the Kim family which as the propagandists have said is a special family, a special revolutionary family, there's no other family in North Korea like it. So it's almost got to be one of his three sons and it looks now like it's going to be youngest of three who is only 26, Kim Jong-un. He hasn't been introduced yet formally to the North Korean people. The North Korean press for example doesn't put his picture -- in fact, we haven't even seen a photograph of him since he was a little boy. In fact, in lectures like party lectures given to groups of people, workers, military and so forth, he's been introduced by name and he's referred to often as the Morning Star General, and recently some apparently legitimate lecture material was smuggled out of North Korea and one of the Japanese newspapers, I think Asahi maybe got ahold of it. It looks legitimate to me because it's 12 pages long and very repetitious, and that's kind of what North Korean propaganda. I read through all 12 pages and all I could make out in terms of the young son's qualifications for being a leader other than he's from the Kim family is that he is a good military mapmaker. They keep mentioning this over and over. He makes good military maps and he's credited with staging the fireworks display this year for the birthdays of Kim Jong-Il and Kim Il-sung. So assuming he wants to

assume the military first policies of his father, these are maybe reasonable qualifications, but other than that, we don't know what he's done. He's a real mystery and that's how the North Koreans like it.

We turn next to a chapter on the economy and I want to skip over that because most of it's background and you're probably aware of how bad the North Korean economy is. The statistics you can't necessarily trust, but unquestionably it's bad, and as I said, I don't see any prospect for economic improvement. I don't know where North Korea would find the resources. They can't lift themselves up by their own bootstraps, so I would expect the situation to continue to be very bad for a long time. It's going to take hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign assistance, aid and investment to help North Korea recover.

What we're more interested in in the book is the everyday economy, how people deal with this. What do you do if your economy is in a permanent depression year after year, decade after decade? The logical answer is you try to start your own economy and that's what the North Korean people have done of course in the last few years since the late-1990s. Everyone goes into business for himself or herself at least part-time because if you want for the government to give you food, you're probably going to start as perhaps as many as a million people or even more died in the late-1990s. There are very food rations being distributed. Government wages are almost worthless. If you wanted to exchange your North Korean won that you've gotten in wages for dollars, you'd make something like two dollars a month or something like that. You can't feed yourself on North Korean wages so everyone is going into business for themselves. But it's very small business for the most part and you'll see that we have a few photographs in the book of women where it's easier for the women to get away from their assigned workplace than it is for men, women sitting at the roadside with a few fish or pieces of fruit or a bottle of two of homemade liquor and just sitting there on the ground hoping to sell it, hoping to make a few pennies. For the majority of North Koreans, I think that's the nature of their economy today, not much better than that, so that you live from day to day, week to week, maybe month to month. The top cadres and bureaucrats can sell their influence through bribery and make a lot more money. Teachers can earn money by tutoring, doctors can make money by making medicines and selling it because the medical system is pretty much out of medicine. People can hire themselves out. Day laborers can earn it looks like 1- or 2,000 North Korean won a day just standing on street corners like we see here in Washington and hiring themselves out, where if they worked at their office or factor they'd earn maybe 6,000 North Korean won a month. So it's much more profitable than going to work. Everyone is in business for themselves.

A lot of the buying and selling is done at marketplaces which the government condones. Kim Jong-Il is not at all happy with those marketplaces because it means that people are dealing outside the government system, but for now at least the regime is accepting this as necessary although there are always restrictions on them. This year they put on some extra restrictions about the ages of people who can sell in the market and so forth. I would expect that there is

maybe an equilibrium here or balance, so I'm not really looking for a great expansion of the markets in the next few years, but I'm not expecting that they're going to close the markets either. There's a sort of an uneasy relationship now between the government and its centrally controlled economy and the people's economy.

The next chapter is the information environment and the logic here is that if you're struggling to make a living, struggling to stay alive, just doing it day to day isn't going to get you anywhere. You really would like to have some plan. How can I make my life better and get some guarantee that I'll survive and that my family will survive? To make a plan you need information, so we looked at what information is available to the North Korean people and there are two information environments as you might guess. One is the official environment or propaganda. That doesn't change from year to year. It's the same themes, North Korea even with the hardships is the best place to live, it's the only place that people are truly free, Kim Jong-Il is the greatest leader in the world, all the other countries of the world are discriminating against North Korea and some like the United States are trying to stifle North Korea and enslave the North Korean people. This is the usual propaganda. But because life is so hard even though the propaganda is this the best place to live, people have turned their backs on the propaganda and ignore it as much as possible. They still have to listen to all the party lectures, but they don't pay attention to it. What they pay attention to is the information in the other unofficial information environment, Roberta mentioned some of these sources as videotapes and DVDs and so forth being smuggled into North Korea from China, radio broadcasts from stations such as Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, some South Korean stations, some religious stations. A lot of North Koreans go over to China for a short period of time to do a little trading. They come back and they tell their friends, neighbors, relatives what they've seen, rumors start circulating in the country.

So I think today most North Koreans know something about the outside world. It's not a coherent picture, but they've got some idea of what's going on out there. This is I'm going to say in a minute is what I'd like to promote in greater detail, more information for the North Korean people. What they do with that I'm not sure. Right now I think they're puzzled. They don't believe the propaganda and they're getting glimpses of the outside world, but that's not what they've been taught all their lives. So what should we believe. And the next chapter actually is belief. That's not the title. I forget the title, but it's about what the North Korean people believe based on this information filtering into the country and the information they've been given all their lives. Of course, we don't have any public opinion polls for North Korea so we rely mostly rely on defector testimony and we put quite a lot of reliance on that I think. What we gather, and a lot of surveys have been done in South Korea of defectors, actually there are now I think over 17,000 defectors in South Korea and there are a lot of surveys of that and there's quite a bit of consistency I think in the survey results.

The picture that we get is that the people as Roberta mentioned are mostly focusing on the here and now. They're just trying to make it through the

week and make it through the month. They don't have any big political ideas. It's dangerous to have political ideas of course in North Korea. So in that sense they don't have firm beliefs that could guide them into the future. They've heard that China and South Korea are richer than North Korea which is got to be puzzling to them because they always were told that the South Koreans were actually slaves of the Americans and they've always looked down on the Chinese, and now they know these people have more than we do. Something has gone wrong here. Something has gone very wrong.

I don't think they realize how much foreign aid they get, but they know they get some which contradicts the traditional *juche* self-reliance policy. They blame Kim Jong-Il for some of this, but they also maybe even more blame bureaucrats saying maybe if the bureaucrats did what Kim Jong-Il and his father had told them to do we'd be in better shape. And they blame foreigners. Certainly they blame Americans and the Japanese. I think there's quite a strong anti-Americanism in North Korea. Even from birth children are told to hate Americans, taught to hate Americans. We have a few passages in the book, one for example, we have a little reading textbook for first grade students in North Korea and one of the lessons to teach them how to read is it shows some boys playing with a toy tank, many tank advances, our tank advances crushing American bastards, many take advances. This is the first grade. In fact, bastards is pretty much the usual suffix anytime Americans are mentioned. It's like their last name, American bastards. And the same goes for the Japanese, Japanese bastards like the same family. For that matter, they don't much like the Chinese or the Russians either. They're really kind of isolated people, it's a threatening world out there, which is good for Kim Jong-Il because it means the only person looking out for them, the only person standing in the way of those foreigners who want to come in and get us, is our Kim Jong-Il. And sure enough, no foreigners have invaded North Korea since the Kims took power. So I think this is what Kim likes and I think it supports his regime.

I'm going to pretty much skip over the next chapter which is on law, political class and human rights. We know about the dismal human rights situation in North Korea, and Roberta certainly has spoken about this. I just want to suggest that those human rights policies are absolutely part of the ruling regime. They're not an accident, they're not an aberration, they're not something that could easily be changed. The human rights policies are a tool of the regime just as the law is a tool of the regime. Kim Jong-Il and the party come first.

The next to the last chapter is on defectors. Again I want to skip over that fairly quickly because we know a lot of defectors have come down from North Korea. There are even more in China. The easy part is getting into China. A little bribe and you're across the river. The difficult part is getting out of China because nowadays the only good way to go it is to go down to Southeast Asia to Thailand and that's a long trip. Surveys have shown that most North Koreans who defect to South Korea have lived in China, hidden away in China away from the police, for one, two, three years or more. They stay there a long time. It's a very tough life for them. Through the whole 1990s, the number of defectors was only

533 and then the number increased. In the last few years it's been between 2,500 and 3,000 a year getting to South Korea, and this year the latest we heard was 2,100 through the end of September. They hardly receive any notice anywhere because it's just a steady stream coming in. Once they get to South Korea they face further hardships because they're not ready to live in a democratic market economy. There's a very high unemployment rate, a lot of dissatisfaction, and that tells us something about what's going to happen when North and South Korea finally unify.

The final chapter is about the end of North Korea, question mark, *The End Comes Slowly* is the title we use. My conclusion is that North Korea is very poor but it's stable. The people are not satisfied, but being dissatisfied isn't what causes revolution. You've got to have some alternative, and I think the Kim regime has been very successful in keeping alternatives away from the people. There is not really any civil society, it's the Kim regime and the party and there are lots of individuals and not much else. I would not expect anything like a revolution even though times are tough in North Korea. So no pressure from inside the country to remove the Kim regime or make it change, and no pressure from outside either. The Chinese certainly support North Korea. They sometimes say things about the North Korea nuclear program, but I don't think we should take this too seriously. They definitely support the North Korean regime. The United States doesn't talk about regime change anymore. So really there's not going to be anyone outside who wants to see a change. They'd prefer to see stability. Bad as the situation for the North Korean people, they'd prefer North Korea to be stable than to take a chance on some sort of collapse and refugees running all over the place and hundreds of billions of dollars of aid needed.

So we think that the situation will continue for some time, and that leads to the final question, should we do anything about it? We offer the same policy suggestions we did 10 years ago in our first book which are not likely to be adopted, namely, let's give the North Koreans as much information as we can and let them decide what to do about it difficult as it will be for them. There hasn't been that much of an effort to send information into North Korea. I mentioned some of the ways, Radio Free Asia, I don't know right now, but I think it's only about 5 hours of Radio Free Asia and 5 hours of Voice of America broadcasting per day into North Korea. We've been very reluctant I think to push any harder on that because as I said, our government doesn't want regime change right now either.

What I'd like to see is more of an attempt to get information into North Korea. There are lots of ways you could do it, that you could be creative. Our government is not very good at information dissemination of course. You'd have to bring in Madison Avenue and Madison Avenue is very good at that, but make a more concerted attempt to tell the North Korean people what's going on in the outside world and also what their government is doing or not doing for them. In our dealings I would like as much as possible to deal directly with the North Korean people and avoid the regime. That's difficult to do of course, but the more we deal with the regime especially at high level talks and so forth, I think the

more legitimacy we'd give to it and the people would see these presidents and secretaries are coming to talk to Kim Jong-Il. He must be pretty good after all or they wouldn't come. So I would prefer information, aid if we can get it as directly as possible to the North Korean people. I think that would be good and strengthen them because they are I think in competition with their government.

Let me stop here and then we'll see what Katy has to say about the book and maybe how it was written, and she might even want to contradict me on points. I don't know.

KATY OH: I'm actually in a very luxurious position as the last speaker since Richard, Roberta and Ralph, the three R's, took care of the most important part of the presentation today.

I want to thank everybody again to come here today to listen to this North Korean story and our book, and I also again called Aileen, Kevin, and Richard to stage this. This is the first debut of our book because I'm a Nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings, I don't want to give this presentation other organizations even though I have my own Korea Club, but that will be the second meeting. But lastly I also would like to thank Dr. Ralph Hassig who is the first author and my hidden partner of North Korean research. I think this is his first time to be at Brookings as a matter of fact for the past two decades who happens to be actually my husband, and he was the one who pushed the book project while I was working for the government task -- and he had work to bear the chunk of the writing and organizing the book, so my thanks go to him.

North Korea has been my pain, my passion and my profession since I became an accidental North Korean analyst. I went to Berkeley in 1979 at the age of 30, so you can guess how old I am. I was born in 1949, less than a year before the Korean War. My parents came from North Korea, but I was born actually in the south, but in Korea your parents' hometown is considered to be your hometown. At the age of 30 I came to Berkeley because everybody said it's a great school and you can have the emancipation of your intellectual life and your kind of yoke in growing up in very conservative and male chauvinistic Korean society. I was very glad to study for the first time Chinese politics, Japanese politics and Russian politics. But since I was Korean, my professors called me to serve them as a research assistant with an assistant with a special ability in speaking Korean very fluently, and I thought the boring North Korean propaganda material. That's the kind of beginning of my becoming an accidental North Korean specialist.

About several months ago I was cleaning my office since our second book is done and we thought that this would be our last full serious reference foot noted book because it almost killed us. So I was cleaning and I found my 1981 notes for Professor Scalapino of U.C. Berkeley and it was all handwritten beautifully -- whatever North Korean document material and then the side column painstakingly with clear beautiful English writing with my hand about the interpretation and implication for Professor Scalapino. If you cover it

you can actually use it today, so I was really fascinated by the interesting consistency of North Korean propaganda material.

If you remember since the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s and the 1994 Agreed Framework, the United States had been pretty much preoccupied with the nuclear issue. We wrote actually our first book, "North Korea Through the Looking Glass," published proudly by Brookings in October 2000 and for the last chapter we titled "Dealing with the DPRK," and in that chapter, several ways to deal with the North Koreans were suggested because then Richard Haas, the Foreign Policy Program Director, currently the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, asked us, Katy, is not an academic campus, but you have to add policy options for the book. I told him adding policy options for the U.S. government is almost like the kiss of death because nothing will be accepted by the government, but nonetheless we added it. Even though we earnestly wrote with our full objective and fairness, none of the policies seemed to be accepted. So I should say that the comprehensive book that covered the history of the military the situation of North Korea was widely read and pretty much appreciated, but we decided we should write another book. This time our focus is not nukes or not military regimentation, but the North Korean people.

I must say that today you can say a couple of things that are very common sense and maybe you can agree with me or maybe only a minority disagrees. That is, number one, the Kim regime's nuclear program will always be with us and U.S. policy options for removing nuclear weapons and materials is very limited. People are waiting for the Kim regime to go away with wishful thinking. Finally, Kim's survival strategy continues with good calculations and patience, one commodity that American has less of than the North Koreans.

Inside North Korea I also would like to offer the situation in 2009 compared with 1994 and what are the differences. Number one, Kim Jong-Il is almost 15 years old than before and 30 years less healthy. Two, North Koreans have learned to make a living without the regime but they are still under tight political control. Third, the North Korean elite have also learned how to be capitalists without telling Kim Jong-Il while supporting Kim's version of socialism at least up front and for the public. Number four, foreigners know more about North Korea since the defectors and cellular phones as well as intelligence. If you would like to find out the currency rate today, actually I could call one of my sources in South Korea, a defector, then he can immediately call northern China and he can call his sister or brother in different parts of North Korea and I can get the currency rates of Wonsan, Sariwon, and Nampo, maybe in less than 20 minutes. Number five, the regime has more nuclear material and weapons and missiles. Finally, the U.S. is more vigilant about foreign threats after 9/11.

Today as a matter of fact, we are pursuing with or without any intention maybe the policy of four D's I call it, the U.S. government I'm talking about. Dialogue with North Korea or regional powers. Dialogue is always good. If possible, always sit down with North Korea. Soon our first important person, Special Coordinator Steven Bosworth will be in Pyongyang. Number two,

diplomacy to persuade the U.S. public at least the U.S. is doing something and also talk to regional powers, but dialogue and diplomacy don't make us to reach the goal of a nuclear resolution. So what do you do? The third D is to detect what is going on inside North Korea and outside North Korea and especially on its WMD and trading. Finally, if all these fail, in that case to deter, deterrence. So today we live with the policy of four D's, although none of the government members will pronounce it with confidence.

Meanwhile, most North Koreans continue starving and struggling to survive. I always lose weight when I go to Korea to interview defectors. After 10 days of defector interviews I come back with a little thinner Katy and I sometimes have a lot of nightmares to think about their lifestyle. I was in Germany from the summer of 1990 to 1991 experiencing the incredible drastic situation in the two Germanys. Ralph and I went to Koblenz and attended the German unification ceremony and I was maybe the only one who was crying. I thought that that national drama of Germany will be played in South Korea pretty soon. My father who came from North Korea when I was in Germany suddenly had a stroke although he was very light weight and his nickname was White Gandhi, but he died suddenly and I happened to be very lucky to fly out and saw him on his last death bed. I told my father, Father, I will not work for the private sector to make money or go to the academic campus only focusing on theory, but I will stay inside the Washington Beltway politics although I hate it every day and particularly working for the DOD because the military is the operator and implementer if something happens in a drastic situation in the Korean Peninsula. I will work for think tanks working for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to work toward Korean unification. He would not speak then already, but he loved me that his first daughter and he was my intellectual godfather. He clasped my hand so tightly and then he let it go twice, three times signaling that he heard me and the doctors said he understood what you said.

As Ralph and I were working for the last 7 years on this book, we thought what should we do in terms of giving some ways and pathways for the North Koreans to face some freedom and happiness. Our book is about the North Korean people because I believe North Koreans have the same DNA as the South Koreans. If you give them the information and tools and then maybe as South Koreans because I grew up in a dictatorship government had a choice or option to fight against the government and change the dictatorial military regime to a democratic, incredibly beautiful modern society, I think sharing the same DNA, the North Koreans will do the same and that's the reason we wrote the book. Thank you again to be here with us.

DR. BUSH: Thank you, Ralph, thank you, Katy, for your presentations. The floor is now open. If I call on you, please wait for the mike and then identify yourselves and your affiliation if any, and we'll go from there.

QUESTION: My name is Judd Heriot and I'm a documentary filmmaker. I wondered if you could speak more to the elites in North Korea. Who are they? You also mentioned that Kim Jong-Il has, I forget how you said it,

a bad reputation, not so good a reputation, because of his association with the economic downturn in 1994. I assume that's predominant amongst the elites. Maybe you could talk more about the elites. Who are they, what they do, how they communicate with each other and so forth and so on. Thank you.

DR. HASSIG: I'll let Katy handle some of that. Let me say that we rather extensively discuss some of the film that you made several years ago about North Korea and you'll find that in the book and it was very helpful. Do you want to address who the elites are?

DR. OH: First of all, if you go the Brookings' website there is a special report that I was a task leader and also Ken Gause today here presenting the seven experts on North Korean study, presented a different chapter on North Korean elites. Depending on how you ordinarily define really core elite that is like say in Kim's kitchen cabinet, there are 100 maybe who are really involved in national decision making. That's really the core of the core. But if you stretch over to the provincial level or county level, party cadre, top managers, they can be all called elite which you can congregate maybe I'd say about up to 8,000. But then if you want to enhance a little bit like in normal American society, anybody who graduated from college, anyone who has a technical background and professional interest in the national -- and then involved in professional work, they can be also different from ordinary people, so in that case it can reach up to maybe several hundred thousand people. So depending where you are standing, the elites can be defined very differently. So I strongly suggest that you go for that.

At this point today, only one thing that I would like to add is that elite is most well informed and aware of both internal and external situation in North Korea and they are the ones maybe who could make some changes. But also the elite can be the worst bunch in terms of cowardliness and corruption. They don't want to lift a finger to care for themselves first and their families so they are maybe the people who knew, have all the knowledge, and yet they seem to be more slow. So in a sense by delivering information, I'm talking about from the ordinary level to the elite level, if there is some linkage between elite and ordinary people, there might be some interesting changes, so we can talk about it more later.

DR. HASSIG: Let me add just two sentences on that. If we're interested in who the elite decision makers are, I think that group is very small clustered around Kim Jong-Il. If we're interested in which people want to support the current regime because it's in their best interests, then I think as Katy said it could go to hundreds of thousands or maybe a couple of million people. Two ways to look at it.

DR. BUSH: Let me break for a commercial. The book is on sale outside as you leave.

DR. OH: Just like TV.

QUESTION: Thank you for a wonderful presentation. Ralph, I was struck by something you said at the tail end in your recommendation portion when you said the more we engage with the regime the more legitimacy we give it. It does seem like the Obama administration is going to reengage in a matter of time. The announcement may even come today. Knowing what you know and what collectively we in the United States know from the past several administrations' dealings with North Korea on and off, since we are going to go ahead and engage with North Korea at least on the nuclear issue, what do you recommend? Broadening the dialogue? What would your idea of smart engagement and effective engagement be?

DR. HASSIG: That's fairly high level anyway, but that's what the Obama administration wants. I have a lot of sympathy for other governments like the American government because if they don't do anything, the American people say why don't you do something about those North Korean nuclear weapons you say threaten us? So for political reasons we've got to engage.

I'm in favor of talking, presenting our point of view and saying you know this but I'm presenting it again. Now you tell me what you think. I think I know it, but you say it. Beyond that, since I don't see any way that North Korea is going to give up its nuclear weapons, I'm very leery of any more agreements like the 1994 agreements and some that were made in 2006 and around there. Just talk. Just go and talk to them. And I kind of wish that we'd talk in a third country so we don't have to go over there, make them come over here or make them go down to Singapore or something like that.

QUESTION: If I may follow-up, do you think food aid is appropriate?

DR. HASSIG: If we can monitor it so we're sure that most of it goes to the people and it's identified as coming from the United States, yes.

DR. BUSH: I would only comment that Jeff Bader from the National Security Council spoke here on Friday last week and he's laid out a set of conditions concerning whether we would truly reengage with North Korea. One can ask whether North Korea is ever going to be willing to meet those conditions. I think one of the reasons for being willing to go the extra mile and sending Steve Bosworth on yet another trip to Pyongyang is to demonstrate to other countries, particularly China, that the problem is not us.

QUESTION: Thank you. Joshua Leitz from Radio Free Asia. I was wondering what your opinion is of information exchanges that might be viewed as less hostile by the regime such as cultural exchanges. What kind of research were you able to pull together in terms of cultural exchanges?

DR. HASSIG: One specific example being Syracuse University? What sorts of exchanges are you thinking about?

MR. LEITZ: The philharmonic, for instance. It's another way maybe to win over the hearts and minds, that might be something that the regime allows in.

DR. OH: In the first book as I said dealing with the DPRK we suggested multilateral really all directional different engagements. Let engagements be like 100 flower blooms sort of situation. Then the dynamic diverse different approaches by everybody, regional powers, the U.S., the private sector, academics and think tanks and sportsmen and rock stars, and it's good the more we engage. Having said that, somehow the North Koreans have displayed great skill to be like a rare commodity I should say like accepting and then letting the people come in, just not everybody, let's say all of you would like to go to North Korea just for the heck of it to see North Korea, none of you will get -- maybe only about zero percent or 1 percent will get a visa. Because of that, the engaging partners like Syracuse University or anybody always kind of like a victim in a sense that North Koreans set the conditions, we do this, this, this, and then the other side of it really has to follow that like almost nagging and kneeling and please accept us, please. So somehow I think as the Koreans say, when you start with the wrong button about fitting your clothes, you just ended up having on wrong clothes in the sense that engagement has been played in the hands of North Korea. But I still believe that deliberate information we got to engage and all of us have to be very creative and come up with some ideas. We are every night over dinner with a glass of wine what can be done to deliver more? And maybe that could be our next 100 ways to deliver information will be our next book.

QUESTION: Rob Warren from the Foreign Service Institute. Thank you for excellent presentations. I wanted to ask you about the role of South Korea vis-à-vis the North. It seems to me that we can play a greater role in information, perhaps in aid, but it's South Korea that I think can have the greatest impact. Would you care to discuss that?

DR. HASSIG: Yes, you're absolutely right, and of course we went through 10 years when the South Korean government didn't want to even criticize the North Korean government at all, so there was very little that the South Korean government did and they let the South Korean people do anything. Now we have the balloon drops for example as the most dramatic thing where some religious groups and human rights groups are sending flights of balloons over North Korea with everything from little Bibles, to information, to some money and candies and so forth which tells the North Korean people what's going at least in South Korea. I'm all in favor of this and I wish there were more and I wish the United States maybe would even think along those lines.

But even now the South Korean government is a little concerned about that. I can understand that the South Korean government doesn't want unification in the near term. It would be an economic disaster. So anything that might get the North Korean people excited which includes foreign information I think the South Korean government even is a bit concerned about. I wish they weren't so concerned.

DR. OH: I'll go a little bit philosophical on South Korea's role. South Korea has the best brains and resources and analytical powers and the intelligence sources than anybody else.

DR. HASSIG: When it comes to North Korea.

DR. OH: Yes, when it comes to North Korea. They speak the same language, they are close and if there is one good thing is coming out of the 10 years of Sunshine Policy is there are so many bureaucrats and traders and diplomats and businessmen and academicians went to North Korea and showed how the South Koreans can be very Westernized and can be very rich and can be very generous, and North Koreans of course charged an arm and a leg going into the karaoke bars, they charge an entry about \$100. Nonetheless, Koreans willingly, what the heck, they need some money and they dropped it, so some of the spoiling process that North Koreans educated by South Korean presence and contact so that was good.

But I think South Korea domestically I think they should really show some kind of spirit of reconciliation and embracement like Nelson Mandela did after apartheid and his jailing and coming out as a national leader. If you look at South Korean politics, all the presidents were sent to a prison and they would be purged and dead or committing suicide.

If you think about North Koreans try to reconcile and having a little bit of exchanges of South Koreans, they may say if we become a third rate citizen in South Korea, they will butcher us and there will be a purge of every bloody finger that we put maybe in the jar that will all be finger cut.

So South Korean politics itself has to go through some improvement to really become much more embracing, and what about the treatment of defectors? I tried to introduce one of the beautiful women who had a nutritional health degree from North Korea. She left her 6 year old child and she was working as a dishwasher at a barbecue restaurant. So much beer and the beef and everything they consume and every night she has to wash those dishes with piled up food and she couldn't stand it. She had a bloody memory of her starving son. So when I interviewed her I said, you look very smart. Are you happy with your current job? She said, no, I'm not. I really would not like to touch the leftover food anymore. It kills me. I say, why? Because it reminds me of my starving boy in North Korea. So I said, what kind of degree do you have? She has a technical degree of nutrition and health science. I said, all right, and very coincidentally the Korean woman who owns the beautiful, luxurious café serving the cappuccino, sort of Starbucks of Korean version, said, Katy, do you know any great woman who can be manager? I said, yes. When I introduced her she almost slapped my face, saying that she couldn't use a defector. They could be liar and murderer. I said because of your kind of person, there will be no real true engagement. So then finally she hired her. She is now the booming manager scouted by every hotel. So this is the kind of philosophical way South Koreans

can do something by being a true genuine good citizen and North Koreans say there is an alternative. We can join with them.

QUESTION: Hello. I'm with the Asia Society. You mentioned how women were key economic actors in the marketplace in North Korea. I was wondering if you could expand on the role of women culturally, economically, legally in North Korean society.

DR. HASSIG: Let me start by saying for those who don't know, the reason that women are more often in the marketplace and for that matter the reason that women outnumber men as defectors is something like 3 to 1 these days is because it's easier for them to escape from the workplace and to actually stay under the regime's radar and operate by themselves. What it means is that in a lot of households, maybe the majority today, it looks like the women are the main breadwinners because the men still go to work and earn useless North Korean money. So this gives women more power and reports we get are that that causes all sorts of family problems because North Korea is still a male dominated society so the husbands are angry that the women now have more money, more power, and that situation is probably gradually changing, but it's still a big problem in North Korea. And it's very difficult for the women because they still have to take care of the family plus go out and earn the only money that the family is really getting.

DR. OH: I'll give you a little bit of a Korean story. There is always the phrase of, I don't know whether you know at Chinese like forward expressions of describing some wisdom and social-cultural patterns and there is the expression *nam nam buk yeo*, which means Southern man, Northern woman.

Korea is a little bit longish like a running rabbit and it has kind of a natural resource division line. North Korea is more forested, more natural resources, South Korea is more aggregation, flat field, bread making. And so that there is very much a natural division, and the North Korean woman tends to be a lot more resilient and very hard working and also a little bit more aggressive than the typical as you say very polite and pretty South Korean woman. So that has been the expression.

Often I was joked around with by Korean men who said because you came from North Korea, you are very tough. And the North Korean woman is really -- I mean when I see the defectors, most Korean defectors men in South Korea they are sick, they are a drunkard, they are unemployed, they are angry and bitter. They talk about the goodness of North Korea my God's sake. They left that bloody North Korea and now they have a great meal and nice food, nice car and they're complaining. Women are all hard working. Women are the managers, traders, businessmen, they are the ones who collect the money to send to North Koreans, so the same pattern happens in South Korea as well.

QUESTION: My name is Priscilla from the Center for Defense Information. You mentioned that you don't think North Korea will give up its

nuclear weapons and I know a lot of the media talks about how North Korea wants to keep it for a bargaining chip. But I wonder if you could talk about perhaps the domestic factors that go into that because I feel like with the propaganda they try to create this illusion of unity under the military first policy and while you're interviewing defectors did any of them say that the nuclear weapons legitimize the government's control or the anti-American sentiment at all?

DR. HASSIG: I think defectors generally say they're not the least bit interested in the nuclear situation as long as it doesn't start a war, but whether the regime has one nuclear weapon or 50, it doesn't touch them because they're worried about getting food today. I'm not sure that there is really a domestic factor involved in this. I think it's really the regime figuring out what's best for it, and when I say they're not going to give up nuclear weapons I'm relying on history. They probably started in the mid-1980s and why give up something that you've had for such a long time and that's served you well? That's what brings the United States to North Korea and that's what brings all the big countries to North Korea is nuclear weapons and I think it would be crazy for them to give it up. For years of course Kim Jong-Il said we have no intention ever of building a nuclear weapon. The United States has so many. Why would we want one or two? It would be useless. Then Kim Jong-Il for years and years has been saying we want nothing more than to give up our nuclear weapons and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Now of course the official line is, sorry, we can't do that, and I think finally the North Koreans are telling the truth and we should believe them.

DR. BUSH: I have a somewhat speculative question. I would hypothesize as a non-Korea expert that 60 years or more of the North Korean regime has inflicted terrific psychological damage on the North Korean people in terms of their willingness to engage in meaningful, personal relations, trusting each other, having empathy for other people, engaging in civil society. I would imagine also that when the regime ends and when unification comes that there will be an initial euphoria but that this damage is going to linger for some time. Do you agree with that line of thought? And how long will it take for people of Northern Korea to get over this profound damage that's been done to them?

DR. HASSIG: I absolutely agree. It's as if you interviewed the defectors yourself. When they come to South Korea that's one of their problems. They can't establish relationships. They have to be so careful in North Korea what they say to anyone even inside the family sometimes. And so there's all sorts of psychological problems they have or suspicion which isn't necessarily a problem. How long it lasts I don't know, I'm not a political scientist. As a psychologist my rule of thumb had been, I don't know why I always thought for every year that you lived under that regime it's going to take another year to get over it, so maybe it's going to be 60 years. We can look at Germany and the problems they have even today, and North Korea has got to be a much worse situation. I'm very pessimistic.

DR. OH: If I can add that I had breakfast with the German ambassador who just arrived in South Korea a couple of weeks ago when I was in Seoul last week, and he's not just a diplomat but also an historian and studied the German unification and after the unification process. He and his first secretary, we had a very somber and interesting breakfast. Because the German Berlin Wall that the celebration was going on and so he said, Katy, it's still going on the lingering about the Eastern Germans cannot be a member of the real unified Germany and the impact and scar and nostalgia and the new rise of socialism and communism. And compared to Germany he's just experiencing that Korea will be about three times longer. And that's why I emphasized that if South Korea is ever interested in becoming a strategic player and interested in a long-term national goal of unification, today is the day begin with embracement, reconciliation and then really truly think about how to help the poor North Koreans because defectors are arriving in the 19th, 20th and the 21st centuries, it doesn't matter. You leave 10 years ago or 15 years ago, they still carry the impact of indoctrination and they curse some of the things that they don't like and I can see the lingering impact of their damage.

DR. BUSH: Thank you. Richard Shin?

QUESTION: Richard Shin with Economists Incorporated. Thank you for a wonderful presentation. Katy, we go back to Berkeley back in the 1970s. Right?

DR. OH: Right.

MR. SHIN: My question is really concerning information. I've read articles where they said you could talk to a North Korean soldier on a cell phone and they're bad mouthing the government, and on the other hand I read another article that says if you're found with a Chinese cell phone, you could be severely punished and there's a lot of restrictions, and the same thing with the marketplace. There is a lot of market going on and the next thing you hear is that there's a crackdown and it's suppressed. So you get all these different types of information, and how do you filter them out to reach a general consensus or general understanding of what's really occurring in North Korea?

The second thing is that you also said you interviewed a lot of defectors and I was wondering they also have certain views about North Korea and that's the reason why they defected. The question is how do you also put a filter on what they say to get a more reasonable assessment of what's going on in North Korea?

DR. HASSIG: One thing you do is you look for consistency, of course. That's just the social science approach to it. And when you get three-quarters of the defectors saying this and one quarter saying that, you tend to go with this I think. We find quite a bit of consistency I would say. But also it's interesting, can they use cell phones, can't they use cell phones. Both. North Korea is a very complicated country. It's a changing country and that's why we

don't have this unity, and some people can get away with using cell phones and others not. Even occasionally some people criticize their government in public and get away with it, where the next week someone will be thrown into prison for that. So both things happen and that's why it's difficult I think to write about North Korea.

DR. OH: Maybe between the punishment and the possession of using the cell phone is that in the olden days, let's say about 2003 through 2005, if you're really discovered that you possess an illegal cellular phone when you cross the border most in the edge in the provincial area, in Hamgyong Province, then they immediately, what did you get this? Where did you get this? Did you meet a Korean Christian or traitors? And so somehow they can be beaten and then to a different degree they can be sent to the political camp, but these days everybody wants money so these guys got a little smarter saying that I was just given. You can have it. And then deliver the battery functioning the cellular phone to the security. And he may be a little bit shattering and trembling, but nonetheless, the guy behind it get it and then the bribery. So it means that people discover how to manipulate. And then also constantly the cellular phones bought in China is sometimes underground they bury and then they use it and then if the battery is gone and then they cross the border again. So that's why we call it individual economy is the number one driving factor.

QUESTION: I'm Kara Bartlett, I work here at Brookings. I was interested in how you referenced the United Nations report and I was wondering if the United Nations is met with the same hostility as other individual countries and the outside world, and also what role the U.N. can play moving forward in helping the North Korean people.

DR. HASSIG: United Nations? How did we reference that?

MS. BARTLETT: You talked about the report that the North Korean government submitted to the U.N. and the review in December.

DR. HASSIG: That was Roberta.

DR. OH: That's what Roberta said. Roberta is the expert.

DR. HASSIG: She's the expert on that. All I want to say is that of course the official North Korean propaganda line which they give to their people is that the United Nations is controlled by the United States, so they don't expect much from them.

DR. OH: But they use the United Nations for the goodwill, for the money, UNDP, and the United Nations is a legitimate institution that they have to go through.

DR. BUSH: I also recall that it was under the flag of the United Nations that our side fought the Korean War and it's a U.N. organization, the

International Atomic Energy Agency that creates a certain amount of trouble in the nuclear program. So the bias is on the negative side I think.

QUESTION: My name is Keith Hill and I'm from BNA. My question is since Dr. Hassig in his presentation mentioned when rather than if unification will occur. My question is do you think the steps toward unification will increase once Kim Jong-Il's son takes over or will it still be at a low level of 10 years after he's in office? Thank you.

DR. HASSIG: That's such a tough one to predict. Everyone is asking what's going to happen. I take a very pessimistic view and I think whoever takes over is going to be able to pretty much keep things the way they are, but every succession will reduce the regime's chances of staying in power a little bit.

DR. OH: He's a pessimist and I'm an optimist. Not exactly an optimist, but try to take a different stance, and knowing the Korean culture and the Confucian family ethics and all these things. We have a couple of expressions as I expressed like Southern men and Northern women. There is also a very famous expression in Korea that means that even though the richest and the healthiest family will not last more than three generations until all three generations at an equal level of genius and creativity. And maybe shareholding and corporate structure will corporate will change and then eventually will be this disfranchised and becoming a different corporation and different family. Kim Jong-un is 26 and I was the one who created the title Father and Dog Son and the title father was Kim Il-sung and dog son was Kim Jong-Il, and the dog son was actually lasting longer than I expected. So this one is puppy grandson.

DR. HASSIG: You heard it here.

DR. OH: Kim Jong-Il was born at least in the camp of the military camp during the colonial period when his father was a resistance leader and fighter. Kim Jong-un had an incredible and luxurious life and surrounded by the iPod and pizza and pasta and Geneva schooling and listening to classical music and somehow I think all these kinds of like third wave of third generational information and lifestyle is making North Koreans exception. It means he knew it, and so if he become a puppy crown prince I think that there will be some dissention within the military in the sense that the process will be not fastened, so I put a little bit more marbles than the optimistic.

DR. HASSIG: But just as a pessimist let me add that this idea of a system, North Korea is not just Kim Jong-un. When he takes over he may be the number one decision maker. But there are a lot of other people involved and I think that if he decides to make some changes I think they will slow him up. My prediction.

DR. BUSH: Roberta?

DR. COHEN: I just wanted to comment briefly on the point about the United Nations. The North Korean government seems to be quite ambivalent really with regard to the United Nations. I can see this in the human rights area. They have ratified international human rights agreements, they come before some of the U.N. bodies to answer questions, they have submitted their report to the U.N. under the universal periodic review of their human rights record, and the report uses the language of international human rights and they have put these terms in their constitution. On the other hand, they don't cooperate with the U.N. recommendations, so they kind of come into part of it and then the U.N. could do quite a lot to exert influence and pressure if they would to try to get North Korea to abide by some of the recommendations, mainly access. They've denied access to the human rights parts of the U.N., the High Commissioner for Human Rights, et cetera, but they have allowed in humanitarian organizations and of course there there's always an ambivalent relationship over monitoring and access. So the U.N. could be very useful in helping to pry open the country with regard to access I think and I hope that the universal periodic review on December 7 will actually have a punch line in getting North Korea to agree to some access for human rights bodies.

QUESTION: Will Amatruda. There have been reports in the press that Kim Jong-Il's son was educated in a Swiss boarding school. Do you think the reports are accurate? And what do you see as the implications of having eventually a North Korean leader who has personal knowledge of the West?

DR. OH: The Washington Post's Andrew Higgins who is stationed in Paris, by now maybe he went to China as a new correspondent for the Washington Post, went to Geneva and I suggest to him that he would find a very attractive French woman to go to the boarding school because obviously that boarding school that Kim Jong-un and Kim Jong-chul they attended two different schools were bombarded by the Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, Singaporean, Taiwanese and global media presence so they were totally spoiled. But if he goes with a very nice attractive French woman speaking French maybe will open the door. Nonetheless, we wrote an article about 6 months ago, so I don't know, but they attended those schools. It's a formative age for them and it's exposed, but of course who could say Switzerland is a totally free country? It's a very regimented boarding school so you can imagine their exposure to the local civil society must be very controlled and limited. But nonetheless, I think it has some impact on their inner cultural or whatever formation I think. That's my opinion.

DR. HASSIG: And more likely to lead a little bit more to reform I think, although Kim Jong-Il has surrounded himself with Western products all his life, he loves them, and yet he denies them to his people. So either Kim Jong-un if he takes power is going to have to open up the country a little more or else he's going to have to be more of what we call in the book a double thinker and live one life in his palace and then another life when he's speaking to the people.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. Brian Hollingsworth. You mentioned that Kim Jong-Il was fascinated by technology but denies to his

people. Orascom to my knowledge recently is brokering a deal for a 3G network called Koryolink to my knowledge. I could be mistaken with the name. How do you explain the will to bring 3G technology and fiber optics into North Korea but yet deny them? How is it possible do you think to deny such a powerful medium to the people?

DR. HASSIG: They're introducing the 3G network, that's true. So in that sense they're not denying it, but it's extremely expensive so very few people are going to get it and my understanding is that you can't make international calls with it and I suppose all the calls you do make are monitored by the state security department. Kim Jong-Il from the beginning realizes one half of his brain, the left half or something, I don't know, says we have to have technology in North Korea or we're always going to be behind, and this is an important aspect of technology. The other side of his brain says if people start calling each other on cell phones, I'm in big trouble because they'll be plotting. So it's ambivalence again and I'm skeptical about the expanding cell phone network in North Korea. They clamped down on the last cell phone network and the same might happen on the Orascom network.

QUESTION: Grace from Institute for Policy Studies. My question is about the American media portrayal of North Korea. Do you think there are notable discrepancies in present circumstances on development in North Korea and our portrayal in the media of North Korea and if there is a need to approach it in a more comprehensive manner?

DR. OH: American media. Do you have any comments?

DR. HASSIG: We've been studying North Korea for so many years, it hasn't changed. It's a pretty dull country to tell you the truth. That doesn't get into the media. So my only comment would be really the media articles, media programs you see tend to suggest that something big is happening in North Korea. They're finally melting or there's finally reform or finally this or finally that. But in fact usually that's not the case. It's going to be business as usual, but you got to sell the newspapers or something like that. So we read these articles and we say I got a good enough memory, I remember reading that article 5 or 10 years ago.

DR. BUSH: Ralph and Katy, thank you very much for a very illuminating presentation. Remember "The Hidden People of North Korea." Thank you very much for coming.

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