

**A Brookings Iraq Series Briefing**

**PREPARING FOR A WAR WITH IRAQ:  
COALITION BUILDING AND HOMELAND DEFENSE**

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**MR. JAMES B. STEINBERG:** Good afternoon and welcome to Brookings. This is the third in our series of briefings on Iraq, weekly briefings. We've had a few before the weekly series started. How long we will go remains to be seen. We'll have a little pool outside. Beyond the conventional pool of when the military action will start, it's how long the Brookings briefing series will last.

Today we're going to do our briefing in two parts. We're going to begin by a latest update on the diplomatic situation at the UN and around the world, and to discuss those issues we have Fiona Hill, a Senior Fellow here at Brookings who is going to talk about both the situation in the U.K. and in Russia. Then Phil Gordon who is going to give us a report from both the old and the new Europe. And we might get Mike O'Hanlon to pitch in a word or two about the situation in Turkey at least on the military front.

Then the second part of our briefing, we're going to turn to the question about what does the crisis with Iraq mean in terms of the threat to the United States from terrorism. What should we expect, what kinds of dangers do we see and how should we be responding to it.

We're fortunate today to have with us a special guest, our Nonresident Senior Fellow here at Brookings, Dan Byman who is going to talk about the terrorist threat. He has been one of the most insightful analysts of the terrorism problem in the country and brings a lot of expertise on both the Middle East and the terrorism problem more generally, so we're grateful to have you with us today.

Then Mike and I will talk a little bit about the homeland security response and how we're doing in terms of dealing with that, including probably touching a little bit on the latest public relations initiatives that we're seeing from the Department of Homeland Security.

So let me begin first with Fiona who will talk about old friends and new friends and how they're reacting to the Iraq situation.



**MS. FIONA HILL:** Thanks, Jim.

First of all as Jim mentioned, I'm going to start with our new friend, Russia. What I wanted to do was try to explain what Russia was up to in the UN Security Council in the broader context of Russian foreign policy.

The major point to bear in mind here is that under President Putin the major thrust of Russian foreign policy has been to preserve rather than change the international status quo. What we're seeing here at the UN is no exception to this rule.

A critical component of Russian foreign policy has been to try to create a predictable, stable relationship with the United States in which Russia is consulted on all issues that directly affect its national interests. And international stability is seen by Putin and by the Russian government as a critical

element in enabling them to get on with their major task which is domestic reform and renewal.

The preference has been all along for multilateral arrangements for dealing with the United States too. Rather than having Russia facing the U.S. directly and unilaterally in tackling crises. So the only issue where Russia has tried to preserve the bilateral nature of the relationship has been on the old issue of arms control.

Russia doesn't want to be seen as an independent player in world affairs when it's dealing with the United States or even to create its own alternative coalition of states. It wants to use existing mechanisms and international consensus. Hence while there's been so much stress all along by the Russians of using the UN as a forum and as a chance of resolving critical issues like Iraq.

As Foreign Minister Ivanov put it in his recent statement to the United National Security Council, what Russia wants to do is follow the position shared by the overwhelming majority of the states in the world.

This has been the theme in Putin's foreign policy right since the very beginning. He hasn't really changed this in any way. All of his statements beginning in 2000 and especially in 2001 have stressed the dangers of unilateralism in world affairs, and especially, quite explicitly, the dangers of the U.S. taking unilateral action.

If we look at the statements that Foreign Minister Ivanov made just a few days ago in the February 14th Security Council meeting, he again stressed the same issues as Putin has repeatedly. He said all states need to have the opportunity to seek solutions on an equal footing. And this is especially the case where there are issues of general security involved, and he called upon everyone to unite their efforts.

In short, the current strategy of Russia at the UN fits in well with an established pattern over the last three years. It's not anything out of the ordinary and it's in fact very similar to what happened when Putin was trying to head off the inevitability of missile defense: allying first with China and then with European states to try to restrain the U.S. to some degree until it became evident that the U.S. was going to forge ahead and that further resistance would have proven damaging to the U.S.-Russian relationship.

On the domestic front, President Putin has some major advantages over other European leaders like Blair or Berlusconi, Schroeder or Chirac. He doesn't have the same kind of domestic pressures or the same opposition to the war as we've seen elsewhere in Europe.

Most notably if you look back to last weekend when we saw a million plus people marching in the streets of London and Rome and elsewhere, there were only a couple of hundred people who turned out in Moscow. There were in fact bigger protests in Kiev, next door in Ukraine, and a larger protest in the southern city of Krasnodar near the front lines with Russia's war in Chechnya. Though there's not a great deal of popular support for the war in Iraq, people haven't taken to the streets to

protest. And in fact Putin has largely kept his own counsel on foreign policy. There's not a great deal of external participation in foreign policymaking in Russia, so he's pretty much out there on his own, making his own decisions without the kinds of constraints that other policymakers have against them.

This being said, there are still some real risks for Russia and for Putin in supporting the U.S.. The fact that the U.S. has made it clear that countries like Russia, as well as Turkey and others, have to choose sides in what's ahead, has made it very difficult for Putin because his preferred policy is to sit on the fence, to play a balancing act. He's made quite an art form out of that in his relationship with the United States over the last couple of years.

We've seen how Russia has courted North Korea, it's courted Iran, as well as reaching out to the Arab world to counteract its overtures to the United States. But this balancing act has become increasingly difficult on the issue of Iraq. We've had a lot of discussion about how Russia's interests in Iraq are fairly straight forward. There's been the Soviet-era debt issue; the issue of Russian oil contracts in Iraq, some of which have now been suspended because of Russia's preference towards the United States over the last few months. And Russia's made it very clear to the U.S. that in any future post-war plans for Iraq, Russia wants to, at least, be given the chance to compete on an even playing field and not be excluded in what happens next--as it has perceived it has been in other settings such as the Caspian.

Russia has made its position clear on what it might want in a post-war scenario, but still there are strong overwhelming preferences for no war at all with Iraq, and that Hussein be ousted by other means. It's not just a question here of unpredictability--of what might happen if there's a protracted war, but really the very fact that Putin will finally be forced to show his hand and to choose sides, to get off the fence.

Putin overall doesn't like to make firm commitments. The hallmark of his presidency right from the beginning has been a kind of strategic ambiguity, of keeping all of Russia's options open and of trying to expand freedom of action as much as possible. If the U.S. makes an unequivocal decision to move forward, Russia will have to get down from the fence, and that means tying Russia's policy and Putin's own future to U.S. decisionmaking and to whatever happens next in Iraq.

What Russia is trying to do right now is to delay the inevitable as long as possible, and hence the dance with China, France and Germany at the UN, with the hope that eventually some other outcome might be possible and if not, to delay it as long as possible to buy time.

I just wanted to mention a few things on some of the general problems of coalition building and this time from the perspective of the United Kingdom. I was just in the U.K. at the end of January, and what was striking at that point was the sense at that juncture that war was not inevitable. I think the dawning realization over the last month in London and elsewhere in Britain that a war is going to take place sooner rather than later; that the United Kingdom's government has pretty much thrown in its lot with the United States--which people knew all along, but the reality hadn't really sunk in--has really shaken things up on the domestic front.

Here is where the rub is, the feeling on the popular level in Britain is that all the serious questions about what happens next, the dangers of a protracted war, what happens at the end of a war with Iraq, how Iraq will be rebuilt, what happens next with the other designated members of the axis of evil--Is there going to be a crisis with North Korea? Is there going to be a crisis with Iran? All of these have been left unresolved.

The fundamental problem here is a lack of trust in the United States and in the choices of the Bush Administration. What was really striking in Britain as well as in the rest of Europe in other trips there through the summer was a sense of disenfranchisement, a kind of democratic deficit, that populations in Europe have no say whatsoever in the decisions of the United States. Clearly there's a realization that President Bush, the Administration, are in charge of United States policy, that they're acting in U.S. interests, but there's a strong feeling, nonetheless, that as the U.S. is such a dominant power in the world today, and that whatever it does affects other interests, there should be some means of making sentiments elsewhere in the world felt in the U.S. political arena. We've seen that through protests. We've also seen that through pressure on governments to bear their own pressure upon the United States and to try to change directions in U.S. commitments.

Here we've interpreted that sense of disenfranchisement and frustration simply as anti-Americanism which has made it quite easy to dismiss, but I think that that is a mistake and that the United States is going to have to address this sense if it wants to push ahead with gaining support for actions in Iraq and whatever comes next.

In some respects what we're seeing with the UN is threat it's becoming, it has turned into, a kind of townhall for expressing grievances against the U.S.--some of which are completely disassociated from what's happening in Iraq.

In Britain itself, one of the predominant issues is a genuine concern that London, rather than the United States, or the U.K. in general, will become the next target, the top target for terrorism. Perhaps the next big stop after 9/11.

I want to point out here that we shouldn't just look at the current terrorist threat in the U.S. context, we must look at it more broadly, especially given the fact that the U.S. will have to factor in these vulnerabilities in thinking about coalition building.

A crippling blow to London at this juncture could certainly overwhelm Blair at a very critical time in preparations for a military campaign. We just had the ricin scare, raids on the Finsbury Park Mosque, the death during a raid in Manchester of a British police officer, confirmed raids in Spain and Italy uncovering evidence of a larger plot involving terrorists in England, and the British government has declared that a major terrorist attack on Britain is inevitable, that has certainly fed into the atmosphere about Iraq.

And Britain is uniquely vulnerable on three fronts. First of all we have the mega-city phenomenon. If you think about the case of London, an attack on London would cripple not just one

city, but certainly the bulk of Britain. A fifth of the population of Great Britain live in the greater London area. If you think about that in the sense of the United States you'd have to factor in four of the United States' major metropolitan areas -- Los Angeles, New York, Houston and Chicago -- to get the same proportion of population as you have concentrated in London.

Britain also has crumbling infrastructure. We've seen just over the last few weeks the desperate efforts of London's Mayor, Ken Livingstone to impose a congestion tax on the city to try to relieve some of the pressure on all of the major transportation networks. You also have overstretched, understaffed hospitals, overtaxed emergency services, a recent strike of firemen in London closed all of the deep underground stations for several days. A derailment on one of the lines also closed down part of the system for several days. In fact the joke in London was who needed al Qaeda when you had the British government screwing up the transportation system. But the basic point of this is that London and Londoners and Brits see themselves as uniquely vulnerable in the event of another cataclysmic terrorist attack. We have to factor that in when we're thinking about the sentiments in what still remains the U.S.'s staunchest ally in the coming campaign against Iraq.

Finally the immigrant influx into Britain. Although Britain has been more willing than other countries in Europe to accept asylum seekers and large numbers of immigrants, it doesn't assimilate people very well. There's also a long tradition of foreign revolutionary and radical movements making London their base. In fact a colleague who is going to be joining us soon at Brookings based in London, commented that if you sat in Heathrow Airport long enough, every single one of the people on the FBI's most wanted list or on any of the lists of the major terrorist groups would pass through Heathrow Airport. He figured you'd just have to sit there for about a week and you'd see everybody pass through.

London is the communications hub for most of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and it's very easy to get out of London, get through Heathrow and to get to elsewhere. And we've just had the incident of a Venezuelan carrying an armed hand grenade in his luggage through Heathrow, which underscores that point even further.

Blair is under a great deal of pressure at home with severe criticism for the government's failure to deal with all of these issues that I've just outlined -- the mega-city phenomenon, the crumbling infrastructure, the influx of immigrants. We're starting to see a backlash in Britain now about asylum seekers, and in terms of war the memories are still really quite fresh in Britain about the effects that a war can have. Homeland security is not such a remote idea. There were many TV programs recently about what to do, how to evacuate the whole of central London in the event of a major crisis. The memories of IRA assaults are very recent, very fresh for people in London. And the IRA never threatened to use biological or chemical weapons.

So this time around the risks for Blair and for the British government are very high. Blair's having an increasingly hard time in selling the necessity of another war to the British public. The risks from a war in Iraq have become muddled together with other genuine concerns about the future of London, the future of Britain, and how to tackle all these domestic problems that could collide in a very real fashion with a coming crisis.

The major point of this is just to try to put a finger on some of the other vulnerabilities that are affecting the United States' major ally at such a critical point.


**MR. STEINBERG:** Thank you, Fiona. I wondered if you did any checks on the inventories of duct tape at the DIYs in London while you were out there.

**MS. HILL:** Nobody was buying any.

**MR. STEINBERG:** All right, we'll come back obviously to the terrorism question in a few minutes.

Phil, in the last week we've seen once again a demonstration of the characteristic French approach to diplomacy, subtle, fine use of language, indirection and the like to make a point. I'd like to hear a little bit more from you about just how do they manage to be so deaf.

**MR. PHILIP H. GORDON:** I'll try, Jim. I'll do my best.



I had a chance last week before many of this group to talk about the French and French motivation so I'll try to be more brief today and talk about where I think we are at the UN with the French and others, what's driving the French to try to answer your question, Jim, and then finally a word on Turkey for discussion.

Where we are now I think, we've all seen that the United States is now informally approaching allies with a draft resolution, the idea of one at least that would simply say Iraq remains in material breach. There's no sign that they're going to come out of material breach, and if they don't meet the following benchmarks very quickly, date to be determined, it will be time for serious consequences.

I think the real question about that, one of three things happens. Either they win broad support for this. We've already heard from the French and the Germans that they're not going to support it, but if it's only that I think the U.S. can move ahead. Even if it is, obviously you have the risk of a French veto, but otherwise you get a majority support for such a resolution and the U.S. can go to war on that basis.

An alternative is that faced with the fear of a French veto opposition, the U.S. and the U.K. withdraw the resolution and go to war based on 1441 and say we already have all the legitimate means we need to do this, and we do not.

It becomes most interesting if not only the French and Germans are opposed but the rest of the Security Council is opposed, and this gets back to the Russians and the Chinese. I've been saying I think they are really key here. Because if it's just the French and Germans I think they will be seen as a minority isolated and the U.S. goes ahead. If it's the French, the Russians and the Chinese, and the majority members of the Security Council to say "no" to the U.S. resolution and to ask for more time,

that would put the Bush Administration in the position, the unenviable position, not only of going to war without an explicit second or 18th UN Security Council resolution, but in the face of the will of the Security Council. That would be, for me, the most dramatic outcome at all and that's why the positions of Russia and China seem to me very important, and they in turn depend a lot on the French position which I want to say something about now.

The question being, what's driving the French position and why these remarks that Jim referred to?

I think if the French analyze it as I just did which is that the Americans are determined to go to war one way or another, with or without support, it raises the question of what then they are trying to accomplish with the strong opposition and the threats of veto and so on.

It seems to me it's one of two things. I don't have the answer. Either they don't share that analysis and they actually believe they can still stop this. If they get the Russians and Chinese on board and get nine members of the Security Council to say we want more time, maybe they still somehow think that they can get the U.S. to back down.

If not, then it's simply a principled stand that war is just not the right thing to do, and whether the United States likes it or not they're going to oppose it and they've got European public opinion on their side and they've got much of world public opinion on their side. I think that in part explains not only the determination of the French to dig their heels in much more than anyone I think expected. I think the general view previously was that they would be difficult until the end and at the last minute seeing the writing on the wall they would come along and maybe get a good deal for themselves, preserve the Security Council and move forward. I don't think that analysis any longer holds up. And they are dug in and I don't think we should exclude the possibility that Chirac will stick to his guns and simply say look, the Americans aren't in charge of this alliance or this world or the international community, a majority of us are against it, and I'm going to stop it. I've got public opinion behind me.

Remember Jacques Chirac doesn't have to get elected in America and he reads his newspapers at home and the debate back there. He's receiving widespread support. That's why I don't think we should exclude the scenario in which we don't win French support in the end and whether they veto or just remain opposed, it still makes the international community divided.

Will they ultimately come along? I think it's improbable now, but the one thing that could change it, it seems to me, the only thing that could change it would be a very strong negative report from the inspectors. I think the only way you would see the French turn around at this point is if Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei came forward and said we don't need any time, they're just not cooperating, there's nothing we can do.

But I would stress if we're trying to understand where I think the French are coming from, and again last week I got into much more of the motivations about why they think war is a bad idea, here I do think they feel they have the wind in their sails on a lot of issues and that explains some of the



intemperate language that surprised us all vis-à-vis the Central Europeans. The irony about that of course is that the French are talking to and behaving towards the Central Europeans as they accuse the Americans of doing towards them. Where they say NATO is not the Warsaw Pact, or the United States simply determines where we're headed and we have to follow; but then ironically immediately turn around to candidates to the EU and say well, if you want to be part of this alliance you have to come along with us, and all the more difficult position when the "us" is not necessarily the French and Germans but a majority of EU members who have actually taken a different view.

Let me just end with a word on Turkey, and I hope we can come back to these issues. We've seen the very last minute negotiations going on with the Turks. Some people are surprised they're still saying no, we're upping the ante. The Bush Administration is talking this down a little bit for understandable reasons saying we have other plans in place and it would be nice to have Turkish support but it's not absolutely necessary.

I would say don't believe that for a minute. Turkish support is absolutely fundamental for this operation. Mike can comment in more detail on actually militarily what your alternatives would be if you don't get support for Turkey, but to the United States this is absolutely critical.

The stakes in the northern part of Iraq, because of Kirkuk and the oil around Kirkuk and the very serious risk that different ethnic groups would try to seize this territory and hold it before anyone else got there is a very dangerous situation. If you can go in from Turkey, the U.S. itself can quickly seize the oilfields, stabilize the region and prevent other people from competing over it.

If we have to do it, and again I'll defer to Mike on how challenging it would be to parachute in, the 4th Infantry Division. But it seems to me it would be so much slower that the risk of casualties would be greater, therefore the risk of American resentment vis-à-vis Turkey would be greater. And if anybody thinks that the different ethnic groups, all who have claimed to the oilfields around Kirkuk will simply defer to the others out of a notion of common solidarity, I'd just ask you to think about the Northern Alliance and Kabul a year and a half ago when everyone said they won't go in, we'll ask them not to go in—they'll go in.

So it seems to me a very dangerous situation. We desperately need Turkey's support.

The interesting thing about the dynamic and who will win, if I'm right that we desperately need it, you might say well why not just pitch in an extra \$6 billion and you've got it. I think there is a reluctance to go too far and start buying everybody off massively with billions and billions and billions of dollars even though we've already spent billions, but also because as desperately as we need Turkey, Turkey also needs us. That's why even though everybody is pessimistic now, and the New York Times said the U.S. doesn't think this is -- I cannot imagine that this deal will not be done, simply because it is so fundamentally in both countries' interests to do it. And it is also so consistent with Turkish negotiating behavior to push things not only to the 11th hour but beyond. But as difficult as it is now, I think both sides know that it would be so strongly not in their interest to cut this deal that they'll find a way to cut it.

**MR. STEINBERG:** For anyone who's done any shopping in Istanbul that sounds right to me, too. [Laughter]

Mike, is there a military option without Turkey?



**MR. MICHAEL E. O'HANLON:** Thanks, Jim.

I certainly agree with and am sobered by Phil's comments but I also think there is an option without Turkey, at least without Turkish land bases and access for American ground forces. We clearly want to have the ability to use Incirlik and fly airplanes out of Turkey. But I think if we could get a couple of brigades into Northern Iraq to help protect the Kurds we could at least ensure that our important allies in that region were not decimated. Between our couple of brigades and the Kurdish forces could be in position early on, I think they could probably protect a good part of Kurdistan pretty well. Then the question becomes the oilfields. I think that is sort of the real core issue.

It's not going to take us that long to get to the oilfields, even if we have to come in from the south. We're going to send a division I think on a big sweeping maneuver around from the west and probably bypass Baghdad, or maybe from the east, but get to Kirkuk within a week to ten days, so I don't expect it would be a protracted war among different Turkish groups. I could be wrong and you may want to respond to this analysis in a minute. But I do think Saddam will torch the oilfields if we don't get there fast. So that's my more immediate concern, that we will have to repair those oilfields and put out fires. And I think at a minimum you have to expect you're going to have that consequence if you're denied access to Turkey for large American ground forces. It may not prevent us from seizing Kirkuk relatively quickly, within at most a couple of weeks after the war begins. It may not impede us from protecting our Kurdish friends but it will I think make it more likely that there will be a lot of havoc wreaked by Saddam in the mean time. So for that reason I would very much want to be able to put ground forces into Turkey.

But I can imagine an alternative. It's not a good alternative, it's not desirable, I don't think it's worth saving five billion bucks over, I'd rather spend the five billion bucks, but I think you could still win the war. It would not have to be a show stopper if you were denied access for your ground forces to Turkish territory.

So that's the overall way in which I would look at that.

One last dimension of course is what Turkey's role would be if we did not have large forces in this region and Turkey was worried about Kurdish refugees and then Turkey got more involved inside of Iraq itself. That's yet again another downside, and one could perhaps imagine conspiracy theories about how people in Turkey, and Phil you may want to comment on this too, certain Turkish politicians may actually like the idea of getting their feet on the ground inside of Iraq. My guess is most of them would just as soon not have any more of the burden than necessary, but if we're not present in large numbers it gives Turkey more of an argument for why they are needed to help protect refugees, to help prevent these refugees from coming onto Turkish territory, and maybe even as a deterrent against

Saddam's military moving that way. Turkey may or may not view that as an advantage to denying us access. But from a U.S. perspective I would think it's a decided disadvantage. That the more Turkish involvement in Northern Iraq the worse for us because the more complications between the Turks and the Kurds that we have to sort out in the end. So I would see that as again another downside. Not a showstopper. If we have to send in just one or two brigades through airplanes and they combined with the Kurds will have to hold off the Iraqis I think we can do that, but there will be a lot of damage done to the oilfields in the mean time and these complications between Turkey and the Kurds.

**MR. STEINBERG:** Also an interesting question of how the Iranians would feel about it and whether in some respects the Iranians wouldn't like to see us in there as well to prevent things from getting out of control in the north.

Let's turn to Part B of our briefing. We've been through a fairly difficult couple of weeks, and not just because of snowstorms as a result of the increased terrorist alert. But one of the things we've heard consistently from the intelligence community is the additional risks of terrorism in connection with an Iraq crisis. Dan Byman is going to talk a little bit about the terrorist problem and how we should think about that and then we'll talk a little bit about the responses.



**MR. DANIEL BYMAN:** Thanks, Jim.

There's no question that the impending war with Iraq raises the already high risk of a terrorist attack on the American homeland and U.S. interests overseas and on U.S. allies. Four general points I'll try to leave you with today.

One is that Iraq itself might turn away from its historic caution in using terrorism, and either use its own operatives more aggressively or work with al Qaeda. Al Qaeda and its affiliates may strike at any time, seeing this as an opportune moment to grab the world's attention.

The Islamic Radicals inspired by al Qaeda but not controlled by it also poses threat. And while we're very focused on the next week or the next two weeks, we need to be thinking about the long term because the war with Iraq and how we handle the aftermath has tremendous implications for the overall campaign against al Qaeda.

Now Iraq has always been very cautious in its use of terrorism. Unlike Iran, say, it has not tried to create a large independent guerrilla movement. It hasn't worked with groups like Hezbollah or Hamas in an extensive way which would, mainly because Saddam does not trust anything he cannot control completely.

When striking the United States, Iraq has preferred to use its own operatives. During the first Gulf War attempted attacks in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, Iraq used its own people to attack U.S. facilities. In 1993 attacking former President Bush in Kuwait trying to kill him. Again, Iraq uses its own operatives.

It's worth pointing out that Iraq's attempts have been in some ways rather startlingly inept. That in 1990, for example, when it was going after U.S. facilities in Southeast Asia the former Director of Central Intelligence William Webster noted that Iraqi intelligence officials used sequentially numbered passports. As a result, when you wrapped up the first two you could figure out who the next, the third, the fourth, the fifth, the sixth were. And it wasn't exactly rocket science.

They're also not very good at hiding their hands. One of the people arrested in Southeast Asia said oh, I've been arrested. Would you call the Iraqi embassy please and let them know I've been arrested?

Also in 1993 the Iraqi operatives used the same type of explosives, didn't practice phone security that Iraq had done in the past. So again, easy to trace it to Iraq.

Having said this, that Iraq was cautious and rather inept, all bets may be off today. Saddam is facing a very different situation, the loss of power himself. The stakes are much much higher. And as Michael can talk about more extensively, Saddam himself has relatively few realistic military alternatives against U.S. forces. So terrorism by default becomes much more attractive. It's not a desirable option in and of itself but there are few good options from Iraq's perspective.

Also Saddam is infamous for his desire for revenge. That even if it doesn't serve his cause, if he knows he's going down he may try to take as many Americans as possible with him.

Thus we do have a plausible case for the transfer of chemical or biological weapons. Though given Iraq's lack of trust of independent terrorists, I think it's much more likely that it will use its own operatives in this case. Again, here, still limited at least by past example by the lack of competence of its own people.

It's also possible that Iraq may actively work with al Qaeda. I promised Jim I'd be relatively brief so I won't go into the exhaustive analysis of the different allegations about Iraqi links to al Qaeda, but I'll just make a general point which is war makes strange bedfellows. Iraq hasn't hesitated in the past to work with groups that are ideologically opposed to it for a common goal.

In the early 1980s Iraq worked with the Muslim Brotherhood against [Hafa Zilasad] even though this group which has an ideology that in many ways was a forerunner to al Qaeda, this group hates Ba'th secularism but nevertheless worked with Saddam.

Again, just as a caveat, cooperation is not necessarily controlled. That although Saddam and al Qaeda may work together, al Qaeda is independent or do things according to its own timetable.

But this whole discussion was really a prelude to my biggest concern which is al Qaeda on its own. If I were talking to you two year ago, one year ago, yesterday or a year from now I'm going to tell you al Qaeda by itself is the greatest risk of terrorism in that Iraq is one concern to consider, but al

Qaeda itself has no hesitation about attacking the United States and this is a spotlight moment for al Qaeda. This is a moment when the world's cameras are watching, when attacks in Kashmir or Chechnya will get much less attention, so there's a tremendous incentive from its point of view to act.

Also a chance to really seize the Pan-Islamic cause. If Iraq's conventional military means fail to work al Qaeda can show that terrorism is the best way of confronting the United States, and to be fair to al Qaeda, and we do want to be fair to them, it's probably a mistake, to at least credit them on bin Laden has for many years expressed concern about what he says is the brutalization of the Iraqi people. And his February 11th statement really tried to walk a fine line between showing solidarity, trying to associate the al Qaeda cause with that of Iraq, while expressing contempt and dislike for Saddam's regime.

But we can't just focus on al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, part of what makes it special is that it tries to inspire and work with other groups that are not necessarily controlled by it. And as a result, many of these groups are unaffiliated but sympathetic to al Qaeda, may shift towards attacks on Americans.

European officials have said that groups active in Chechnya are planning attacks should a war break out with Iraq. There are numerous individuals and cells that we've never heard of that may suddenly pop up inspired or angered by the war with Iraq. And even some [inaudible] groups might change a bit. The spiritual leader of Hamas has issued a statement that Western interests should be attacked in the event of war with Iraq, and that's a shift for Hamas, even though Hamas has always been anti-Western, it hasn't called for direct attacks.

I'll close by talking about the long-term picture. The initial outlook for anti-American sentiment, for al Qaeda's recruitment is very gloomy. Remember in much of the Middle East probably 40 percent doesn't believe that al Qaeda was behind the 9/11 attacks, so we're dealing with an audience that is utterly unsympathetic. And well before the war talk ratcheted up, only six percent of the Egyptians had a favorable opinion of the United States.

So add to this the current crisis where the United States is widely seen as picking on multiple countries, trying to keep it down, it's going to cause problems for recruitment.

There are a few advantages that may be seized. One is that after this conflict troop levels in Saudi Arabia can be drawn down perhaps to a level similar before the first Gulf War. Another advantage is there will be a sense of U.S. prestige and clout. I'm quoting a real expert here which is Osama bin Laden. He has a statement which is when people see a strong horse or a weak horse, they will naturally follow the strong horse. And the United States may emerge from this at least temporarily as a very strong horse in the region.

But a lot is going to depend on what's done after Saddam is ousted. That if the United States does not actively commit to the reconstruction of Iraq, Iraq could become a playground for Islamic radicalism. We need to make sure that the oil wealth is used for the Iraqi people. We need to offset any charges of greed, that this is really a war for U.S. oil companies.

Also to talk very briefly about force protection, there's a U.S. tendency, natural, understandable, good, to protect the lives of its soldiers to the utmost. That cannot in Iraq get in the way of also carrying out other duties such as protecting the civilian population. Force protection is important but it should not interfere with the overall mission. And if we're going to recognize that we need to recognize that in a post-Saddam Iraq some casualties from terrorism will be inevitable, but that's the price of making sure that the long-term picture is much better. Because if Iraq slides into chaos, it's going to be al Qaeda that's going to emerge the victor.

**MR. STEINBERG:** Thank you, Dan. Let me draw you out on a couple of points before we turn to Mike.

In terms of your first set of concerns, that is the capabilities of the Iraqi intelligence service, what can you say about their state of capability today compared with where they were in 1990, and again, I realize it's a lot of speculation. In particular, are there particular targets, countries, places, where they would be more likely as in the past, you mentioned Southeast Asia, where people should feel they'd be looking to as potential targets?

**MR. BYMAN:** Two questions which, needless to say, information is scarce on. My judgment would be that Iraq's intelligence capabilities externally are worse ten years later simply because they've had to draw down their presence in many countries, and they haven't had the same sort of ability to run freely that they had in much of the 1980s when Iraq was not a [pariah] nation.

Iraq has been watched closely for involvement in terrorism throughout much of the 1990s so a lot of its activities are restricted.

In terms of where Iraq might be most active, look for places where either there was a relatively poor local rule of law or local intelligence services just as much as the developing world, all places where Iraq has had a very close, historical relationship.

Countries I would worry about, for example, and this isn't meant to reduce tourism in one country to another, but a large Iraqi presence of course in Jordan. And from Jordan you can go to several other countries. Jordan would be one area of concern simply due to ease for the Iraqis.

**MR. STEINBERG:** There's been a little bit of speculation and a little bit of reporting about FBI focus on Iraqis here in the United States. If you were Director Muller, how worried would you be about Iraqis in the United States and what would you be looking for?

**MR. BYMAN:** Director Muller's job is to worry, so I think he's doing his job well.

In general, Iraqis in the United States have been vehemently anti-Saddam, extremely loyal, no concern about a fifth column in the United States. That said, is it plausible that Saddam has planted several individuals or much more than several individuals in the United States? The answer is of course.

In large part because Saddam has made a point of keeping tabs on any opposition movement, trying to penetrate, regardless of where it's located. So is it plausible that there are Iraqi intelligence operatives in the United States? Certainly. Could they be turned on or activated to go from my attorney in opposition groups to conducting terrorist attacks?

Yes, although that would probably be a little more difficult.

In terms of what sort of activities they might do, the ideal for these officers would of course be things related to the war. So military sabotage, things that are highly symbolic in the sense of official operations. But the feasibility is probably going to rule what they do. So maybe attacks on what, the largo term of softer targets which means less protected targets.

**MR. STEINBERG:** A final question, Colonel Lindbetter talked earlier about the need for the U.S. military so to secure the oilfields. Obviously another population. Colonel Lindbetter talked earlier about the need for the U.S. military to secure the oilfields. Obviously another preoccupation is going to be to get to the WMD, particularly the bio and chemical stocks that possibly exist. How are terrorists thinking about that? Are there groups that are thinking about the opportunities that the chaos of a war situation might offer to acquire materials? Do you see any signs or any reason to be concerned that al Qaeda or others would see this as an opportunity to acquire what they perhaps up until now have not yet been able to manufacture for themselves?

**MR. BYMAN:** Certainly. Al Qaeda, unfortunately, is almost unique with one or two exceptions in terrorist history of being able to plan several years down the road, to seize opportunities that it knows may come along. So the possibility of al Qaeda being prepared to take advantage of chaos in Iraq I think is actually likely. Not just a possibility, but something that bin Laden and his operatives almost certainly have discussed.

Al Qaeda has long been interested in chemical and biological weapons. In fact there are some disturbing transcripts that came out of documents captured in Afghanistan where bin Laden's number two, [inaudible], kind of hectored his subordinates saying what's wrong with you people? I had to find out about the importance of many of these weapons from the Americans instead of discovering it ourselves. So we can assume that several years later that al Qaeda is very focused on this.

So seizing the production facilities, seizing the staff is essential. My big concern though is we don't know where many of these things are. That's the whole point with the problem with the inspectors. They simply cannot discover a lot of the missing stocks. If it is not known to the inspectors who is it known to? Presumably the Iraqis themselves, and that's the concern is will they turn first to terrorists or will they surrender themselves to the United States in the hopes of clemency in exchanging information.

**MR. STEINBERG:** Let me turn to Mike. We've been talking in a variety of contexts about the homeland security effort. How do you see the specific response now in terms of the heightened threat, not only the general threat from al Qaeda but the threat of war in Iraq and what should we here

be thinking about? What should Secretary Ridge, Muller and the others be doing now to prepare America for this?

**MR. MICHAEL E. O'HANLON:** Thanks, Jim. I guess I'll comment on four recent developments along these lines. One, the budget; two, the threat warning about apartments and hotels and soft targets; three, the duct tape issue; and fourth, the phone book campaign. In order.

On the budget issue, at least we now have as part of the omnibus appropriations bill a homeland security budget. We have money for first responders. Generally speaking that budget wasn't a bad budget for one you had to develop four months after 9/11. Remember, this is the budget that was essentially submitted last February. There are some things that it left out that we talked about in our Brookings book last year, and again in the new issue that we're putting together now as you know. But for the most part not a bad first step, but why did it take so long and why did the Bush Administration even once it had a purely Republican Congress allow sort of business as usual to develop this final appropriations bill and only get it passed in the course of February. So I think we've lost weeks. We have to be rushing to deal with the imminence of attempted terrorist attacks in the coming months and I think the Bush Administration has been matter of fact and a bit lackadaisical about this. I think we therefore have to be a little critical on that front.

Moving to the apartment and hotel issue and the warnings that were issued a few weeks ago for how these soft targets could be the subject of attack, again I'd be somewhat critical of the Bush Administration because this was an area of potential vulnerability that we discussed last year in our book. The Administration however, in general did not want to pay much attention to privately owned infrastructure in this country. Did not want to spend a lot of time or regulation or other legislative attention on securing and improving security at these sorts of sites. Basically trusting the private sector to handle things on its own.

It's tough to protect these targets. There are a lot of them and you can't obviously prevent each and every kind of attack, but there were a number of things which I won't get into here that we think could at least have been done to deal with the most catastrophic kinds of potential attacks such as anthrax being introduced into the air circulation system of a skyscraper. And these things generally were not done in any way, shape or form in the last 18 months. So I'd be critical on that point.

Third, the duct tape issue. Everybody else has been critical on that, so let me just quickly move along and say that wasn't necessarily handled very well, but let me finish on a more positive note. I like the phone book campaign. And I think Americans would rather be scared than dead. And it's okay to scare people a little bit if they're actually going to take useful precautions as a result. I don't think Mr. Ridge going out and giving a press conference where he seems to randomly pick out bottled water, duct tape, and plastic sheeting as the three things you should do is appropriate, but I think when you sit down and you're more careful and you put together an eight-page brochure and you put together a web page and you help people understand that if they live in a small farm town in Iowa they're probably not very vulnerable to a chemical attack but they still may want to have some precautions in case the electricity grid comes down or in case food distribution networks across the country are somehow impaired by



some kind of event. You allow people enough information to apply it to their particular circumstances and reach their own judgment, then you're doing your job. My sense is that the web site and the phone book campaign and so forth will provide a more detailed and sober set of recommendations and discussions of the homeland security issue.

Again, it's a little bit late given where we are in the Iraq issue and the Iraq imminence of the campaign because this almost certainly will provoke more additional attacks and we should have been anticipating this since we've been on a march to war now for a half year. But at least the Administration seems to be making up for a little bit of lost time now with the passage of the appropriations bill, with a relatively good 2004 budget proposal that I won't discuss in detail just now, but again, that corrects some of the shortcomings of the 2003 proposal, even if some still remain. Then finally with this advertisement and information campaign, I think we're starting to make up for lost time.

**MR. STEINBERG:** Let me just add a few thoughts on that score.

I think it's become pretty clear that as we think about strategy for dealing with terrorism that we're dealing with a problem that we have to deal with over the long haul. There may be spikes with particular bits of intelligence that we gather, there may be circumstances like the conflict with Iraq that increase the general likelihood, but the fact is that this is a problem that we are likely to have to endure for years, decades perhaps. That the history of terrorist movements are such that they ebb and flow but that they don't come and go overnight and they're not sort of outright defeated on the military battlefield.

So how does the society begin to cope with this? I think what we are now finally beginning to realize is that there are other examples that we can look to in other societies and our own society about things that do work and don't work.

Fiona's talked about Britain. It is a country that lived with terrorism and fairly pervasive terrorism. It was not massive in the number of casualties outside of Northern Ireland itself, but nonetheless it was directed at civilians in many cases and people had to learn about how you adjust your day to day and also how government had to adjust its own procedures. And we have a lot to learn there.

The other thing we've seen in the last two weeks is how much this whole debate about how citizens should respond, looks like the whole question about responding to earthquakes in California, as somebody who lived out there for a few years. People understood this as a chronic risk in their lives. They decided to make it a part of their lives. There were things citizens did in order to prepare themselves. They had advice from government about things that were sensible to do. But we also had government structures and government activities designed to deal with it so we had fire codes and the like and building codes in California that were specifically designed to deal with the problem of earthquakes. We had emergency response systems that were specifically trained to deal with them. I think that kind of sober look back at how we prepare ourselves for the long term, rather than this kind of hit or miss type response that we've seen too often over the last 18 months is really what's needed. It's a recognition that there are some things that we need to do urgently, but what we really need to do is

prepare over the long term for something that may not happen today, tomorrow, but most experts I think, and I'd ask for Dan's view on this well, think inevitably will happen. There will be another terrorist attack in the United States.

So under those circumstances what do you do as a society? What do you expect your citizens to do and what is a prudent level of care? And how do you go from what I think has been a fairly sober approach to the problem of earthquake protection in California to not repeat some of the panicked experience of the early 1960s on the nuclear threat where foolish exercises like duck and cover, and massive air raid shelter building and home shelters got built. I think there's a lot to be learned there.

I think the second thing that we see is that the government and the Administration are still groping very hard with the question about how much they should see this challenge of being one of a fundamentally different kind of problem than we've faced in the past. We've seen in the last week the latest new proposal from the Administration on the intelligence side, the creation of this new terrorist threat integration center, which is kind of a curious development because we had thought that throughout the debate on the Department of Homeland Security that the Congress and the Executive Branch had come to rest on a strategy for dealing with terrorist threat integration and analysis through a new part of the Department of Homeland Security, the information analysis and infrastructure protection division, under an under secretary there, that was largely supposed to be the place in which all this terrorist threat information came together, got analyzed and then shared with the key actors who needed it.

Just one week after the department came into existence the Administration announced a new initiative to create this terrorist threat integration center not in the Department of Homeland Security but rather under the Director of Central Intelligence, and basically on a model of shared analysts from a number of agencies, largely the FBI and the CIA.

If you go back and look at what's been said about this, it's very difficult to see how this new center differs at all from the former counterterrorism center which reported to the Director of Central Intelligence which consisted of analysts from multiple agencies, and why this is somehow a significant step forward. There clearly have got to be more resources attributed to it, but it has a lot of the feel of bureaucratic business as usual rather than a recognition that we need to think fresh about this problem and the challenge that it represents.

On that note let's turn to your questions. Anything is fair game, but I hope we can focus a little bit on the terrorism issue because we have a good panel here that can talk about it.

**QUESTION:** Miles Bentson, with Newhouse Newspapers.

If we go in to Iraq, what happens to the Iraqi government infrastructure that's there now? Do those people all get swept out, become hunted men? Or you mentioned clemency. Do we see a repeat of what we saw at the end of World War II where a lot of Nazis went to work for us? Do we hire these people? Do we pay them to tell us where the warheads are, where the chemical weapons are stored,

etc.?

**MR. BYMAN:** There are different answers to that depending on what the question is. Would I pay to find out the location of a biological weapons facility? Certainly. I think that buying someone off is a cheap price.

Do you give these people jobs in running the future Iraq? There to me the answer is clearly no. Now how much of a purge you want depends on how high a level official it is.

People talk about, of course, those implicated in war crimes would not be part of the new government and that to me is [obvious]. We can move on beyond that level I hope in our discussion, but there are a couple of questions beyond that, one of which is do you want people who have learned under the old regime running the new regime? These are for example, you have judges for whom the idea of the rule of law is a joke because the ruling is determined either by a bribe or by a call from the Ba'th party headquarters. So you don't want a legal system even though the individual judge may not be implicated in a war crime, that person has no idea what the rule of law is.

You could ask me would I rather have the first thousand people in the Baghdad phone book or the current government and the answer is I'd rather have the first thousand people in the phone book, even if it's random. In most cases of development, aid officials I talk to tell me again and again that you want new people who have new ideas who are open to new ways, rather than keeping the old people in, despite their supposed expertise, because you're just going to perpetuate the system and many of the bureaucratic habits as a result.



**MR. STEINBERG:** I do think it's a challenging question because there is going to be a tremendous need for people just to simply run the basics of making a society work. Public health, sanitation, utilities, all of that. And you have a society which the Ba'th party has fundamentally gotten control of all of these parts. It's not just a few political leaders, it is the whole infrastructure of the public administration there.

So even if we were prepared to devote the resources and the manpower to try to take these over ourselves, it's just simply going to be impossible to generate the numbers and kinds of people. We've seen in other post-conflict situations that in some ways the easiest thing to do is to get the soldiers in to maintain basic physical security. You can get 100,000 troops in. You can't find policemen, administrators, sanitation, doctors who can come in. So we saw in Kosovo and in Afghanistan and in Bosnia that the single hardest part was getting the civilian and the quasi-para military type capabilities there. So there are going to have to be tradeoffs. It's simply not going to be something that the international community can on day one substitute.

My guess is that you'll see a rolling process in which there's an attempt to decapitate the top layer, people who are known to be political leadership in the Ba'th, and then to try to do it in a more systematic and individualized way as you get down to the middle levels so that you can both continue

the functions and also not create such a kind of a backlash that is an overdone version of it. But those judgments are going to be hard to be made, they're going to be made in the chaos of war and the post-war, and even in a relatively stable situation of post-liberation Central and Eastern Europe, we saw how in the Czech Republic and other cases these issues dragged on and on for over a decade.

**QUESTION:** My name is [inaudible]. Just to follow up on Daniel's thing.

The Ba'th party, the membership is like a million and a half in Iraq. A lot of people joined up to go to college or to get a job or something. What would you propose to do?

And I have a question to Fiona on the future of the Blair government.

And for Mr. O'Hanlon, I know there were a couple of things you mentioned on American casualties, that it could be as few as 100 or as high as 5,000. Have there been any studies done on the number of Iraqi casualties?

**MR. BYMAN:** I'll briefly answer the Ba'th party question. Estimates, 1.5 million, two million, 2.1 million. Clearly all these people are not going to be jailed, and the vast majority of these people are not criminal. They simply got the party membership as a ticket to punch to going on to do other things.

The key is are they part of the governing system? You can take of that 1.5 million if you'd like to use that figure, 1.3 million or so of those are not. So it's almost irrelevant. If someone's a student who's a Ba'th party member, life goes on. You move on beyond it. But you focus on individuals who are part of the system. You determine their culpability in a crime, you determine their skill set, and also if you can you determine their mindset to see if they're suitable for continuing their tasks when you have alternatives when not under the system.

**MS. HILL:** Quickly on the Blair government, speculation is always a difficult thing, but we have to remember that Blair has staked a great deal of his own personal prestige within his party on this relationship, this very close relationship with the United States. I think it's fairly certain that without the influence of Britain and Blair it was unlikely that people within the U.S. Administration would have prevailed in getting the Administration to embrace the UN process. That was a major part of Blair's approach to Bush. If that fails that will also undermine Blair internally.

The pressures that I mentioned in my opening presentation are really piling up on Blair right now. Recent polls suggest that his popularity now is lower than it's ever been. He never has been the single most important leaders within the Labor Party. Everyone makes a great deal of play on the relationship between him and the Chancellor, Gordon Brown. Brown has aspirations to be Prime Minister. There's been discussion that at some point Blair might step aside and let Brown assume the Prime Ministership. And of course we have a past precedent of a sitting Prime Minister finding the chair pulled from underneath her in the case of Margaret Thatcher, who became increasingly unpopular at home even as her star rose internationally.

I think Blair's at some considerable risk right now. There's a lot riding for him on what happens next.

If they succeed with a new UN resolution and if the tide of support shifts in the direction of the U.S. and of Britain, then I think Blair is going to be in a more comfortable position, but as I said, if there's some devastating event at home which collides with all of the domestic problems and puts Iraq and this other issue in stark relief then we may well see a rebellion, a very significant rebellion from within Blair's own party. I would just say watch this space.

**MR. O'HANLON:** On casualties, in my analysis I estimated there could be let's say on the order of ten times as many Iraqi civilian deaths as American military deaths in very broad terms, maybe even 20 times as many. Probably more Iraqi civilian losses than Iraqi military losses. And of course Saddam has an incentive to magnify those losses to the extent that he's indifferent to the suffering of his own people, but delighted to have Arab populations around the world rising up in anger against the United States for the way in which this war is inflicting pain on innocent Iraqis.

Therefore I would say that if American losses are X, Iraqi civilian losses would be 10 or 20 times as high. That could be 10,000, 20,000 deaths immediately, from combat alone, and then of course you have to say in warfare any time there are 10,000 deaths there are typically 50,000 injuries and in a system, in a country where the healthcare infrastructure and the nutritional infrastructure has largely broken down, you have to assume a lot of those people are at risk of succumbing to their injuries unless quickly treated.

So you have the potential, and this is where some of the UN numbers have come up into the low hundreds of thousands range even, you have the potential for many tens of thousands dying and hundreds of thousands being adversely affected in a very direct way. But I think again, the onus is on the U.S. military to get in quickly with humanitarian relief and with medical care for the Iraqi population. If that happens I think we have a good chance of holding combat fatalities down into the thousands or low tens of thousands among the Iraqi civilian population. Still a very high price, but of course that has to be compared to the price of living under sanctions and living under Saddam. So the Iraqis will suffer in the short term, but I think over the longer term if we can get in and relieve the suffering, even that high of a death toll would not be higher than what they're likely to suffer in peace time.

**MR. STEINBERG:** I'd follow up with a slightly provocative question which is there's been a lot of talk about the connection of this war and perhaps future wars about other instruments of waging war to try to deal with the problem of civilian casualties. A lot of speculation that this war will feature the debut of the so-called e-bomb, for example, and a lot of debate about whether we should have low yield nuclear weapons to be able to destroy sites, perhaps radiation weapons that don't have casualties, a repeat of the neutron bomb.

Your own judgment, how much difference would that make both in terms of the casualties and the overall military mission?

**MR. O'HANLON:** In terms first of what we have now, e-bombs and unmanned aerial vehicles and other kinds of technologies that have come on since Desert Storm, I don't expect these things to radically change the basic nature of combat because what you're thinking about is a company of Iraqi soldiers interspersed with civilians in a city in the basement of an apartment building or what have you. That's the sort of environment in which they're going to operate, and their mortars and their hand grenades and their rifles probably can work even after being subjected to an e-bomb.

So I think e-bombs are the way you bring down an air defense network, but we already have multiple modes of bringing down. Even infrared guided missiles may not be vulnerable to e-bombs. So I don't expect that sort of thing to be all that helpful to us. It's certainly going to be helpful now and again as a niche capability but not a radical improvement.

In terms of other kinds of technologies like unmanned aerial vehicles and Predator drones and so forth, some benefit but again you can't see inside of buildings with these sorts of assets and you have to know generally what you're looking for and where to look before they can be of much help.

Going finally to the nuclear issue, and there's been more extensive analysis done of this question by people like Mike Levy and the Federation of American scientists and a Princeton physicist as well, basically it's very hard to build a nuclear bomb that's so small that it doesn't create fallout, that it's going to detonate high enough, or near enough to the surface that even if it's small it will produce a plume and a cloud that releases radioactivity into the air.

So generally speaking even if you had this operation it wouldn't be a good way to destroy sites unless they were removed from population centers. And under those circumstances you could argue there could be a narrow military utility to it. There might be alternatives of course to that kind of a nuclear weapon being used, but there could be a narrow military utility at least in that kind of a circumstance. Whether it's worth the broader political cost of developing the weapons is another matter.

**QUESTION:** Priscilla Huff with Channel News Asia.

A couple of you hinted at your opinions on this, but is war inevitable? Or is there something that could happen that could throw things off the track? Or are we just planning ahead now because it's going to happen and it's time to think of a post-Saddam Iraq.

**MR. GORDON:** I don't think it's 100 percent inevitable because there are so many unpredictable variables that could pop up. I think it's likely given the most reasonable assumptions to make about what happens over the next couple of weeks, but it also depends on your definition of war. What if we do line up and get towards a deadline where there is an ultimatum and it's clear the U.S. is going to go, and at that point there's a coup in Baghdad, the military moves on Saddam, or he starts producing all of the weapons of mass destruction. Unpredictable things that cannot be excluded. I mean Saddam has made a profession of being unpredictable and no one has seen the effects of 200,000 American troops on Iraq's borders poised to move in.

So would you count that as war if there was a coup in Baghdad and then U.S. forces went in anyway, partly with the agreement of the new government? To me that would avoid the war.

I think it's an even longer shot to imagine situations where Iraq, when Saddam finally sees the writing on the wall, says all right, you've got me. Here's all the stuff. I think it's probably too late for that. I mean I think there the U.S. military response would be thank you very much, we appreciate that, now turn yourself in to the U.S. military representative and when we take you away then we'll go into the country. But I don't think there's any chance that the U.S. would say all right, thanks for the WMD, we're not going to war.

And you notice I have excluded the possibility by which the Americans just say all right, we get the point, there's a lot of international opposition, the French are against it, we didn't really persuade the world, so let's just not do it. I pretty much exclude that political development but some of these other unpredictables I think are still wild cards out there.

**MR. STEINBERG:** I think on the last point, it's just unimaginable to me that having deployed now moving up towards 150,000 U.S. troops to the region that it is possible for the Administration to bring them home without being able to credibly say that there's been a victory. How high or how low that bar needs to be I think is subject to some debate but it has to be something fairly convincing. And I don't say this merely as a political matter although there are obviously political overtones. But I think the cost to the United States internationally would be so high from essentially being stared down by Saddam Hussein, not only specifically in Iraq where one would wonder what would happen to containment after this but more broadly in terms of the credibility of the United States in dealing with other challenges.

It's the flip side, I think, of the Administration's view that if they do this that other countries will see the United States has the will and the capability to confront these challenges and therefore will be much more cautious in challenging the United States. The flip side unfortunately also is true, having staked American credibility here to not follow through I think would have very serious consequences. It's an argument that Henry Kissinger has been making and I think unfortunately it's right. It doesn't justify a decision to do it. You can't just bootstrap the rightness of the cause by saying credibility is at stake, but you can also not avoid the fact that credibility is at stake here.

I might also add that as many of you know from our past sessions, we've been privileged to have Amatzia Baram here as a Visiting Fellow. He's away for a few weeks, but we will shortly have up on our web site an analysis that he's done about how Saddam will think about these choices, how far he will be prepared to go in giving up and making tactical concessions. I think his judgment on this which you'll be able to see in more detail is that he will make a fair number of tactical concessions, but not to the point of giving up at least the kind of the basic infrastructure that would allow him to reconstitute. That is the scientific know-how and some of the basic capabilities so that he might even be prepared to give up some stocks of weapons, but only in a situation where he would have confidence that within a fairly short order he would be able to restore his WMD capability.

**QUESTION:** Clint Fenning, concerned citizen.

I just have a couple of questions regarding the Administration as far as they continually say it's not about oil, and is that naive to think that it's not geopolitically? And two is, is the Administration saying that it's worth it to have a couple of terrorist attacks at home in the event of a war or the aftermath of a war? That's all.

**MR. GORDON:** I don't think it's about oil. One of the interesting things about this is that most Europeans think the Americans are going to war for oil, and I think they're wrong; and most Americans think the French in particular are against war for their oil reasons, and I think they're wrong.

First of all you have to define the argument of what precisely is the allegation that it's about oil? If it's somehow that what the U.S. intends to do is to seize Iraq's oil and take it and use it, send it back to the U.S. or sell it, I just think that's wholly implausible that the United States is going to do that.

So then what is it? To have lower oil prices and get Iraq to produce more? That doesn't really hold up either. I mean Iraq actually is putting a lot of oil on the international market already. Most estimates are that it's going to cost \$30 to \$40 billion over the next ten years to get the oil industry back into shape. And if you do the numbers, the idea that somehow we're spending possibly hundreds of billions of dollars on the war after we get done with the negotiation with Turkey, that you're going to spend thousands of casualties of your own, you're going to kill a lot of people and you're going to spend \$50, \$100, \$150, \$200 billion in order that in ten years the oil price might be slightly less? I just find that difficult to believe. It doesn't hold up. The problem with the oil argument to me on the American side is it assumes there's no other plausible reason to go to war. That somehow they just decided let's go get these Iraqis and you have to scratch your head and figure out why might they want to do this?

You've got the weapons of mass destruction argument, you've got the human rights argument, the dictatorship in Iraq, you've got the fact that so long as Saddam is there you need to have sanctions on Iraq so therefore a humanitarian argument. So long as a Saddam is there you need to have troops in Saudi Arabia which provokes the Saudis or terrorists in Saudi Arabia. There are all sorts of other reasons that I find perfectly plausible to explain why the United States has found this sufficiently threatening enough to go to war, that it seems to me you don't have to invent an oil argument that doesn't hold up.

I think the same is true of the French, about whether it's their oil interests that are pushing them, but I won't go into that here.

I did want to say one word about your second point --

**QUESTION:** [inaudible]

**MR. GORDON:** Oh, the terrorism. Just one sentence on that and Dan will want to comment on that perhaps. But I think the Bush Administration's argument on that would be we have terrorism now. When you say that this will lead to terrorism, you do have to acknowledge that we're living with



terrorism. We just experienced a massive terrorist attack and their argument, and I think Dan gave good reasons to think twice about whether on balance we'll produce more or less terrorism, but you asked what the Bush Administration is thinking, and I think the response is we're faced with terrorism. It's out there now. The current geopolitical situation in the Middle East has produced terrorism. We're living with it. And therefore doing nothing is not really a response.

**MR. BYMAN:** I think Phil summed it up very neatly. I would simply add with Iraq in particular I think the Administration sees a window which is Iraq is in their eyes increasingly dangerous, about to acquire nuclear capability, and that about could be judged in six months or ten years, but could happen I think would be their view. And given that the world is a dangerous place where terrorist attacks are likely, why mingle these two?

You can criticize their reasoning all you want but I think it's a genuine belief. I don't think it's incredibly cynical, in fact quite the opposite. It may be criticized for being too ideological. And I also think their view on terrorism more broadly is it's coming, it's in some ways a surprise that we haven't had a major attack since September 11th. Many people, myself included, were asked on September 12th, will there be a major attack on the U.S. homeland again soon? Most people, myself included, said yes. It's been 18 months.

At a certain point you start to say okay, things are going better than expected. If there is another major attack there may be a longer breathing space than we anticipated initially.

Now you can argue things like if Richard Reed had been a little less stupid or the passengers a little less alert, we'd be talking very differently right now. But even so, I think their view is terrorism is a continuing phenomenon as Jim said, and the risk is not going to greatly change because of what goes on in Iraq.

**MR. STEINBERG:** I think one thing though that is genuinely troubling, even for those of us who have some sympathy for what the Administration is trying to do is this question about if the greatest danger is the nexus between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, does an attack on Iraq make it more or less likely that terrorists get weapons of mass destruction? They're arguing that we've got to deal with Iraq because if we don't over time one, they will get even worse, that is Iraq will get worse weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, and two, there will be a greater likelihood that they'd pass it on.

But for the reason of the scenarios that we talked about earlier, it's very easy to conjure some scenarios, either deliberate decision by Saddam for revenge to give it to the terrorists which up to now he has not done; and/or even if he doesn't do it, that simply because of the chaos of the situation that this becomes a free for all in which you have loose, not nukes but loose bio and loose chem that's on the market and available for people. And in some ways Saddam's control freak nature may have been keeping a bit of a genie in a box that will then get out.

So while I do fear that the overall level of terrorism is probably not going to be dramatically effective in the long run, that this could potentially accelerate the transfer of bio and chem to terrorists, in

particular the al Qaeda.

**MR. GORDON:** That's why I think the Administration has been so desperate to prove, in my view unsuccessfully, that the link already exists. In the future if terrorists use weapons of mass destruction that we later learn came originally from Iraq, they will be desperate to say well that link already exists and it would have happened anyway, lest they be blamed, as I'm certain they will be, for having produced the link in the first place.

**QUESTION:** Ken Mechek, also a concerned citizen.

I'm interested in getting your thoughts on the root causes of terrorism. Assuming we all don't want to live like Israelis for the next 100 years.

**MR. BYMAN:** A good question.

The first answer, there isn't a root cause. Different terrorists around the world have different motivations.

One cause that it seemingly is not is economic. It's usually not a question of poverty. In fact the poorest areas in the world tend to produce relatively few terrorists.

So let's focus on al Qaeda or a group like al Qaeda which is what we're talking about for much of today. Part of it seems to be a genuine sense of that the United States is an oppressive and hegemonic power. I mean imagine what, if I can caricature it, what the French have been saying more gently, take that to about the 100th power, that it's not going to be that the United States throws its weight around with its allies or is kind of an uncaring giant, it's that the United States is an aggressive bully that deliberately seeks to subjugate much of the Muslim world.

With that broad framework you have very specific reasons. For example, proof of that is U.S. support for Israel. Proof of that is U.S. occupation of the Arabian peninsula. Proof of that is sanctions against Iraq where Iraqi children die.

So there are a large number of specific reasons, but if you tie it to a broader sense of the United States as an oppressive power.

The problem is, much of this oppression comes from simply being a global power. There isn't much answer for the United States to, except for really trying to reduce its cultural influence. The comparison I'd like to make is Japan. Japan is the world's second largest economy, but there isn't a major anti-Japanese sentiment throughout the world that inspires terrorists. I think it's because Japanese culture hasn't permeated world culture to the same degree. There isn't a sense everywhere you go that Japanese products in the symbolic sense are dominating everything. They might be there in terms of exports just as much as American products but it's not the same sort of sense of cultural occupation, if you will. And so this is a rather nebulous answer to your question but I think the motivations are rather

nebulous at times.

**QUESTION:** Marvin Jim of Global Report.

This follows onto an earlier answer. Supposing we had done nothing. What is the presumption that Iraq would have done with its biological and chemical weapons and its ability to develop nuclear weapons, would they have attacked us directly, or as you say have loose nukes? What do we think they would have done?

**MR. GORDON:** My general impression is there is no sense that if Saddam had developed a nuclear weapon, had there been no Gulf War, Iraq developed a nuclear weapon and developed a very potent biological arsenal, that it would have immediately sent a bunch of ships to Washington and done terrorist attacks or somehow attacked America.

What people I talk to are most concerned about is that Iraq would throw its weight around in the region. It would do something such as attack Kuwait again or attack a neighboring state and then deter the United States. Say if the United States attacks and tries to reverse such an occupation, we will use nuclear weapons perhaps against Israel, perhaps against Saudi Arabia, perhaps against a European state, and that it's a sense they would allow Saddam to become a major regional power, one that is hostile to the United States, but not directly attack the United States, more as a deterrent against the United States.

**MS. HILL:** Can I just add something to that? That ties back directly to your question about oil. Oil was a significant dimension where Iraq was concerned precisely because unfettered access to oil revenues on the part of Saddam Hussein would have given him an opportunity to build up an arsenal. That was one of the major motivating factors for sanctioning Iraq and the development of its oil industry, for imposing limits on the amount of oil that Iraq could export and what it could use its revenues for. It has been a hallmark of U.S. strategy in the Middle East for the best part of the last 50 years, certainly since World War II, in preventing hostile powers -- first of all, of course, that was the Soviet Union-- from securing access to oilfields, and therefore the related revenues to build up a military arsenal that could be used against the United States. That's one of the problems in disentangling this issue from oil. Oil obviously made Saddam Hussein more powerful and if he had of course secured access also to Kuwait oilfields we'd probably be in a lot more difficulty than we are today.

**MR. STEINBERG:** I would just put it even more starkly. I agree with both points, but I think that if you recall after the attack on Kuwait there was a lot of uncertainty about what Saddam's intention was vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. And even if he were not to attack, whether he was going to insist on further control there.

Similarly vis-à-vis his broader objectives in the region, there's a lot of reason to be concerned that, vis-à-vis Israel for example, that one of his strategies would be to basically provide a support for rejection of states to take a more aggressive stance vis-à-vis Israel, knowing that they were backed up with an Iraqi nuclear weapon. It gave them a lot more freedom to be able to deter the Israelis or to put

the Israelis on a more level playing field in the event of another conflict there.

It also means for the other Arab states, would it be a tolerable situation to live in a universe in which Saddam had the bomb but they didn't? And because many of the other countries in the region have fairly significant technological infrastructure, how difficult would it have been ultimately for the Saudis or the Egyptians to develop their own nuclear weapon. So you'd see massive proliferation in the region with tremendous consequences as we've seen just from the risks that we see in South Asia.

So the destabilizing consequences of Saddam getting nuclear weapons I think are very high even if, as Dan says correctly, I don't think there was any risk that he was going to in an unprovoked way simply try to blow up New York City. Because he is a survivor and I think that would not have been likely to be part of his overall motivation. But there are huge costs, and in a region where the risks and balances are very fragile.

**QUESTION:** Caspin Ervil, [inaudible], Denmark.

I have a question on the issue of homeland security and how it relates to alliance building. The question goes whether there's a need in the view of the panel for more cooperation and maybe aid on behalf of the U.S. government for not only on the offense but also the defensive part of a fight against terrorism, that being homeland security, especially in light of Fiona's point that it could influence the current situation and support for war in Iraq, but maybe also more generally in the fight against terrorism.

**MR. O'HANLON:** I'll start by citing a New York Times OpEd today where the authors point out that we have not yet seen other countries around the world take the kind of airport security measures in general that we have and you have to ask how secure is the Western Alliance system where we're all sworn to defend each other's security if that's the situation? We could be vulnerable to an attack from an airplane that was hijacked somewhere else, or our allies could be vulnerable.

And to the extent this remains a concern, and Phil's been sort of hinting at it and talking about it especially last week about the French motivation here, if the French really are attacked as a result of a war or even partially as a result of a war that we initiate as a matter of choice against Iraq. It's going to test the Western Alliance system in a much more serious way than the worst words between Rumsfeld and Chirac have so far. So I think that your concern is, and you would be better placed to answer that than I would in many ways, but I would think your concern is right on, and one big priority for the homeland security effort in the coming months has to be to internationalize this. We have internationalized the law enforcement and intelligence sharing piece to some extent, but most of the rest of the effort has not yet really gotten up to speed here, much less in other countries.

**MR. STEINBERG:** No doubt you know, there's a history in NATO of civil emergency planning as being part of the portfolio in NATO. It seems to me, and we've been trying to push this agenda since as far back as the Washington Summit, that there ought to be and there are capabilities that ought to be shared within, among the allies to deal with this and to have a shared sense. For the

same reason that there was a lot of pressure to expand the concept of missile defense to a broader alliance concept. The same considerations exist here.

I know in Europe there's a lot of kind of national sovereignty set of issues which particularly the French are concerned about, about seeing these as matters of domestic police and response, but I think it's very short-sighted.

There's also obviously opportunity for Europeans to cooperate within the framework of the EU. But a lot of the capabilities, particularly in dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical attacks which exist in our militaries, could be put to the service of dealing with civilian attacks as well. So I for one believe very strongly this is an area that NATO ought to explore more seriously and to see this as part of the common defense mission.

**MS. HILL:** If I can make one point. I think Jim had an extremely good analogy when he was referring to his experience in California of earthquake response. We've seen in major earthquakes around the world that there's been a rapid response and a rapid mobilization of civilian emergency teams that have flown out to affected areas, and we can perhaps use that as a model on an international scale. I know that NATO and many of the quasi-military alliances already have that approach within their existing mechanisms. We saw that in the instance of the major recent earthquake in Turkey, for example. So I think that would be a viable model for discussion in the future, and the sooner we start to look at these issues the better.

Certainly municipal planners should consider this for some of these uniquely vulnerable cities like London. In fact, Paris is in a very similar situation--it's another mega-city with a large portion of the country's population within it, I think Paris and London should be specifically targeted by us, not just by terrorists, in thinking ahead.

**MR. STEINBERG:** So the answer is Montana and Northern Scotland. Right? (Laughter)

Thank you all for coming and we'll see you all next week.

Next week we'll be on Wednesday.

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