

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

FIRST ANNUAL ALTIERO SPINELLI LECTURE

“BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: THE FUTURE OF THE  
EUROPEAN UNION”

Washington, D.C

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**Welcoming Remarks:**

DANIEL BENJAMIN

Director, Center on the United States and Europe

**Introduction:**

STROBE TALBOTT

President, The Brookings Institution

**Featured Speaker:**

GIULIANO AMATO

Former Prime Minister of Italy and Vice President of the European  
Constitutional Convention

**Moderator:**

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## PROCEEDINGS

MR. BENJAMIN: Good morning. I'm Director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. I was going to say here at the Brookings Institution, but it's actually next door at the Brookings Institution.

And it's great pleasure to welcome you today to the first Annual Altiero Spinelli Lecture.

The Center on the United States and Europe has been fortunate to have two annual lecture series thus far. On October 7th, we held the fifth Ramon Aron Lecture, which was delivered by the French strategic thinker and historian Thérèse Dépeche.

Last spring, former Undersecretary of State, Nicolas Burns, was the speaker at the fourth annual Sakip Sabanci Lecture.

Now, as we all know, good things come in threes, like presidential debates, so we are now proud to add to this the Altiero Spinelli Lecture, and to welcome Italy's former prime minister, Giuliano Amato to deliver it.

As many of you know, Altiero Spinelli was one of the founding fathers of modern Europe, and more specifically the European Union.

Born in Rome in 1907, Spinelli was drawn early to radical politics. In 1927, when he was head of the Communist Party's youth wing, he was arrested by the fascists and spent the next 16 years in prison.

After Stalin's purges in 1937, he broke with the Communists,

and in the years after, he began to dream of a federated Europe in which the states would be more closely integrated, and, therefore, disinclined to wage war against one another.

The Ventotene Manifesto, which he reportedly wrote on cigarette papers while interned on an island of that name, is one of the original documents of European integration.

After the war, Spinelli played a pivotal role in the creation of what we now call Europe. He was the founder of the European Federalist Movement. He supported the European Defense community; serving in the 1970s as a member of the European Commission in charge of industrial policy, and later won a seat in the European Parliament.

It was Spinelli's view that the European Parliament should act as a constituent assembly, and this happened actually on the 14th -- or nearly happened on the 14th of February 1984, when the European Parliament adopted the draft treaty establishing the European Union, which Spinelli himself had written.

Although his effort was approved in the Parliament, member governments rejected that initiative. Nonetheless, it set off the impetus that ultimately resulted in the Single European Act in the Maastricht Treaty.

Today, appropriately, a building of the European Parliament bears his name. We at Brookings are also pleased to have a connection to Altiero Spinelli.

One of his protégés from the European Federalist movement

was a young scientist named Cesare Merlini, with whom he had worked on the failed effort to secure ratification of the European Defense community.

When Spinelli was elected to the European Parliament, he summoned Merlini, who had just been given a chair in nuclear science -- and never let it be said that the Europeans don't put their smartest people into these activities -- to the Polytechnic -- he was at the Polytechnic in Turin, and Spinelli summoned him to Rome and told him that he had to take over the Institute for International Affairs that Spinelli had founded five years earlier.

Cesare, I'm happy to say, is here with us today. He's been one of the really great proponents of U.S.-Italian and U.S.-European relations, and, as executive vice chairman of the Council on the US and Italy, has been a tremendous supporter of our Center and in particular its Italy program.

As a result of that program and their support, we have a visiting fellow, Federiga Bindi, who's here on the stage on the today. She is the Jean Monnet Professor at Tor Vergata in Rome, and she will moderate the discussion after Professor Amato speaks.

I want to thank Cesare as well because not only for his and Council's support of our program, but because the Spinelli Lecture was really his brainchild, and he's been a great supporter of this effort in his personal capacity.

With that, I want to turn this over to Strobe Talbott, someone

who has thought deeply about integration in Europe, at Brookings, and also around the world. And he will introduce our speaker today, and I want to thank you very much.

(Applause)

MR. TALBOTT: Thanks very much, Dan. And I would like to echo Dan's greetings to all of you. I would also, with particular sincerity and enthusiasm, want to echo Dan's thanks. Cesare, who, in addition to all the points that Dan has made, has also become a very close personal friend of mine. He is a man of parts, a Renaissance man, not only a nuclear physicist specialty, which, by the way, I think helps in many ways understand the complicated physics of politics sometimes. But he's also a historian.

And he and I share a passion about the way in which history relates to the future. And I'm very indebted to him for the help that he's given me on a project or two.

You may have noticed as we were coming in here that we had a little discussion sort of on the move about protocol. We had an earlier discussion about protocol as well on the extremely important question of how our guest of honor and speaker today would like to be addressed.

And in Washington, of course, we always have three options for everything; right? He could be Mr. President. He could be Mr. Prime Minister, or he could be called professor.

And Federiga and Dan and I were delighted when you told

us that you'd like to be called professor. After all, in cyberspace, you are now in the dot.edu domain. We are Brookings.edu. And it is -- I cannot think of anybody more appropriate than Professor Amato to give the inaugural Spinelli Lecture.

I had the great privilege and honor of knowing him as one of the pivotal figures of the 1990s, when he was, both at the beginning and then at the end of the Clinton administration, Middle East Prime Minister.

In both of his terms in that office, he confronted many challenges, but especially on the economic front.

I might add that we regard Professor Amato as one of our own. He was a visiting scholar at Brookings more than a quarter of a century ago in governance studies, back in the early 1980s. And our friend and colleague, Pietro Nivola, remembers him very well and claims -- and I would never dispute such a claim -- to have identified Professor Amato back then of being of prime ministerial timber.

DR. AMATO: I don't remember these things.

MR. TALBOTT: Well, but it's Pietro's story, and I'm sticking by it.

What makes Professor Amato particularly suited to give the Spinelli Lecture is his championship of the idea of Europe. He championed it on the national stage in Italy, and, of course, also in Brussels. He helped develop and realize that idea. He argued for it lucidly. He acted decisively on behalf of its implementation and its realization.

Now without prejudging what he's going to have to say to us this morning, I know from his past record and from my own interaction with him that he's also a great believer in the importance of American support for the European Project, a message that I think if he does choose to deliver it comes at a particularly timely moment in the ongoing evolution of our own foreign-policy.

He has, as I think all of you know from the invitation that was circulated, chosen as his title a reference to Scylla and Charybdis, which is a favorite myth of both policymakers and those of us who kibbutz on the policy process.

And we will hear how our speaker chooses to apply and relate that tale to the journey on which he has helped to steer Europe.

I'm sure it's not lost on any of you are that even though those monsters resided on opposite sides of the Straits of Messina, which is between Sicily and the mainland of Italy, he will, I'm sure, find a way of locating their cousins or their descendents elsewhere on the continent as well.

So, Professor Amato, the podium is yours and so is our gratitude. Thank you.

(Applause)

DR. AMATO: Well, really thank you for inviting me. It's such a pleasure to be here again after more than 25 years. You were right.

What he said to me that it was in 1980. Actually it was in 1981, so it was not so far in the past. But it was 1981, and it was a

wonderful time for me, because I had the opportunity to -- my idea was to study here the redistributive aspects of the American welfare that, at the time, was still under the heading of President Johnson substantially.

And I learned so many things staying here both by reading and by talking to colleagues. And this was a unique experience of reading books or data or figures, and finding immediately somebody two rooms after mine to discuss precisely these things and to have the sense of them. It's -- I hope it has remained as it was at the time, because really it was quite a learning experience for me.

Well, now, times have changed for us. At the time, we didn't have the Europe we have now. And I wonder whether it was worse or better. It's not easy to say. In the '70s, there was the great invention of the monetary system -- I will go back to it -- which was the expression of a great leadership with vision about the future of Europe.

And this will be one of the main points of my talk here this morning, because it mostly depends on this nowadays. But let us say one -- what I have to say -- let me say what I have to say with some order.

First of all, Spinelli. Spinelli was really a great figure. If I may say something that Cesare will appreciate, it was, as it happens in history, somehow better than many of his followers.

And you know why he was better? Because he was the typical visionary leader. He had -- mostly a visionary leader, but he was so pragmatic in looking for the opportunities that political life could give him to open a gate toward the future he had in mind, not necessarily a



wide gate, even a narrow one. But he could see it and he would not lose the opportunity to try, to pass through it and see what happened.

Some of his followers would somehow rigidly remain on the ideological vision of Spinelli, rejecting the small gates. I say this with some passion, because I had personal difficulties on this point.

The late Spinelli wrote -- and I have remained loyal to this kind of position in his -- I don't remember whether it was in his long diary or it's somewhere else -- but he wrote that visionary idealists like he had been would've gone nowhere without the pragmatic statesmen they had to work with.

Of course, pragmatic statesmen would have remained where they initially were without the visionary idealists, but they needed each other. And this is something that I've always appreciated.

Actually, if you think of his vision, the idea of a federalist Europe where the exclusivity of national sovereignty could be somehow diluted in such a way as to (inaudible) the reasons for conflicts with each other, and, therefore, no sovereign states, but a new European entity where internal wars would be un-conceivable -- well, if you ask yourselves has he succeeded after so many years, he has succeeded.

Europe is not federal. This is an important point.

And yet, his mission has been successful because nowadays war among European states is un-conceivable.

And the sense now for us to widen the union to the Western Balkans still is the sense of Spinelli. If you become members of our union,

whatever happens, that thing won't happen again.

And this is an interesting point. So the mission was accomplished with a Europe that has not become federal. Let us understand this kind of thing.

We are perfectly aware that the mission has been accomplished. And this is why several Europeans nowadays think that it's difficult for Europe or for the European Union to survive as a healthy organization without a mission so emotionally significant as the original one.

And, therefore, several Europeans think well, but Europe is not satisfactory as it is now. We need a mission with the same emotional impact of the initial one.

I don't agree with this position because, you know, after winning a war, you have won the war. You cannot imagine the future with the same emotional intensity that you could somehow taste while you were fighting that kind of battle.

Actually, this Europe, this European Union, is now rooted in our citizens. They have accepted it. And they are not satisfied with it. They remain unsatisfied, though having accepted Europe. We are sure of that.

Whenever -- despite the fact that surveys and polls tell you that the Irish, independently of their referendum, still are Europhiles, more than 70 percent belong to Europe in Ireland. Other countries are lower.

But when the satisfaction is asked in relation to the

European Union and your nation state, generally the European Union scores much higher than the nation states, which is interesting, because it demonstrates that satisfaction and dissatisfaction clearly depend on the performance of the union and of the member states in responding to demands of the citizens.

Now, the real point we have to understand is where the reasons lie for this dissatisfaction that somehow exists, and that has nothing to do with the fact that the regional mission cannot be replaced with another similar mission.

Well, sometimes the dissatisfaction is the artificial consequence of national debates in which Europe is blamed for something that national politicians are responsible for, but in order to somehow transfer the responsibility somewhere else, they say it's Europe that wants me to do this.

This is sort of dirty political game that is being played by several national leaders that implies that whenever there is a difficult decision to be taken, it's not me. It's up there, forgetting that, up there, it's still me, because, as you know, not being a federal organization, Europe -- the European Union still has as its main decision-making body a ministerial council, the members of which are national ministers -- are ministers of our nation states, and they are not federal ministers.

So there is a joint exercise of the -- you are a member of a ministerial council in Brussels as long as you are a national minister. This has to be clear. This is a unique feature of our institutional organization.

So sometimes this is part of the political game of our nation states. But, in other occasions, clearly there is dissatisfaction because our citizens perceive that when a European response is needed -- and this is why Europe exists -- giving cross-border answers to cross-border issues -- and actually they expect Europe not to care about their welfare or about their health system, but to care about fighting criminality, fighting terrorism, creating safe conditions for their energy supply, caring about climate change, all of these sort of issues that clearly none of our member states to take care of individually.

This is where the dissatisfaction lies. You see, frequently our leaders succeed in giving the necessary responses. I would say that the initial reaction in the case of Georgia was a good reaction. And we owe to the role initially exercised by the European Union leadership if the Russians were stopped, and somehow it's cooling off over there.

The initial reaction to the financial crisis was not equally satisfactory, but after some days and heavy losses, their ordination was much more effective. But you never know for the future. We will discuss Georgia and Russia in two hours, but, at the moment, if we go beyond the role of honest broker, as it was said by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, the divisions inside the leadership of Europe will emerge. I'm sure that they will emerge between the eastern European countries and other countries.

And this is basically the problem, the divisions inside the union -- national interests that negatively affect the decisions that are

taken at the European level. And here, you can assess really the distance between what is happening now and several, let's say, important decisions taken by the leadership of the first decades that were different.

The specialty of the initial Europe was giving European solutions to national demands. And this was the sense of the new construction.

Let me take the clearest example of all, the euro and initially the European monetary system and afterward the single currency. It's not the only one, but it's the clearest one.

You remember when Bretton Woods collapsed after the Washington decision to abandon the gold standard, the volatility of the relationships among our currencies and their respective value, the enormous space that was given to financial speculation at the time. They could enter into the gap between two of our currencies and create an immense trouble.

We had to face several times sort of previews of the financial huge battles that we have seen in these weeks -- defending -- they were attacking the leader against the deutsche mark, and, therefore, we have to defend the leader against the deutsche mark. If the leader was successful in defending itself, they started attacking the French franc. And again, the same kind of thing and billions and billions of lire or francs or whatever or pounds had to be spent to defend the currencies from the attacks in the market.

Well, two European leaders, Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Germany and France, this is an interesting chapter of our history, the Franco-German axis, which was an important really pillar of the strengthening of the European Union.

Well, they could have found solutions satisfactory both for the franc and for the deutsche mark. It was conceivable. But they said we have the European Community, and, therefore, let us do something at that level.

So nothing directly satisfactory for the franc, nothing directly satisfactory for the deutsche mark, but let us create a new thing above the franc and above the mark. And, at that point, we will create even a better barrier against these attacks. And actually this was the euro that later on our rights because between the idea and the implementation of it in a case like this year it might be necessary.

But when the euro arrived, it was impossible to exploit the gap between my currency and yours. And, therefore, we gave the world a substantially -- a very limited number of currencies. And these kinds of speculative attacks against the currencies substantially faded away.

This is the clearest example of national demands that -- or national issues, if not necessarily demands, but find an answer at another level. This is typical of federal organizations, if you think of it. And it's something you're used to if you think of your member states. There might be a problem for two or three member states of this federal organization, but it is part of the cultural paradigms of a federal system to elaborate a

federal solution. What corresponds to the interests of the U.S. might solve problems of some of its member states.

Not so easy, not so natural in a context of national sovereignties that are little by little somehow transferring part of themselves to another organization which is not federal. But at the time, the leadership succeeded in introducing into that transitional organization the same, I repeat, mental paradigms that you have in a federal system.

What has happened is that this kind of attitude has been somehow reduced, reduced more and more, and our leaders tend to look for the best solution for their own countries at the common level.

If you are not friendly, you might say a sort of pork barrel in Brussels. If you are more friendly, you don't choose that kind of expression, which is never nice, but, I mean, it is quite a good description of what happens.

Now the reason is why. Why it has happened? Isn't there any relationship between the fact that the Spinelli mission was accomplished before having a federal state and with the kind of organization that in the meantime we have been building?

My answer is yes, there is this connection. First of all, let me say that understanding that this is mostly our problem, there are other explanations that are being given for these problems. The first one, which I firmly reject, is enlargement is responsible for it. When we were a few ones, we could understand each other better, and we could find common solutions for our also domestic problems.

Now, 27, so many with such variety of interests, of positions, of national cultures, unavoidably when they go there, they have their national angle in mind. This is not correct. I reject this opposition to enlargement basically for two reasons.

The first reason relates specifically to this issue. When we get divided, it is not necessarily because we are 27. The case of deepest division inside Europe, inside the European Union, was the case of the military intervention in Iraq. In that case, the division was inside the core of the old European Union, because Italy, Spain, and the U.K. were standing with Washington. France, Germany, Belgium, and others were standing against Washington.

The poor Slovaks were completely innocent. Of course, eastern countries tended to support the position closer to the American administration for their own reasons, but they were not responsible for the division, and the division was inside our traditional group.

Now, we are discussing environmental measures, and you have Italy and Germany that are the countries that produce automobiles more than anybody else. And it's Italy and Germany that are opposing these measures, not Poland.

So, I mean, if you say that when we are divided because national interests prevail, this is due to enlargement, you simply make a false statement because the divisions also exist, and the main divisions have existed among the traditional members.



Second, and if you want even more important, argument in defense of enlargement is that Almighty God has not entitled us, the Western Europeans, to define ourselves Europe. Europe is a creation of culture, of history, of values, of principles. In the 16th century, Europe was represented as a woman whose head was in Portugal and whose legs were in Russia.

At a certain point of history, some parts of this body were conquered by Communist regimes, and we were lucky enough not to be conquered by the same kind of nightmare.

Due to that, can we say that, therefore, we are Europe and they are not? Let me say it's not nice. And it is against the sense of past and contemporary history. Europe preexists, and it does preexist even in our treaties.

Not everybody is aware of the clause on accession to the European Union which says European states complying with or accepting the values and principles stated in these treaties, in the charter, and in whatever may apply. So, you are European before applying, not because you have applied. And you become European afterwards.

So, there is no coincidence between Europe and the European Union. In the countries of Europe that are members of the European Union at a certain date are not entitled to define themselves as Europe. The full enlargement was rightly defined initially as a reunification of Europe; more it was an enlargement of the European Union, but a

reunification of Europe, which also applies to other countries which are not members as yet.

And we should be mindful of this that we still are coping with a not completed reunification of Europe. So, I reject the fact that enlargement -- of course, eastern countries after so many years of communism have some positions that are different from ours.

I can understand that there is a difference between countries that were facing the USSR and countries that had the USSR inside themselves. It's difficult for them to see Russia as something that has nothing to do with the USSR somehow, while it is easier for me. And, therefore, this might need some sort of common digestion of past differences between us.

But this is not the source of our division. Other explanation is purely, if you want anthropological, well, the leaders we had in the past were better than the leaders we have now. Okay. It might also be. It might also be, because if you look at the processes throughout political leadership is being formed and trained.

Well, the older generations had experiences that were much more formative than the experiences throughout which contemporary leaders are formed. You know, passing through the war through great issues and ideal battles such as the West versus communism, et cetera, et cetera. I mean, this is something that gives you something more.

Now, these leaders sometimes have other experiences -- TV, you know, these sorts of things -- different, somehow different.

But this is not enough an explanation in my view. They tend to be what they are. They tend to give attention to national solutions for national problems also because the union has become an organization where the role of national governments is such has been enhanced year after year.

And this is something that not everybody is aware of, and please give me your attention because this is an important passage. Not everybody is aware of the difference between European Community and the European Union. And not only -- it would be easy for me just to walk around and ask an American passing by, do you know, by the way, the difference between European Community and European Union? What do you want from me? I mean, no, I don't. Should I? Et cetera.

But you would get exactly the same answer from a European citizen you meet anywhere -- in Rome, in Brussels, in Paris, or in London. And I'm not so sure that all of our European leaders are where of the difference. Don't ask them. Not to have surprises.

Because what? I have to make it short, because -- sorry, I'm Italian. I like talking, but when it's time to stop -- I mean. No, because I've still got a long way to go through that -- in this -- I have to make it shorter.

But you see initially we have the Community. The Community was a legal entity entitled to exercise legislative powers and therefore enacting legislative regulations having direct effects in our legal systems. So, this is the Community.

There are powers -- legislative powers conferred by national states to this upper level of government, devised very similarly to the federal ones. So there is a legislative power of the Community that is substantially centered around the integration of the market, so whatever is needed legally to integrate the market -- abolish tariffs, abolish other barriers, creating common regulations instead of differentiated regulations that fragment the market, et cetera -- all these things can be done by European regulations that are immediately applicable to the citizens, exactly as a statute of Congress is immediately applicable to the citizens of all the member states of the federation. And we also have a court that not only was in power to settle the disputes among the member states, but also to defend the rights of the European citizens vis-à-vis their own member states when the states were not complying with common regulations.

And, therefore, this kind of community was going toward the federal future. It was not federal. The very fact that these regulations were adopted by a ministerial council whose members were national ministers did make a difference.

But after a while, we introduced a parliament that they directly elected initially as an advisory body to the Council. But after the direct election necessarily demanding co-decision-making power on legislation, you cannot elect a parliament and keep it as an advisory body. It is nonsense.

And, therefore, the parliament started expanding its powers, and these powers were slowly recognized.

But everything was connected to the integration of the market. In the '80s, our leaders understood that this creature up there could be used also for other missions, not only integrating the market, but also having a foreign policy, not only a foreign policy, but due to cross-border criminality, immigration, the first signs of terrorism, creating an area of, as we call it, freedom, security, and justice is substantially having police activity, cross-border crimes, common investigation on these things, plus social Europe.

In the early '90s, there was a discussion, what are we going to do these new missions? Do we confer to the Community the necessary powers to legislate on these matters the same way the Community is empowered to legislate on integration of the market and the surroundings?

The treaty had to be amended anyway, and there were proposals to expand the Community, to expand the community method to these new missions. When the heads of state and governments met in Maastricht, this was the proposal of the Dutch presidency of the Community at the moment. It was rejected by a wide majority, because those who know the Union might think the British as usual. Yes, the British as usual, but not alone -- but not alone.

Also Germany, one of the most European of our member states, due to the increasing pressure of the lender, wary of more transfers of power to Brussels, which is beyond the direct control of the

lender, because there is no European Bundestag, also Germany, and the others were against.

And, therefore, there was this great imagination. Europe has to be considered as a temple. There are three pillars. The Community is one of the pillars. And then there are two pillars that work throughout inter-governmental cooperation.

And putting the three pillars together, Europe looks like a temple. And we call this temple European Union.

So if you ask me what the European Union is, I respond it's a temple. But you might think you're crazy. I have to ask somebody else. But the most precise and specific answer you might have is mine. It's just a temple, because it's nothing else. It's not a legal entity. It's an invention with no substance in it that justifies the decision adopted to introduce on a wider scale the method of cooperation among governments parallel to the method of confirming powers to the upper level of government.

This has created a lot of confusion. I tend to say that, let's say, the Americans -- we tend to say that the Americans are simplistic, because we Europeans are much more sophisticated. But at least, in this instance, the simplistic mind of the Americans is right -- gets it right, because we arrived here in the capital just to stipulate an agreement, U.S.-Europe.

This agreement generally is, as we say, technically mixed. There are some chapters that have to do with economics, and, therefore, belong to the Community because they have to do with the integration of

the market and with the powers of the Community, which is a legal entity; and, therefore, entitled to stipulate and sign international agreements on its own.

There are chapters of the same agreement, if it is mixed, that fall under the inter-governmental European Union. And, therefore, we arrive. Everything is ready. And we ask our American friends, "can you prepare to copies because we have different signatures here?" Who signs, the Americans ask, we are ourselves.

At that point, the simplistic mind gets confused. And said, but, you sign, so you are still you. Why I have one only signature and you have two ones on copies that are identical?

At that point, we explain the difference between the temple and the Community, et cetera, and the American looks at us and says, "these people are completely crazy." I mean, he is right. He's absolutely right. This is nonsense. This is nonsense. But this nonsense -- I make it short; no, I'm not making short at all -- but I'm saying that I'm doing it -- please, excuse me. I promise that sooner or later I finish.

Well, this mess has somehow created new patterns, and, therefore, most of the crucial political decisions are adopted in the inter-governmental part of our system, where playing the game of national positions confronting each other, looking for something common is a sort of natural kind of game in that context, which is not the same that we have with the Community, where we have to find throughout common regulations European solutions, you see.

So, therefore, in other words, after Maastricht, after the great room given to the inter-governmental method, we have somehow trained our leaders in being national and in using the European venues as where they need to find agreements among different national positions more than in finding something new.

Of course, with the attention that legal scholars have to words, I could make this difference clear by noticing that when it is European, it is single; when it is inter-governmental, it is common, and it does make a difference, because a single solution is a single solution. It is up there, and it is for all. And it is the new invention; it's the value added by the European Community to the initial positions. Common it's a sort of horizontal thing. It's not the same as single. It's finding a common sort of compromise among us.

Now, if this is true, even my Spinelli, not the Spinelli of the followers, because the Spinelli of several of his followers would say, well, this is quite obvious. I mean, you have completely abandoned Spinelli, and, therefore, you traitors, what do you want from us. It's not so, because the several steps that have somehow changed Europe are very much similar to Spinelli's proposals.

But even my Spinelli would say, "listen, guys, but if this is true, there is a connection between the dissatisfaction for Europe and the fact that the political union has not been accomplished." There is a connection.



The fact that you have opened up this enormous pace to inter-governmental cooperation has corrupted the initial attention to the single solutions instead of the common. And, therefore, if you return to my initial inspiration, perhaps you might make a sort of cleansing of these new patterns and might return to without necessarily having the Schmidts or the Giscard, but also you more modest people might succeed similarly.

It's difficult to reject this argument. It's difficult to reject this argument. What I can only say is that this argument has to be used still working as Spinelli did. I don't think that we may have the magic of a constitutional assembly changing things all of a sudden. We have to keep working, using gates that we see, passing through, making new steps, and changing things.

And by changing things, promoting what I call a sort of return to thinking European by our leaders and by our ministers. Actually, this is what we have been doing throughout the years, because, and this is the final part of my presentation, really, it is true that Maastricht gave us two parallel Europes -- the community one and the cooperative one.

But since then, we have been trying repeatedly to bridge these two parts with each other and to attract inside the community part of the cooperative Europe. In the area I was responsible for in the latest years, the freedom, security, and justice, most of the police cooperation of the definitions of European crimes, of common investigations, et cetera, of regulations on migration has passed from the third pillar, inter-governmental, to the first one.

And when we have not succeeded in doing this, we have been trying to create the conditions for future developments in this sense. It is a long, long difficult battle.

When I explain this to my students, I sell the image of Europe as a hermaphrodite, because it is a hermaphrodite that is becoming slowly more and more female. My assumption is that female is better, and, therefore, the cooperative Europe is the male, is the international kind of gathering of people. The community, the single instead of the common, is the female.

So, this is a hermaphrodite. I cannot tell the British that the hermaphrodite will become a female, because they are not ready to accept it. There is a -- I mean, I don't enter in these delicate matters, but I'm sure they prefer it hermaphrodite.

I'm speaking of the European Union. I want to be clear on that. . They prefer, but, I mean, it is happening. It is happening little by little, and there are for those who study governance and institutional architectures, there are fascinating chapters. You see, I give you short hints. Let's say the European Parliament.

Now the European Parliament has been successful in creating little by little and increasing space to its co-decision-making power on legislation. And nowadays, most of our European legislation has become bicameral -- Council and the Parliament, which somehow envisages a sort of chamber representing the states, the Council, chamber representing the citizens, the Parliament.

The Parliament has been successful in creating the typical political connection between any executive and any Parliament with the Commission.

It has not succeeded in creating a similar connection with the European Council. Again, when I explain these things to my students, I say, you see, here in Europe, we have two executives, not one -- an executive with the small "e," that is the Commission; and the executive with the capital "E," the executive defining the policies, the broad lines for the future is another one. It's the gathering of our heads of state and prime ministers. It's the European Council.

Now the European Council is not responsible to the European Parliament, because, we say, well, our Prime Ministers respond to national parliaments. But here, there is clearly a gap in democratic terms, because, when they meet up there, they define European policies, and our national parliaments are not the counterpart for European policies. So, there is a vacuum there to be filled. We cannot today fill this vacuum, but we have written and it is being practiced that whatever the European Council does where the ministerial councils do has to be communicated to Parliament, which always the formulation is we'll be kept fully informed.

We'll be kept fully informed means that they have to go to the Parliament, report to them, and there is a discussion. Those who know the history of parliaments know that it begins with that; that the Parliament initially is only fully informed, but after a while it adopts

resolutions, and after the resolutions, there might be votes. And there might be an increasing process of I could call it federalization of that level.

We, you know, are going toward joining the external relations of the commission and the foreign and security policy, which is of the cooperative Europe, depending, therefore, on the Council. And we have two figures going around in the world representing, one way or another, external policies of the Europeans. One is the commissioner. The other one is Javier Solana to make it clear.

Well, the Lisbon Treaty that sooner or later will enter into force, I'm sure, provides for the double-headed high representative. Now, double-headed reflects our difficulty -- two heads -- two heads. Okay.

We at the moment cannot create the single that we put them together, and, therefore, there will be a further process of somehow converging of the cooperative Europe and the community one. In the Lisbon Treaty, we have written that the European Council will have a long-term full-time president, the president of the European Council not rotating anymore every six months, but being a European figure.

We have also written that this is position is incompatible with any national mandate. Initially, the formulation was with any other mandate. Some of us succeeded in having national instead of other, which means that the double headed kind of horrible device -- I'm aware of that -- can be also applied tomorrow to the presidents of the two main bodies, and, therefore, something might lead to converging the European

Council and the Commission perhaps; and, therefore, something similar to a European government might come out of this process.

I don't know. Again, don't tell the British, and also others, I am sure, but I mean politics is putting cards on the table and finding the opportunity to use them when times are ripe for using them. What all of this should lead to is returning to thinking European, because this is the real substantive problem that we have, you see, because if we think European, if we think what solution at the European level might be the best for solving also our national problems, we go back to the initial inspiration, which is, therefore, not only an institutional matter, but a political one.

The real force of the double-headed is it will not be having two heads, but having a single diplomatic service that might think of a foreign-policy which is not a compromise among the foreign policies of the main member states, but a geopolitical and regional when needed strategy for the European Union, conceived in European terms.

When we will discuss at lunch the case of Russia and Georgia, I will give you another test of what thinking European might mean to solve these kinds of problems.

But let me close with the clearest example of all that has to do with Russia. We have been negotiating separately, each of us, with GAZPROM. Isn't it nonsense? Because negotiating just one to one and having only one European interlocutor negotiating with GAZPROM would

have prevented GAZPROM from using all of the differences that exist between us.

It's the same scheme that we use for the euro. There are several other opportunities in other sectors to do exactly the same. What is essential is for our leaders to learn again that they have this wonderful thing that is the European Union that they are not using enough, and, therefore, defending their positions in their national arenas they might get more votes than sensible solutions to their problems.

So, I remain loyal to the initial Spinelli inspiration, but it has to be conquered step-by-step pragmatically. I don't know how much time it takes, even longer than a talk of mine to explain you these things.

(Applause)

DR. AMATO: It was the typical academic; yes.

MR. TALBOTT: We're just getting started.

DR. AMATO: No, because I thought it was getting late, but I spoke around 45 minutes.

MS. BINDI: Which is perfect. We have 45 minutes for discussion. And, you know, after this speech, you understand why for me the only word which can describe Professor Amato is professor. And I recall when I was in his classes as a Ph.D. student, which would last two hours actually, we would get out of the two hours and say, more, please don't stop. You know, begging don't stop. We want more.

So, it's even difficult to moderate after him. Before I give you the word, I only have one. I'm happy to see that you are so enthusiastic.

I'm a little bit less enthusiastic. You know, here in the U.S., you do have a feeling that with elections, you might have a new start, new leadership. I see that much less in Europe.

DR. AMATO: With the elections in this country?

MS. BINDI: Yeah, with the elections in this country, and I have less hope that our current leader will return thinking European. And when I saw the list of the wise men, you know, I thought that this is somewhat less than a mouse, as Spinelli would say. We're expecting a mountain, and we have much less than the mouse. So I am much less optimistic that you are, but I hope to be very, very wrong.

I have plenty of questions, but I would leave the floor to you, if, otherwise, I will start. If you can please identify yourself. Be quick, and because we want to listen as much as possible to Professor Amato.

Michael?

DR. AMATO: Wait a second.

MR. TALBOTT: Michael, there's a mike coming, as it were.

MS. BINDI: Yeah.

SPEAKER: First of all, thank you very much for a fascinating and thoughtful presentation. I get the impression from what you're saying is that you view the process really as inevitable toward more community solutions, force of circumstance, as essentially we've seen it in foreign affairs, as you described justice in home affairs and certainly recently in the reactions and responses to the financial meltdown.

Is there some thing or things that could turn that in another direction and is it something that is essentially being forced upon publics which are not very enthusiastic about the idea?

DR. AMATO: Do I take more questions perhaps before?

MS. BINDI: Okay. I see one.

DR. AMATO: To some of them and then.

MS. BINDI: One, two, and three.

MR. DEVESA: Thank you. Thanks also for the presentation. I also agree it has been great one. And I have a couple of questions. I like your point about --

MS. BINDI: Identify yourself.

MR. DEVESA: Oh, sorry. I'm Domenec Devesa, currently President of the Washington European Society here in D.C., which is an organization of young professionals interested in Europe. And I was saying that I like your point about finding windows of opportunity and wondering if the current financial crisis could be one.

We have seen that at least in Europe this has been affecting more Britain in terms of its banking sector. We have seen also Iceland being in a great crisis, and now thinking about joining I don't know the EU or the euro.

DR. AMATO: The ice is melting in this climate change time.

MR. DEVESA: So, I'm thinking what kind of lessons these countries like Denmark or Norway, Britain that have been less enthusiastic of the single currency or the EU.



And the second question in terms of the transatlantic relations, the EU and the U.S. You haven't talked about that. I don't know if Spinelli thought about that, but Monnet also did, and he was also a federalist, and he also was very ambitious about some sort of Atlantic union. And I guess this is adding like a new whole level of complexity to all these European Community, European Union, and then to Atlantic cooperation. Thank you.

MS. BINDI: And we also have a question in the back.

SPEAKER: Thank you. Well, thanks very much. After this talk, this talk is a much better guide to Brussels than any map one could be given at Grande Place.

But I have a question about the potential foreign-policy capacity or creativity of Europe in your view. Even in the worst days of the Cold War, there were European initiatives -- Gaullism, Ospolitik, the Vatican policy of Casaroli and Koenig, even work parallel to Repatski. Do you think now that the Cold War is over, it seems that these creative capacities have diminished, not increased. But somewhat paradoxically, do you think there could be some new kind of foreign policy creativity coming from the Union or do you think it awaits the solution of the structural problems?

DR. AMATO: Okay. Does it work, this one? Yeah. Can you hear me from down there? Great.

Well, I mean, the group of wise men -- be generous.

(Laughter)

DR. AMATO: They are just supposed to be wise and nothing more than that, suggesting possible long-term trends in Europe. So, I think that, I mean, it's a mixture of professors, of businessman, an experienced men. Perhaps not everybody knows what this thing is.

A couple of years -- no, a year ago, President Sarkozy failed to the need to redefine the long-term prospects of Europe. Where are we heading to -- this kind of question that is typical of those who think that their mission is exhausted somehow, and I'm not sure of that.

I said it. But anyhow, and, therefore, he failed to the need of a group of wise men, who, being wise, can explain the future to the others, as it usually happens. If you are defined a wise man, you know the future more than I do.

So, I mean, on this assumption Felipe Gonzalez was appointed as a chairman of a group of wise men with this kind of mission, and the group was completed after the appointment of Felipe with some new names by the European Council last week. And there are some good new names. I don't know how many. Seven, eight persons will meet in the next months, and will produce a nice document, I'm sure.

So, what else do you want? So, be nice, I mean.

Having said so, now it's not inevitable, you are right, but there might be conditions under which things may change. This is something that has so many evidences in history that, all of a sudden, changes attitudes that had remained firm for years.

I give you two examples that are very similar -- the position of the U.K. on these matters financial, and the position of the U.K. on terrorism after 9/11.

We know that the United Kingdom is the champion of the cooperative method, reducing as much as possible the occasions for transferring things from the cooperative area to the community area. But when they feel strongly that something has to be done, it has to be done. And, therefore, they create the precedent. It seems that they are not aware of it, but they are aware of it, because if there is somebody who is perfectly familiar with all the technicalities of the procedures, of the rules of the European system, these are the Brits, which are much better than the others.

If you want to read, say, analysis, reports of the legal life of Europe, the House of Lords is the best in Europe, because they really care about this matter, and they are excellent in professional terms.

Having said so, you remember that after 9/11 there was a resolution of the Security Council of the U.N., according to which the members of the U.N. were invited to adopt freezing of the assets and accounts, financial accounts, of groups and individuals connected to groups connected to Al Qaeda.

Now, members of the U.N., as we know, are our states, not the European Community.

The European Community is not a member of the U.N. But the fastest way we had to immediately introduce these freezing measures

was a European regulation. Can you imagine the British asking for a European regulation in a matter where there is no legal basis for the Community to have -- reminds me of Carlos's comments yesterday on Ohio when we were talking about (inaudible) because then they -- our government leaders will have to go back to our (inaudible) and explain them that (inaudible) which as you will know whether it's true or not -- it's not true. But (inaudible) together with the euro as one of the (inaudible) for the (inaudible) interest rate (inaudible) in Europe. So it would have been possibly politically difficult for members of the (inaudible) to justify such a measure. So very much like as you said.

And then about the U.K., it's striking because in fact is what happened which the (inaudible) which are reluctant towards the European (inaudible) are -- like the U.K. at the same time they want to (inaudible) active at least (inaudible) more active in implementing, they're more active in promoting issues whenever (inaudible) interest them. And then I will also (inaudible) learn out of all this and what are the challenges according to (inaudible) matter for the next U.S. administration and the future of Europe.

SPEAKER: We'll see if there's time but I know (inaudible)

SPEAKER: (inaudible)

DR. AMATO: Excuse me, want to say something. Because you haven't said -- you said (inaudible) is a Renaissance man, but you haven't said the main reason for him being a Renaissance -- he loves horses.

MS. BINDI: I know that Dan wanted to say something too and then I think we'll take these three and then we'll go next.

MR. BENJAMIN: I'll ask my question now because it's related to Strobe's question. In some ways it's interior to it. First of all, thank you very much for a terrific and enlightening lecture. The Spinelli vision of a Europe that was integrated so that national states did not come into conflict has been something that the United States has supported deeply since the early post-war. The flip side of it which is a Europe united as a global player is something that America was much ambivalent about for many, many years. Some would argue that that argument is now over within America and that in fact America now feels that it has a strong need for a global partner, one that is a unified Europe, because as you said, the West needs to speak with one voice, and I agree with you that it shouldn't be the West against the rest.

There may very well be a president, and in fact it might be either from either party in a very little amount of time who would want a more active unified consequent European partner in 2009. What would

you counsel as new American president to do to hasten the appearance of that European partner?

MS. BINDI: The gentleman over there.

MR. THOMPSON: I'm Gordon Thompson of the (inaudible) Foundation. Would you please speak about the problems, challenges, and opportunities of Turkish accession to the E.U.?

SPEAKER: The E.U. The U.N. is already there.

MR. THOMPSON: Sorry, I misspoke to the E.U.

SPEAKER: Somebody --

SPEAKER: We have two (inaudible) and then --

SPEAKER: There is a problem of generations.

MR. LEE: (inaudible) Amato. My name is Joshua Lee, and I'm an international student from Korea at George Washington University. I'm fascinated by how the European Union has been getting more invigorated. In fact, they've come up with (inaudible) economic policies this week to resolve the financial crisis and I was wondering if you could comment on how it's going to be implemented. And people say the next step for the E.U. is a political union and they're looking at how they can emerge as a political union. And could you please comment on the obstacles that the European Union is facing as it's moving towards political union?

SPEAKER: Good morning. My name is (inaudible) I'm a Ph.D. student in economics here at George Mason University. Thank you for the speech which made me honestly --

SPEAKER: Proud.

SPEAKER: -- proud (inaudible) today because which is something that's honestly doesn't always happens recently when fellows of mine ask me about Italian politicians today. I know that (inaudible) from academia. My question here is we know that in Europe there is kind of asymmetric situation between how the European Union can conduct monetary policy through the European Central Bank and the way the European Union or the European community can conduct fiscal policy. So that for political and political reason I think there are many possible way for the one and the other cannot go same way which might undermine the effectiveness of both monetary and fiscal policies. Now you touched on a very important I think when you said that many European leaders say in their national context if I got -- if I had to take some tough decisions it's not because of it, but it's because the European Union is kind of (inaudible) this decision upon me. So do you think that this asymmetry might give room to all the European politicians still to claim this and do you think is the reason for we might think in the future (inaudible) might remain difficult to reach a better coordination from the (inaudible) fiscal policy point of

view because what we got so far is the Maastricht treaty which kind of forces all of the countries to keep their balance sheet under control but we know that recently many European leaders said maybe we should review those rules because many maybe don't work that well? So do you think there is room enough to improve in this way of making the way and the tools of fiscal policy in Europe can work and to achieve a better union?

Thank you.

MS. BINDI: There are several questions.

DR. AMATO: We take them all. When are we supposed to  
(inaudible)

SPEAKER: Fifteen minutes.

DR. AMATO: So let us take a couple of more questions and then respond to.

SPEAKER: (inaudible) down there (inaudible)

SPEAKER: There are too many. I mean, the sense that we had (inaudible) cut it out.

SPEAKER: I take one woman here. Is (inaudible) here?  
Can (inaudible) here?

SPEAKER: To the young lady here.

SPEAKER: (inaudible)

SPEAKER: Irene . I know Irene.



SPEAKER: My name is (inaudible) you might remember me. I'm a young European in the sense that I come from young Europe from (inaudible) so I have to stand up (inaudible) respect. Thank you so much for a very, very inspiring talk once again and I'll try to be as brief as possible. My first question --

SPEAKER: Speak slowly because otherwise it's difficult to understand.

SPEAKER: Indeed. My first question relates to one of the comments that you made during your lecture. You referred to the Franco-German axis (inaudible) so I wanted to know what the Franco-German relation is right now and what its role is for the future of Europe. And my second question is about the role of the European public, the European society, if you can speak about -- and the European integration. It seems to me from your talk that we have an obstacle in terms of leadership here because on the one hand we have the European Union, the European community who is trying to communicate to protect its citizens. On the other hand, you have the European public who wants to know more about Europe before it votes yes or no. And then you have a screen that is providing the access to information and communication between these two levels. So what is there to do about that? Thank you.

SPEAKER: We have a couple of hands. Very quickly on the  
(inaudible)

SPEAKER: Maybe hold it for one question each, please.

SPEAKER: Yes, and very quickly, please.

SPEAKER: Good morning, Professor Amato. I'm a  
research associate at the Public International -- Policy Group. I was  
wondering if you could give us your thoughts on the European  
Mediterranean Partnership, its foreign policy implications, will it be  
successful do you think, and where do you see it going?

SPEAKER: Very quickly on the (inaudible) and then -- and  
then we are done. One question straight. There.

MR. BROWN: I'm Matt Brown. I'm a visiting fellow at the  
Center for American Progress. My question for Professor Amato is can  
you have a political union without a traditional form of politics at the  
European level? What we see in the European institutions is a very  
technocratic form of politics which has actually bred I might argue a sort of  
growing anti-Europeanism on the extreme left and the extreme right in  
Europe because many people have seen would sort of -- the European  
project would protect European citizens from the sort of ravages of  
globalization and what they see is the opposite. So is there a kind of -- I  
mean in particular from my perspective is there a center left project that

can actually build -- help us identify a political union, a political project for Europe, because I think that's what's missing?

SPEAKER: And the very last one very briefly -- very briefly.

SPEAKER: My question will be a follow-up to the question about Turkey anyway. How -- the Bush administration support -- support for the Turkish membership is taken in Europe?

SPEAKER: How is the Bush administration support for Turkish accession to the E.U. regarded in Europe?

SPEAKER: We have a full set of questions.

SPEAKER: Ten minutes. Anyhow, the let's say limit that we have reached in our difficult internal negotiation -- internal European negotiations on the security council is sort of miserable because it provides for the high representative to be invited to meetings of the security council just to give the security council the opinion of the union on certain matters. And can you imagine the representative of the union speaking in the council and maybe the British or the French representative expressing to you in the same meeting which is not forbidden at all which might occur. In other words, we have reached the point that the voice of the European Union should be listened to in the Security Council but as a voice added to the membership of the two permanent members that we

have inherited from a war of the previous millennium and this is substantially our problem, I mean this is substantially our problem.

I am very grateful to Angela Merkel because somehow she has been trying to cool the temperature around the demand of Germany to be a member of the Security Council (inaudible) et cetera because should a new European state enter -- be admitted into the security council, this would be the end of the single voice of the union in it because you can challenge the legitimacy of the winner of that war of the century and millennia ago but difficult would be for you to challenge reform of today introducing a new member. This is really the difficult part of our job. This is where I don't know which conditions might be politically needed to remove obstacles because it's not by change that foreign policy is arriving last in our construction. Those who built in the past the federal states are well aware of the fact that foreign policy is among the first competencies that are transferred to the upper level of government.

When I read the Articles of the Confederation of 1776 there was more in the confederation in our union because sending ambassadors abroad for the member states of the confederations required an authorization of the upper level already at the time. So can you imagine with a federation -- we have started off with economic affairs and the area where national sovereignty is mostly rooted which is the area of

foreign affairs have remained for so long in the hands of the member states that for them handing it over to the upper level will be a very painful process. That's why are (inaudible) people which is not creating something single and we still are speaking of a common foreign policy. So this is something that is really one of the (inaudible) that we are needing that something really new that I cannot at the moment even imagine might remove in the future.

For sure I'm convinced that an American administration really playing the card of the new setting of the (inaudible) would be more interested in having a strong alliance such as a single European voice than playing the game of building coalitions of the willing here and there because we have a common interest in finding viable agreements with the new interlocutors that we have to admit in our meeting room which is the (inaudible) because we are convinced that our meeting room (inaudible) is our meeting room. Therefore, having also the uncertainty of where the Europeans will stand might be a disadvantage for the future in this new setting. Therefore, I am really convinced that it is now in the interests of the U.S. to play the card of the European Union more than the other.

I'm not convinced that it should be, but it is politically difficult for our European leaders to enhance the role of the European bank. Simply they keep lying to themselves and to our national public opinions

because the European bank has nothing to do with the economic difficulties. It's a matter of fiscal policies. It's not -- blaming the (inaudible) bank's policy of the European Central Bank after what has happened here and then requires quite bold approach to these matters because I understand that my old friend (inaudible) is more blamed for the low interest rates policy that was adopted (inaudible) here. This should somehow reevaluate the central bank, but independently of it it's a matter of fiscal policy. They don't find the courage to adopt the needed policies and they blame the European Central Bank for what is going on. This has been one of the clearest examples of it's Europe that -- not for its (inaudible) in this case for (inaudible) at least the Euro countries could have a common fiscal policy. Nobody prevents from doing it. I launched years ago the Common BPF, and Italians know what the BPF is, the basic document giving the main figures of the basis of which the budget -- the year budget is adopted. The Euro countries, it depends on them, could have a common basic document with the basic aggregates for parallel national budgets adopted exactly on the basis of the same (inaudible) figures. Why don't they do it? Why don't they do it? This is something that is feasible.

The obstacles to a political union, this is something that somehow I have responded already by explaining the sense of foreign

policy which is still perceived as a national policy. Let's say I have (inaudible) Europeans in the very important category which is the ambassadors, the Italian diplomats. They tend to be very (inaudible) sometimes I ask them why don't we abolish the embassies inside Europe? Do you know they don't agree with (inaudible) proposal? They tend to say that abolishing Paris, London, Berlin, et cetera, would be something -- they dislike it. Now this would be one of the most obvious consequences of a single foreign policy because at least -- and then it will be hard to meet (inaudible) an embassy of Massachusetts in Pennsylvania even though American diplomats might enjoy it even today. But I mean now here it is not conceivable at all -- in Europe also (inaudible) diplomats wanted it to remain.

The Franco-German axis is -- it's something that was very much (inaudible) in the initial years of the European community when they really (inaudible) before the others bilaterally -- the solutions and entered into the (inaudible) giving the others the solution (inaudible) by them. This is something that I mean the others resented quite obviously. Now with (inaudible) axis cannot be used in the same way and whenever there is an agreement between France and Germany, I think (inaudible) for the simple reason that German is in my view the real engine of the process of integration while France is powerful advocate of a Europe where we have

to reach the best by cooperating with each other. We have -- I mean, we have these two basic positions in Europe. This is the sense of my initial talk. And having these two important countries with these different views looking for a common position which (inaudible) hope is more German sided than French sided. This is useful for the ensemble of our union.

The problem of public opinion in Europe is connected with the (inaudible) Matt Brown -- Matt, it is obvious that part of the dissatisfaction (inaudible) the technocratic Europe we know is due to the national rhetoric against Europe. We know that it is in great part this kind of thing (inaudible) in convincing the public opinion of the (inaudible) I mean in this country they had George Wallace and others, they had (inaudible) there isn't any country the tradition of the right is the populism that indicates the upper level of government as something that is far from democracy that (inaudible) that cares only of regulating people instead of leaving them free to do what they think is right, et cetera. Necessarily, however, changing the mood and convincing these people requires policies that are convincing and here we should go to actual and concrete methods. I am ready to conclude that throughout these latest years all of the policies that have been adopted, liberalizations, privatizations, et cetera, without caring about the losers, without caring about the losers, have succeeded in widening the gap between our (inaudible) and what



was being decided at the European level. This is a lesson, a lesson that has to be taken up, understood, and somehow practiced by our politicians. It is an interesting fact, however not very encouraging, that the mood has remained populist and therefore our electorates at the moment seem more convinced by the right than by the center left. And like it or not, the right tends to use more the populist argument than (inaudible) policies giving a new balance. This is a European political problem.

Let me finish with these two chapters (inaudible) policy and Turkey. The (inaudible) policy, I would say that no -- I am one of those who have not exactly understood what President Sarkozy means by a Mediterranean Union. He likes launching beautiful -- but this is very French. It's not something peculiar to him. It's a very musical country and "The Sound of Music" which is a title of my old times, "The Sound of Music" is beautiful by itself and sometimes you have just sound, but it's beautiful. But in any event, it is useful to remind us that Barcelona is not enough really. It's part of the policies I was referring to a minute ago. Considering the existing differences between us and the African countries, considering the fact that we have received migrants from them because they are much poorer, because they don't have (inaudible) to where all of their youth can find a job and therefore the inflows of migrants crossing (inaudible) risking lives to get to Europe, several Egyptian, several

Moroccans, et cetera, and we propose a free trade (inaudible) I still remember when I was a young professor here at Brookings I arrived immediately after Reagan had won the elections and therefore here it was a sort of refugee camp where any Friday lunch was an opportunity to criticize the Reaganomics, et cetera. And when President Reagan said that it was necessary to explain the magic of the market to Zimbabwe -- other countries, here inside there were reactions to that (inaudible) it makes a lot of sense because we have to open our doors to the products of these countries, but it's not enough. It's not enough. There are more substantive and promotional policies that are needed. Therefore, the sound of that music -- a Mediterranean Union might be useful to switch to something to more different shaded.

And finally Turkey. I don't know whether Turkey will ever become a member of the European Union. It is quite likely that they get fed up with us before we conclude the process and this might be the main reason for them to abandon their long-standing application. They are the most ancient candidate to the European Union. In the '60s their application was submitted to Brussels. They are having remarkable growth now. If you go to Istanbul you have really the sense of something changing. Of course, Anatolia is still there. On the other side, it depends also on how public opinions in Western Europe react to the -- succeed I

would say in this interreligious dialogue which is very difficult at the moment, very difficult. I'm not so optimistic about the relationship between the Christian part of Europe and the Muslim communities that we have. This is part of the problem. The other part might be that Turkey is not (inaudible) and always been in favor of Turkey joining the European Union not only for strategic reasons. I suppose that the Americans support to this has strategic reasons that make a lot of sense, but these are not the only reasons for me to be in favor of it. I am ready to advocate the sense of Turkey as a European state, the sense of Turkey as a European state because we really belong to the same area and we need the sort of intercultural platform that together for the future we might (inaudible) Europe (inaudible) with 10 minutes of delay and we haven't had (inaudible)

SPEAKER: (inaudible) wanted to say two words.

DR. AMATO: From the podium tell us something about your (inaudible)

MR. MERLINI: I discovered that pro-Europe people and pro-Obama people have (inaudible) problem with (inaudible) as you know, one of the slogans in France during the referendum against the constitutional treaty was the threat of (inaudible) so the other day -- evening when this

name (inaudible) understand several times during the discussion I said there we go again.

SPEAKER: (inaudible) brings bad luck.

SPEAKER: Cross the fingers.

MR. MERLINI: Then in opening -- mentioned (inaudible) manifesto that Spinelli wrote during his confinement in the (inaudible) blueprint of a process of European (inaudible) I would like to underline the date, 1941. That means that it was exactly at the time where the German troops were invading Europe and the (inaudible) were for Germany (inaudible) very much (inaudible) to have this vision of a democratic united Europe I think it was very -- quite extraordinary. And the Europe that it is in the manifesto of (inaudible) I would like to underline what (inaudible) said was not the little Europe that came out of the Cold War, it was the current Europe, the Europe with a unity European Union. What they had in mind was a large Europe so in a way the enlargement of the European brought European closer to the vision that it was set up by Spinelli in 1941.

Another thing I would like to pick up on what (inaudible) said is this definition of the invention (inaudible) invention, and in a way I tend to believe that one could even call it the second European invention. The first European invention was the nation-state that came after the Thirty

Years' War after the Enlightenment. The Thirty Years' War brought about the separation between state and religion and the building up of the new European state. What I call the second Thirty Years' War which was the one between 1915 and 1945 is possibly, and (inaudible) said clearly -- is possibly the origin of the second invention, to have something that allows us to say never again as (inaudible) said. I didn't want to take any more time and would like to express my pleasure and my thanks both to Brookings, Strobe Talbott and Dan and Carlos for having made this possible and I hope this is the beginning of a successful series of lectures and of course very grateful to my old friend (inaudible) for having made it so clearly the connection between the historical process and (inaudible) on one side and the current problems we are facing. Thank you very much.

MS. BINDI: (inaudible) let me thank you actually personally both of you, Professor Amato and (inaudible) because without the two of you I wouldn't be here and I wouldn't be (inaudible) so thank you so much and thank you (inaudible) coming here.

\* \* \* \* \*

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

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