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THE UNITED NATIONS AT A CROSSROADS:
DEBATING THE USE OF FORCE IN AN EVOLVING WORLD

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INTRODUCTION AND MODERATOR:

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FEATURED SPEAKER:

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PROCEEDINGS

MR. PASCUAL: Good morning. My name is Carlos Pascual. I am the Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policies Studies Program here at the Brookings Institution, and I would like to welcome you to Brookings. The talk that we have today by Mark Malloch Brown, the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, is part of a conference that we are holding on the use of force and its legitimacy. It is part of the conclusion of a multiyear project that has brought us all around the world in consultations with regional experts, academics, think tank analysts, political figures, and policy figures, to try to better understand how to grapple with this question of the use of force.

There are a number of very key things that have come out of these discussions that you will see in papers that are going to be put forth, including the importance of having broad strategies to deal with humanitarian transitions, weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation, terrorism and conflict, that within those strategies force may in fact be a legitimate or a useful component, but that force is not the only strategy that is necessary to advance. So what this project has been grappling with is what are the right strategies to approach those broad questions of transition, and where does force fit in.

We are particularly indebted to the two individuals who have played a

leadership role on pulling this project together, Jim Steinberg who was my predecessor here at Brookings as the Vice President and the Director of Foreign Policy Studies, and Ivo Daalder, one of our Senior Fellows, who have done an extraordinary job in pulling together extremely talented people from throughout the world, and those who dedicated their time to participate in the project, thank you very much for the insights that you have provided.

The project is done in the spirit of understanding how to build effective and capable multilateral institutions. It is done in the spirit of recognizing that if these institutions cannot change to address the kinds of realities that we have today that require us to deal with transnational threats, as Jim Steinberg said yesterday at the opening, the reality that the individual instabilities within countries can in fact have global impacts in the transnational world that we live in today, if we cannot deal with those two sets of issues, the internal instability of countries and the transnational implications, then we are not adequately serving the global security interests that we have as well as the security interests of the United States.

We are very fortunate in this context to have an opportunity to hear from an individual who has really spent his life dealing with this challenge of transition, and in particular in recent years, dealing with the challenge of building an effective multilateral system and building an effective United Nations.

Mark Malloch Brown as all of you know is the Deputy Secretary-

General at the U.N. He was Kofi Annan's Chief of Staff before that. Before that he was the head of UNDP and the U.N. Development Group. So his fundamental challenge at the U.N. has been to not only build an effective institution, but to build it recognizing that the world is changing and how should these institutions change in that context.

Before that, Mark was at the World Bank where he was the Vice President in charge of External Affairs and Relations with the United Nations. He has worked with UNHCR, he has been a report with The Economist, and he has been a specialist in communication strategies. Throughout all of that, I think the key theme that Mark has worked with is how to empower people to deal with transitional environments. So we are very pleased to be able to give him this forum to address us and share his ideas on where we are in the process of reforming multilateral institutions and where should we go in the future. Mark, thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. BROWN: Thank you, Carlos, Ivo, Jim, and everybody who has been involved in this I think very important undertaking, this group who have met now a number of times, and the rest of us are joining them today for this lecture.

When Brookings started to look into this issue of the legitimate uses of force, it was at the same time that a high-level panel set up by Kofi Annan was asking itself the same questions at the United Nations, all of this in 2003 in the

aftermath of the Iraq War.

If I look back to 2003, my own suspicion about our high-level panel is that it asked the wrong question but got the right answer. Let me say what I mean by that, which is that in the immediate aftermath of Iraq, the real casualty appeared to be the U.N. Security Council. I think what preoccupied all of us was that it had failed to contain the United States within a strategy of dealing with Saddam Hussein that the U.S. could live with. The U.S. impatience, the presumption of the imminence of the threat, the assumption that there were weapons of mass destruction, all combined to mean that the U.S. was not willing ultimately to operate within the strictures of the Council or at the pace that the Security Council wanted to deal with the problem. Therefore, the casualty seemed to be the Security Council.

Three years later, I suspect we draw a rather different conclusion from it, that in some ways 2003 was the "High Noon" of acting outside the context of the Security Council, the difficulties in an era of asymmetric conflict even for a country as powerful as the United States, the difficulties of intervention which lacks that broader international legitimacy that comes from the Council meant that it has left the U.S. wary of taking on other similar challenges through a narrow coalition of the willing or acting alone. And it has driven the U.S. back to the Security Council in a way which would have been seen as utterly implausible only 3 short years ago. So that today we see North Korea, Iran, Darfur, Lebanon and the Middle East very

much on the docket of the Council and, indeed, Myanmar, an issue where Washington has been hugely ahead of the rest of the world in trying to get resolute action, that too has been brought through U.S. diplomacy to the Security Council.

But I do not think we should take any comfort as multilateralists from this swing of the pendulum back to the United Nations because unless the U.N. is able to live up to the renewed expectations of it to be able to deal robustly with these crises, one can only assume that the pendulum will keep on swinging or swing in a new direction, but it is impossible to imagine, whatever the setbacks in terms of Iraq policy, that the U.S. would invest its foreign policy in an institution such as the Security Council that did not deliver results. Therefore, of course, that list of crises that I have observed that are on our docket at the moment are a huge challenge to the effectiveness of the Council and it would need an utterly rosy-eyed U.N. optimist to believe that we are going to quickly and rapidly come up with smart, quick, effective solutions on that range of issues. That drives us to say: what is it that we should or can do to strengthen the United Nations to make it a better multilateral partner for a U.S. seeking again to solve global problems through the U.N.?

Here to the high-level panel's answer to its own questions which were, first, did we need to reopen the U.N. Charter? That is always a problematic issue. It is in its own way as difficult as opening a lot of national constitutions. We have not had a series of amendments like the U.S. Constitution has, and we have been very

afraid and timid to open up what we fear would be a Pandora's Box where whatever improvements we secured might be offset by interventions by groups of member states intending to weaken the Charter.

The reason that the Charter is in itself actually a rather strong document is of course the historical circumstances in which it was written which was in the immediate ending months and months after the Second World War where in a sense the driving ideas for the drafter was not the League of Nations — anything but, please — a recognition that the League of Nations had lacked the robustness or interventionist requirements in terms of the use of force, or let me say preventive requirements in terms of the use of force, necessary for it to effectively keep the peace.

So chastened by the experience of the Second World War and the utter failure of the League of Nations to stand up in any way to the unfolding events of the 1930s, the Allies and victors of the Second World War who drafted the Charter did so with the intention that it would be a forceful instrument, and the Security Council particularly a forceful instrument, in keeping the peace in the postwar world.

But of course there were certain aspects of that design which may have looked very good in 1945 but hardly hold up in terms of the legitimacy of the Charter and the effectiveness of peacekeeping in the Security Council today in 2006.

I think there are several changes particularly that we have to recognize and see what we are going to do to adjust to.

The first is the assumption that wars would largely be between states, armies crossing borders to invade neighbors, the phenomenon of war which had led us into the two World Wars of the first half of the last century, and the idea that wars would instead migrate to be within states and no longer between formal armies but very heavily targeting civilians was not something that was foreseen. Nor was the idea that the whole rules of combat coming almost from the chivalry of many centuries earlier would be thrown aside in terms of preventive strikes using new generations of weapons which allowed very powerful countries to be struck in their heartland before they even knew that they were formally under attack. And of course, these kinds of issues and how to address them were very, very much alive in 2003 as they had been from 9/11 onwards.

The second, if you like, change in the U.N. itself which was not foreseen by the founders was its emergence as a universal body. I know within this panel that we are joining today there has been I think a minority that has embraced this club of democracies idea, if only international affairs were managed by a small like-minded group of nations, we would not have the problems we have. Of course, that was very much the original idea of those who founded the United Nations. The term United Nations was not the inclusive term that we see it as today. It was a term

the Allies used to describe themselves during the Second World War which they then applied to this new institution that they had set up and intended to indefinitely control through their veto rights on the Security Council, and it was only over time with decolonization and enlightened leadership in Washington particularly that essentially it moved towards expanding membership as new countries emerged, therefore, from some dozens of members at the beginning, to 192 today. But if you think if it had stuck to that club of democracies version of 1945, just like-minded allies, where we would be today on the problems I mentioned earlier such as North Korea, Darfur, Iran, or even the Middle East, because under that formula, China would not occupy the Chinese seat in the Security Council, Taiwan would. Indeed, were you today to introduce a club of democracies to replace the U.N., at a stroke you would eliminate a country of 1.3 billion people from its membership and tie the arms of that institution in terms of any credible strategy for dealing with either North Korea, Iran, or Darfur. And it was of course those pragmatic considerations which led generations of leadership here in Washington and in New York to recognize that you got much more power from an institution which was truly universal, that its legitimacy was not derived by commitment to a single democratic idea, but to the idea instead that all kinds of problems, not just political and security problems, but public-health problems, environmental problems, issues of poverty, all of them had to be dealt with on a transnational global basis by countries who might not in terms

of their own values and organization of their political lives at home be natural soul mates. So the organization has become both universal, and as it has done so, a more and more quarrelsome club of countries with very different views on issues. And at the same time, is being challenged by new kinds of warfare that it had not foreseen at the time the Charter was written.

So that has led perhaps predictably to a crisis of governance in the organization. As the new kinds of warfare forced the Security Council even without a Charter change to envisage earlier interventions, preemptive interventions, if you like, when there is an imminent threat of conflict, as we are forced to embrace doctrines like the responsibility to protect with its obligation on the international community to intervene in a country over the original Charter recognition of national sovereignty in order to stop an internal genocide or major mass human-rights violation in which the government is either not stopping it or is even party to it. As these intrusions on the old laws of war and sovereignty gradually take the U.N. into new waters, the crisis of governance only becomes greater because a more intrusive body is one where even more member states fret at the lack of representativeness of its principal, or at least perceived principal organ, the Security Council, and particularly the issue of the P5's veto.

That, if you like, marginalization or frustration of many members that they do not have a central enough place in the decision making of the organization

has impeded their desire to see a retooling of the United Nations means of averting conflict, and I will come back to this in a little bit more detail later and, above all, this sense that the P5 is not representative of the political economy of 2006 and, therefore, nor is the Security Council. And beneath that, a sense that the universal membership of the General Assembly versus its very closed 15-person membership of the Security Council, the five permanent members and the 10 2-year elected term members, that this has created a them-and-us class system that it takes a Brit to particularly recognize. But as we also recognize and have spent many centuries trying to solve in our own system, if you do create a powerful inner group and leave others outside, a lot of bricks get thrown through the windows, and that has in a sense been the challenge now for the organization and it is one which threatens its legitimacy and therefore threatens its authority as an effective tool to prevent conflict.

I want to take these different issues and what we have tried to do about them as well as the roadblocks that have been thrown in our way to do more. The first one I have mentioned is the changed nature of conflict where essentially in a kind of Indian summer of legislative activity by this Secretary-General and General Assembly, we have done much more than a late term, by normal political theory lame-duck Secretary-General might have been expected to achieve, because first we got through the General Assembly last year this radical new doctrine of the

responsibility to protect, and I will come back to its application in the case of Darfur if only to head off a few fierce questioners before they get at me.

Secondly, the issue of a counterterrorism strategy where finally we have managed to get the member states to agree to a collective approach across the U.N. system dealing with terrorism, both the military and security dimensions and the information-exchange dimensions, but also locking in a human-rights dimension and the need to make sure that as we combine internationally to combat terrorism we do not undermine the whole thing by an unnecessary and drastic reduction of people's human rights around the world.

The third issue or institutional change that we have made is that we have been able to win the agreement to a Peace Building Commission. The idea here was that with conflict now within states, the most dangerous moment for international organizations in terms of helping a country through an exit strategy to conflict and back to sustained development is often the immediate post-conflict period. Some of you who have heard me talk before may know that this is a particular bugbear of mine to watch the economic international institutions race rapidly to try and get post-conflict states to live within their economic means and to have balanced budgets, et cetera, at a time that there is almost no tax or income base for the post-conflict government. While at the same time, the political institutions and security institutions in New York want to be as Keynesian as possible to spend

lots on demobilizing rebels or on integrating them into an expanded national army, lots on school and health clinics for the previously rebel areas of the country, lots on job creation for those same areas, on the logic of not just an economic pump-priming logic, but more a political pump-priming logic, that unless you quickly show a peace dividend to victims of conflict, there is a high propensity for countries to slip back into conflict. I suspect you are all familiar with the statistics that Paul Collier has developed which shows that indeed there is an 80-percent or even 90-percent-plus likelihood of conflict resuming in the first year, and that like a patient being slowly led through rehabilitation, every year the likelihood of conflict gets a bit less. But for us, the Peace Building Commission is an attempt to bring donors, neighbors, international economic and political institutions together around buying into a single peace-building strategy for a country where all of our economic, political and security support is moving in the same direction and is not contradictory with each other and contributing indeed to undermining the fragile peace rather than building on it.

Of course, the fourth change that we have made in this last sort of legislative rush is the new Human Rights Council. This has had a mixed record so far. I am sure all of you are aware that here in Washington there were a lot of reservations about it which I think many in Washington, including The Washington Post this morning, have been confirmed by the early acts of the new Council. We

ourselves, Kofi Annan and all of us in the senior management of the U.N., including Louise Arbour, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, are deeply troubled by the early acts of this Council which has, for example, taken an extremely one-sided view on the conflict in Lebanon where it has set up an inquiry into Israeli abuses but has not matched it with an inquiry into Hizballah attacks on civilians, and we find this kind of already sort of political lens being applied to the decisions of the Council deeply disappointing.

I must observe though that one of the design faults in the new Council which has to be put fairly and squarely on the U.S. door is that in all of the negotiations, whether it is Security Council reform or the Human Rights Council, the U.S. has a passion for smallness, an assumption that if you cannot get people around a small table together for direct negotiations, you cannot solve any problem in the world. And the consequence for the Human Rights Council was to cut the size over the old Human Rights Commission, and when we did that and had to represent of today's population and economic distribution in the world, sure enough, the region that took a huge hair cut was the European region. As a result, there is now an in-built developing country majority on the Human Rights Council which there was not before, and let me say when I say developing world, it is not Latin America. As it has voted so far, there has been a Latin America/Western Europe group, but then there has been an African, Asian, and Middle Eastern group that have voted together,

and that latter group has a built-in majority under the smaller council than we had wanted that the U.S. had pressed for as a condition for its involvement, and I devoutly hope that when we come to Security Council reform that this similar obsession with size will not drive aside these very important debates about representativeness and making sure that the good guys have enough position. But the fact is, a lot of the African countries that have voted, if you like, disappointingly, are democracies, which again raises questions about whether a club of democracies really is as useful an international tool as some believe.

But I think secondly raises a much more fundamental question which is that still this legitimacy issue and internal cultural commitment amongst the weaker member states in the U.N. system to the overall pride and success of the organization as a whole is poisoned by this governance issue. My own view is if all the governance was working well and the countries of Africa or Asia felt that they really had an adequate voice in the say of the total institutions of the organization, this kind of highly politicized behavior in a vehicle like the Human Rights Council would diminish and perhaps even go away. So this legitimacy/inclusion argument remains enormously important, hence, to how we struggle to now that we have become a universal organization, how we handle reform of these institutions to allow more representative participation.

And the top of that list is the Security Council because if it is to be a

stronger instrument of intervention, then it must be more broadly representative of world power. And when you look for example at the extreme caution that a country like India has traditionally shown to the involvement of the U.N. and the Security Council to its own neighbors such as Nepal, you recognize that a country such as India must be brought into the tent. You cannot expect to have effective global security strategies with India outside. Without a single country in Latin America in the Council, perhaps most notably Brazil in terms of its size, it is equally difficult to imagine a Council which carries global legitimacy and force. Without Japan and Germany, huge economic powers in their own right, without a single member from Africa or a single Islamic nation, it is hard to believe that this Council really will enjoy adequate legitimacy. So we have here a major challenge, and I am going to come back again in a moment to explain what reform might look like, and we will have more opportunity to do that perhaps during the questions and answers after this.

But let me at this point just add one further issue which is that while there has to be an expansion of membership and the original visions of how this options of how this might be done of either more permanent members or more slightly longer-term members than just the 2-year terms, both those options seem to have fallen away in view of some kind of consensus in the middle which would satisfy both sides to this argument. But I think those of us involved with the Security Council believe that almost as important as the reform of membership is the reform

of its procedures. To watch during several long grim days in August the difficulty of getting not a resolution, but just a strong presidential statement on the Lebanon-Israel conflict condemning the civilian casualties and calling for a cease-fire and to see just two countries able to hold up the will of the rest of the Council on this really I think suggests that there are procedural issues that need to be addressed as much as membership issues.

Let me just go to the other issue that is critical to a more effective Council, and that is an effective Department of Peacekeeping Operations, one really able to deploy quickly into a Darfur or into a Southern Lebanon and do so with the equipment, the material, the people, and the political will and resources to get the job done and do it in a way which is not going to challenge any sort of agent of dissent to risk attacking us when we do this.

Peacekeeping which is a bit of a sort of ragtag operation in the sense that we have to beg and borrow our soldiers for each operation, there is no standby force, there is no common training; given all of these constraints, it has exploded in size. When this Secretary-General came to office, there were 20,000 peacekeepers in the field. By the end of this year, there will be 100,000. Possibly by the spring of 2007 there will be as many as 130,000 or 140,000. The U.N. peacekeepers are by far the second-largest international deployment of soldiers in the world after that of the United States. We are ahead of NATO by a multiple of several-fold; we are ahead of

the U.K., France, China, or Russia or any of the other possible candidates you might think of.

And yet unlike NATO, we do not have the sort of staff headquarters support to these operations. We do not have the standby arrangements where units in NATO member states regularly train together and are on standby for rapid deployment. We do not have access to the military police resources that are increasingly a vital part of the peacekeeping in these internal conflicts. So there is a massive issue of improving how we generate forces in a quick, timely, effective way.

Nor do we pre-force deployment have an effective repertoire anymore of sanctions always, and I am going to come back to this in the case of Darfur in a second. But what I just wanted to say here is that we face in the situation of Darfur, an all-too-frequent case for the U.N. where essentially there is a little bit of bluff playing in that we are saying to President Bashir of Sudan give us consent for deployment or else, and there are a lot of questions about what plausibly the "or else" is. President Bashir looks at us and he thinks he has seen us blink, and that makes it hugely difficult to credibly address this issue of winning his consent to deployment.

Therefore, let me very quickly just take Darfur as an example, if you like, of the limitations of this U.N. that the U.S. has pragmatically returned to in the recent years as a partner in achieving multilateral solutions to problems that it no longer feels equipped to solve itself.

Our first diplomatic push for Darfur was a largely Western push, and to this day, by far the best leaders on the Darfur issue are President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair. They are the most outspoken, they are the most clearly personally seized by it, but they are not the most effective in securing President Bashir's cooperation, in my view. They have a vital role, but what is critical is that they reach out to build a broader coalition, and I think the U.S. is very seized of this and is working very hard with us to try and get Arab neighbors and African neighbors, along with their regional institutions the African Union and the Arab League, much more engaged in a concerted diplomatic effort to press Bashir to accept a U.N. deployment.

The other critical partner to this is China, Sudan's new principal energy client, and a late convert to putting direct pressure on Sudan to admit U.N. peacekeepers, and I think in that sense we have actually arrived at a very important new direction in the road where the efforts of Secretary Rice along with my own boss Kofi Annan, but also of Prime Minister Blair and others, is to now much more directed not just to the direct pressure by British or American envoys or, indeed, ultimatums from Washington or London or indeed from New York, but much more to a concerted, much broader diplomatic effort by these regional neighbors and other voices that have huge influence on Sudanese decision making.

The second thing is that the same message is now being delivered:

there is no choice, there must be a U.N. deployment, perhaps in partnership with the A.U., but there needs to be more troops there and they need to be there quickly.

The third element to that is perhaps a better refined sense of what are the carrots and sticks that President Bashir faces. On the one hand, there has been a notable failure by all of us to put enough pressure on the rebels who did not join the Darfur Peace Agreement to sign up and participate. President Bashir has a legitimate complaint about this. Second, clearer assurances that the U.N. is going to do nothing to undermine his sovereignty. It is a sort of spurious fear in the sense that we have 9,000 peacekeepers in Southern Sudan who have helped stabilize Sudan heartily undermine it, but nevertheless it seems to be a particular concern of his not least because of his presumed link to the ICC indictments of leading Sudanese officials which there seems to be a deeply held fear in Sudan that we would use our peacekeepers to arrest and apprehend Sudanese officials.

So I think they are starting to understand that there are benefits to allowing a deployment now, and at the same time there are real costs. And I think here I have been struck by how little work has been done on the nonmilitary sanction, if you like. Beneath the threat of deploying or else there has not been enough done on what are the levers you use on an oil-rich boomtown regime like that in Khartoum.

There are real pressure points. Selling oil means you meet clients, but

selling oil also means that your exchequer is full, you want to use your money to buy goods and services for the country abroad, your officials want to travel and enjoy their new status as an oil-rich regime, all of that is threatened if you are a pariah in the international community and falling under sanctions pressure. So my own view is there are a very tough set of sanctions, but that we have not done enough to develop and build the support to use them if we have to.

But I also have to say that we can never take the military option off the table of deploying even without the consent of the Sudanese government, and the reason for that is not because I believe that there is today the will to do it, in fact, we only have five countries who have volunteered troops for this force at the moment, and this at the moment is a force designed to go in with a peace to keep, but assuming that we could build such a force and could go in, the key trigger point will be what happens on the ground in Darfur where the omens are very, very bad indeed. Humanitarian access has sharply decreased, our humanitarian workers cannot get to certain areas West of Al Fasha, and we fear the worst because of the massive amount of Sudanese armament deployed in the area. This is a region and a country at a real tipping point which could tip back into massive loss of life again. And of course if that happens, I think all the work that so many of you here and others have done to build an understanding in America and Europe of this terrible tragedy that is unfolding, would unleash itself in an irresistible political pressure to do something.

So I do not think President Bashir should assume that just because at the moment we are looking for a way to win his consent to deploy that if indeed he blocks us and the situation tips into mass violence that political leaders in the West would be able to resist deployment, but I think what they would have to understand is this would be the worst option for everybody involved, not just for the Sudanese. This remains unchanged as we have argued so long an area the size of France in the middle of Africa with huge logistics challenges and really plausibly only a place where you can save life if there is a peace agreement to enforce, not if you are trying to stop a thousand intergroup conflicts, even with 20,000 peacekeepers and a lot of helicopter support power we just will not be able to keep the peace in an area that big if there is not one negotiated and agreed on to keep between the Khartoum government and the different rebel groups in Darfur.

So a unilateral military intervention is absolutely the worst option for everybody involved and it is not one which I think is in anybody's list of likely scenarios at the moment, but we should not rule out that if this negotiation and nonmilitary set of sticks and carrots fails that public opinion I devoutly hope will expect us to fulfill the last condition of responsibility to protect which is if sanctions and other means fail, there is an obligation in the international community to step in and end conflict.

So just in closing, I think Darfur shows the challenges. We do not

have 20,000 troops lined up and ready to go, we do not have them let alone ready, we do not have the equipment to go with them. We are not yet even fully deployed in Southern Lebanon, sufficiently deployed to serve the needs at the moment. But the U.N. peacekeeping operation is still remarkably amateurish, inspired, brilliant, well led, making due with very little, but in terms of its staffing, its financial resources, its cost base, it is a very thin blue force compared to similar operations undertaken by the U.S. and others in terms of peacekeeping. The Security Council which is the empowerer of these different strategies, peacekeeping and others, suffers still from this issue of a crisis of legitimacy coming from the narrowness of its representation.

So my bottom line is here we warmly welcome the U.S. back to multilateral diplomacy, but we are conscious that unless the U.S. joins with us in investing in true reform of this institution, governance, management and resources, it will never be an adequate vehicle to carry the new expectations that this administration is placing upon us. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

MR. PASCUAL: Mark, thank you very much. It was an extraordinary survey of both the management and theoretical challenges as well as the realities that face the world today and how they in fact touch on the lives of indeed millions of people, very specifically in Darfur, but really throughout the

world as well, and I think you really create a very compelling case that one needs to think about these questions of representation and process, how you function and capacity together and that they are all part of what confers legitimacy. If you can be seen as working for many and be effective and have the capacity to deliver the results, then it is a lot easier to be legitimate, and in that context I think you create a framework that provides a very strong foundation for discussion.

What I would like to do now is turn to the audience and provide you an opportunity to ask Mark questions. I will ask that identify yourself first. Mark, if it is okay with you, what I will do is ask to take two questions at a time, there are a lot of people here, and that way we will get more questions onto the table and it will give you an opportunity to merge answers or slightly ignore some questions if you want to do that.

(Laughter.)

MR. PASCUAL: I am going to begin with two questions from the group that has been in discussions for the last day and a half since they have been teeing up to be able to put these questions on the table, and then I will go to the broader audience. Jim?

MR. STEINBERG: Jim Steinberg, the University of Texas. Mark, thanks again for a characteristically brilliant and thoughtful discussion of the issues that we have been grappling with for a long time. And you did a brilliant job of

forestalling the questions on Darfur. I thought that was a brilliant presentation.

MR. BROWN: I doubt it.

(Laughter.)

MR. STEINBERG: But I do want to pick up the gauntlet you obviously threw down on the issue of the Community of Democracies. There are two prongs to the question and comment, I think certainly in our discussions with the group and across both the United States and elsewhere that there is little dispute about the fact that the broader institution such as the Security Council is the first best choice if you can get it. So I think comparing the Community of Democracies with the Council is really not the question. The question is more the Community of Democracies as an alternative to unilateralism, to coalitions of the willing and whether we need under circumstances that the Council is not able to act, other mechanisms that give an alternative to either self-defined groups or unilateral action to deal with some of these challenges.

I want to put it even further given your argument for a broadening of the composition of the Council which is you may be right and maybe it is a risk worth taking that a bigger, broader, less veto-y Council will be better because all of a sudden countries will step up to the plate and behave differently than they are behaving on the Human Rights Commission. I am skeptical, but assuming that one wanted to take that chance, isn't it true that under those circumstances there would be

even a greater case for having an alternative if that chance did not work, because if we make the move and the Council because of its size and broader diversity is even less able to act in these circumstances, then it seems to me there is going to be even more pressure for unilateral action, more disenchantment? So again, understanding all the limitations about the Community of Democracies, who belongs, what the rules are, there are problems there as well, but isn't there a need as Kosovo itself suggested for having alternatives available that deal with some of the problems of the inability of the Council to act, but also the risks associated with individual nations taking these decisions unto themselves?

MR. PASCUAL: One other question.

MR. LUCK: Ed Luck, Columbia University. That was terrific, but it was provocative at the same time. So if I could ask you about two points, and I am not sure if this is a question, it may be more a statement. One is about the history of the U.N. You suggested that it started as a small club of democracies, then it was decolonization and it changed in some radical way, and so now there is more disharmony and indifference. It seems to me that given that the Soviet Union was a founding member and that the word democracy is not used in the Charter, that certainly was not a criterion at that point. And the fact that the differences in the organization were much greater in the late 1940s and 1950s than they are today, that, yes, it covers a great range of issues, but I think in terms of basic values there is

much more convergence now than before.

The other piece of history, and I am sorry to raise these, but one hears this so often from the thirty-eighth floor on these two points. The other one is that somehow because the founders were focused on interstate conflict that there is something in the Charter that makes it more difficult to deal with terrorism, interstate conflict, et cetera, I cannot see anything in the Charter that restricts the organization. In fact, the founders realized that the nature of conflict would change enormously over time and were very careful to leave that very flexible, so I do not see that.

My second point is, as you know, my view on Security Council expansion might be slightly different than yours. You made the statement which we hear often including from African representatives that somehow Africa and Latin America are not represented on the Council. They have several representatives each. What they do not have is one country that claims to be there permanently and represent the region. Of course, one of the reasons is because neither region can find one country that would do that, nor is there any history of permanent members representing anyone else, they are permanently there for themselves. So I do not see how that deals with representation.

The other piece on the Council is you mentioned that you watched this problem in August when they went on and on and on because a couple of countries were being difficult. Why is it going to be easier for the Council with nine

or ten more members? Isn't it going to be that much more difficult? Isn't it going to take that much more time? Thank you.

MR. PASCUAL: Mark, two sharp questions on management and reform.

MR. BROWN: Yes, two sharp questions. Let me just first say, Jim, that I was a big supporter of the Community of Democracies coming to the U.N., in fact, as Administrator of UNDP, footed the bill for a lot of the early activity when it was one of those typically Washington ideas without money behind it, so I have a real belief in the Community of Democracies. What I am not convinced of is that it is a useful way of organizing countries to solve individual regional, political or national political issues because I just do not see a common commitment to democracy as the critical variable which determines countries' positions on issues.

Where I would like to see a Democracy Caucus much more active in the U.N. is on issues like the Human Rights Council. In other words, there are value-based universal issues such as human rights and many others where I think a Democracy Caucus and the Community of Democracies is now well over a hundred members which means that it is coming close to two-thirds of the membership which is a critical number in terms of getting a lot of things through in the U.N. There are a lot of those issues where it should be working together and where, unfortunately, in the case of Geneva and the Human Rights Council it is not. So I would want it to

look at those sort of issue-based actions rather than, if you like, national security-cum-political issues where I do not see it as really working very effectively. So for me it is a caucus within the U.N. around that one set of issues but, unfortunately, less around the second.

I am always reluctant to engage in history when Professor Luck is in the audience, but just in defense of myself, and this may be the danger of speaking from note cards rather than from a prepared text, I did not mean to imply that the Allies of 1945 were a club of democracies. What I meant was that they had a similar commonality of interest. In their case, they were the victors of the Second World War apparently bound together by their desire to keep the peace that they had so painfully fought for and to create a cooperative security system which they controlled to do that, so I think it is very different from the value-based common interests of the Community of Democracies. But my point is, they found to be effective that they had to dilute themselves by moving towards a 192-membership organization and my argument is that the Community of Democracies would quickly find itself forced into the same thing because how can you fix any global problem without China would be the sort of shorthand answer to it.

On your second point of the founders, I think again you are slightly parsing me because your point was that the Charter because it was about interstate conflicts impedes our ability to deal with terrorism, et cetera. The high-level panel

concluded just as you did and we did that we do not need Charter change. What we need is changes in the procedures of the Security Council, a re-legitimizing of it, a retooling of our peacekeeping operations, so that we can deal with terrorism and new weapons and interstate conflicts more effectively. So we think, as I said, that the Charter precisely because it was to end the worst war of all, the Second World War, is a tough document and that is why we do not want to reopen it because we worry about the ways it would be diluted, but we do think that the procedures and the tools that we have do need to be upgraded and adjusted to these new needs.

Then on the Security Council point, enlarging it is a risk. We are up a creek without a paddle if we enlarge it, and we will get even more ineffective action, I completely agree with that, but my argument is that the status quo is not very credible either. When you look down that list of problems that we are confronting in the world, and I didn't even get into the great confrontations between the Islamic world and the Western world or any of those big kind of meta issues, you need a Security Council whose voice just carries more authority and that actions more legitimacy than I believe they do today.

There is a sort of almost tin, hollow quality to some of its pronouncements and I think we are seeing that, frankly, over North Korea even though at the moment we have China and Japan both on the Council, Japan as a 2-year member. So I think enlargement is key, but I absolutely want to be clear that

while you have at the moment got these two categories of membership, 2-year rotating elected membership and then permanent membership and, therefore, you are right, Africa and the Muslim states are represented, again, it is another British problem of a refinement of the two-class system. There are life peers and people who have been earls for generations and the second look down their long noses at the first, and it is the same in the Security Council where the 2-year memberships are a second-class citizenship, and whether there is a formula of 6-year re-electable membership, this is not for me, this is for member states to sort out, but I think finding some formula which would work. But then I come again to my point, for us as managers, procedural reform is almost as important as membership reform. In other words, if you just added members but left the procedures how they are so one or two members can block action, it would not work.

I want to be clear when I make that last point that I am not arguing for the removal of the veto. I recognize that to try and remove the veto at this time from its existing veto holders would have me hounded out of this town but, more significantly, would utterly undermine the U.S. commitment to the institution, so I am not arguing that. But what I am arguing is that the rules and procedures which determine what can be put on the docket of the Council and what statements can be made short of a resolution, all of these things need to be liberalized so that it is a more democratic set of rules and procedures.

MR. PASCUAL: Mark, I know you would be disappointed if you left without giving Susan an opportunity to ask you a question on Darfur, so let me turn to Susan next.

MS. RICE: Susan Rice of the Brookings Institution. Thanks, Mark, for what was as always an agile and brilliant presentation and trying nobly to preempt my question. You didn't manage to preempt it, but you did manage to divert it, so that shows progress.

(Laughter.)

MS. RICE: The situation in Darfur is critical, as you know, and I share your view that a military option is the worst option for all involved. My question is, given how much emphasis that I think the United Nations has put rightly on the current urgency of the situation, that the humanitarian situation is deteriorating, the government is in the process of launching another massive offensive, how much time can we afford to continue to give diplomacy of the sort you urge to persuade the Sudanese to let the U.N. in? How much time can we give sanctions which have been on the table but never been implemented in any meaningful way since 2004 when we have this imminent and already begun offensive underway which presumably could result in several hundred more thousand being killed within a matter of months, the amount of time that it might take even in the best of circumstances if we were able to get tough sanctions and

even then they would not have had time to bite? So I do not understand quite the time frame part of your approach, but I understand the objective.

MR. PASCUAL: And I will just tag onto that in considering the time frame issues, another reality is how quickly could a force be deployed, because that obviously then affects any kind of strategy that you could undertake whether you in fact actually consider a more muscular strategy. We can take one other question from the back over here on the aisle.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Vladimir Kara-Murza with RTVi Television. Could you comment a little bit on the North Korean situation following the alleged nuclear test of earlier this week? At what point will the use of force be legitimate by the international community against North Korea?

Secondly, regarding the brewing Russian-Georgian crisis and both sides have now appealed to the U.N.? Russia appealed to renew the mandate of its peacekeeping force, Georgia appealed to end the mandate of the Russian peacekeeping force. What do you think are the next steps that will be taken by the U.N. in this situation?

MR. BROWN: Let me just to Susan first say that we have got days or at most weeks, but we do not have longer than that. I think the situation is tipping in a very alarming way in Darfur and that essentially events on the ground are going to drive this very, very soon. Therefore, this diplomacy either has to pay off very, very

quickly or we are going to be forced to much more drastic actions.

But my point would be that to threaten the drastic actions now in a highly public way would I think not be helpful for two different reasons. One, we are convinced that this engaged more private diplomacy with the Sudanese in Khartoum to try and talk through their issues and find solutions to them is more effective than, if you like, the megaphone, and that the one thing which would really stop what we are trying to do in terms of Sudanese receptiveness to it is very big threats like the troops are coming because we just think that would stop the more constructive diplomatic climate that we have painfully now built involving Arab, African, and Chinese spokesmen, as well as Western ones.

Secondly, the other reason it would not be credible is that given the difficulty of forced generation for this, if we were to say it, the next question would be where the troops are coming from. The tragic thing is that because of this lack of standby arrangements for the U.N., the moment we are slowly generating a force for a traditional peacekeeping mission, if the issue became generating a force for an intervention, one, it might well not be a U.N. force, but likely some kind of multinational force under a Security Council resolution because we really do not do invasions. But second, at the moment there are not the volunteers for that. In this terrible lack of preventative capacity and preventative will in the way we run the world at the moment, it would need pictures on American and European TV screens

of mass deaths in Darfur to generate the political demand to get the forces there, and that situation does not exist. So while I fear, as you are right to say, we may move very quickly to a much less attractive and dangerous set of options for all concerned, flagging them and posturing them now is I think very counterproductive and we have got to devoutly hope that this intense diplomatic effort is going to prevail, but I am realistic, it may not.

On the North Korea issue, I think this has obviously taken a lot of people by surprise what happened. There is still some confusion about the exact nature of the explosion, but there is no uncertainty about its purpose which was to show the rest of the world wake up, we matter, and we are going to go on making trouble. I think the Security Council has very much taken this unto itself and there may even be a resolution as soon as tomorrow afternoon on this and I am just not going to say something which in any way would preempt or appear to try to influence what that resolution will say. But while I think some of the neighbors were extremely surprised and wrong-footed by this test, that this is one where everybody recognizes that a strong response is necessary. The issue is how quickly are different neighbors completing dramatic shifts in their own policy to embrace the kind of stronger options that have been recommended from Washington and elsewhere.

Similarly, the Council has now I think discussed once the Georgia-Russian issue and there is going to be more discussion but, again, it is just at the

stage where the positions are forming and I do not want to get drawn into something I just can't give you a terribly thoughtful answer on.

MR. PASCUAL: Two more questions.

MR. MITCHELL: Gary Mitchell from The Mitchell Report. I think the question I want to ask is this; roughly speaking we have two sets of options that have been discussed here today and in this room yesterday, roughly speaking. One is Security Council reform and the two elements of it that you spoke about, membership reform and procedural reform. And the other is, call it what you like, a community, a concert or something of democracies, which would somehow make things different or better. If we keep the same list of issues, Iran, North Korea and Darfur, let's stick to those three, and you could have option A which is Security Council reform, both membership and procedural and/or option B, a Community of Democracies, what evidence is there to suggest that circumstances would be different as the world community faces those three very complex issues?

MR. PASCUAL: That is a very challenging question in trying to get you to think of the counterfactuals, and maybe I will take the prerogative of being here next to you to ask the last question and give you the opportunity to sum up. You have made I think an extremely compelling case about the potential to achieve effectiveness at the U.N. that is poisoned by the governance issue, a very powerful term, and in that you outline a whole series of issues on representation, process and

capacity, and by capacity I would say the tools for peace building, peacekeeping, dealing with the proliferation questions, counterterrorism, there are the MDP issues and the environment issues which we have not really talked about.

One of the experiences that we have seen is that there are different constituents, different members, who have different interests. So when the process has come to try to find a way to come to a better solution, every country seems to pick their issue and take an extreme position from the perspective that I'd better get out there in the corners because if somebody is going to force me to compromise, I've got to start with the maximalist approach, and in the end, it becomes impossible to get anybody to move because nobody wants to relinquish a piece of their position without understanding that somebody else is going to give on another issue.

Thinking ahead with a new Secretary-General coming in and the experience that you have just been through, what is your advice on how to undertake this task? From just a practical perspective how would you approach it?

MR. BROWN: That is a very good question, and while I try to think of my answer, let me deal with an equally difficult question from Gary. If you look at the countries that we are now trying to get to be our partners in pressuring the regime in Khartoum to modify its position and allow in a U.N. force, quite a few of them would not be members of the Community of Democracies, and that is really my answer, that you would be tying one hand behind your back and leaving out a vital

set of partners to solve this particular issue. There are many more levels to the answer, but let me try and stop at that one in terms of for now because I do just then want to take the last moment to answer Carlos's difficult but in a way softball opportunity to try and say something thoughtful to end.

When I worked at the World Bank, it has an Executive Board which, interestingly, the loyalty of its members is halfway between the nation-states they represent and commitment to the Bank the institution. You see on that board a real effort always in discussions to say what is good for the Bank and what is good for its development mission.

While that internal legitimacy of the board and the Bank has its limitations, and that I would argue that the World Bank is a much less globally legitimate institution than the United Nations, it does make for much more coherent support to management reform in the World Bank. The President of the Bank has been able to reform and reform and reform and fix the mistakes he was indulgently allowed to make by the board with further reforms, and this has gone through many presidents and I was at the shoulder of several of them and making the mistakes, too, but there is just that kind of commitment to the institution. Larry Summers always uses this wonderful example as an economist of you never wash a rental car, his argument being that you do not care for it because you do not own it and you are returning it. And my feeling is that a very large part of the U.N. membership I am

afraid treat the U.N. like a rental car because they do not feel enough of an ownership stake in it to take it for a tune-up and get it new tires and even improve the model at times. So I think the great challenge to the certain almost now new Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon who will be confirmed by the General Assembly tomorrow is to use those very powerful Asian consensus-building skills to try and get that broad sense of ownership. And ultimately he may arrive at his own decisions about what is possible to do and not do on governance and, anyway, on the something like the Security Council it is much more the decision and prerogative of member states than it is of the Secretary-General. But what he must do is find ways, if not the Security Council than other ways, to improve that sense of consensus and ownership of the institution in order to do the retooling we have been calling for.

We didn't even get into management reform today. I told you that peacekeeping was a fairly haphazard business, and I did not mention that in all of our peacekeeping operations, in our civilian staff, our vacancy rates run at something like 40 percent, and the average length of service of our civilian staff in the field in the U.N. is less than 2 years, versus 20 to 30 years at headquarters, because the one group are all on 6-month contracts and not allowed to have their families with them and have a kind of really disadvantageous set of terms and conditions, and the ones in headquarters have tenure, basically. We have been trying to equalize conditions of service as we have long since done in UNDP or UNICEF, but even these reforms

which have a huge management logic to them fall in this case not, just it has to be said, into general sort of blood-mindedness to reform in our different committees of the organization, but in this case also to the donor countries who do not want to pay the extra cost.

But the fundamental issue here is we've got to get that commitment to the institution, we've got to build the U.N. back up to a kind of vessel able to deal with 21st century challenges, security, development and humanitarian and human rights and democracy building and all of these things, but we have got to build it into an institution which all its members have enough confidence in, enough sense of ownership in, that it becomes an effective enough vehicle to carry U.S. ambitions on all of these issues.

MR. PASCUAL: Thank you very much for a very eloquent presentation and response to questions. Thank you.

(Applause.)

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